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FOREWORD
The digital revolution1
Michael  Wesch,  then an  assistant  professor  of  cultural
anthropology  at  Kansas State University,  is  well-known
for  his  inspiring  YouTube  lectures  and  documentary
shorts. In 2009 he received over a hundred applications
for  his  graduate  course  in  ‘digital  ethnography’  from
around  the  world.  The  only  problem:  no  such  course
existed.  Wesch  teaches  undergraduates  and  had
organized  a  ‘digital  ethnography  working  group’  for
them; and that was it, so far. But millions have seen his
creations on YouTube and people want more of it.  The
world is changing all around us and anthropology must
try to keep up, not just because we study this world as
anthropologists, but because our students live in it and
they are rapidly leaving their teachers behind. 
The new communications technologies are blurring the
boundaries  of  disciplines,  transforming  the  content  of
education,  spawning new genres and sites of research,
demanding  fresh  intellectual  strategies.  And  academic
institutions act as a brake on our ability to engage with
all this. Anthropology as a discipline has not yet grasped
the potential of this new world. When we contemplate its
future, we need to think again about its scope, reach and
impact, about the audiences we wish to address and how.
We  are  living  through  the  first  stages  of  a  world
revolution as significant for humanity as the invention of
agriculture.  It  is  a  machine  revolution,  of  course:  the
convergence of telephones, television and computers in a
digital system whose most visible symbol is the internet.
It is a social revolution, the formation of a world society
with  means  of  communication  adequate  at  last  to
expressing universal ideas. It is a financial revolution, the
detachment of the virtual money circuit from production,
linked  to  the  West’s  loss  of  control  over  the  world
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economy.  It  is  an  existential  revolution,  transforming
what it means to be human and how each of us relates to
the rest of humanity. It is therefore also a revolution in
anthropology that will make everything we have done so
far seem like the prehistory of our discipline, whatever
its name becomes. 
Oswald Spengler observed in The Decline of the West
(1918)  that  the  world  historical  moment  you  are  born
into does not need you; it will carry on with or without
you. But he offered a challenge to his readers “Do you
have  the  courage  to  embrace  it?”  So  too  with  this
revolution: you can engage with it or you can hide from
it.  And every person’s  trajectory is  particular  to  them,
even if  some common outlines can be glimpsed as the
revolution  unfolds.  The  revolution  is  based  on  social
networking:  Google,  Facebook,  Flickr,  Twitter,
Stumbleupon, Academia.edu, Instagram and all the rest.
Social bookmarking is especially important. Classification
of  knowledge  was  hitherto  done  by  experts  and every
piece  of  information  had  its  unique  place  in  a  folder
somewhere. Now tagging makes it possible for anyone to
leave a mark on something they like or consider useful
and  you  can  find  their  guidance  with  increasingly
sophisticated software.  The people  are now generating
the  categories.  Even  Google  is  becoming  obsolete
because its millions of hits are impersonal, less attuned
to the user’s own profile. 
Participation in all this has sharpened my appreciation
of  the  sociology  involved.  Twitter  divides  people  into
followers and followed.  For  those of  us brought  up on
Fascism and Stalinism, the talk of leaders and followers
that  animates Web 2.0 is  something  of  a  turn off.  But
when  the  Latins  invented  ‘society’  to  describe  their
aspirations for collective order, the word they used had
as its root ‘to follow’. If anyone was attacked, the others
agreed  to  support  them  in  battle.  The  hierarchy  was
temporary;  so too on Twitter.  The idea of  society  as a
state with fixed boundaries came much later.  The new
social  networks  are  personal  and  unequal;  they  often
have a commercial feel that puts off many intellectuals.
iv
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But there is something exciting going on that it  would
pay us to understand and use. 
In May 2009, an unanticipated chain of events led to
the launch of the Open Anthropology Cooperative. Some
Twitter friends began discussing the possibilities for an
online anthropology network. Someone suggested trying
Ning  and  I  jumped  in.  An  administrative  team  drawn
from the launching group supervised its explosive growth
in the first few months. In less than a year we had 2,000
members from an amazing diversity of backgrounds. Our
visitors  settled  down at around 500 a day;  the largest
group came from the US, Britain and Canada (in a ratio
of 4:2:1), but the next batch made interesting reading, in
order: France, Portugal, Germany, Brazil, Georgia,  Italy,
Greece,  Australia,  Switzerland,  India,  Netherlands,
Sweden, Turkey, Norway, Mexico, Spain, New Zealand. 
We  soon  set  up  over  a  hundred  discussion  groups
(some of them in Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian,
Russian,  Norwegian,  Turkish  and  Georgian),  blogs,  a
forum, a wiki repository, the OAC Press, a seminar series
and  personal  pages  in  all  their  multimedia  variety.
Anyone can start anything on the OAC; some of them do,
many  more  stay  quiet.  The  administrators  got  some
minimal rules generally accepted. In time, however, the
Ning  platform  became  less  heterogeneous  (despite
having over 8,000 members today); the active users now
come mainly from the US and Britain; linguistic diversity
has vanished, participation rates are lower. This pattern
is not unusual in web networks. We later started an OAC
page on Facebook which is livelier, with 12,000 members
who  keep  up  a  daily  flow  of  announcements,  links  to
pages elsewhere, short posts and personal updates.
We already know that fieldwork will never be the same
again  because  of  the  digital  revolution.  It  will  be  less
lonely for one thing. But what can anthropologists, with
our  supposed  expertise  in  social  relations,  do  more
generally  to  help  shape  the  future  of  our  institutions?
Our students, readers and those we study expect to be
engaged through these new media. For some this will be
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an  uphill  struggle.  We  must  move  from  monologue  to
conversation, from guild disciplines to the lifetime self-
learning that the internet affords. The universities now
lag behind the students in terms of media literacy. The
‘edupunk’  movement,  armed  with  user-friendly  digital
technologies, rejects the forced imposition of costly out-
dated  software  systems  that  universities  have  bought.
The  latter  face  a  threat  to  their  monopolies  when
teachers  extend  their  classrooms  to  non-university
students. Anthropology has always been something of an
anti-discipline,  sitting  uneasily  with  academic
bureaucracy. We have a lot to gain, professionally and as
human beings, from joining this revolution.
What  have  I  learned  from  all  this?  The  two  great
memory banks are language and money.2 Exchanges of
meanings through language and of goods through money
are  now  converging  in  a  single  network  of
communications, the internet. We must discover how to
use  this  digital  revolution  to  advance  the  human
conversation about a better world. Our common task is to
make  a  world  society  fit  for  all  humanity.  And
anthropology is indispensable to such a project. 
The digital revolution is driven by a desire to replicate
at a distance or by means of computers experiences that
we  normally  associate  with  face-to-face  human
encounters. All communication, whether the exchange of
words or money, has a virtual aspect in that symbols and
their media of circulation stand for what people really do
for  each  other.  It  usually  involves  the  exercise  of
imagination, an ability to construct meanings across the
gap between symbol and reality. The power of the book
depended  on  sustaining  that  leap  of  faith  in  the
possibility  of  human  communication.  The  virtual  is
abstract,  but  reliance  on  more  abstract  forms  of
communication  carries  with  it  the  potential  for  real
persons to be involved with each other at a distance in
concrete ways. The idea of ‘virtual reality’ expresses this
double  movement:  on  the  one  hand  machines  whose
complexity  their  users  cannot  possibly  understand,  on
the other live experiences ‘as good as’ real. 
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If  we  would  make  a  better  world,  rather  than  just
contemplate  it,  we  must  learn  to  think  in  terms  that
reflect  reality  and reach out  for  imagined possibilities.
This entails capturing what is essential about the world
we live in, its movement and direction, not just its stable
forms. The idea of  virtual reality expresses this form of
movement —  extension from the actual to the possible.
‘Virtual’  means  existing  in  the  mind,  but  not  in  fact.
When combined with ‘reality’, it means something that is
almost  but  not  quite  real.  In  technical  terms,  ‘virtual
reality’ is a computer simulation that enables the effects
of operations to be shown in real time. ‘Reality’ is present
in time and space (‘seeing is believing’); and its opposite
is imagined connection at a distance, something as old as
story-telling,  but  given  new  impetus  by  the  internet.
Already experience of near synchrony at a distance, the
compression of time and space, is altering our perception
of social relations, of place and movement.
How  might  offline  activities  influence  what  we  do
online and vice versa? I have been influenced by Martin
Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics:
World, Finitude, Solitude (1929). For Heidegger, ‘world’
as something whole is an abstract metaphysical category
and its dialectical counterpart is ‘solitude’, the idea of the
isolated individual. Every human subject makes a world
whose centre is  the self.  This  opens up only  when we
recognize ourselves as finite, as individual; and this leads
us to ‘finitude’, the concrete specifics of time and place in
which we live. So ‘world’ is relative both to an abstract
version  of  subjectivity  and,  more  important,  to  our
particularity in the world (seen as position and movement
in time and space).
Living alone in our own world seems more real when
we go online. But the two are imagined and reciprocal;
neither  is  a  suitable  object  of  inquiry.  We  experience
them  from  a  relative  location  in  society.  Thus  it  is
unsatisfactory to study the social forms of the internet
without  considering  what  people  bring  to  them  from
elsewhere. This off-line social life is an invisible presence
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when  people  are  online.  We  should  not  deny  some
autonomy  to  ‘virtual  reality’.  Would  we  dream  of
reducing literature to the circumstances of readers? And
this is Heidegger’s point. ‘World’ and ‘solitude’ may be
artificial abstractions, but they do affect how we behave
in ‘finitude’. The dialectical triad forms an interactive set.
Anthropology for the internet age 
Like the editors, I start from Immanuel Kant’s (1795)
argument that the basic right of all world citizens should
rest  on  universal  hospitality.  We  should  be  free  to  go
anywhere, since the world belongs to us all equally. We
are highly mobile today, but most human beings are more
restricted in their movement than ever. Kant’s confidence
in  an  emergent  world  order,  when  launching
‘anthropology’ as a modern academic discipline, was the
high  point  of  the  liberal  revolution,  before  it  was
overwhelmed by its twin offspring, industrial capitalism
and the nation-state. 
The world is much more socially integrated now than
two centuries ago and its economy is palpably unjust. We
have barely survived three world wars (two hot, one cold)
and brutality  provokes  fear  everywhere.  Moreover,  the
natural  consequences  of  human  actions  are  severely
disruptive,  if  left unchecked.  Kant (1784) held that “In
man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural
faculties which aim at the use of  reason shall  be fully
developed in the species, not in the individual.” He meant
through libraries or the means of communication that we
have  today.  The  anthropologist,  Roy  Rappaport  (1999)
recently wrote that “Humanity is that part of the world
through  which  the  world  as  a  whole  can  think  about
itself”. Or, in C.L.R. James’ (1938) words, “The distinctive
feature of our age is that mankind as a whole is on the
way to becoming fully conscious of itself”.  The task of
building  a  global  civil  society  for  the  21st  century  is
urgent and anthropological visions must play their part in
this.
Copernicus solved the problem of the movement of the
viii
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heavenly  bodies  by  having the  spectator  revolve  while
they were at  rest,  instead of  them revolve  around the
spectator.  Kant  extended  this  achievement  into
metaphysics. In  The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) he
wrote,  “Hitherto  it  has  been  assumed  that  all  our
knowledge  must  conform  to  objects…(but  what)  if  we
suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge?” In
order  to  understand the world,  we begin  not  with  the
empirical  existence  of  objects,  but  with  the  reasoning
embedded  in  that  experience  as  all  the  judgments  we
have made. The world is inside each of us as much as out
there. We must bring the two poles together as subjective
individuals who share the object world with the rest of
humanity.
The cheapening of information transfers thanks to the
digital  revolution  makes  it  possible  for  much  more
information  about  individuals  to  enter  into  commercial
transactions  at  a  distance.  This  trend  to  customize
economic relations has its counterpart in many aspects of
contemporary  social  life.  It  involves  a new idea  of  the
person, one based on digital abstractions as much as on
new  forms  of  individuality.  Academics’  dealings  with
Amazon are at once remote and personal. 
The use of new technologies means that learning can
now be more individualized and ecumenical at the same
time;  and  this  poses  a  threat  to  the  academic  guild’s
traditions. Teachers must live with this radical revision of
subject-object relations. Learning anthropology would be
impossible if we were not human beings in the first place.
Anthropologists must also cope with mass mobility and
media.  What  can  we  offer  that  is  not  delivered  more
effectively  through  novels  and  movies,  journalism  and
tourism?  The  rhetoric  and  reality  of  markets  today
encourage individuals to choose the means of their own
enlightenment. Anthropological teaching must reflect all
this; any new paradigm for the discipline must reflect the
social and technological implications of the internet age.
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The Open Anthropology Cooperative: between social
movement and the academy
Ever  since  the  internet  went  public  and  the  World
Wide  Web  was  invented,  I  have  made  online  self-
publishing and interaction the core of my anthropological
practice.  The  OAC  promised  to  be  the  most  powerful
vehicle  for  this  project  yet.  The  predominance  of
academics  there  is  reflected  in  this  collection.  The
chapters  show  that  anthropologists  are  often
idiosyncratic individuals with an extraordinary range of
interests.  But  as  a  collective  we  are  extremely
conservative.  It  is  unsurprising  then  that  publishing
papers for  discussion  in  seminars was the OAC’s  most
prominent achievement. Our network has not moved with
the times, as we once hoped. Nevertheless, the OAC has
been  and  still  is  a  great  leap  towards  bringing
anthropology  into  the  21st  century.  This  book  and  its
subsequent  companion  volume  on  economy  serve  as
eloquent testimony to its hybrid originality.
In  practical  terms,  the  OAC  is  a  place  of  online
interaction. It is also an archive where each member can
store photos, videos, music and texts on their home page
and post similar material around the site. The language
issue, however, is crucial. Despite the OAC’s worldwide
reach and  initial  linguistic  variety,  the  trend  has  been
inexorably  towards  the  dominance  of  a  few  native
Anglophones.  Our  inability  to  sustain  a  multilingual
community is particularly troubling given anthropology’s
global  aspirations  and  the  public  impact  the  network
could have had.  The OAC’s founders believed we were
launching a social movement; and the heady first weeks
reinforced  that  feeling.  But  the  network  was  born  in
reaction to academic bureaucracy and its leadership has
since been trying to catch up with events.
 
The most useful lessons from the OAC experiment for
other online organizations (including public anthropology
web projects)  are  pragmatic.  The social  web  offers  an
ever-evolving selection of sites, apps and services, many
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of  which  are  free  or  relatively  low-cost.  Innovation  is
rapid and open source is increasingly common. On the
other  hand,  the  speed  of  application  launches  and
failures  means  that  free  sites  are  often  not  stable  for
long. Most anthropologists feel powerless in the face of
technological  change.  New  software  and  web
applications  (increasingly  for  mobile  phones)  are  not
usually  tailored to  academic needs;  but  they  are often
flexible  enough,  given  basic  technical  knowledge;  and
willingness to endure many bouts of trial and error helps.
You  have  to  invest  time  and  energy  to  find  out  what
works and what does not. 
The OAC opposed elitism, bureaucracy and academic
hierarchy; so we tried to avoid centralized leadership and
control. But what kind of leadership replaces hierarchy?
In  a  context  of  calls  for  less  bureaucracy  among
academic  anthropologists,  the  site’s  laissez-faire  policy
privileged self-regulation over firm rules.  But this is like
promoting the free market without rules of oversight. No-
one  would  try  to  build  a  community  on  free  market
principles; but in retrospect it seems that we did. 
The OAC shows that anthropologists may be adaptable
bricoleurs  online,  piecing  together  communication
technologies for chatting, learning, teaching and sharing.
But  it  remains  problematic  to  break  with  academic
prejudices  about  online  publication  and interaction.  To
attract  participants,  we reproduced  the  very  academic
values  that  we  founded  the  OAC to  escape  from.  The
network thus offers an anomalous commentary on how
anthropology treats online and academic conversation as
being  mutually  exclusive.   The  OAC  became  a
compromised  public  island  avoiding  academic
bureaucracy, yet populated by its denizens.
Social  and  academic  networks  are  significantly
different  in  their  need  for  time  investment,  volunteer
labor  and  long-term  objectives,  not  to  mention  power
relations and status hierarchies. Much social web activity
does not concern itself with aims, intentions or long-term
goals. It's easy and can keep ticking over until boredom
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or  newness  force  change.  Academic  networks  do  not
work like that. The OAC mixes them together. Dabbling
on Twitter or Facebook is not analogous to what goes on
at the OAC. Being an active member there takes more
time commitment, at least some critical thought and the
shared expectation of pointed exchange or response. 
The ethnographic model was never intended to inform
a  movement  to  change  the  world.  Contemporary
anthropology and social science reflect the world and are
not  designed  to  improve  it.  The  internet’s  growth  has
generated a strong counter-movement to the status quo.
Anthropologists  spent  the  last  century  –  a  time  of
urbanization, war and the break-up of empires – seeking
out isolated places that we could study as if they were
outside modern history. Having realized at last that we
live in a world unified by capitalism, we now spend our
time bemoaning the fate of the universities and our own
irrelevance to public discourse.
The  OAC  was  born  as  a  reaction  more  than  a
movement.  Its  slogan of  being ‘open’  turned out to  be
contradictory.  The  leadership,  who  abstractly  rejected
hierarchy,  became  managerial  and  half-hearted.  We
preferred  to  maximize  membership  at  the  expense  of
making  rules  that  might  exclude  people.  They  left
anyway.  We were always catching up, never ahead of the
game. 
The OAC’s instigators, members and critics never used
anthropology or social theory to address the problems we
faced. Anthropologists, it seems, cannot catch up with a
changing world while they meticulously document it. We
are losing control of our master-concepts like culture to
other disciplines and even to web moguls who are not
afraid to engage with the popular media. Anthropologists
do have something to offer the general public. It is just
that we are terrible at communicating it. More often than
not,  anthropologists  are  confounded  when  interacting
with the world outside academia. 
The OAC struggled to reverse this trend and reinforces
xii
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it by producing little to attract a general audience. Fear
of marketing our expertise, of ‘branding’ anthropology or
seeking out  media  attention  undermined  an  innovative
project  that  once  promised  so  much.  Our  web-based
activities  closely  resemble  office  politics.  So  a  public-
facing  anthropological  experiment  became  inward-
looking,  being  by  and  for  academics  and  subject  to
prejudices  and  hierarchies  similar  to  those  in  the
universities.  Like  academic  anthropology,  the  OAC  is
better at  describing what happened than explaining it.
The  social  media  have  undoubtedly  shaped  the  OAC’s
attempt  to  expand anthropology’s  horizons  to  a  global
level. Worse, we have not yet been able to draw on our
own discipline to help fulfil its promise.
‘Anthropology’ and the new human universal
By ‘anthropology’  I  mean  a  human  teleology  in  the
sense  of  Kant,  Rappaport  and  James  above.  We  must
develop self-knowledge as individuals and as a species,
especially  the  relationship  between  the  two.  This
relationship  is  mediated  by  a  bewildering  range  of
associations  and identities  which  have  been  the  prime
focus of anthropology conceived of as a social science.
The vast bulk of humanity is more interested in how each
of us relates to the whole. 
For Kant a ‘cosmopolitan’  approach to world society
would  lead us to  the exercise  of  human reason at  the
species level. For him, humanity’s last and hardest task
would  be  the  administration  of  justice  worldwide.
Meanwhile,  anthropology  explores  the  cognitive,
aesthetic  and ethical  universals  on which human unity
might be founded. The categorical imperative to be good
provides  a  moral  link  between  individuals  and  this
inclusive order.
Kant published  Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View in 1798. It was based on lectures he had given
for a quarter-century. He wanted to attract the general
public  to  his  subject.  Histories  of  anthropology  rarely
mention this work, perhaps because anthropologists have
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since moved far away from Kant’s original premises. He
summarized “philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense of the
word” as four questions: What can I know? What should I
do? What may I hope for? What is a human being? The
first question is answered in  metaphysics, the second in
morals,  the  third  in  religion and  the  fourth  in
anthropology.  But  the  first  three  questions  “relate  to
anthropology” and might be subsumed under it. 
Kant  conceived  of  anthropology  as  an  empirical
discipline,  but  also  as  a  means  of  moral  and  cultural
improvement. It was an investigation into human nature
and  into  how  to  modify  it.  He  aimed  to  provide  his
students with practical guidance and knowledge of the
world. His lectures were to be “popular” and of value in
later life. Above all, the Anthropology contributed to the
task of uniting world citizens by identifying the source of
their  “cosmopolitan  bonds”.  The  book  moves  between
vivid  anecdotes  and  Kant’s  sublime  vision  as  a  bridge
from everyday life to horizon thinking. Kant concentrated
on “what the human being as a free actor can and should
make of himself”. This is based on observation, but also
involves the construction of moral rules. Anthropology is
the practical arm of moral philosophy. It does not explain
the  metaphysics  of  morals  which  are  categorical  and
transcendent;  but  it  is  indispensable  to  understanding
interaction between human agents. It is thus ‘pragmatic’
–  “everything  that  pertains  to  the  practical”  –  popular
and  moral,  being  concerned  with  people’s  motives  for
action.  His  book’s  value  lay  in  its  systematic
organization,  so  that  readers  could  insert  their
experience and develop new themes appropriate to their
own lives. 
Academic  anthropology  is  not  equipped  to  inform
participation  in  the  world  today  because  its  cultural
relativism reflects the dominant nation-state structures of
the  twentieth  century.  How might  people  find  a  more
secure foundation for self-knowledge as individuals and
as a species?  Anthropology  for Kant reflected both his
idea of a just world society and his vision of individual
subjectivity  as  a  means  to  that  end,  as  a  branch  of
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humanist education. Twentieth-century civilization placed
barriers between each of us as a subjective personality
and  society  as  an  impersonal  object.  Its  anonymous
institutions  –  states,  capitalist  markets,  science  –  left
little  room  for  personal  agency,  beyond  spending  the
money we had.
We all embark on a journey outward into the world and
inward to the self. Society is mysterious to us because we
have lived in it and it now dwells inside us where it is
ordinarily invisible from everyday life. Wherever we have
lived  becomes  a  source  of  introspection  regarding  our
relationship to society; memory allows us to synthesize
these varied experiences of the world. If a person would
have an identity, this requires making out of fragmented
social  experience  a  more  coherent  whole,  a  world  as
singular as the self. 
Emergent world society is the new human universal –
not an idea, but the fact of our shared occupation of the
planet crying out for new principles of association. This
entails making a world where all people can live together,
not the imposition of principles that suit some powerful
interests at the expense of the rest. The next universal
will be unlike its predecessors, the Christian, bourgeois
and imperialist versions through which the West sought
to  dominate  or  replace  the  cultural  particulars  that
organize  people’s  lives  everywhere.  We  discover  our
common  humanity  in  great  literature  which  aims  for
universality by going deeply into particular personalities,
places and events. Good ethnography does the same. So
does case law at its best. The new universal will not just
tolerate cultural particulars, but will recognize that true
human community can only be realized through them.
There are two prerequisites for being human: we must
each  learn  to  be  self-reliant  to  a  high  degree  and  to
belong to others, merging our identities in a bewildering
variety  of  social  relations.  Western  cultures  emphasize
how  problematic  it  is  to  be  both  self-interested  and
mutual. When conflict between the two is expected, it is
hard to be both. Yet the two sides are often inseparable
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in practice and some societies,  by encouraging private
and  public  interests  to  merge,  have  integrated  them
more  effectively  than  ours.  One  premise  of  the  new
human universal will thus be the unity of self and society.
It  is  now harder  for  self-appointed  guilds  to  control
access  to  professional  knowledge.  People  have  other
ways of finding out for themselves, rather than submit to
academic hierarchy. Many agencies out there compete to
give  them  what  they  want,  including  the  self-learning
possibilities afforded by the internet. Popular resistance
to the power of experts is moral – most people want to
restore  a  personal  dimension  to  knowledge.
Anthropologists’  dependence  on  academic  bureaucracy
leaves us highly vulnerable and the OAC’s aspiration to
liberate anthropological discourse through online media
foundered because academic norms took it over. 
‘Anthropology’  is  indispensable  to  the  formation  of
world society. The prospects for the academic discipline
to contribute to this process are poor, given its prevalent
localism  and  anti-universalism.  Kant’s  vision  of
anthropology  as  humanist  education  contrasts  starkly
with  the  emphasis  on  scientific  research  outputs  in
today’s universities.  We should emulate his program of
personal  life-long  learning  to  develop  practical
knowledge  of  the  world.  Kant  recommended  both
systematic  observation  of  life  around  us  and  that  we
study  “world  history,  biographies  and  even  plays  and
novels”.  He  aimed  to  integrate  individual  subjectivity
with the moral construction of world society. 
The  rapid  development  of  telecommunications
networks today contains a far-reaching transformation of
world society. Anthropology is one way of making sense
of it. The academic seclusion of the discipline, however,
its  passive  acquiescence  to  bureaucracy,  prevents  us
from grasping this historical opportunity. We rightly cling
to our commitment to joining the people where they live,
but have forgotten what this move was for or what else is
needed  if  humanity  can  build  a  universal  society.  The
internet offers a wonderful chance to open up the flow of
xvi
FOREWORD
knowledge and information, already partly realised.
It matters less that an academic guild should retain its
monopoly  of  access  to  knowledge  than  that
‘anthropology’ should be taken up by a broad intellectual
coalition  for  whom  the  realization  of  a  new  human
universal – a world society fit for humanity as a whole – is
an urgent personal concern. Rather than obsessing over
how  we  can  control  access  to  what  we  write,  which
means cutting off the mass of humanity from our efforts,
we must figure out new interactive forms of engagement
that  span the  globe  and make the  results  available  to
everyone.
Keith Hart
Paris, 2016
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION:
COSMOPOLITICS AS A WAY OF THINKING
Huon Wardle and Justin Shaffner
From  its  launch  in  2009,  the  Open  Anthropology
Cooperative (OAC)  and  its  publications  series  were
shaped  by  what  we  can  reasonably  call  cosmopolitical
concerns.  Weeks  after  its  creation,  the  OAC  gathered
hundreds, then thousands, of visitors and members from
every  region  of  the  world  —  everywhere  there  is  a
networked  computer  at  least.  A  flurry  of  discussion
immediately took place on the OAC forum around what to
make  of  the  fact  that  within  a  few  months  an
unprecedented  global  assembly  of  anthropologists  had
sprung  into  being.  The  whole  world  of  anthropology
seemed  to  have  arrived  at  one  virtual  site,  and  the
question was what to do with this singularity. From this
point of view, the numbers proved illusory — perhaps a
disappointment – if the expectation was that, like Venus
on  her  seashell,  a  new kind  of  global  anthropological
politics  would  also  spring  up  out  of  the  waves.  Many
people visited, read what was offered, and left comments
–  perhaps modeling  their  behaviour  on  how they  used
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other social network sites – but, for most, the OAC was
simply a launch pad to “go” somewhere else. (It is worth
remembering  that  like  other  websites  the  OAC is  only
metaphorically “a place”, but then it is not “just a place”
either).  The  OAC  had  proved  its  global  reach,  sure
enough,  but  this  did  not  initiate  any  definable
architecture of  social  change itself.  Thus,  arguably the
OAC has  not  built  on  its  initial  promise  of  creating  a
globally articulated forum, and in that sense, the ideas
fomented  by  this  venue  for  openness  and  cooperation
have been more a sign of the times than an expression of
a realizable social future (Barone and Hart 2015). 
One  of  the  acknowledged  successes  of  the  OAC,
though,  has  been  its  open  access  publication  series.1
From  the  beginning,  the  aim  was  to  make
anthropological work available online without copyright
restriction and to use the social media platform to open
these essays (and now books)  to  discussion  by anyone
who wants to participate. In principle at least, from the
start,  this  was  anthropology  for,  and  open  to,  the
“people”; the idea being that, since anthropology is the
study of humanity, anyone who is human would have an
interest in what that fact implies. Again, of course, the
results were more limited than the hubristic expectation.
The papers and surrounding dialogue that the OAC has
gathered together are nonetheless fascinatingly diverse,
all of them offer at least a sideways (and often a front on)
view on the stroboscopic display of global humanity that,
in  just  a  few decades,  the  new digital  technologies  of
mass communication have set in motion.
So,  when  the  time  came  to  put  some  of  the  OAC
papers  together  in  edited  form,  this  awareness  of  the
shifting  meaning of  the  words  “cosmos”  and “politics”
immediately  emerged  as  a  key  theme  shaping  our
editorial perspective. It is for this reason that with our
first  volume  of  collected  papers  we  have  brought
together work by Alberto Corsin Jimenez, Daniel Miller,
Huon  Wardle,  Jean  La  Fontaine,  Joanna  Overing,  John
McCreery,  Lee  Drummond,  Liria  de  la  Cruz,  Martin
Holbraad,  Paloma  Gay  y  Blasco,  Philip  Swift,  Sidney
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Mintz  and  Thomas  Sturm,  that  foregrounds  the
“cosmopolitical” dimension of contemporary experience.
But what does this venerable compound word signify? In
contemporary  social  science  we  find  that  at  least  two
distinct uses of the word are in play.
Kant and the cosmopolitical 
The initial sense of the word is Kantian. It is fair to say
that  from  its  beginnings  the  aims  of  the  OAC  were
imbued  with  a  Kantian  spirit.  Thomas  Sturm  in  this
volume  explores  Kant’s  cosmopolitanism  and  his
anthropology  in  detail  (“What  Did  Kant  Mean…”).
Nonetheless, even now, Kant’s ideas on anthropology and
cosmopolitanism are not  widely  known (or understood)
within contemporary social science, so it is worth giving
a brief light-and-shade sketch of the Kantian position and
its  contemporary  relevance  before  entering  more
complicated terrains of debate. 
For Kant cosmopolitanism, and the cosmopolitics that
goes with it,  delineates a firmly anthropocentric set of
problems ([1795]1988).  First,  at  issue  are the political
struggles  of  human  beings  who,  whatever  their
differences (and also because of them), must inevitably
come to recognise themselves  as occupying a common
world. Secondly, there is the historical awareness that an
already  existing  global  community  is  ever  more
integrated in politically complex ways; perhaps primarily
due to war, conquest and human displacement, but also
through  mutually  beneficial  commerce  and  peaceful
movement.  So,  thirdly,  questions  arise  about  the
transformation in the thought and practice of individual
human beings as they become aware that, whatever local
communities  they  feel  they  belong  to,  whatever  local
common sense they may adhere to, whether they wish it
or not, they are part of a human community at large. The
cosmopolitical  sphere  is,  then,  a  scene  of  emergent
mutual recognition of this interconnection. In turn, the
cosmopolitical  describes  an  arena  for  debating  and
contracting certain general principles – rights, freedoms
– that should apply to all humans as such. Hence Kant’s
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ius  cosmopoliticum postulating  a  basic  extension  of
hospitality  to  all  humans  as  citizens  of  a  common
humanity in-the-making ([1795]1988:112fn). 
The role of anthropology in this Kantian picture is to
discuss the pragmatics of what it means to be human in
the light of the cosmopolitical framework; in particular to
find out what humans can make of themselves as “free
acting” beings who are nonetheless destined to share the
same  world  for  better  or  worse  with  others  akin  to
themselves.  Anthropology  offers  a  guide  both  to  the
meaning of  the  diversity  involved  in  this  cosmopolitics
but  also,  crucially,  regarding  what  humans  have  in
common,  including  their  “unsocial  sociability”  —  their
tendencies  toward  both  love  and  violence.  As  Thomas
Sturm summarises Kant here:
We are citizens of the world in the sense that our
nature is partly plastic, and more specifically that
we  ourselves  produce  our  rules  of  action  and,
thereby, our social world. This is a fact that holds, in
principle,  for  each  of  us,  and  which  each  of  us
better  recognizes  in  social  interaction  (Sturm,
"What Did Kant Mean…"). 
Kant’s sphere of cosmopolitical debate and action, and
the  anthropology  that  goes  with  it,  are,  of  course,
emblematic  of  an  enlightenment  view.  Humans,
belonging as they do to one species, have an obligation to
care  for  their  own  kind.  Recognising  myself  as  an
instance  of  humanity  becomes  a  duty  toward  human
beings at large. At the same time, by universalising the
significance of my individual life, this recognition offers a
kind of personal liberation of my individuality from pure
historical  contingency,  while  giving  onto  a  genuinely
informed politics. Incorporating the cosmopolitan project
as  a  dimension  of  personal  world-knowledge
(weltkenntnis)  is,  meanwhile,  a  matter  of  developing
one’s  own schemas  and ideas  for  life  and in  this  way
arriving at “maturity” (acquiring a “character” is another
way Kant puts it [1798]2006). What Kant opens for the
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kind of study we call anthropology, then, is the realisation
that  the  human  being  is  a  self-interpreting,  self-
conceptualising, hence a self-making, creature.2 How this
human  comes  to  interpret  its  own  life  –  creating
schemas,  analogies,  symbols  and  concepts  for  it  –  is
inextricable from how its politics grow and take shape. 
Because human nature is partly plastic, and the ideas
people  live  by  are  significantly  an  expression  of  their
freedom from natural constraints, anthropology is not a
natural,  but  rather  a  moral,  science  (an  argument
developed by Dilthey).  By reflecting on their own ideas
people can change them. This, in turn, means that human
thought is not susceptible to the same kind of analysis
that  natural  objects  are.  Anthropology  is  itself  an
extension  of  the  desire  and  freedom  people  have  to
understand  and  change  themselves.  This  reflexive
insight, in turn, gives the ground from which Kant argues
that, as they strive to define who they are, humans must
sooner  or  later  arrive  at  an  awareness  that  they  are
citizens of a common cosmos since this is the necessary
horizon for defining their own humanity. This rethinking
takes  place  in  the  midst  of  fundamental  uncertainty
about  the  nature  of  the  world  as  it  is  outside  the
conventions of human perception and conceptualisation.
Hence, for Kant, anthropology has as its central concern
the creation of a cosmopolitan conceptual toolkit that can
be put to use to rethink the pragmatics of our everyday
individual experience. To adapt a phrase, whether we are
consciously  aware  of  it  or  not,  “the  personal  is
cosmopolitical”.
The utopianism in Kant's account – a peaceful world
society is possible – is justified by his awareness that this
ever-intensifying social interdependence of human beings
globally – the inevitably inter-indemnifying struggles of
hospitality and hostility that humans engage in – has the
potential to lead toward moral institutions with greater
and greater  inclusivity.  From this  stance,  cosmopolitan
interaction (reasoned or unreasoned) is unavoidable, as
is  the  cosmopolitical  debate  that  travels  with  it
([1795]1988).  Hence,  Kant  gives  the  possibility  of
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peaceful  cosmopolitan co-dwelling,  within diverse  ways
of life and out of particular conceptions of freedom, as
the  widest  ethical  frame  for  his  anthropology
([1798]2006).  Living  “wisely,  agreeably  and  well”  (as
Keynes would later put it)  at a global  level is not only
conceivable, there are some existing facts in favour of its
achievability. 
In this way, cosmopolitanism is not just a provocation
constantly to review the global anthropological situation:
more than this, the as-if utopia offered by a cosmopolitan
end-state provides anthropology with its outer meaning
as  a  type  of  knowledge  and  inquiry  (wissenschaft)
directed actively at the self-making of world citizens. It
should  be  noted  that  the  ethical  framings  of  the  kind
Kant  gave  to  anthropology  were  for  the  most  part
deemed irrelevant or anathema (if they were noticed at
all) by the logical-positivist social science established in
the  Twentieth  century  with  its  unrecognised  outer
stabilising  frame –  nationalism.  They  were  periodically
picked up by anthropologists, notably Malinowski in his
last manuscript, Freedom and Civilization. However, this
short nationalist Century – 1918-1989 – is long gone and
with it the implicit idea that the national boundary is also
a boundary on morality  and truth,  albeit  recent global
events have again foregrounded a politics of isolationism
or ‘nativism’ as it is now sometimes termed.
Acquiring  a  cosmopolitan  orientation  becomes  the
guiding ethical principle through which anthropology as
a search  for  knowledge  gains  meaning,  as  opposed  to
being  simply  a  pursuit  of  the  Machiavellian  or
meaningless  in  human  experience.  At  the  same  time,
knowing that it is in the character of human beings to
create  new  distinctive  ideas  for  life,  Kant  presents
anthropology as a quest on the part of humans through
which they acquire new understanding of the concepts
they  are  using,  thereby  gaining  new  insights  and
widening  the  scope  their  own  freedoms.  To  know  or
understand  something  is  to  gain  some  autonomy  with
regard to that thing (cf. Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016).
However,  significantly,  Kant's theory of the human is a
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theory of the limits on human comprehension: some of
these  limits  are  set  by  the  natural  human capacity  to
sense the surrounding world, some by the limited hold
humanly created concepts have on reality  once human
sensations are schematised into thoughts. 
Clearly,  many  of  the  ideas  and  freedoms  humans
create for themselves and live by are delusional judged
by their incompatibility with the larger principle of free
and peaceful community with others world-wide; but who
is  to  decide  which  ideas  and  on  what  grounds?  An
intercommunicating  world  entails  a  complexly,
chaotically  interconnected  politics  whose  radical
uncertainty  threatens  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  all
humans in contingent and variable ways. Kant's answer
is cosmopolitan (self-)education (Hart 2010): learning to
live  in  the  same  world.  Each  individual  educates
themselves to the best of their capacity in elements of a
common ethics for a global type of life in the midst of
fundamental mutual human uncertainty. 
"A transgression of rights in one place in the world is
felt everywhere" states Kant in support of his demand for
a constantly re-initiated cosmopolitics ([1795]1988:119).
Equally,  a  growth  of  freedoms  in  one  place  may  also
herald a like emergence elsewhere.  We are wise to be
alert  to  either  of  those  potentials.  These  are  ideas
Simmel  develops in the early Twentieth Century in his
neo-Kantian theory of fission and fusion in social circles
and  the  networks  that  connect  them;  and  that  Ulrich
Beck  extends  in  the  end  of  that  century  with  his
conception of  globally  dispersed risks to the individual
(Simmel [1922]1955, Beck 1992). For Kant, anthropology
and cosmopolitanism answer a demand of rational self-
interest;  they supply  the kind of  knowledge individuals
need to co-dwell  in an increasingly  interconnected and
politically  threatening world.  His  view is  also crucially
dialectical: new schemas, symbols and judgements about
life appear out of the often hostile interaction between
people  and  peoples.  Hostility  between  ideas  and
communities is never absolute though; the constant need
for re-envisaging humanness within a global frame comes
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about  because  there  are  no  absolute  boundaries  on
human  interchange  and  community.  Certainly,  cultures
have  some  general,  but  not  absolutely  defining,
characteristics.  Likewise historical epochs do not place
defining  perimeters  on  human interchange,  conceptual
elaboration,  or  on  the  kinds  of  relations  of  ethical
answerability that go with these.
Whatever  the  intensity  of  local  common-sense
metaphors,  sentiments  and  aesthetic  judgements,  the
real  value  of  these  are  as  conventional  signposts
expressing  the  contingent  relationship  of  the  diversely
placed  individual  to  their  universal  situation  –  the
ramifying network that is the human cosmos taken as a
whole  (Kant  [1790]1952,  Wardle  1995).  In  his
anthropology  and  elsewhere  Kant  makes  use  of  the
ethnological evidence provided in his day, but ethnology
is not an end in itself. We need to know about the ideas
and  ways  of  lives  of  others,  not  because  of  their
fascinating linguistic or conceptual differences to us as
such  (themes  developed  by  Herder  and  Humboldt  for
example),  but  instead  because  the  continuance  and
development of their distinctive conventions, social rules
and  freedoms  are  intrinsically  interconnected  with  the
future of  our own.  Here begins  Kant's  daunting (some
will say impossible) task of cosmopolitan self-education.
Cosmopolitan  awareness  does  not,  then,  rest  in
knowledge of sui generis differences, rather it  involves
an  exploration  of  difference  toward  a  continuous
imaginative expansion of the area of our common human
truths  and  common  human  goods.  In  this  way,  the
narrower  horizon  of  responsibilities  to  an  immediate
circle of relationships widens into a duty to humans in
general allowing of highly diverse ways of thinking and
acting.  Every  individual  has  a  stake  in  this  kind  of
cosmopolitical knowledge whether they realise it yet or
not  (Wardle 2000, 2010, 2015). Kant would respond to
the oft reiterated jibe that cosmopolitanism is merely the
language of the elite or the narcissistic by answering that
we  are  all  cosmopolitans  (Josephides  and  Hall  2014).
Logically, and as a matter of fact, as humans we are all
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involved in creating the cosmopolitical institutions of the
future. What kind of future that will be, what our place in
it  will  be,  we  cannot  yet  tell.  The  common  cosmos  is
always an object of search and variable judgement, but
we  can  assume  that  our  acts  of  moral  imagining  and
choice  now will  effect  the  outcome –  the  “kingdom of
ends” as Kant puts it. 
Building  a  picture  of  the  new  cosmopolitics3 –
ontologies, non-human agents and “decolonisation
of thought”
Whatever we make of  Kant's cosmopolitics,  there is,
however, a second, newer use of the “cosmopolitical” that
builds  on  a  deep-seated  modernist  sense  of
anthropocentric uncertainty and anxiety,  one that casts
doubt on both the perceived unity of the human and also
the possibility of a shared common world. Puzzlingly this
newer cosmopolitics has tended to deny any relation to
the old.  Stengers, who coined this newer usage, states
that  she  was  unaware  of  Kant’s  use  when  she  first
developed her own and that her alternative view denies
Kant’s applicability:
“I’m very likely to be told that… I shouldn’t  have
taken a Kantian term… I was unaware of Kantian
usage… the cosmopolitical  proposal,  as  presented
here, denies any relationship with Kant or with the
ancient cosmopolitanism” (2005:994)
Given that what she is describing claims no connection
to  the  older  significance,  what,  then,  do  Stengers  and
those who draw on her work mean by “cosmopolitics”?
As we will see, the question extends to this: is there in
fact  a  connection  between  these  two  distinct
understandings of cosmos and politics despite the claim
to epistemological distinctness; and if there is, what does
this  relation  consist  in?  What  kind  of  dialogue  can be
established and on what terms? The question demands a
further explication of the newer usage. This will also give
us  an  opportunity  to  see  where  the  papers  for  this
9
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
volume  fit  into,  or  offer  a  perspective  on,  a  revised
concept of the cosmopolitical.
If the kind of cosmopolitical awareness described by
Kant has been with us for so long, traceable to the Stoics
and  beyond,  why  does  the  goal  of  intra-species
recognition  and  responsibility  still  seem  so  far  away?
This turns out to be a key implicit quandary for the newer
cosmopoliticians. It is one which they answer by pointing
to the fact that for humans there is not a single cosmos
but  rather  many  cosmologies,  multiple  changing
worldviews, and as such, there is no singular knowable
world or  humanity.  Rather,  there are as many ways of
knowing what it means to be human as there are projects
of  knowing.  From  Stengers  viewpoint  and  those  who
have  expanded  it  such  as  Latour,  the  enlightenment
politics  of  human  recognition  is  founded  on  a
transcendental  illusion  of  foundational  common
knowledge. The very capacity for self-interpretation that
Kant  shows  is  key  to  understanding  what  we  have  in
common  is  also  the  ground  for  a  fragmented,  multi-
dimensional,  multi-foundational  politics.  “Perspective”
thence  acquires  the  uttermost  significance  in  this
approach;  diverse  perspectives  offer  up  multiplex  and
chaotically  juxtaposed  ontologies,  but  no  simple  vista
onto a common world, nor a simple picture of the human.
In  this  newer  view  the  “cosmos”  in  cosmopolitics
becomes charged in a way not seen since Diogenes and
the Cynics in ancient Greece (Turner 2015). 
Questions of metaphysics, ontology and cosmology are,
indeed, in the air in Twenty First Century philosophy and
anthropology. The engagement with the ontic, with what
people studied by ethnographers take to exist, amounts
to  something  of  a  revitalization  movement  for  an
ethnographically-driven anthropology if we are to judge
by contemporary heated debates (cf. Carrithers, Michael,
et al. 2010, Holbraad and Pedersen 2014), or the newly
formed journal  Hau,  whose  stated aim is  “to  reinstate
ethnographic theorization in contemporary anthropology
as  a  potent  alternative  to  its  “explanation”  or
“contextualization”  by  philosophical  arguments”.4 The
10
INTRODUCTION
literature has grown voluminously in this area, but one
symptomatic feature is the heightened awareness of the
“other-than-human-agents”  active  in  the  ethnographic
worlds in which anthropologists travel. We have become
attuned to identifying new kinds of entities, in particular,
new types of agents in places where they might not have
been noticed before; or where, in the past, we might have
dismissed their presence as poetry or reification (trying
in this way to reduce them to prefigured philosophical
“contexts” or “explanations” such as “myth”, “belief”, or
even  “representation”  itself  perhaps).  The  newer
cosmopolitics  is  above  all  about  rethinking inter-entity
relationships. We are no longer guided by looking at how
humans live in what we take to be “their” environment,
“their” umwelt; the other beings and things involved will
have  their  say.  Their  viewpoint  must  be  taken  into
account, including on what constitutes an environment or
unwelt in the first place. Other than human entitites can
no longer be thought of as mere supports for “our” world,
or as symbols for human thought-consumption in general.
We will  recognise  too,  though,  the  distinctly  human
agents whose ideas are feeding these debates, especially
Bruno Latour and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro who have
become its main figureheads and provocateurs, at least
within  anthropology.  These  two  have  different,  but  in
some  areas  compatible,  theoretical  agendas.  Latour  is
working with a theory whereby agency (the capacity to
create effects)  appears as a facet  of  participation in  a
network  (originally  ethnographically  centered  on  the
actor-networks of scientists, e.g. Latour 1988). Some of
the agents involved  are recognizably  human and some
are  not.  One  of  Latour’s  points  is  that  the  particular
capacities of the humans would be impossible without the
assistance  of  the  non-human  agents  and  “actants”.
Having established the great diversity of these networks,
he has called on Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitics to talk
about what happens at the boundary between different
projects and the cosmoses they bring into being, as well
as  the  work  of  translation  that  mediate  them  (Latour
2005a, 2005b). 
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Viveiros de Castro takes as his starting point lowland
Amazonian  societies  where  human  relationships  with
other animal and spiritual beings are of the essence, and
the capacities of humans are again integrated with the
capacities  of  non-human-agents  in  the  task  of
regenerating  society.  Crucially,  he  has  repositioned  a
generic  and  defining  feature  of  animist  worldviews:
humans,  animals  and  certain  objects,  despite  their
outward appearance (their skins),  share soul stuff (and
hence  a  single  culture  or  worldview)  and  are  thus
capable  of  transforming  and exchanging  their  multiple
natural  outer  forms.  The particularities  of  the  “human
condition”  are  thus  discovered  through  contrasts  (and
transformations)  with  the  condition  of  “beasts”  and
“gods”  (1992:304).  This  animist  insight  has  a  central
status  in  his  specialised  social  theory,  “Amerindian
perspectivism” (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2012).
The importance of these ideas for an understanding of
cosmopolitics  comes  from  their  power  in  combination.
Latour’s  extension  of  network  theory  to  include  non-
human-agents gains strength from Viveiros de Castro’s
revised exploration of an animist worldview. Viveiros de
Castro’s theory, specific to Amazonian societies, takes on
much greater significance as part of Latour’s reappraisal
of  modernity  (Latour  2004,  2009),  and  vice  versa.
Latour's  critique  of  the  moderns  (1993)  is  newly
mobilized in Viveiros de Castro's generalized symmetrical
perspectival anthropology (see his “Manifesto Abaeté”5)
and  in  his  emphasis  on  the  “controlled  equivocation”
needed  for  conceptual  translation  and  ethnographic
description (2004). Of itself,  animism is hardly news in
the world of anthropology (even taking into account the
special turn Viveiros de Castro gives it) but Viveiros de
Castro’s  ideas  gain  much  greater  force  if  it  turns  out
that, in one way or another, we are all animists, which is
effectively what Latour has been arguing for some years,
that “we have never been modern” (1993).
By  removing  the  hierarchical  order  that  makes  a
singular  nature  the  measure  of  every  subordinate
worldview (cf. Wagner 1981), the new cosmopoliticians,
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in principle, democratize cosmology opening the door to
an  infinite  number  of  further  universes.  Rather  than
trying to eliminate inadequate worldviews in the name of
nature,  each  cosmos  is  welcomed  for  the  project  it
describes; there is no best cosmology that all could aim
towards partly because there is no “totality”, only many
transforming  networks  and  communities  of  actors  and
entities. Even Hilbert’s hotel (Benardette 1964) with its
infinite number of rooms is full sometimes, but this can
easily be remedied — the guest in room 1 shifts one room
down  along  the  corridor  ad  infinitum.  Here,  we  can
knock on the door of Humanity1, H2, H3…, H∞. Thus,
theoretically at least, space is made for each new entry in
the  cosmological  encyclopedia  –  a  splendidly  baroque
scene  of  endless  refractory  courtyards,  staircases  and
corridors. At the same time, of course, the cosmopolitical
anthropologists present themselves in the special role of
describers,  translators,  negotiators  and  diplomats
(Latour 2005b) when it  comes to neighbourly relations
between all  these “rooms” or  cosmoses.  This  image of
infinite space crumpled into the form of rooms is central
to Deleuze's account of the Leibnizian fold (1993), whose
language Vivieros de Castro transposes to his own theory
of  “Amerindian”  and  “anthropological”  perspectivism
(e.g. 2007:160). It is also the theme that Corsin Jimenez
takes  as  his  starting  point  in  understanding
anthropological knowledge practices (this volume).
Combined, a central feature of these new perspectives
is  that  they  remind  us  how humans  depend on  other-
than-human  agencies  for  their  social  projects.  These
relationships are not peripheral. They are of the essence
in  understanding  how  people  gain  a  cosmological
perspective.  In particular these relationships should be
understood  as  constitutive  of  what  it  means  to  be  a
human  actor  because  human  capacities  transform  in
concert with the changing relationships between human
and  non-human  actors.  Taken  even  further,  then,
humanness  (subjectivity)  is  relative  to  whatever
particular  networks  and  relationships  appear
situationally. We are reminded of Wagner's image of the
“fractal person” — “never a unit standing in relation to
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an aggregate, or aggregate standing in relation to a unit,
but always an entity with relationship integrally implied”
(1991,  p.  163).  Hence,  we  may  view  these  new
developments as, on the one side, subtracting from the
ethics of human recognition and hospitality that guided
the older cosmopolitics. However, perhaps we may come
to see them as having promethean qualities too. Certainly
(some)  human voices  will  lose  their  right  to  speak for
everyone; but at the same time it may come about that
others gain a voice (cf. de la Cadena 2015). And there
may be similar losses and gains when we place the two
kinds of cosmopolitics in a conversation. 
Both Viveiros de Castro and Latour are working out of
a structuralist-post-structuralist trajectory which involves
decentring and relativizing human subjectivity. Of course,
we have known about the relationships between humans
and  other-than-human  entities  for  a  long  time  in
anthropology  –  as  the  extensive  literature  around
totemism, taboo animals and liminal objects shows. In his
book  The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, (1935)
Bergson  indicates  that  when we  stare  at  the  spinning
roulette  wheel  and  rotate  our  hand  to  “make  it”  stop
where we want, then we are, in a generic way, invoking
the  same  kinds  of  animistic-magical-pantheistic  forces
that we humans have always enlisted in pursuing our life
projects.  Bergson  adds  that  what  we  call  religious
experience can lead both to “closed” and to “open” ways
of  experiencing  the  material  world  and  its  psychic
properties. In an ecstatic open mode, 
the  soul  opens  out  broadens  and  raises  to  pure
spirituality a morality enclosed and materialized in
ready-made  rules:  the  latter  then  becomes,  in
comparison  with  the  other  [the  open  mode  of
experiencing]  something  like  a  snap-shot  view  of
movement … Current morality is not abolished; but
it appears like a virtual  stop in the course of actual
progression (1935:46). 
However,  leaving  the  history  of  thought  entailed  here
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aside,  combined,  these newer expositions have allowed
us to clear some of the intellectual overgrowth; perhaps
enabled us to see some new wood beyond.
One  key  issue  is  this:  as  anthropologists  our  focus
often  narrows  to  particular  people  and  their  relations
with  each  other,  but  for  the  people  in  question,  their
world is not made up solely of other people or of human
relationships:  it  is  engaged  with  a  panoply  of  diverse
significant  entities  and  relationships  between  them.  In
this volume (“An Amazonian Question of Ironies and the
Grotesque”), Joanna Overing tells how the Piaroa of the
Amazon, must continuously try to clean up the poisons
left  behind  by  the gods  Wahari  and Kuemoi  in  Mythic
Time  so  that  they  can  live  a  human  life  now.  The
practices of ingestion,  excretion and cleansing involved
are absolutely of the essence in living a beautiful life of
wit  and  laughter  in  their  present  day  cosmos.  In  a
different vein, but with a comparable degree of ethical
and  aesthetic  concern,  Sidney  Mintz’  gathers  together
decades of his own interest in kinds of food and ways of
eating  (“Devouring  Objects  of  Study:  Food  and
Fieldwork”). All  this offers him the ground for a global
vision  of  human beings  united  in  their  dependence on
foodstuffs (we know ourselves through what we eat); and
of the anthropologist as, in turn, a “devourer” of these
varying “objects”. Humans, we come to see, are unified
by their fragile relations with a diversely edible  world.
And,  we may think here  of  the  efforts  made by  space
scientists to domesticate extraterrestrial environments in
light of anthropocenic awareness that the earth may soon
become too toxic to support human life (Battaglia 2016).
The  older  cosmopolitics  understood  that  the  subject
knows itself by way of the objects that preoccupy it – that
make up its world. The aim is an “enlarged mind” (to use
Kant’s phrase; [1790]1952:153) capable of extending the
scope  of  its  preoccupations.  However,  the  newer
cosmopolitics  goes further; subjectivity is  co-dependent
— it is the kinds of exchanges between humans and other
agents and entities that are key to a cosmos: “humans”,
“beasts”,  “things”,  “gods”  together  compose  particular,
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mutually defining, worlds (collective “nature-cultures”). 
Some of the entities we encounter in these worlds, as
strangers or guests,  will feel familiar, others much less
so.  Adjusting  our  ethnographic  focus  can,  then,  offer
rewarding perspectives and remind us to consider, in any
given field situation, “for this person, or for those people,
how is their community, their cosmos, made up?” And, in
talking  of  a  community  we  will  include  not  just  the
relationships  of  human  beings,  but  also  all  the  other
agents and crucial objects that are clearly participating
and  contributing  to  whatever  meaning  “society”,
“community” and “cosmos” comes to encompass. 
The basic question that the newer cosmopolitics has
revitalized, then, is how do all these beings and things
(which were taken to have a merely semiotic  status in
previous “cultural” accounts) participate actively in the
lives  of  the  people  anthropologists  are  studying?  For
example, if someone says in a tragic tone that “society”,
“the healthcare system” or “the banks” have failed, then
the ontologically-oriented reader will feel entitled to raise
the question “what kind of other-than-human-entitites are
these that they can ‘fail’ a given person, shared project
or cosmos?” In this vein, Mitt Romney claimed during the
2012  US  presidential  elections  that  “Corporations  are
people  too  my  friend”.  Corporations  do  indeed
increasingly  present  themselves  as  persons  politically
and economically, but, of course, this is actually not new
(see Bashkow n.d. for an anthropological understanding
of  modern  corporations  as  a  transformation  of  “house
societies”):  social  persons  of  this  kind  have  long  been
able to invoke their jural right to freedom of worship, for
example.  The  (quasi-)political  claims  of  “bodies
corporate”  were  a  prime  object  of  enlightenment
critique,  of  course,  as  The  Wealth  of  Nations (1776)
exemplifies. This was because the political power of the
corporations in their day stood directly at odds with how
enlightenment  thinkers  understood  individual  freedom
and human moral agency.  Adam Smith exemplifies this
stance, but it is integral too to Immanuel Kant’s view and
hence to his understanding of how a cosmopolitics should
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proceed.  So  it  seems  worth  our  while  (both  as
anthropologists and as human beings) to treat claims on
behalf  of  corporations  very  seriously,  and  to  treat  the
power  of  other-than-human-agents  likewise.  Above  all,
Stengers asks that,  as makers of claims about a “good
common  world”  or  of  one  yet  to  be  composed,
anthropologists  and  others  should  “slow  down”,  and
exercise  a  certain  Dostoievskian  “idiocy”;  we  should
recognise and pay attention to the many participants and
cosmological  interests  involved  in  a  situation  before
assuming  we  can  already  know  “who  can  be  a
spokesperson  of  what,  who  can  represent  what”
(2005:995).
As ethnographers, if we can shape what is involved in
these  kinds  of  concerns  and  questions  into  a  method,
then the answers we uncover are likely to be revealing:
we will gain new concepts and frames for anthropological
comparison – new accents on what reality can be like for
a human being. Even for Viveiros de Castro, this seems to
be what is motivating his theory; he is interested in what
the world is like for Amazonians precisely because they
too are human. Their world is interesting “to think with”
precisely because it  too is a “human” world, hence his
interest as an anthropologist (Viveiros de Castro 2014).
As we might  expect,  this  kind of  striving curiosity  lies
behind many of the chapters in our volume: for example
John McCreery (“Why Do the Gods Look Like That”) asks
why, when divinity is known to be immaterial, there are
human-like  statues  of  Chinese  deities  and  why  do  the
gods  differ  as  they  do  in  the  ways  in  which  they  are
depicted?  Wei-Ping  Lin  has  provided  one  answer:
“statues make the formless omnipresent gods settle down
and  build  a  stable  connection  with  the  villagers”
(2008:460):  McCreery  tests  the  implications  of  this.
Again,  questions  of  cosmos  are answered by  exploring
the inter-entity relationships involved, but the knowledge
derived  is  still  very  much  knowledge  about  a  human
perspective.  
A  few years  ago,  the  BBC released  a  film made  by
Emad  Burnat  and  Guy  Davidi  called  The  Village  that
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Fought Back: Five Broken Cameras (2012). Emad Burnat,
a one time Palestinian farmer, is the narrator and the film
is made up of video footage edited to show the struggle
between people in Bil’in and the Israeli army and Israeli
settlers  in  this  part  of  the  West  Bank.  The  film
foregrounds the effects this has on the villagers, many of
whom are arrested, some shot and one is killed by Israeli
soldiers, and on Emad Burnat himself. The “five cameras”
of the film are quite explicitly presented as protagonists
in  Emad’s  narrative  since  they  are  either  shot  at  or
otherwise  broken.  Emad’s  compulsion  to  film,  and  the
fact of the camera constantly “filming”,  become cruxes
for understanding the reality of the situation. Other key
agents  include  the  Israeli  jeeps,  the  bulldozers  and
excavators,  the  wire  mesh  wall  that  divides  the
Palestinians from their former farmland, the newly built
high  rise  settlements  that  tower  over  the  surrounding
landscapes, the olive trees that are torn up at the roots
or set alight. In the unfolding visual description we see
different objects acquiring prominence as components of
the “struggle”: the villagers build an “outpost” on what
they consider to be their own land and this building then
takes on a certain life of its own. 
Looking at a situation of this kind, the new ontologists
will  have us attend to the objects  and people that are
cooperating (or otherwise)  immediately in the unfolding
of this particular reality, this specific montage of shots.
They  would  have  us  see  all  this,  not  in  terms  of  the
mechanisms  and  structures  of  a  static  society,  but  as
elements of a process through which reality is constantly
being sutured together. There is clearly value in this way
of looking, because it takes us closer, in certain ways, to
what  the  people  involved  actually  perceive.  What  they
envisage acquires greater significance than if we claim
that  this  is  a  “representation”,  an  “identity”  or  the
expression  of  a  “system  of  symbols”.  And,  so,
anthropologists may be able to jettison some of the heavy
machinery  of  interpretation  by  which  they  mediate
between “reality”  and “ideology”  –  structure,  semiosis,
episteme, doxa, whatever. So far so good we may think.
This,  for  example,  is  a  central  concern  of  the  chapter
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"Can the  Thing  Speak?"  by  Martin  Holbraad,  who has
taken  a  key  part  in  arguing  for  a  revised  kind  of
ontological  awareness  in  anthropology.  And  here  he
makes a further step. We should no longer perhaps think
of  what  we  do  as  a  study  of  (or  an)  “anthropos”  —
perhaps what we need instead is a deep “thing-ology”,
one that gives us much more direct access to things as
they are,  not  as they are mediated by human-oriented
concerns about belief or representation.
That  “things”  can  act  independently  of  human
intentions should hardly come as too much surprise; the
question is of course which, when and where and who is
in  control.  In  particular  how  is  this  awareness
operationalized  and  theorized  in  an  ethnographic
account?  Daniel  Miller  gives  us  one  answer  in  his
“Extreme Reading of Facebook” (this volume). Facebook
is  a  body  corporate,  a  “big  bang”,  whose  powers  of
engrossment  may  seem  mind-boggling  to  anyone
(perhaps those very few remaining persons)  of  a  fusty
enlightenment  mind-set.  Miller  makes  a  crucial  point
when he argues from Nancy Munn that the power of a
body  like  Facebook  lies  in  its  command  of  “negative
transformations  of  spacetime…  any  cultural  form  that
creates expansion has to have within itself the opposite
quality  which  would  destroy  and  shrink  spacetime”.
Titanic  powers  of  this  type  may  well  remind  us  of
Overing's account of the Myth Time struggles of Kuemoi
and Wahari strewing behind them a world full of poisons
for the people of Today Time to sort out, re-ingest and
turn  into  a  beautiful  “human  life”.  However,  these
questions of scalar expansion and contraction are taken
up in another register by Alberto Corsin-Jimenez in his
chapter  (“How  Knowledge  Grows”)  to  talk  about  the
“optics of volumes” involved in being able to envisage the
state  as  a  large  body,  specifically  as  “Leviathan”.  The
most individualist of thinkers will accept that the State is
“something  big”,  it  has  “large  proportions”  thus  its
effects on humans are large — how has this knowledge of
the  state  body  come  about?  Corsin-Jimenez  offers  an
erudite  survey  of  the  intellectual-technical  means  by
which the modern state acquired space and embodiment.
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His intervention also reminds us that in the background
of the new ontology are “hyperobjects” — objects such as
“global warming” or “finance money” that are so large,
and whose effects are so ungovernable, that they defeat
traditionally  “modern”  scales  of  human  thought  and
action (Morton 2013). 
The ideas underlying the new cosmopolitics are clearly
potent and have reach, but a few initial sounds of caution
are warranted.  At  the ethnographic  level,  applying the
kinds of insights that Latour and others are developing
via  this  programme still  presents  us  with  a  politics  of
explanation  when  we  decide  to  generalize –  when  we
make  claims  at  the  “cosmological”  level.  In  Ruth
Benedict and Margaret Mead’s joint research project –
The  Study  of  Culture  at  a  Distance –  there  is  a  case
where former Shtetl jews are being interviewed, and one
of  the  lines  of  inquiry  concerns  whether  women  have
souls or not. The male interviewees seem unanimously to
take  the  view that  women do  not  have  souls.  When a
woman is interviewed about whether women have souls
she  replies  “certainly,  more  than  men”  (Mead  et  al.
1953:135-137).  So  immediately  we  can  witness  how
friction regarding the way the cosmos is constituted is
not  just  friction  between  different  peoples  and  their
cosmologies, but also takes place within groupings and it
scales  down  to  the  level  of  individual  meaning  (see
Radin’s  Crashing  Thunder for  more  on  this,  1926).
Joanna Overing, who has worked for many decades with
the  Amazonian  Piaroa,  has  indicated  that  Viveiros  de
Castro’s interpretive emphasis on predation and certain
kinds  of  relationship  with  spirit-beings  amongst  the
Araweté has the effect of giving analytical preeminence
to  adult  men  (shamans  and  warriors)  in  that  world  –
because prioritizing the significance of certain kinds of
ritual  exchange with spirit-beings also foregrounds the
power  of  male  human  beings  to  make  society (e.g.
Viveiros  de  Castro  1992:142;  note  the  contrast  with
Overing 1999, 2004, n.d.). Anyone who has read Evans-
Pritchard’s The Nuer (1940) carefully will notice that the
point of view that predominates is that of a young adult
Nuer man. So,  again,  alongside  the issue of  subjective
20
INTRODUCTION
change  and  personal  transformation,  we  are  left  with
dormant questions about how the community or cosmos
might  be  constituted  otherwise from  other subject-
positions.
In fact, many ethnographic accounts are written out of
the experiences of young, often single (or at least alone
in  the  field),  graduate  students  of  perceived  affluency,
already given to occupying certain social categories and
networks,  both  at  “home”  and in  the  “field”,  positions
that  thus  limit  their  perspectives  and  understandings.
When it  comes to  a  vision  of  a  kind of  fieldwork  that
might collapse these predictable categories of field and
home, questioner and questioned, friend and informant,
the discussion here ("Friendship, Anthropology”) by Liria
de la Cruz and Paloma Gay y Blasco precisely helps us
reconsider the fieldsite and the ethnography that awaits
it  as  analytical  artifacts  built  out  of  the  experience  of
particular kinds of human relationship. We are reminded
that the notion of “the gypsy woman”, the “middle class
Spanish  woman”  are  precisely  operationalized  by  the
type of intellectual apparatus that is an ethnography. In
this way, we come to recognise this artefactual character
of  the  ethnography  when  it  comes  to  rethinking  our
individual  experiences  of  friendship,  of  being
categorized, of categorizing; and the part these play in
our notion of “our” world.
What  is  valuable  in  all  this  “ontological”  discussion,
then, is at least twofold: it reminds us of the purpose of
ethnographic work as Malinowski described it, which is
to  understand  “their”  (the  people  with  whom  we  as
anthropologists  work) “vision” of their “world”;  and,  in
addition, when it helps clear out of the way some of the
mediating theoretical  language.  We cannot achieve the
basic Malinowskian insight if we have already decided in
advance what a “rationally” structured world looks like
and what kinds of actors are existent or non-existent and
how  they  really  are,  or  ought  to  be,  ordered  and
interrelated.  This  is  what  the  newer  cosmopolitics  is
challenging.  Arguably,  the  highpoint  of  the  rationalist
stance in anthropology came in the late 70s and early
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80s. By then ethnography had become far less engaged
with  understanding  how  people  in  a  certain  setting
viewed  their  world,  and  much  more  concerned  with
identifying  where  those  people  fit  in  preconceived
theoretical  templates,  whether  that  be  Structuralist,
Marxist, Cognitivist, or Semiotic-Interpretive. 
In  this  particular  sense,  the  more  rationalistic  and
linguistically orthodox ethnographic writing became, the
more circular it  became too;  since it  ceased to matter
how the  particular  people  involved  thought  about  and
acted on the questions at issue. The post-modern trend
certainly undermined confidence in what theory could do
by itself  in that respect:  but,  as has often been noted,
post-modern  writing,  if  anything,  took us  further  away
from  people  and  instead  attended  to  the  life  and
concerns of the ethnographer, and a lot of what resulted
was facile and narcissistic. One positive reaction to this
has  been  to  argue  much  more  vigorously  for  the
phenomenological  validity  of  informants’  concepts  with
the  aim  of  “rendering  [their]  categories  analytical”
(Toren  and  Pina  Cabral  2009:10).  Ethnography  thus
becomes the apparatus for an analytical “rendering” of
local  terms  –  baloma,  baraka,  cargo,  the  corner,  crab
antics,  mana,  mayu-dama,  moka,  naven,  offcomers –
concept-words which, for all their specificity in capturing
a world outlook and a pattern of action, still yield insights
into  universal  human  capabilities  for  the  perspectives
they  offer  on  different  “spaces  of  reason”.  The  new
cosmopolitics could be described as “neo-rationalist” in
this regard, highlighting the creative work that concepts
– whether “etic” or “emic” – do in different knowledge
practices (Crook and Shaffner 2011). For instance, they
can enable us to  put  in question  ideological  principles
that have a similarly  reified status in our outlook (e.g.
marriage,  productivity,  mental  illness,  and  welfare),
including those that act as an analogic base for modern
anthropology  and  ethnographic  description,  such  as
“kinship” (Schneider 1984), “culture” (Wagner 1981),  or
the  “relation”  (Strathern  1995).  Cosmopolitics,  then,
involves  putting  a  more  varied,  and  more  jaggedly
juxtaposed,  range of concepts into play to test  out the
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parameters  of  our  supposedly  common  world  and  the
experience of being human in it. 
Given this awareness of the analytic value of terms like
these,  what  seems  to  be  strikingly  absent  in  the
ontological  approaches  we  have  discussed  so  far  is  a
consideration  of  imagination.  For  an  anthropologist,
questions of the kind “which agents are participating in
the world of  the people we work with?” fundamentally
comes  back  to  a  concern  with  how  those  people  –
individually and in aggregate –  imagine their world. So,
in  asking  that  type  of  question,  we  are  giving  an
epistemological  value  to  their  ways  of  imagining  and
reasoning. We are, after all, hoping to answer why these
people  do the things  they do;  not  from our preformed
theoretical template, but from what we understand to be
their pattern of thought and action. There is a problem
involved  here  that  philosophers  describe  in  terms  of
“internalism” versus “externalism” (e.g. Williams 1981).
Are people’s reasons for action best understood in terms
of their motivations (internalism) or by reference to the
layout of the field they find themselves in (externalism)?
We can cut a long story short here by asking how far we
anthropologists  will  go  in  crediting  our  own  external
gaze,  and  our  capacity  to  model  the  given  situation
(including its ontic properties), with the power to explain
the internal motivations and understandings of those we
are encountering (Wardle 2014: 280).
Concerns akin to these (and to those described by John
McCreery) are explored by Philip Swift (in his chapter on
“Cosmetic Cosmologies in Japan”). At Ise, Buddhist and
Shinto shrines “[e]verything happens as if the invocation
is simulated, seemingly going no further than the curve
and  contact  of  surfaces  –  clapping,  bowing,  and  the
pressing of palms together.” There is indeed “something
happening  here/What  it  is  ain’t  exactly  clear”6 since
responses  to  questions  are  frequently  equivocal,  but
whatever “it” is demands an inspection of our intuitively
held  topology  of  internal  versus  external,  motivation
versus  outcome.  This  awareness  of  “something
happening”  seems,  in  turn,  to  depend  on  a  particular
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understanding of the “surface” which, while it is literally
“superficial”, its very artificiality is also “efficacious”. We
are led to ask what notional self or motivational state (for
example,  what  manner  of  “prayer”)  is  implied  by  this
particular mode of relationship to divine objects whose
divinity is often disavowed. A Protestant “man of action”
may  feel  uncomfortable  here  we  guess,  but  there  is
nothing inactive  about  Japanese  social  life;  indeed  the
gods do not want offerings that have not been “fabricated
by means of a device”. We are left with a puzzle and a
challenge.
We have seen that Latour’s interest in ontology has to
do with describing what kinds of coalition of human and
non-human agents are at work in creating a particular
reality – and hence what it is like to be a subject or agent
in  this  or  that  arrangement  or  assemblage,  which  is
where  “cosmopolitics”  has  also  entered  the  picture.  If
particular  situations  throw  up  distinct  coalitions  of
subjectivity  and  agency,  then  these  will  show up  as  a
distinct  “cosmology”.  It  is  not  obvious  from  Latour’s
description  how  the  transition  or  translation  involved,
from  network  to  cosmological  gestalt,  comes  about  —
how the cosmological boundary is formed. Nonetheless,
different  coalitions  and  cosmologies  clash  where  some
key feature of their world is at stake. A mining company
conflicts with a group of forest users over the capacities,
meaning and value of the entities and forces present in
that setting.  Latour points  to the fact that this kind of
clash  is  not  just  one  between  Western  technological
civilization and a “local culture” over the same resource;
it is a clash between two entirely distinct assemblies of
people  and  things  for  whom  reality  coheres  in
fundamentally  distinct  ways.  They  cut  the  network
differently (Strathern 1996).
In  Tristes  Tropiques,  Levi-Strauss  mentions  a  case
where  Spanish  colonists  torture  Amerindians  to  see  if
they have souls, while Amerindians drown a conquistador
to see  if  he has a  body:  their  worlds  and their  world-
hypotheses – their cosmo-ontologies – are fundamentally
distinct. It should be noted though that the logic of the
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differences involved indicates, for Levi-Strauss at least, a
common manner of structuring thought (1973:91). It is a
shared  logical  foundation  of  this  kind  that  Jean  La
Fontaine  (this  volume)  draws  on  in  her  chapter  here
when  she  critically  assesses  our  fear  the  others  are
engaged  in  profane  acts  of  human  sacrifice  (“Ritual
Murder?”).  Ironically,  inhumanity  is  ascribed  to  others
according  to  a  universally  available  human  thought-
scheme.
The  outcome  of  clashes  of  understanding  like  these
will be, Latour suggests, that either one of these realities
is erased, or there will develop some kind of negotiation
and redefinition of terms.  Notice that Latour is not an
internalist – the reasons the individual gives for whatever
is  going  on  are  insufficient  because  the  truth  of  their
cosmology is not to be found in what one person thinks
about  the  matter,  but  is  rather  distributed  across  the
network, particularly in the co-activities of all the other
agents.  But,  nor  is  Latour  an  externalist  either  –  that
which is exterior to the actor only makes sense if we take
into account what this actor is aiming at, who they are
trying to enlist and wherefore. The perspective on reality
is  itself  a  fold  of  reality:  what  appears  to  be  internal
knowledge  is  external  seen  from the  adjacent  position
that  overlaps and encloses it.7 A lot  of  this  feels  quite
paradoxical  and  we  may  feel  that  this  adds  to  its
attraction.
In  his  chapter  here  (“Cosmopolitics  and  Common
Sense”),  Huon Wardle  comments  on this  aspect  of  the
Latourian viewpoint. Indeed the question of “viewpoint”
is curious in all this. Latour is always careful to avoid a
claim  to  any  special  analytical  position  from which  to
understand some other person’s network or  cosmology.
He is certainly arguing against the possibility of any type
of  “externalist”  or  transcendent stance from where we
might  judge  what  is  “really”  going  on.  Me (and  “my”
knowledge)  are always inside the “social” according to
Latour.  In this  regard,  he likes to use metaphors from
computing:  as subjects we are always plugging in new
connections  and  downloading  new  signifiers  that  will
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help us extend our network capabilities, nevertheless we
cannot reach beyond the horizon of our own particular
knowledge state because this knowledge is integrated in
a supportive network. We would, so to speak, be tearing
our own knowledge out of its own fabric of meaning by
doing so. We may add components and programmes to
enhance  our  capacity:  either  way,  there  is  no  view
“outside”  our  networked  subjectivity.  Following  the
philosopher  Leibniz,  Latour  thinks  that  I/we  is  always
already occupying whatever optimal reality it can at any
given moment. 
This may remind us of Voltaire’s satirical creation, Dr
Pangloss,  who  lives  “for  the  best  in  the  best  of  all
possible  worlds”.  And,  if  we  have  understood  Latour,
there really is no universalisable standpoint from which
subjectivity can take a view on and then critique its own
understanding  in  any  foundational  terms;  which  also
means there is no transcendent position from which an
anthropologist can critique the conditions of experience
of  another  person or  group of  people.  The role  of  the
anthropologist  is  rather  to  describe  the  enfolding  and
remaking of reality with certain actors in view. But let us
remind  ourselves  that  the  politics  of  cosmology,  both
between cosmologies and amongst groupings of people is
usually precisely aimed at organizing and ranking certain
ways of understanding the world, and, in some cases, at
the extreme, this will involve the intentional eclipsing, or
erasing, of particular points of view.
Latour  does,  though,  praise  the  potential  in
anthropology to show that there are many ways of living
a  life.  This  side-by-side  diversity  seems  to  offer  an
opportunity for a kind of critical appraisal; the process of
comparison  involved  might  also  contribute  toward  the
peaceful  negotiation  between  cosmological  views.
Sometimes  Latour  points  to  a  special  role  for
anthropologists  in  mediating  between  clashing
cosmologies (a kind of disinterested third party?), but it
is not clear at what point this mediation might become an
externalist  view  vis-à-vis  each  side;  hence  the
anthropologist  would  be  making  claims  to  intellectual
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transcendence which Latour has seemingly already ruled
out of bounds within the game of asking and giving of
reasons. In what seems like a similar vein, Viveiros de
Castro has urged anthropology to be “as the practice of
the permanent decolonization of thought” (2014). 
This, however, taking into account Latour’s argument,
feels incoherent. Viveiros de Castro appears to be asking
that we should relinquish “our” given view in favour of its
constant  variation  and  transformation  through
encounters with others’, and particularly, that we should
halt the colonisation of other people’s worlds through the
superimposition  onto  theirs  of  our  own  cosmological
models and concerns. We may well sympathise with that
proposition, but it does not seem compatible with what
Latour is telling us. Latour argues that we can negotiate
about  our  mutually  incomprehensible  cosmologies,  but
we cannot absolutely “decolonise” our view because this
would  involve  jumping  out  of  our  conjunction  in  the
network into some kind of transcendent position. At best
we can adapt our view into something else:  innovation
and transformation necessitate convention as an analogic
base, or starting point (Wagner 1981). Perhaps, then, we
would colonise in a new way but, it would seem, we do
not decolonise,  per se.  Maybe this  is  what Viveiros de
Castro already means by that phrase, one can only guess,
since here we are at the outer limits of understanding the
programme  that  they  are  laying  out,  sometimes  in  a
shared, sometimes in a distinct, register. 
Some final Remarks on subjectivity and imagining;
and the beginning of a critical response
There is  a  lot  that  is  useful  food for  thought in the
approaches  that  “the  ontologists”  (Holbraad  and
Pedersen 2014) are making available. We have mentioned
some features; the focus shifts from deploying a heavy
theoretical  machinery  vis-à-vis  social  reality  toward
closely observing the kinds of aggregates of people and
things that fieldwork affords. All this is grist for the mill
of following the lines of interconnection that the people
that we are working with in the “field” have themselves
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established as important. Researching the field from the
point  of  view  that  we  are  all  animists may  well  yield
rewards – though further questioning is necessary when
we ask on behalf of a particular situation, “in what way is
that  true?  And  how  is  it  important?”  Or,  how  to
recompose an understanding of the world or the human
in  the  singular  from  all  of  these  different  multiple
perspectives.  Do  they  add  up,  and  if  so,  how?  So,
epistemologically, there are other kinds of concern too. 
It is striking that, despite Latour’s claims, particularly
his insistence that subjectivity is always network-specific,
there is in fact a universal capacity at stake here (already
mentioned) – imagination. Human beings live in distinct
worlds,  at  least  in  part,  because  they  imagine  them
distinctly.  Some particular human being may recognise
agency in a stone or in their i-device;  this will  change
from scene to scene. In contrast, we know that all human
beings  imagine  things  and  that  this  activity  is
constitutive of what the world is like for any given human
being.  Imagining  is  a  universal  capacity  of  humans
(distinctive,  though,  we  might  add,  not  exclusive).  My
empathic  ability  (or  inability)  to  orient  myself  in
another’s world, a world that is foreign to me, is likewise
an imaginative capacity and a limiting condition (or an
absence  of  one;  see  Stein  1989).  In  contrast,  the
particular agency of stones or i-phones varies depending
on the social set-up. Imagining and reality are sometimes
opposed to each other (as are empathy and psychological
naturalism),  but  we  should  also  remind  ourselves  that
imagining is the ground from which reality is constituted
via  experience  –  there  is  no  experience  that  does  not
involve  imagining.  To  quote  Mimica,  “What  we  call
“reality”  and  “rationality”  are  its  works”  (2003:  282).
They are literally after the fact of the imagination.
If one is not philosophically a Leibnizian, one may find
it  hard  to  take  Latour’s  claims  that  objects  have
intentionality as seriously as we do the fact that human
beings imagine and thence they conjure into being highly
diverse human scenarios. The imagination is constitutive
of our perception and experience of reality – and often
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realities clash: we are not calling here on the distinction
imagination  versus  reality,  but  rather  on  the  synthetic
relation  imagination-and-reality.  However,  when
considering  Leibniz’  central  place  in  contemporary
“ontological” framings of the project of anthropology, his
role as a founder,  arguably the founder, of ethnology in
the Seventeenth  Century should  also  be  acknowledged
(Vermeulen 2015);  likewise the deep-seated differences
from  the  very  beginning  between  the  projects  of
ethnology  and  anthropology  despite  their  common
origins  in  Enlightenment  thought.  Here,  then,  we may
note  an  antithesis:  between  infinite  perspectival
extension  of  intellectuality  versus  the  limits  of  reason,
between  ethnology  and  anthropology,  between  Leibniz
and Kant.
We are all animists, then, in the sense that, in figuring
the world, and in living in it, we recognise ourselves as
enlisting  the  assistance  of  innumerable  things,  people
and  non-human-agencies  that  help  us  continue  the
project  of  a  life  with  others.  Our  claim  then  is  the
capacity  for  imagination  is  a  human  universal;  one
possessed by anthropologists in common with the people
they  work  with.  In  contrast,  the  sense  in  which
cockatoos,  khipu knots,  corporations,  i-phones,  or
financial  instruments act and have intentionality varies
from fieldsite to fieldsite. This is not at all to dictate what
people  should imagine, or to prejudge how their worlds
should look to them, let along why – certainly not to rule
out certain worlds or particular formations of reality  a
priori. Nor is it to deny that other animals have their own
respective cognitions (e.g. de Waal 2016). There is plenty
of  room to  debate  and  celebrate  how the  imagination
participates in making reality. But it is clear that the fact
of imagining does offer a universally available position of
(cosmopolitan) critique because all human beings share
this faculty. And here one is reminded of a comment by
Hannah Arendt:
Imagination… is the only inner compass we have,
we  are  contemporaries  only  as  far  as  our
imagination reaches. If we want to be at home on
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this earth, even at the expense of being at home in
this  Century,  we  must  try  to  take  part  in  the
interminable dialogue with its essence (1953). 
Anthropocentric  anxiety  is  also  anthropocenic
uncertainty.  The  older  comforting  perception  of  the
protecting hand of  Leviathan supporting mid-Twentieth
Century anthropology’s notion of culture has fragmented
–  with  mechanical  bits  and  pieces  left  in  its  place.
Meanwhile,  intensified  awareness  of  being  part  of  the
same  human  species  beyond  the  older  circles  of
sympathy accompanies and triggers contemporary fears
that  humans  have  altered  the  balance  between
themselves  and  nature  to  such  a  degree  as  to  set  off
ungovernable  ontological  effects;  perhaps  most  of  all
irreversible chaotic environmental change forced forward
by the unstoppable financialiation of the common human
landscape.  Anthropologists  were  quicker  than  most  to
diagnose the “runaway” character of global society and
the human as a “fearful god” in the midst of its creations
(1968); but in the interim the world ran away even faster
leaving  the  expert  and  their  expert  knowledge  ever
further behind. The individual human, once mechanically
severed from those it loves, hates, eats and kills – beasts,
plants,  things,  gods  –  is  also  a  homeless  being,  one
incapable  of  hospitality.  This  modernist  insight,
accelerated by contemporary facts, surely underlies part
of the urgent activity of the newer cosmopoliticians.
What the clash between the old and new cosmopolitics
highlights, then, is a central and continuing problem for
anthropology — one that is at least as much a matter of
epistemology as of ontology: ways of knowing have their
own  “ontogenesis”  (Gow  2011),  but  our  capacity  to
comprehend  this  fact  is  epistemic.  How,  imaginatively,
are  anthropologists  to  localize  the  places,  people,
concepts and experiences that compose the intellectual
apparatus that is “a fieldsite” within a larger local-global
topology, or a common cosmos writ large? What kinds of
ideas of cause and effect should ground our accounts — a
scientific  conception  of  the  cosmos?  Our  “common
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sense”,  folk  conceptions?  Is  it  instead  the  cosmos  as
expressed in the words and actions of our informants that
counts? In a world of massive human movement we can
hardly  expect  ethnographic  concepts  to  stay  in  place.
And if so is the “informant” a specific category of person
or can they truly be “anyone” (Rapport 2012)? The motto
that Leach adopted for anthropology was “only connect”
(1967),  but  how  should  we  place  their  cosmology  in
relation to our own? Should theirs be bridged to ours,
and if so, at what point? How to keep one from taking the
other  hostage?  Do  we  anthropologists  have,  anyway,
anything  approximating  to  a  unified  cosmology?
Ultimately, we may ask, what is cosmology? This renewed
problem  of  localization  (cf  Fardon  1990,  Negarestani
2014), with its concern for how to establish a ground for
anthropological  understanding,  and hence ethnography,
in many ways re-plays the inaugural moment of “modern
anthropology”,  which  has  haunted  the  history  of  the
discipline ever since, and here we return to Kant and his
original grounding of cosmopolitics in universal history.
“Humanness” is both given by nature and also a thing
of the human’s own making, Kant argues, saying this in
an era where other enlightenment thinkers,  like Hume
took the make up of the human to be universal and given.
What we call “culture” is precisely the visible byproduct
of this human self-making, for Kant. He thus makes room
for freedom in his argument: there is freedom to make
different manners of life, distinct kinds of social truths on
top of, out of, and in addition to what is naturally given.
But  his  formulation  has  come back  to  haunt  us  in  an
“anthropocenic” world,  as Lee Drummond shows in his
chapter for our volume. When it comes to an athlete like
Lance  Armstrong,  whose  seemingly  “naturally  given”
athleticism has been enhanced by drug use, the fault-line
is laid bare at the tense intersection of what is given and
what is plastic: the horizon where, as Kant would have it,
what humans may freely “make of themselves” comes up
against  what  nature  “makes  of  them”.  But  to  critique
Kant via Armstrong is, of course, to read Kant’s view of
the  nature-culture  distinction  anachronistically.  Indeed,
the  Armstrong  case  exemplifies  a  world  where  new
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entities and their chaotic effects appear constantly and
ideas about how to humanize the conflicts that arise are
themselves  diverse;  branching  off  toward  distinct
possibilities for a common human future.
 
Sturm's chapter (“What did Kant  Mean… “)  offers a
context for Kant's pragmatic and cosmopolitan viewpoint
on history, placing it  within discussions taking place in
the late 18th Century. He points to tensions that existed
during the enlightenment concerning the possibilities for
a  cosmopolitan  history.  Amongst  these  were  central
questions for historical inquiry such as: “what is human
nature?” and “how malleable is it?” “What constitutes a
cause in history?” “What part do human motives play in
historical change?” Figures such as Herder came to the
fore at this time to decry an enlightenment tendency to
project current values onto the history of other peoples
and  epochs.  Sturm  proposes  that  Kant’s  cosmopolitan
viewpoint  simultaneously  accepted  human  plasticity
without  relinquishing  the  claim  for  a  universal  human
nature. He shows how Kant's intervention in debates of
his  time  about  what  constitutes  a  rigorous  science  or
discipline  of  history,  precisely  problematises  the
givenness  of  the  "human".  In  this  sense,  Kant,  by
introducing  the  idea  of  mediating  “categories”  and
“concepts”,  inaugurates  the  possibility  of  a  modern
anthropology, one that could take humanity and human
society in all of his variability across all time and space
as its subject matter.
In that sense, Kant's opening move – his cosmopolitics
–  is  modern  anthropology's  facilitating  and  limiting
condition.  All  of  the founders –  Herder,  Alexander  and
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Durkheim and Mauss, Boas, and
Levi-Strauss  –  wrote  in  relation  to  his  anthropological
concern.  Contemporary  critiques,  even  of  Kant,  are
enabled by his intervention. Kantian thought remains the
horizon of modern anthropology,  even if  remain mostly
unaware of it (Viveiros de Castro & Goldman 2012: 426),
just  as  we  are  unaware  of  Leibniz’  role  in  initiating
ethnology (Vermeulen 2015). In this way, one could,  to
borrow a  phrase  from Whitehead,8 say  that  the  safest
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general  characterization  of  the  Euro-American
anthropological tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes  to  Kant.  We  may  think  here  of  Foucault’s
comment that while anthropologists  may feel  that they
can “do without the concept of man, they are also unable
to pass through it, for they always address themselves to
that which constitutes its outer limits” (see Piette 2015).
Hence,  the  necessity  to  come  to  terms  with  our  own
Kantian  heritage,  affirming  rather  than  disavowing  it,
making it explicit. 
Modern  anthropology  works  from  an  implicit
assumption  of  a  universal  human architectonic,  of  the
constituting role that concepts play in mediating human
thought and experience. The assumption of the concept,
and of our particular image of it, both facilitate and limit
our  capacity  as  anthropologists  and  ethnographers  to
orient and navigate what we take to be others’ “worlds”.
“Localization  is  the  constitutive  gesture  of  conception
and  the  first  move  in  navigating  spaces  of  reason”
(Negarestani 2014). For anthropology, this concerns the
problem  of  how  to  locate  oneself  in  the  field,  and
subsequently,  the  “field”  internal  to  ethnographic
description, with the added twist  of having to describe
others’ concepts in terms of our own. It is a topological
problem through and through. As Wagner notes, “every
understanding of another culture is an experiment with
one’s own” (1981: 12).
Our accounts of others’ “concepts” are only as robust
as an anthropological concept of the concept (Viveiros de
Castro 2003; cf. Corsin-Jimenez & Willerslev 2007), since
the  former  is  invented  in  terms  of  the  latter  (Wagner
1981). Our image of the concept acts as a control on the
kinds of concepts we allow ourselves to imagine to exist.
The moment we think we know a priori what a concept is,
ethnographic understanding is forestalled. We do not yet
know fully what a concept is, which is why it should be a
site of ongoing inquiry, rather than remaining given and
implicit. But what a concept is, is relative to where it is
within  a  general  ecology,  or  space,  of  concepts
(Negarestani 2015). What the Kantian turn does then is
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make explicit the assumption of the concept as both the
facilitating  and  limiting  condition  of  modern
anthropology (Zammito 2002), as both a means to and an
object of knowledge. 
What is unique about the grand project of ethnography
is, hence, that it highlights or foregrounds other people’s
capacities – imaginations, gestures, practices, and ideas –
not as sites of intervention, per se, but rather as places,
moments  or  vantage  points  from  which  to  recursively
intervene and transform our own concepts and thinking
(Holbraad  2012,   Holbraad  and  Pedersen  2017).  The
assumption that the other is analogous to us, that their
capacities (in particular their capacity for concepts) are
not  only  universal  but  also  contemporaneous  and
symmetrical  with  ours  (Fabian  1992),  rather  than
subordinate,  allows  us  radically  to  extend  our
understanding of concepts as such, and thus to transform
our anthropological image of what it is to be human, or of
what is possible for humanity. 
After  Kant  ([1798]2006),  the  hope  has  been  that  a
distinctively  anthropological  intervention  in  knowledge
about  human  nature  will  allow  us  not  only  to  better
understand the unfolding of human history,  but also to
make better interventions in it.  “Our” here, in Kantian
terms, ultimately indexes no particular society, culture or
nation state, but rather a cosmopolitical anyone and "all
of us". The idea being that by reflecting on human self-
knowledge  –  the  limits  of  humanity’s  momentary
conception  of  itself  and  its  world  –  may  allow  human
history to  become a site  of  intervention that  opens up
pragmatic potentials for further human co-dwelling in a
common  world:  earth.  Here  the  two  senses  of
cosmopolitics,  Kant's and Stengers'  are not only closer
than they originally appeared to be, but also come full
circle in the historical moment where the anthropocence
and  “world  society”  emerge  as  new  universals  (Hart
2010); ones that both implicate but also transcend any
given particular locale or region. 
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Notes
1. For a full list of the OAC series see: 
http://openanthcoop.net/press/publications/
2. See Charles Taylor on the pivotal role of Kant in re-orienting 
human self-knowledge in this direction (1985: 81-83).
3. Our account of the “new cosmopolitics” intends neither to be
comprehensive, nor to imply that it exists as a homogenous 
approach or field. There are significant differences say 
between Descola’s program and that of the “recursive” 
anthropologists (e.g. Wagner, Strathern, Viveiros de Castro,
etc), or between them and Latourian inspired “science 
studies”, or even object oriented approaches. What we 
intend instead is an account of the intellectual implications 
of these positions, exploring what they have in common in 
relation to the older Kantian sense of the “cosmopolitical”, 
in order to bring them back into dialogue with each other.
4. See http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/index
5. See 
https://sites.google.com/a/abaetenet.net/nansi/abaetextos/m
anifesto-abaet%C3%A9
6. Lyrics from “For What It's Worth” by Buffalo Springfield
7. ‘a subject will be that which comes to a point of view… the 
transformation of the object refers to a correlative 
transformation of the subject’ (Deleuze 1993:21).
8. “The safest general characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of 
footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1929).
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COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
Huon Wardle
HORATIO
O day and night, but this is wondrous strange!
HAMLET
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
(Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5)
The  paradox  of  a  ‘stranger’  welcoming  something
‘strange’ was not lost on her Tiv audience when Laura
Bohannon recounted  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet  to  them in
1950s  West  Africa:  without  a  relevant  genealogy  how
could  they  assess  the  meaning  of  the  ghost  King’s
relationship  to  Hamlet?  (Bohannon  1966).  The  same
paradox  looms in  the idea  of  a  cosmopolitan  or  world
anthropology: who plays host to whom intellectually in a
discipline  without  favoured  sites  or  privileged
genealogical  matrices?  Who  will  arbitrate  which
‘spectres’ are honoured and which are relegated (Derrida
2006)? If we accept that both the ethnographic field and
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anthropology  as a discipline  are now not simply multi-
sited  but  in  truth  ‘unsited’,  then  this  paradoxical
predicament is already with us (Cook et al.  2009, Lins
Ribeiro  2006).  Modern  anthropological  knowledge  has
always been imagined in a certain way; it comes in emic
form from a fieldsite to a centre of knowledge where it is
welcomed for  its  potential  to  inform etic  debates.  But
who will  play host and whom guest in an ethnography
and  anthropology  which  does  not  distinguish  fixed
intellectual loci or points d’appuis?
In what follows, I argue that pursuing the logic of a
cosmopolitan  anthropology  will  inevitably  open  up  a
renewed discussion on the meaning of subjectivity vis-à-
vis the social. I take as my focus a debate between Ulrich
Beck  and  Bruno  Latour  over  the  notion  of  the
cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical. Their contrary positions
signal  the  increasingly  strong  divergence  between  a
humanist and an organicist answer to the question 'what
is  a  subject'?  On  the  one  side,  Beck  stands  for  an
enduring humanism associated especially with Kant and
refracted  in  latter-day  anthropology  by  diverse  figures
including Firth, Mintz and Hannerz. For Beck, the human
subject is ‘a primary substance’ (Whitehead 1978:157): in
his stance, understanding the current condition of human
subjectivity  is  paramount  for  social  science;  other
questions are questions only relative to this substantial
one. On the other side, Latour ranks with proponents of
organicist  philosophies  and  anthropologies  including
Peirce,  James,  Whitehead,  Bateson  and,  closer  to  the
present,  Strathern.  For  these  thinkers,  subjectivity
derives its qualities from its distribution across emergent
networks: it is not a property solely or necessarily even
mainly of human individuals. The important discussion on
cosmopolitanism is not, in the first instance, then, about
whether  this  term  will  replace  other  terms  or  even
whether cosmopolitanism is a ‘good thing’; it rather has
to  do  with  the  diverging  conceptions  of  subjectivity  it
engages, and the intellectual and ethical effects of these
engagements.
This paper begins with an excursus into the debate in
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question, looking first at Beck’s cosmopolitanism then at
Latour’s  contrasting  cosmopolitics.  We  will  see  that
Latour’s  critique  revolves  around  the  proposition  that
Beck’s  cosmopolitanism  is  too  sociological  and  not
anthropological enough (Latour 2004). My worry is that
Latour’s  comparative  anthropology  may  itself  be  too
purified  -  insufficiently  comparative,  plural  or
subjectivized, but I will leave those concerns until later.
However, Latour makes some points that we undoubtedly
need  to  consider  in  arriving  at  a  distinctly
anthropological cosmopolitanism – one that accounts for
the common sense of  ethnographic knowledge.  Against
Beck’s  humanistic  cosmopolitanism,  Latour  posits  a
cosmopolitics  in  which  people,  along  with  many  non-
human agents, create conflicting natures which they then
fight over. I suggest that the positions of Beck and Latour
may usefully be triangulated with a certain type of 19th
Century skepticism or ethical egoism. Via a discussion of
Kantian common sense I  return to the issue in hand –
what  might  be  distinctive  about  an  ethnographically
informed  anthropological  cosmopolitanism?  What
assumptions concerning subjectivity might it presuppose
or  engage?  An  initial  rapprochement  between
cosmopolitics  in  the  Latourian  sense  and
cosmopolitanism may involve acknowledging the activity
of  some  of  Latour’s  non-human  agents  both  in  the
common sense of anthropologists and of their informants.
Zombie categories made visible
Ulrich  Beck  has  described  extensively  the  crisis  in
‘methodological nationalism’ that he sees at the centre of
the  fragmentation  of  latter-day  social  theory  –  and  its
cosmopolitanization (2002, 2004, 2006). The roots of this
crisis  lie  in  how  the  state  has  lost  its  metaphysical
priority as the cause, frame and context for all the social
phenomena that constitute it. There is an awareness that
most of the stock concepts of Twentieth Century social
science; the statistics that give mathematical meaning to
state practices; society (understood as a synonym of the
‘national  fallacy’  2002:29);  the  family;  the  household;
social  class  have  become  what  Beck  terms  ‘zombie
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categories’ under current conditions (2002: 24). Taking
their  meaning  each  from  the  other,  these  concepts
continue to do intellectual  work even though the lived
reality to which they refer no longer exists. The symptom
of these developments, and in certain respects the cure,
is the ‘clash of cultures and rationalities within one’s own
life’ (2002:35). Insofar as the awareness of attachments
across these supposedly bounded categories becomes an
ethical project, it lends itself to acknowledging a sense of
‘global  responsibility  in  a  world  risk  society,  in  which
there are “no others”’ (2002:35-36).
methodological  cosmopolitanism implies  a  new
politics  of  comparison…  The  monologic  national
imagination  of  the  social  sciences  assumed  that
Western modernity is a universal formation and that
the modernities of the non-Western others can be
understood only in relation to the idealized Western
model (2002:22).
In  this  new  field,  ‘there  is  not  one  language  of
cosmopolitanism,  but  many  languages,  tongues,
grammars’  (2002:35).  However,  on  this  point  Beck  is
wary  of  giving  value  to  culturally  relative
‘cosmopolitanisms’ since with this move we revert to the
conspectus of multiculturalism in which each individual
becomes ‘the product of the language, the traditions, the
convictions,  the  customs  and  landscapes  in  which  he
came  into  the  world’  (2002:35).  In  the  specific
intervention that becomes the object of Latour’s critique
(2004),  Beck argues  that  rather  than positing  multiple
and  incommensurable  forms  relative  to  one  another,
cosmopolitanism  must  be  based  on  a  type  of
contextualized universalism.
The true counterposition to incommensurability is:
there  are  no  separate  worlds  (our
misunderstandings  take  place  within  a  single
world).  The  global  context  is  varied,  mixed,  and
jumbled—in  it,  mutual  interference  and  dialogue
(however problematic, incongruous, and risky) are
inevitable  and  ongoing.  The  fake  joys  of
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incommensurability  are  escape  routes  leading
nowhere, certainly not away from our intercultural
destiny (2004:436).
It is this ‘single world’ cosmopolitanism that becomes
the focus of Latour’s criticism. Beck, Latour argues, has
taken his cosmopolitanism ‘off the shelf, from the stoics
and  Kant’  (2004:453).  For  Latour,  Stoical  and  Kantian
cosmopolitanism both imply an ‘already unified cosmos’
(Latour 2005:262,fn362).  I  will  dispute this further on,
but it is certainly true that this represents Beck’s stance
– we have each internalized ‘jumbled’ versions of a single
world (Beck 2004:436). Further, in Latour’s view, it is no
use  our  continuing  to  say  that  if  only  we could  agree
about  the one world we all  inhabit  then our  problems
could  be  resolved:  we  do  not  inhabit  one  world  but
instead  a  pluriverse  of  divergently  mediated  worlds
(‘pluriverse’  being  an  adoption  from  William  James,
1909).  In the sense that  people  will  not give up these
multiple  worlds  without  a  fight,  then  they  are
incommensurable.  In an ironic echo of  Kant’s proposal
that  enlightenment  consists  in  throwing  off  a  ‘self-
imposed immaturity’ (Kant 1983:41), Latour tells us that
instead  of  continuing  to  appeal  to  a  shared  (human)
nature,  Westerners  need  to  jettison  the  Eurocentric
‘exoticism they have imposed on themselves’ (2004b:43);
that is to say, they need to join the others in recognising
many, variably mediated, natures.
As  elsewhere  in  his  writing,  on  this  point  Latour  is
fulsome in his approval of Viveiros de Castro’s account of
Amerindian  multinaturalism  (Latour  2009).  Unlike
Westerners who hold that there is one nature but many
cultures,  Amerindians  entertain  many  natures  and  a
single anthropomorphic culture. For Amazonian indians
the specific natural  form of  an entity  hides its general
anthropomorphic  meta-structure.  Latour  presents  the
parable  of  a  fight  between  Amerindians  and
conquistadores:  Amerindians debate whether Spaniards
have  bodies  while  Spaniards  discourse  over  whether
Amerindians  have  souls  –  there  is  no  shared  nature
regarding which their  arguments can be resolved.  The
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most important lesson here from Latour’s point of view is
that the stabilization of any given form of nature involves
the  mobilization  of  hosts  of  non-human  agents  who
intervene,  interfere  and play  diverse  negotiative  roles;
whether  as  divinities,  test  tube  cells,  DNA profiles,  or
‘non-material  couplings’  (1996).  No  purpose,  then,  in
invoking  Amerindians  as  participants  in  a  shared
cosmopolitan  future:  Amazonian  Indians  ‘are  already
globalized  in  the  sense  that  they  have  no  difficulty  in
integrating “us” into “their” cosmologies. It is simply that
in  their  cosmic  politics  we do not  have the place that
“we” think we deserve’ (2004:457,fn13).
Latour’s cosmopolitics is, hence, not simply a struggle
between human individuals and their diverse worldviews,
it  is  a  fight  between human subjects  plus  all  the non-
human actors who participate (and can be thought of as
having  an  interest)  in  the  mediation  and
institutionalisation  of  specific  fields  of  nature-and-
culture. Thus Latour defines subjectivity in the following
pragmatic  (some  might  say  generous)  way:  ‘every
assemblage  that  pays  the  price  of  its  existence  in  the
hard currency of recruiting and extending is, or rather
has,  subjectivity’  (2005:218).  This  formulation  has  the
effect – and this is of course central to Latour’s project -
of  reanimating,  repersonalising  and  resubjectivising
numerous  inert  or  ‘dead’  commodities,  categories,
symbols,  properties  and  objects,  and  making  their
cosmopolitical role visible and analytically crucial.
Subjectivity  amidst  a  multitude  of  Gods  and
Demons?
This  matter  of  redefining  subjectivity  is  surely  the
most fundamental point of divergence between Beck and
Latour.  In  Beck’s  stance,  subjectivity  remains  without
question  a  property  of  human  individuals.  For  him,
cosmopolitanisation further pushes to the front the only
kind of subjectivity that counts – the subjectivity of the
thinking and acting human individual. As he states, ‘the
question “who am I?” is now irrevocably separated from
origins  and  essences’  (2004:449):  cosmopolitanisation
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entails  intensified individualisation.  Without  resort  to a
frictionless ethnic or national mandate, individual human
subjects  increasingly  must  answer  directly  to  (and
ethically  for)  the  multitude  of  ‘gods  and  demons’
populating their versions of the world (Weber 1948:148).
At the same time, despite their divergence, an emphasis
on  re-envisioning  subjectivity  is  shared  by  Latour  and
Beck precisely because both eschew Twentieth Century
social  constructionism.  Beck  shows  how  the  category
‘society’  has  crumbled  because  the  ‘transnational’  has
become  so  irrefutably  knotted  into  every  aspect  of
subjective  experience.  The  ‘national  fallacy’  may,
nonetheless, become intensified in these conditions. Even
while it has lost its ‘institutional or geographical fixity’,
the state continues to act – individuals are still forced to
build  their  practices  around  its  manifold  intrusions
(Trouillot 2001:126). But, Beck argues, nationality has at
the same time become decreasingly  comprehensible  in
value-rational  terms:  belonging  to  a  particular  nation-
state has dwindling value as an explanation of anything
else.  Latour,  in  the  same vein,  indicates  the futility  of
invoking a ‘society’ that lies behind, and at the same time
explains, every political manoeuvre apart from itself:
To  insist  that  behind  all  the  various  issues  there
exists the overarching presence of the same system,
the  same  empire,  the  same  totality,  has  always
struck  me  as  an  extreme  case  of  masochism,  a
perverted  way  to  look  for  a  sure  defeat  while
enjoying the bittersweet feeling of superior political
correctness. Nietzsche traced the immortal portrait
of  the ‘man of  resentment’,  by which he meant a
Christian, but a critical sociologist would fit just as
well (2005:252).
Latour  and  Beck  share  something  very  significant,
then:  they  reject  a  cornerstone  of  classic  sociological
critique  and  in  so  doing  they  reach  back  to  social
philosophies  that  predate  ‘society’  as  an  analytical
category.  For  Beck  this  involves  an  explicit  return  to
Kant. Meanwhile Latour, as we have seen, calls on the
pragmatism of Peirce and James in support of his revised
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sociology of actors and networks. But this reaching back
takes them in distinct directions.
The  reversed  gaze  beyond  Twentieth  Century  social
theory  is  a  highly  significant  facet  of  the  current
intellectual dialogues around cosmopolitanism: there is a
search for  a  conceptual  language and this  can involve
either  a  redefinition  of  concepts  already  in  play,  new
coinings, or a return to parallel dialogues from the past.
Here I will briefly triangulate the position of Latour and
Beck by introducing a relatively unknown mid-Nineteenth
Century  social  philosopher,  Max  Stirner,  into  their
controversy. Stirner, if  not the most subtle of debaters,
nonetheless  brings  some  of  the  relevant  issues  into
strong  contrast.  ‘Saint  Max’  as  Engels  and  Marx
nicknamed him (1963), was one of the Young Hegelians
who clustered in Berlin in the 1840s. It  seems that he
was amongst the quietest of that group (Mackay 2005).
He published his only significant book, The Ego and its
Own, in 1844. The foundational stance of the Ego and its
Own is  that  the entire  array of  apparently  humanizing
institutions  –  the  state,  humanity,  human  rights,  man,
society, marriage, family and money comprise ‘spooks’ or
‘fixed  ideas’  not  absolutely  different  to  the  gods  and
ghosts of previous eras. The idea of ‘man’ or humanity is
as much a ‘spook’ as is the ‘nation’ which it appears to
transcend.  These  concepts  stand  in  an  authoritarian
relationship to the individual ego which is unable to know
itself while they continue to dominate its consciousness.
Nationalist,  revolutionary  and  humanist  movements
evidence in common a generalized respect for Man, or
the  Citizen,  or  the  Party  Member  alongside  a  uniform
contempt for the individual as an individual ego.
The inability  of the self  to distinguish itself  from its
own  fixed  ideas  is  ubiquitous,  argues  Stirner.  ‘How
ridiculously  sentimental’,  he  comments,  ‘when  one
German grasps another’s hand and presses it with sacred
awe because “he too is a German”’ (1907:302). Anyone
who rejects incorporation into marriage or fatherland or
humankind is labeled an ‘egoist’; but it is the label that
reveals  the  sanctity  of  the  specific  category,  the
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particular  ‘spook’.  As  a  young  Hegelian,  Stirner’s
narrative of how the ego (‘I who really am I’) comes to
know  itself  vis-à-vis  these  other  lion-skinned  ‘thistle-
eaters’ is historical and dialectical:
What manifold robbery have I not put up with in the
history  of  the  world!  There  I  let  sun,  moon,  and
stars,  cats  and  crocodiles,  receive  the  honour  of
ranking as I; there Jehovah, Allah, and Our Father
came and were invested with the I; there families
and tribes, peoples and at last Mankind, came and
were honored as I’s;  there the Church,  the State,
came with the pretention to be I, and I gazed calmly
on… so I saw I above me, and outside me, and could
never really come to myself. (1907:294-295).
To which  a  latter-day  commentator  might  add:  ‘here  I
allowed multinational corporations, private security firms
and CCTV cameras to act extraterritorially as ‘I’;  there
supermarkets,  university  ethics  committees,  banks and
lobby  groups,  web  portals  and  credit  agencies  ranked
themselves unquestioned as ‘I’, while I, ‘who really am I’,
continued to draw money from the cash point.
Stirner’s ethical egoism demands that any principle or
idée fixe that I invoke I should appropriate as a principle
for  myself  alone.  The ‘money’  I  use is  therefore not  a
metaphysical money somehow independent of myself, but
is rather my money -  money according to me; likewise
any of the other ‘spooks’ that are important for how I act
or think. The others likewise speak, not in the name of
some further  ‘moral,  mystical,  or  political  person’,  but
from their  own unique ego (1907:294).  In  response  to
Fichte’s  humanistic  ‘transcendental  idealism’,  Stirner
posits a ‘transitory egoism’ that rejects the assimilation
of  myself  into  any  other  transcendent  human  ‘I’
(1907:237). Taking back ‘the thoughts [that] had become
corporeal  on  their  own  account…  I  destroy  their
corporeity… and I say “I alone am corporeal”’ (1907:16).
I will act, then, only in accord with whatever principles
guide my action because those ideas alone truly exist for
me  and  I  will  assume  that  the  others  will  act  with
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consideration to their fixed ideas and spooks.
Curiously, the more we read about Stirner’s ‘egoism’,
the more we may feel there is something self-less about
it.  If,  as  Stirner  suggests,  I  accept  that  my  limits  are
purely of my own subjective making then I relinquish the
fundamental egoist’s rationale that the remit of my idees
fixes should expand where and when I please because my
ideas  must  be  true  objectively  for  all.  In  contrast,
Stirnerian skepticism - the extension of an indifference
regarding  the  presuppositions  of  others  into  how  I
consider  my  own principles  -  rather  than exemplifying
egoism,  suggests  instead  a  stance  that  Bakhtin  calls
‘playing  a  fool’.  In  Bakhtin’s  account,  a  ‘self-
consciousness’  may emerge for the ego whereby,  in its
attempts  to  extricate  itself  from  the  rhythm  of  its
relations with others, it ‘has passed all bounds and wants
to draw an unbreakable circle around itself’ (1990:120).
Hence, perhaps, the element of holy idiocy suggested in
Marx’s nickname for Stirner.
However, some important themes emerge here. On the
one  hand,  the  strident  emphasis  on  ethical
individualization  connects  closely  with  Beck,  on  the
other,  the  recognition  of  how  non-human  agents  or
‘spooks’ participate as actors in the lives of individuals is
significantly  Latourian,  albeit  that  Latour  is  more
generous  towards  his  ‘actants’  (2005).  Speaking
teleologically, Stirner occupies a pre-Durkheimian world
where  individuality  can  still  be  thought  of  without
reference  to  a  society  that  preconditions  it.  He  can
nonetheless cognise some of the forces that will coalesce
to  establish  that  understanding.  We  should  remind
ourselves that Stirner lived in a German milieu that was
ideologically but not socially or politically unified – the
disparity  between  the  exercise  of  power,  subjective
imagining and shared sentiment was all  too obvious to
him. Either way, Stirner would surely have agreed with
Beck about the historical processes leading to individual
self-recognition and no doubt he would have approved of
Beck’s description of ‘zombie categories’ so close as it is
to  his  own  notion  of  the  ‘spook’.  Stirner  would
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nonetheless  have  disapproved  of  the  further  idealistic
step towards a shared cosmopolitan project. With Latour,
he would have concurred that we live in many disparate
worlds  in  the  company  of  a  multitude  of  non-human
agents, though, again, he would strongly have disavowed
the intellectual decentring that enables Latour to equate
the subjectivity  of  these ‘spooks’  with my own self  -  ‘I
who really am I’.
The point in contention is not simply that Nineteenth
and  Eighteenth  Century  intellectual  conditions  seem
suddenly  more  familiar;  that  these  parallel
conceptualisations appear more than ever synchronously
available and salient as part of our own apprehensions.
The  problem  can  be  posed  another  way:  what  stands
between these perspectives and our moment is Twentieth
Century mechanistic  nationalism and the sociology and
anthropology  that  accompanied  it.  Perhaps  there  are
ways nonetheless of thinking through, round and beyond
that monolith.
To begin with we need to take heed of the conceptual
revision that is entering the foreground. The Twentieth
Century use of the word 'culture' familiarized us with the
idea  of  a  system of  signs  that  could  be  grammatically
ordered  and  exchanged  at  the  collective  and  personal
levels.  One  thing  that  Latour  -  and  Stirner  too  in
retrospect - tells us is that the matter is not so simple at
all: the entities we have come to call cultural signifiers or
symbols are not inert exchangeables, nor do they fall into
place within mechanical systems: instead they act on us
and  for  us;  they  are,  in  this  sense,  agents  with
subjectivity  of  their  own.  And,  as  Beck  indicates,  they
may well - are likely to - have a life after their own death.
Whatever  social  science  now  emerges  will  have  to
encompass those insights within its own common sense:
we need to rethink the common sense of anthropology
looking backward and forward.
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The common sense of cosmopolitan knowledge and
ethics
The loss of  interpretive power of social  and cultural
constructionism  is  by  no  means  a  new  predicament;
Hannerz  has  explored  extensively  the  ecumenical
situations  and  orientations  that  this  loss  opens  up  for
view (1989, 1997, 2006). As long ago as the 1950s, Firth
had  indicated  how  social  boundaries  are  ‘in  any  case
arbitrary… [human beings]  are  continually  overcoming
barriers  to  social  intercourse’  (1951:28).  Nevertheless,
Beck  and  Latour  combined  present  us  with  new
challenges  for  how  we  rethink  both  the  modes  of
communication  and the models  of  subjectivity  that  are
now in question. Since I want to bring Kant to my aid in
exploring these issues without jettisoning either Beck or
Latour, I must first dispute Latour’s argument that Kant
offers  us  the  cosmopolitanism  of  an  ‘already  unified
cosmos’ (Latour 2005:262,fn362). It seems one thing to
criticize Kant for his unified architectonics of subjectivity,
rather  different  to  suggest  that  the  cosmos  that  this
subjectivity  confronts  is  itself  already  completed  for
Kant. My suggestion here, which builds on earlier work,
is that Kantian common sense offers a distinctive frame
for figuring what is involved in a cosmopolitan imaginary
and by extension for understanding the current common
sense of anthropology (Wardle 1995, 2000).
Cosmopolitan ethics and knowledge are closely tied in
Kant’s writings with the capacity for reflective judgement
[1.  Kant’s  teleological  reflection  on  world  history  in
Perpetual Peace (1795) pursues his detailed inspection of
teleological  thinking  in  the  Critique  of  Judgement
(1790).] (Arendt 2003, Kant 1983, 1952:96-97). Reflective
Judgement, as Veblen tells us, can be understood as the
‘faculty  of  search…  the  faculty  of  adding  to  our
knowledge something which is not and cannot be given in
experience’ (1884:264). Those who consider Kant to have
taken for granted the outcome of this search (a unified
cosmos) have in Veblen’s  words ‘taken up the Critique
wrong  end  foremost’  (1884:263).  Subjectively,
cosmopolitanism exemplifies not a world that is already
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unified but a reflective search for unification which takes
place with others in  mind.  The shifting horizon of  our
judgement at any given moment is whatever ‘everything’,
whatever ‘cosmos’  we can summon to encompass what
we know. Far from being unified before the event, our
cosmopolitanism  is  fundamentally  relative  to  each
situation of subjective judgment.
Hannah  Arendt  ends  her  essay  ‘Some  questions  of
moral philosophy’  by drawing on what Kant has to say
about common sense in his Critique of Judgement (Kant
1983, Arendt 2003). She argues that what he states there
should act as a central point of reference for those who
wish to understand ethics after Nazism. In Arendt’s view,
this final Critique of Kant’s, surpasses the rational ethics
of the Critique of Practical Reason. The fascist disaster
was  not  caused,  Arendt  suggests,  by  a  failure  of
rationality  (Nazi  functionaries  were  rational  enough;
overly capable of applying a purely technical reasoning to
human affairs) the failure was rather one of judgement,
an incapacity to judge commonsensically that the rational
procedures in question were universally monstrous and
wrong. She points to Kant’s treatment of ‘common sense’
in  aesthetic  terms.  Kant  answers  the  potential
fragmentation and individualization of public knowledge
by examining the subjective ability to organize communal
knowledge  through  an  aesthetics  of  common  sense
judgement.
Arendt  argues  that  each  of  my  common  sense
judgements,  results  from  an  imaginative  process  that
involves  me  in  exploring  the  field  of  associations  that
make up the community to which I understand myself to
belong. Community is here radically relative to my own
striving  and  imagining;  it  could  well  include  known
individuals  but  it  might  equally  involve  the  heroes  of
novels or films, dead relatives, figures I know from the
pages of wikipedia, people who I observe on the street
but whom I never choose to keep actual company with. I
am as a result ‘considerate in the original sense of the
word, [I] consider the existence of [these] others and…
try to win their  agreement,  to “woo their  consent,”  as
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Kant puts it’  (Arendt 2003:142). I cannot communicate
concretely  with  Elias  Canetti  or  Fellini’s  filmic  hero
Guido, but I may well have them in mind in arriving at
certain judgements (the sense in which I try to woo their
consent  is  complex,  of  course).  In  this  regard,  when I
explored  the  cosmopolitan  imaginings  of  my  Jamaican
friends in earlier work, I realize in retrospect that I did
not always take full account of how the spirits of the dead
and other divinities can be interactively present in how
situations are imagined and common sense judgements
arrived at (Wardle 2000; I have explored these issues in
more  recent  work  2007).  Particularly,  given  his  early
flirtation with Swedenborgism (De Beaumont 1919), Kant
would have understood the part played by the voices and
visions that told Socrates to cross-examine the Athenian
pretenders to wisdom (Plato 1997).
Common sense (unlike pragmatic moral reasoning in
Kant’s view) is, again, an aesthetic faculty not a matter of
logic.  The  common  sense  of  a  particular  individual
includes  their  distinctive  gestus,  their  tonality,  the
particular rhythm of that person’s modes of expression in
arriving  at  judgement.  It  describes  a  style  of
characterising  events  and  objects  imaginatively  and
applying  these  patterns  judiciously  to  particular
situations. Of course how an individual’s common sense
expressiveness looks to an observer is incommensurable
with  how  common  sense  is  experienced  in  the  first
person.  Either  way,  this  judiciousness  is  not  simply  a
matter of organizing perceptions correctly or not: on this
it is worth quoting Arendt at length.
The point of the matter is that my judgement of a
particular  instance  [depends]…  upon  my
representing  to  myself  something  which  I  do  not
perceive. Let me illustrate this: suppose I look at a
specific  slum  dwelling  and  I  perceive  in  this
particular building the general notion which it does
not  exhibit  directly,  the  notion  of  poverty  and
misery.  I  arrive  at  this  notion  by  representing  to
myself how I would feel if I had to live there, that is
I try to think in the place of the slum dweller. The
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judgement  I  come  up  with  will  by  no  means
necessarily be the same as that of the inhabitants…
but it will become an outstanding example for my
further judging of these matters. (2003:140)
Common sense is, hence, an active capacity: it entails
the ability to search out and organize the examples and
exemplars we need in order to form judgements about
people and situations.
True to his Copernican turn, for Kant, common sense
is  hence a  subjective  faculty,  not  an  objective  body  of
knowledge or a closed set of rules of thumb. And, from
the  objectivist  standpoint  of  social  science,  Kantian
common sense appears as, once more, radically relative.
There is no need to assume that we may be able to map
one  individual’s  ‘common  sense’  onto  another’s  even
though,  subjectively,  common  sense  strives  toward
universal validity. Common sense judgement may arrive
at a moment of objectifiable decisiveness (a box ticked or
not,  for  example)  but  it  has  of  itself  no  measurable
properties only qualities: our understanding of common
sense must take account of the ‘very great difference of
minds’ as Kant puts it (2006:124). Nonetheless, as Arendt
argues:
The validity of my judgements will ‘reach as far as
the community of which my common sense makes
me a member – Kant who thought of himself as a
citizen of  the  world,  hoped it  would reach to  the
community of mankind (Arendt 2003:140)
The  exercise  of  common  sense  is,  furthermore,
reflexive. In his Anthropology, Kant encourages us first,
to  ‘think  for  oneself’;  second,  to  think  oneself  ‘in  the
place  of  every  other  person’  with  whom  one  is
communicating; third, to think ‘consistently with oneself’
(Kant 2006:124,Wardle 2000:130). ‘Every other person’
surely means here not every person with whom I could
communicate in some concrete setting according to some
acknowledged  standard  of  measurement,  but  rather
every  other  person  whose  personal  standpoint  I  can
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imaginatively ‘bear in mind’ in such and such a regard.
Hence,  Kant  construes  a  triadic  process  of  reflexive
refinement which consists in (1) knowing my own mind
(2)  considering  fully  (enough)  the  standpoints  of  the
others (3) bringing this diversity into a kind of judicious
consistency (back to 1). Here is Arendt’s gloss: ‘while I
take  into  account  others  when  judging,  this  does  not
mean  that  I  conform in  my  judgment  to  theirs.  I  still
speak with my own voice and I  do not count  noses in
order to arrive at what I think is right.’ (2003:140-141)
This refinement of common sense is, as Simmel would
say,  a  progressus  ad  infinitum:  newer,  more  highly
differentiated, diversely informed judgements constantly
come to mind even while others are forgotten or perhaps
remain only half cognized (1978:118). There is no point
at  which  I  am  able  to  say  ‘I  now  possess  as  much
common  sense  as  I  need’.  Arendt’s  argument  is  that
ethics requires the constant intellectual traversing of the
community  to  which  I  imagine  myself  to  belong.  The
scope of common sense is a function of the narrowness or
broadness of association that I am capable of organizing
in this way and the judgements that result. She posits a
situation  in  which  someone  cites  Bluebeard  as  their
moral exemplar – such a person we can try to avoid. The
far  more  dangerous  individual  is,  instead,  the  one  for
whom  ‘any  company  would  be  good  enough’,  who  is
incapable  of  considering  others  in  the  moral-aesthetic
frame of judgement. In conclusion, reiterating the well-
known  phrase,  Arendt  comments  how  in  ‘the
unwillingness  or  inability  to  relate  to  others  through
judgement… lies the banality of evil’ (2003:146).
Note how Stirner’s ethical egoism observes stages (1)
and (2) of the Kantian progressus, but disables him from
engaging in (3). Kant saw beyond the predicament that
Stirner  finds  himself  in.  Stirner  conflates  thinking  for
oneself (as a correlate of individualization) with the idea
that in my judgments I can only have myself in mind: on
the contrary, Kant suggests, I constantly displace myself
in favour of the others in order to judge in ways that have
the potential  to  be  generally  true,  not  merely  true for
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myself. What Stirner sees as a monstrous relinquishing of
the  self  to  fetishes  and  ghosts,  Kant  recognizes  as  a
necessary moment in the process of arriving at a moment
of  judgement  -  so  long  as  I  am  indeed  thinking
individually.  It  seems unlikely,  though, that Kant would
have  guessed  the  degree  of  significance  that  all-or-
nothing  decision-making  would  later  take  for  the
existentialists whereby every choice is a test of the self’s
faith in itself.
How does this subjective picturing of common sense
help  us  to  consider  the  disputed  vision  of
cosmopolitanism versus cosmopolitics? There is already,
of  course,  a  historical  trajectory  in  which  Kant’s
subjective sense of community meets and is transformed,
on  the  one  side  into  Weber’s  ‘subjectively  believed’
ethnic  belonging  (1978b:  391)  and,  on  the  other,  into
Simmel’s  subjectively  organized  ‘web  of  group-
affiliations’  (1955).  The  mid-Twentieth  century
interactionists with their emphasis on subjective choice
between cultural-symbolic options are also inheritors of
Kant, but they echo only rather distantly the qualities of
Kant’s  original  description.  Their  attempts  to  find  a
systematics as rationally convincing as Durkheim’s took
them further  and further  away from the aesthetic  and
imaginative dimensions of the Third Critique. But if the
systematism of  Durkheimian society  is  now redundant,
then  this  also  throws  doubt  on  the  interactionists’
answer:  interactionism  as  originally  conceived  will
always be on the look out for social systems to critique in
terms of rational subjective choice. Intersystems theory,
which starts with a similar problematic, relies, likewise,
on  a  ‘system’  that  is  then,  so  to  speak,  crossed  out
(Palmie 2006:441).
A considerate cosmopolitics?
For  the  task  in  hand,  instead  of  extending  our
historical survey further (a useful mission),  we need to
put  some  Latourian  tests  to  Kant’s  common  sense.  In
particular, we need to ask how incorporative can Kantian
common  sense  be  of  the  kinds  of  non-human
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subjectivities Latour demands that we include? However,
once we have pursued that question, it seems fair to turn
the tables and ask in return; how capable are these non-
human  subjectivities  of  making  common  sense
judgements?  What  capacities  for  moral  aesthetic
‘consideration’  can  we expect  of  these  other  subjects?
Let us remind ourselves of Latour’s generous definition
of subjectivity.  Agents and actants are characterized by
their ‘subjectivity’; the big issue is that there are many
more of these subjects  in heaven and earth than were
dreamt of by Twentieth Century sociology. Subjectivity is
acquired by becoming a gathering point in a network and
by demonstrating the further ability to ‘recruit others’:
many, many actants can apply and become qualified on
this basis (2005:218). And, whatever subjectivity is, it is
certainly not given  a priori;  on the contrary,  as Latour
puts it, ‘[y]ou need to subscribe to a lot of subjectifiers to
become a  subject,  and you need  to  download  a  lot  of
individualizers to become an individual’ (2005:216).
As  Latour  observes,  non-human  agents  have  always
held  centre  stage  in  the  ethnographic  worlds  of
anthropologists;  whether  as  baloma  spirits,  patrilineal
ancestors, yams or cassowaries. And as Strathern shows,
accounting  for  the  relations  making up  these  persons,
and the relationships between them, has been integral to
social anthropology as a project (1990). In ethnographic
accounts, non-human persons quite openly participate in
the day to day lives of the humans around them: Tallensi
ancestors  punish  recalcitrant  entrepreneurs  (Fortes
1959); yams decide to roam across the Dobuan gardens
during  the  night  thus  threatening  the  matrilineage
(Fortune  1963:108);  or,  in  a  case  I  am  more  directly
familiar with, Saints instruct city dwelling Jamaicans to
go out and warn of impending destruction (Wardle 2007).
In many respects, as anthropologists, we can agree with
Latour that ‘humans have always counted less than the
vast  population  of  divinities  and  lesser  transcendental
entities that give us life’ (2004:456). But the question in
response  might  be  ‘counted’  for  whom?  ‘counted’  by
whom?
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First  let  us  consider  again  some  of  the  ethical
dimensions. What Latour is asking of Western cosmology
is a repersonalisation of the invisible agents – machines,
pandemic diseases, state practices which, while officially
inert,  act  de  facto as  subjects.  Would  it  help  our
understanding of liberal ethics if we came to recognise
how Israel or Iran act not merely as a ‘symbols’ or even
as determining systems, but as subjects instigating and
authorising reactions?  The anthropomorphism might  at
least be more honest. None of this is in fact ruled out by
how Kant describes the aesthetics of common sense: we
consider the examples and exemplars who partake in the
community  of  our  imagination  and  we  make  our
judgements  ‘without  counting  noses’.  The  dilemma
derives not from this direction – my human subjectivity –
but from the other side: can I expect ‘consideration’ from
these non-human agents; will they consider me as part of
their  community,  a  community  of  humans  and  non-
humans? What kind of ethical behaviour may I expect –
the  unbending  Tallensi  ancestor?  The  humorous  and
unreliable  Jamaican  Saint?  Certainly  if  we  able  to
recognize their field of associations as Arendt recognizes
Bluebeard,  we  can  at  least  make  some  relevant
judgements.
However there are anthropological problems too, and
they take us back to where we began. Any anthropologist
who works closely with Amerindianists must surely view
as problematic the amount of weight a strikingly reified
Amazonian Indian ‘cosmology’ bears in Latour’s account.
Let  us consider  the five century  long process  that  the
term ‘Amerindian’ represents, that is to say the process
by  which  people  recognized  as  ‘Indians’  became
American  Indians.  Viveiros  de  Castro  would  have  us
believe  that  this  process  has  reached  a  point  where
Amerindians have ‘no difficulty’  in integrating ‘us’  into
‘their’ cosmology (Latour 2004:457,fn13). Not for ‘them’,
then,  the  ‘self-reflexivity  of  divergent  entangled
cosmopolitan  Modernities’  as  Beck  puts  it  (Beck
2004:36). In this vista, the Amerindians exist outside the
constant  mediations,  the  typical  interchange  of
personnel,  the  repeated  ‘overtaking’  that  characterizes
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the actor-network in Paris (Latour 2005). Perhaps more
pertinently,  the  Brazilian  nation  as  an  actant,  for
example, is as utterly invisible in this Amazonian Indian
cosmology  as  is  the  cosmology’s  role  as  an  actant  in
South  American  national  mythology.  Does  Latour’s
pluriverse  necessitate  a  purified  self-organising
cosmology  for  which  Amerindians  are  the  outstanding
metonym?  These  are,  surely,  ways  of  thinking  that
anthropologists  have  learnt  to  treat  with  extreme
suspicion. Is it possible then that Latour’s pluriverse is
insufficiently plural? More consideration seems needed.
Conversing  at  the  edge  of  time:  an  ethnographic
example by way of conclusion
It  is  March 2004. I  am standing on the edge of the
road  with  Lazarus  watching  the  early  morning  traffic
running  into  Kingston,  Jamaica.  Lazarus  is  an  elderly
Blue  Mountain  coffee  farmer  of  Middle  Eastern
extraction: his parents fled Southern Lebanon to the West
Indies in 1948. He owns about 25 acres of hillside crop
and, every Friday, brings his workers down to drink white
rum in  the  local  bars  here.  Lazarus  and  I  are  talking
about the war in Iraq that we have been watching via
CNN  news  broadcasts  over  the  last  few  days.  Our
conversation  begins  with  apparently  shared  common
sense assumptions and judgements. We both agree that
the invasion was illegal according to international law, it
will  probably  spark a civil  war and is certain to breed
more violence. When I speak, I draw on the catalogue of
ideas and rhetorics that I have gleaned from the news
media and hearsay, shaped through previous discussions
with those around me. Lazarus concurs with what I say,
but his field of examples and exemplars includes a range
of  distinct  elements  and his  narrative  moves  toward a
quite different, and in effect absolute, endpoint.
You see, Britain is the lost tribe of Israel: that is why
it  ever run things in the world.  But now America
take over. You know about the stone of Scone that
was under the throne of England in time past? It
hold the power. That stone send to America with the
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Mayflower.  Now  America  take  over.  You  see  the
British  must  control  the  Black  because  once
Hannibal  have control  over the British them. And
Black rule hard, man: them make the people bend
over and fuck him in the arse; fuck him, man. So
that is why the British must ever control the Black.
But  now  that  power  pass  to  America.  Book  of
Revelations - America, man, are the lamblike beast
come to rule the world in the last days.
For me to understand Lazarus’ way of framing these
issues requires a complicated exchange of  standpoints.
For the moment, I am interested primarily in the form or
morphology  of  his  discussion  rather  than  its  meaning.
When I, so to speak, step into my own shoes as a white
middle  class  European  I  am used  to  seeing  the  world
perspectivally. In a perspectival image the vista recedes
towards  an  actual-imaginative  vanishing  point.  Things
nearer to me are larger,  more sharply focused: objects
further  toward  the  horizon  are  decreasingly
distinguishable, less fully meaningful and smaller. This is
the ordering principle carried into our conversation both
by the CNN broadcasts that are its focus and by my own
ways of thinking and talking – the assumption of a certain
kind  of  relation  between  centre  and  horizon.  What,
however, if my personhood were defined by being one of
those ‘distant’ subjects/objects nearer the horizon? It is
not  that  Lazarus  disagrees  with  my  presentation.  His
response,  though,  suggests  a  transformation  of  my
perspectival  ordering  somewhat  along  these  lines:  to
take up his standpoint (more like a dream compared to
my  initial  version  of  reality)  is  to  occupy  a  position
bizarrely close to the vanishing point. Looking outwards
from where Lazarus stands,  I  am confronted by actors
who become monstrously  larger  the further  away they
are;  their  activities  have  no  horizon,  but  their
overwhelming  centrality  makes  inevitable  my
disappearance.
In Lazarus’ account, mental objects familiar enough to
me from my childhood  education  -  the  Mayflower,  the
stone  of  Scone  -  have  taken  on  radically  distinct
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dimensions, activities and relationships to their place in
the kinds of nationalist configurations I am familiar with.
Hannibal,  the  threat  to  civilisation  of  my  school  days,
figures  for  Lazarus  as  a  violent  and  sexually  unruly
African who, briefly jumping out of the correct ordering
of  space-time,  is  quickly  returned  to  the  horizon  once
more. America, a titanic entity, has come to hasten the
end of my fellow indistinguishable others – ‘the black’.
Social  causality  is  certainly  not  here  the  measured
rippling  outwards  of  benefits  toward  the  periphery
posited  by  the  perspectival  politics  of  diffusion  or
modernisation: we might picture it instead as a kind of
implosion of forces as smaller actors are sucked towards
the larger body: an event that marks the end of all causal
relationships and all time, the End of All Things.
We are faced, then, with the Arendtian task of trying to
understand  the  common sense  of  others  by  getting  to
grips  with  our  own.  A  fundamental  subjective  work  I
engage  in  with  regard  to  my  available  knowledge  is
surely that of folding cultural discordances back into my
common sense by way of the coherent judgements I make
about  the  present  (the  narratorial  centre  of  which  is
inevitably  myself).  This  entails  being  able  to  map  my
subjective  experiences  cosmologically;  to  gives  these
elements universal, cosmic validity.  There is a constant
traversing  between  my  pragmatic  subjective
engagements  with  others  and  a  referencing  and
legitimating  of  these  engagements  by  reference  to  a
cosmos (whatever examples and exemplars are available
to  me).  That  process  provokes  special  difficulties  and
resulting stratagems in a place like Kingston. Jamaicans
including  Lazarus  recognise  themselves  as  thoroughly
modern. Fundamentally, they accept the all-importance of
the individual as both a claimer of rights and as a maker
of  contracts  with  others.  Tradition  and  habit  are,  by
contrast,  contingent  and  subject  to  the  transformative
power  of  free  will  (Wardle  2000).  But  within  what
cosmological  or  metaphysical  ordering  can  Lazarus
legitimately make these contracts and claim these rights?
His response is both cosmopolitan and cosmopolitical -
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if  we  take  the  key  elements  of  Beck’s  and  Latour’s
analyses. In a Beckian sense, he does not ask to be freed
from a world that holds the potential of being sharable.
In  his  worldview  the  process  of  making  meaning  is
thoroughly  subjectivized,  thoroughly  individualized  and
this certainly seems the aspect that corresponds most to
my  way  of  seeing  also.  At  the  same  time  there  is  a
cosmopolitics  here  also  which  transfigures  the
fundamental spatial and temporal matrix of the ‘nature’
involved.  There  is,  for  instance,  no  deferring  of  moral
judgement historically in his nature because it is about to
come to an end.  We both  recognize,  at  least  in  broad
brush,  the  same  actants  –  Britain,  the  United  States;
constitutional  symbols,  but  what  we  might  call  their
cosmological  distribution,  size  and  efficacy  is  quite
distinctly staged. When compared with Lazarus’ sharply
delineated view, my imagining of these entities becomes
a little confused and vague – historical time and a certain
kind of  perspectival  presentiment mediate it,  but  I  am
now less able to grasp entirely how. Here we can echo
Latour’s  approving  citation  of  Viveiros  de  Castro:
Lazarus’ common sense is already global: it is simply that
in his cosmic politics I do not have the place I would have
predicted for myself. But we have to employ this rhetoric
with  a  proviso:  the  refinement  of  pristine  indigenous
cosmologies - elaborately articulated symmetric fictions -
that provide the foil to a critique of ‘Western’ society is
unsustainable.
Concluding remarks
‘Fetishism’,  remarks  Gilsenan  (paraphrasing  J.S.
Khan), ‘infects us all, or rather it affects others, because
we  always  seem  to  escape  it’  (2000:  603).  Beck  and
Latour  combined  present  the  challenge  of  an
anthropology  that  is  simultaneously  cosmopolitan  and
cosmopolitical. Latour’s cosmopolitical challenge to Beck
involves disavowing cultural  code as a neutral medium
exchangeable  between  individual  cosmopolitan  actors.
Cultural code becomes instead an actant in the world of
sociologists in the same way as spirits are actants in the
world of spiritualists, or Charles Darwin is an actant in
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the world of socio-biologists. In Latour’s view, scientific
modernity  involves  constantly,  in  Gellner’s  words,
‘invoking  the  processes  of  nature  to  underwrite  social
arrangements,…  allocate  responsibilities,  and  settle
disputes’ (Gellner 1964:76). The resultant multiplication
of natures returns us ever closer to non-modern animism.
The anthropologist’s task becomes one of demonstrating
the moments or nexuses where this underwriting takes
place. The Beckian challenge to Latour may consist, by
contrast,  in  recognizing  that  the  ‘others’,  in  their
generality,  will  no  longer  serve  as  stable  points  of
cosmological reference vis-à-vis ‘our’ unstable cosmology.
‘They’  also  evidence  internalized  cosmopolitanism;  the
rhetorical claim that ‘their’ cosmological forms evolve in
‘their’ terms is wearing thin. A comparative anthropology
that  depends  on  building  ever  more  rigid  geometries
around the ideas that certain ‘peoples’ represent is itself
moribund.
If the systems of society and culture have gone then
what is left would seem to be divergent histories and a
conversation about the present and the future. Here we
surely  have  to  agree  with  Beck  that  anthropological
dialogue  can  only  be  pursued  on  the  commonsensical
basis  that  elements  of  cosmologies  can  be  shared
between  individual  human  subjects:  human  subjects
remain  the  only  agents  capable  of  the  kind  of  mutual
consideration  required.  The  danger  here  is  the
reinvention of what Gellner sarcastically terms the ‘Pure
Visitor’  –  an  unmediated  human  ego  whose  role  is  to
‘quarantine’ and arbitrate social truths from a position
outside the social (1964:108). At the same time, it is no
use  reinventing  pristine  ontologies  to  serve  the  same
quarantining function. Without resort to either of these
implausible  guests  we  are  left  with  an  overcrowded
universe lacking the geometric simplicities of ‘our’ versus
‘their’ cosmologies. If culture is gone, then we need not
continue  to  be  spooked  by  cultural  fragmentation:
anthropologists will surely still employ diverse heuristics
of  cosmology  and  social  relationship,  but  their
ethnographies  need  to  be  imaginatively  open  to
previously unrecognized, or perhaps politically incorrect,
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types  of  agent  as  well  as  to  new  fields  and  forms  of
interaction  and  exchange.  Code  made  the  lives  of
anthropologists  easy:  ‘code  presupposes  content  to  be
somehow ready-made and presupposes the realization of
a choice among various given codes’ (Bakhtin 1986:130).
Now, by contrast, we find ourselves ‘in it together’ but
with  competing  definitions  of  ‘we’,  ‘it’  and  ‘together’.
How to understand subjectivity comes to the front at this
juncture as the crucial object of reflection.
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Chapter 3
WHAT DID KANT MEAN BY AND WHY DID HE
ADOPT A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN
HISTORY?1
Thomas Sturm2
Introduction
It is widely held – and not false – that Kant’s philosophy
of  history  expresses  the  Enlightenment  hope  for  a
stepwise  progress  of  humankind  towards  freedom  or
morality. However, we are nowadays suspicious of models
of  a  stadial  development  of  human  history,  especially
teleological ones. Furthermore, Kant’s model of historical
development  is  burdened  with  problems  of  its  own,
concerning its  epistemic  status,  and its  position within
his  philosophy  in  general.  To  deal  with  these  issues,
scholars  have  mostly  focused  on  connections  between
Kant’s philosophy of history and his ethics or his views
about  teleology.  They  have  downplayed  or  neglected
another context,  namely,  the theories of  historiography
that he was faced with. I shall show how Kant reacts to
debates  about  a  theory  and  practice  of  historiography
highly  influential  in  his  time,  especially  in  his  German
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environment. It was called “pragmatic history”.
In part I, I indicate what major versions there existed
of this approach. I  then outline three crucial  problems
that  emerged  with  the  requirement,  set  up  by  many
pragmatic  historians,  of  a  stage model  of  humankind’s
development.  Among other things,  I shall  point to how
the  debate  about  the  meaning  of  ‘pragmatic  history’
became  connected  to  the  idea  of  a  ‘cosmopolitan
viewpoint’  in  history,  an  issue  that  was  discussed
particularly between August Ludwig Schlözer and Johann
Gottfried Herder. In part II, I report on Kant’s reception
of pragmatic history, and what he found lacking in the
most  important versions of  it  –  namely,  an appropriate
understanding  of  human  nature,  which  he  himself
developed  more  fully  in  his  lectures  on  pragmatic
anthropology. I shall thereby try to clarify how his own
“cosmopolitan” idea of the development of human nature
through history is likewise entangled with the notion of
pragmatic history, and that his notion of a cosmopolitan
idea itself has three different aspects, responding to the
three problems outlined. Thus, relating Kant’s philosophy
of history to contemporary debates can make his views
more intelligible than merely analyzing their connection
to other parts of his critical philosophy.
I.  Pragmatic  History  and  Models  of  Human
Historical Development
1. What Is ‘Pragmatic History’?
By the 18th century the study  of  history is  growing
quickly  not  only  in  terms  of  institutions  and  literary
output but also in terms of the level of the debates about
its theoretical and methodological presuppositions. In the
German countries, this debate takes often shape under
the heading of a “pragmatic” orientation. To mention but
a few examples, eighteenth-century authors before Kant
write pragmatic histories of the Jesuits and Protestants,
the rulers of Braunschweig, the school reform in Bavaria,
of literature, medicine, the souls of humans and animals,
and even of sleep. And many historians at the time have a
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serious  intention  with  this.  As  the  Göttingen professor
Johann Christoph Gatterer, the most influential organizer
of historical research in the eighteenth century, writes, in
“history, pragmatic is just what in the proper sciences is
called systematic”.3
But  which  requirements  pragmatic  historiography
need  fulfill  becomes  controversial.  In  the  debate,  the
following four requirements become introduced stepwise:
i. Most conceptions of pragmatic historiography take
it  for  granted  that  the  object of  investigation  is
human action, particularly in more or less widely
conceived areas of social life (at certain times and
places).
ii. In  methodological  terms,  a  history  can  be
pragmatic if it studies the causes, particularly the
motives or intentions of human agents.
iii. A historical study can be called ‘pragmatic’ if it is
tied to a  universal history of mankind – either by
helping to write that history or by presupposing it.
Being “universal” does not necessarily mean that it
has to cover all historical details, but at least the
major factors and/or stages of human history.
iv. Finally,  history  can  be  called  ‘pragmatic’  if
practical  consequences or  lessons  for  human
(particularly social) action can be derived from it.
These elements are not mutually exclusive. However,
some  pragmatic  historians  require  only  some  of  these
features,  while  others  demand  that  all  be  satisfied;
furthermore,  some  authors  claim  that  a  certain
requirement  is  more  important  than  others;  and,
occasionally,  some  requirements  are  developed  and
discussed more closely and thereby become understood
in different ways.
For instance, in the early eighteenth century, Johann
David Kö(h)ler  claims that a historical study is already
pragmatic  if  it  treats  of  public  matters,  especially  the
official and social deeds of rulers, and if it offers practical
orientation  in  civil  life,  having  in  mind  specifically
political action and the design of public affairs.4 But no
later than in the 1750s, such a meaning of “pragmatic
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history”  becomes  viewed  as  overly  narrow.  This  is
accompanied by a growing awareness that there might
be a pragmatic historiography of the “highest level” or in
the “truest understanding” of the term, which has to be
distinguished  from  lesser  degrees  and  incorrect
meanings.5 To begin, a number of authors stresses that
pragmatic  histories  must  also  inform  readers  of
“impelling  forces”  (Triebfedern)6,  motives,  and  other
causes.7 Gatterer  himself,  who  voices  this  point  with
particular  emphasis,  does  not  claim  that  previous
historians  had  never  sought  out  “causes  and  effects,
means and intentions”.8 Thucydides and Polybius clearly
did. Gatterer’s main criticism is directed at the genres of
mere  annals,  chronicles,  and  genealogies,  and  the
accompanying  conception  that  history  merely  records
particular facts of the past. The causes behind historical
events seldom coincide with periods or commencements
of  rule,  and  outcomes  often  extend  beyond  the  dates
covered by annals.
Gatterer  moreover  argues  that  the  “highest  level of
what can be considered  pragmatic history” can only be
achieved by developing a universal history, by embedding
historical  investigation  in  “the  idea  of  the  overall
connection  of  things  in  the  world  (Nexus  rerum
Universalis)”  –  that  is,  causal  explanations  in  history
must be embedded in a system of world history:
For  no  occurrence  in  the  world  is  –  as  it  were –
insular.  Everything  is  connected,  is  produced,  is
induced,  and  in  turn  produces  and  induces.  The
affairs of the noble and the lowly, individual persons
and all of them together, private life and the world
at  large,  indeed,  even  those  of  reasonless  and
lifeless entities and humans; all are intertwined and
interconnected.9
While  these  requirements  are  all  repeatedly
emphasized by the majority of authors, requirement (iv)
remains  relatively  negligible  for  Gatterer,  unlike  for
others. He hints at it in one of his earlier writings10, but
75
THOMAS STURM
later  on  clearly  rejects  the  view  that  it  would  be
constitutive  of  the idea  of  pragmatic  history.11 He also
makes fun of the view, held by several authors, that one
could  derive  practically  useful  conclusions  from  mere
annals, chronicles or genealogies.12 One might also think
here  of  Lord  Bolingbroke’s  well-known  dictum  that
“history is philosophy taught by examples”.13 Obviously,
Gatterer denies that such views help to raise the rank of
history – to approximate it to the bona fide sciences.
While Gatterer becomes the most influential German
historian of his times, his conception of pragmatic history
does  not  remain  undisputed.  For  instance,  the  Church
historian Johann Matthias Schroeckh (1733-1808) favors
a combination of all four requirements: A truly pragmatic
history should focus upon human actions, provide causal
explanations,  develop  and  use  a  system  of  universal
human history, and attempt to draw practical lessons on
the  basis  of  the  first  three  requirements.14 Also,  other
authors  raise  questions  about  various  requirements.
Some  already  discuss  the  possibility  of  giving  causal
explanations in history, while others are concerned about
whether  pragmatic  histories  ultimately  have  to  study
humankind as a whole, and whether such histories – if
they aim at practical conclusions at all – should instruct
particular  individuals  or  groups  or  humankind  as  a
whole.
2. The Requirement of a System of Universal History
Of special relevance here is the call  for a system of
history as a whole (requirement iii). How should or even
could one write “the” complete history of humankind’s
development? Most authors agree that it will not suffice
to collect and order all existing special studies, and then
continue them. That  had been tried before.  Schroeckh
emphasizes  that  causal  explanation  demands  various
kinds of  weighting. It is not easy, he writes, to describe
the universal  historical  “Nexus”  in  a  way that  gathers
and lists all causes and outcomes. It is not necessary, for
instance,  to note every historical  detail  or  every slight
causal connection. On the contrary, it is the difficult task
76
A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
of  the  historian  to  select  the  facts  relevant  for  an
adequate explanation of events. As Gatterer remarks, one
has to identify and structure the “revolutions” of human
history.  Only  these  will  help  to  identify  the  really
important causes of human actions in history.15
His colleague at  Göttingen,  August  Ludwig  Schlözer
(1735-1809) works out this approach in his  Vorstellung
seiner Universal-Historie (1772-73). He claims that one
needs a unifying viewpoint in order to be able to select
and order facts and turn them into a system:
World  history  can  be  imagined  from  a  double
perspective: Either as an aggregate of specialized
histories,  a  collection  of  which,  if  it  is  complete,
constitutes a whole in its own way; or as a system,
in which the world and humanity constitute the one
entity,  for  which from among all  the  parts  of  the
aggregate  some  are  preferably  selected  and
ordered purposefully.16
 Furthermore, Schlözer demands that for this we need
to single out factors that “interest not individual nations
or classes of the human race, but that are significant for
the cosmopolitan [Weltbürger], for man as such”.17 More
specifically,  he  claims  that  Roman  history  –  from  the
city’s founding, the formation and division of the world
empire, to its decline – provides the best focal point:
[Roman  history]  is  the  overall  guiding  thread
[Leitfaden]  that  throughout  various  concurrent
courses  of  almost  innumerous  peoples  prevents
chronological  confusion.  Rom deserves this honor:
For  which  empire  of  the  world  has  had  greater
influence on the fate of the world?18
3.  Three  Problems  with  the  Requirement  of  Universal
History
While  the  requirement  for  a  structured  system  of
universal history has its attractiveness for authors at the
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time, it has several problems.
(I)  A  first  problem  concerns  an  assumption  about
human nature, and it can best be explained by the impact
of Hume. He does not, neither in his History of England
(1754-62)  nor  elsewhere,  use  the  term  ‘pragmatic
history’.  Yet,  German reviews praise the  History as an
example of pragmatic work and applaud Hume’s skill at
“using his knowledge of human nature to enlighten and
promote  the  usefulness  of  history”.19 Two  of  Hume’s
philosophical theses on human nature and history – to be
found  in  the  Treatise and  the  first  Enquiry –  are  of
particular  importance  here.  He  claims,  first,  that  the
historian may and should presume that human nature is
constant,  or  subject  to  unchangeable  causal  laws.
Second,  he advances  the methodological  claim that  by
studying history we can discover these laws:
Mankind  are so much the  same,  in  all  times and
places,  that  history  informs us  of  nothing  new or
strange  in this  particular.  Its  chief  use  is  only  to
discover  the  constant  and  universal  principles  of
human nature,  by showing men in all  varieties of
circumstances and situations.20
Pragmatic  historians  often  follow  Hume  on  these
points.21 But this raises problems for their views. Many of
these historians also stress that human history includes
“revolutions”,  necessitating  a  system  of  the  most
important developments. Also, as one reviewer of Hume’s
History points out, impartiality is seen as vital to causal
explanation: In order to reveal true causes, it is crucial to
assess the past not in terms of maxims of the historian’s
time, but in terms on those that held in the period and
place under  investigation22.  However,  these points  only
make sense given that modes of human conduct change
substantially  over  time.  Moreover,  if  pragmatic  history
should be used to draw practically relevant conclusions,
then  such  conclusions  may  repeatedly  lead  to  new
principles  for  conduct  –  which  threatens  the  Humean
claim of the constancy of human nature as well.
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(II) Second, how ought one to structure human history
as a whole? If you take dominant nations as in Gatterer’s
and Schlözer’s proposals:  Should universal  history first
depict  their  histories  and then turn to the subordinate
countries? Or should the mutual influence of countries on
one another be examined together?23 Moreover, besides
dominant nations,  natural,  economic,  technological  and
intellectual  factors  are  important  too.  Schlözer  himself
stresses that earthquakes, floods and epidemics, or also
“the discovery of fire, bread and alcohol, and so on, are
facts equally as important as the battles at Arbela, Zama,
and Merseburg”.24 Can all the factors be arranged within
a single system of human history? In a review of 1772,
Johann Gottfried Herder complains that Schlözer merely
presents a plan lacking clear execution. In 1774, Herder
furthermore suggests that what one reads “in almost all
so-called Pragmatic Histories of the World is nothing but
the  disgusting  tangled  mass  of  ‘the  time’s  prized
ideals’”.25 In  other  words,  Schlözer’s  cosmopolitan
orientation may in the best case be useless and in the
worst case be the expression of an ideology.
(III)  Finally,  what is the epistemic role and status of
the stage models of human history? The views here are
quite  divided.  The  outlines  by  Gatterer,  Schlözer,  and
others are shaped by tangible tasks of empirical history.
Claims about dividing the past into epochs, or questions
of chronology are viewed as subject to empirical scrutiny.
However, even the very same authors characterize their
historical  ideas  and  frameworks  as  “conjectural”  or
“philosophical”.  This  indicates  that  their  function  and
status is not clear.
To  sum  up:  One  can  see  that  the  shift  towards
pragmatic history, reasonable as it was when compared
with other traditions of history writing, led into serious
new predicaments.
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II. Kant on Pragmatic History and the Development
of Humankind
4. Kant’s Reaction to Pragmatic History
Now to Kant. First, a bit about his standpoint towards
pragmatic history.  From the mid-1770s on, he presents
his  views  especially  in  his  annual  lectures  on
anthropology.  Here,  he praises  Hume’s  History for  not
confining  itself  to  chronicles  of  wars  and  rulers,  but
relating to humanity in general.26 Also,  Kant is familiar
with the Enquiries. And in his early statements, one can
see  Kant  as  understanding  and  sharing  the  idea  of
pragmatic  history  along  Humean  lines:  as  a  study  of
individual  and social  intentions causing actions,  ideally
useful for a practical instruction of agents in the social
sphere.  At  least  until  1775-76,  he  also  accepts  the
ontological thesis that human nature is constant, linking
it  even  to  his  own  conception  of  anthropology.  At  the
same time Kant becomes also interested in the genre of
histories  of  the  stadial  development  of  humankind,
including the idea of genuine change in human history.
In the 1780s, he suddenly scathes pragmatic historians
for lacking the knowledge of human nature they pretend
to have:
…  since  the  authors  of  many  history  books  have
little knowledge of human nature, they have no idea
of pragmatic history and much less of how to write
it.27
I will explain in a moment what he means. Before this,
I  need to briefly comment on a related passage in the
Groundwork.  Here,  Kant  first  distinguishes  between
pragmatic principles as leading to prudence, and notes
that  there  are  two  different  notions  of  prudence:
Weltklugheit and  Privatklugheit.  The  first  is  the
competence  to  use  other  human  beings  for  one’s
purpose,  the  second is  the  competence  to  order  one’s
purposes  such  that  one  approximates  one’s  own
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happiness.  He also says that  Weltklugheit should serve
Privatklugheit, because knowing how to manipulate other
persons but not doing so for furthering one’s own well-
reflected purposes isn’t very bright. But all this expresses
not  his  fully  considered  opinion  on  what  ‘pragmatic’
means but, rather, a report on widely held views. Just one
page later he gives his own viewpoint:
It seems to me that the proper meaning of the word
pragmatic could be determined thus most precisely.
Pragmatic  are  called  the  sanctions  which  do  not
properly follow from the law of states as necessary
laws, but from the precaution for general welfare.
Pragmatically  written  is  a  history  if  it  makes
prudent,  that  is  if  it  instructs  the  world  how  to
reach its advantage better, or at least as well as its
preceding world.28
So what  he wants pragmatic  history to  do is  not  to
teach us how to use other human beings simply for our
personal purposes. But what would be wrong with that
(leaving moral concerns aside here)? And what does he
really  have  in  mind  with  the  „general  welfare“?  His
answers  stem  from  the  background  of  his  then
developing anthropological views about what it means to
be a citizen of the world. This then leads him to a specific
notion of a cosmopolitan standpoint in history.
5. Kant’s Response to the Three Problems of Universal
History
Let me explain this by reference to Kant’s response to
the  three  problems  of  the  various  approaches  to
universal history described earlier on (section 3 above).
(I)  First,  Kant  comes  to  reject  a  naïve  view  of  the
constancy  of  human  nature.  He  does  so  by  means  of
assumptions concerning basic factors of the dynamics of
social interaction developed in his anthropology lectures.
Six basic claims are necessary here.29
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(1) Human dependency  upon society.  Human beings
need education, and later on other forms of social
cooperation to achieve our goals, to improve action
possibilities and to uphold our self-regard.
(2) Human egoism.  At  the  same time,  unfortunately,
human beings are mostly driven by self-interested
inclinations.  We do not  trust  each other;  we are
jealous;  we  try  to  manipulate  and  exploit  one
another.  The  conjunction  of  (1)  and  (2)  Kant
famously  calls  the  “unsocial  sociability”  of
humankind.
(3) The first-person point of view. That such things are
possible  is  rooted  in  other,  basic  human  facts.
There  is  an  important  difference  between  our
having of mental states and our having of physical
states. Not only can we note that we are in such-
and-such a mental state – say, that we feel a pain
or have a desire. Unlike mere animals, we can be
happy  or  sad  about  that,  or  we  can  view  these
states – and those of other persons as well – with a
critical  eye,  reflect  upon and change them.  This
requires  a  first-person  point  of  view  upon  first-
order mental states: To know that one is unhappy
about a certain pain, and that one wishes that the
pain goes away, requires knowing whose pain it is.
Also,  egoism  and  self-regard  as  well  would  be
impossible  without  such  a  first-person  point  of
view.
(4) Prudence and learning to adopt  the third-person
point  of  view.  But  what  can  we  do  about  the
dilemma of our unsocial sociability? Kant’s answer:
If  I  want  to  act  prudently,  I  have  to  learn  that
others have that egoism as well, and that it can be
useful to take into account their first-person point
of view.
(5) Invention of new social roles and rules. Thereby,
however,  social  interaction  becomes  easily
extremely complex. Not only do I perceive others
as having egoistic motives and as having abilities
for hiding such motives; they perceive me in the
same way. Hence, our basic purposes of receiving
respect  and  support  must  not  be  exerted  too
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obviously, and we must be able to find new ways by
which to pursue our goals prudently. This leads to
iterated  forms  of  role-playing  in  society,  to  a
concealing and dissembling of egoistic  intentions
before others.
(6) New roles and rules become “another nature”. In
this  interaction,  humans  therefore  develop  new
rules of interaction, or “another nature”.30 But that
means that  our  actions  do  not  simply  fall  under
rules  as  if  they  were  natural  laws;  rather,  we
follow certain  rules  with  a  greater  or  lesser
amount  of  rational  deliberation.  We can thus  be
producers instead of being mere products of our
development.
From all this derives a first sense of cosmopolitanism
in Kant’s work, which is related to human nature: We are
citizens of the world in the sense that our nature is partly
plastic, and more specifically that we ourselves produce
our rules of action and, thereby, our social world. This is
a fact that holds, in principle, for each of us, and which
each  of  us  better  recognizes  in  social  interaction  –
instead of expecting to extract more superficial kinds of
egoistic prudence from history.
(II) How does this notion of cosmopolitanism relate to
the project of universal history? Kant – like Schlözer –
claims  that  the  historian  needs  a  guiding  “idea”,  and
again characterizes this idea by claiming that it centers
on  the  human  being  as  a  “citizen  of  the  world”.  But,
unlike Schlözer, Kant gives this notion a distinctive and
not  implausible  meaning:  the  knowledge  about  the
plasticity  of  human  nature  and  its  conditions  is  the
knowledge he finds lacking in many pragmatic historians.
In  Idea Kant  then  first  outlines  basic  features  of
human social dynamics and explains afterwards how an
adequate  universal  history  would  have  to  look  like.  It
should  start  with  ancient  Greek  history,  for  the
contingent  reason  that  only  here  a  real  source-based
historiography could start. But the further steps should
not  look  at  dominant  people  and then wonder  how to
83
THOMAS STURM
include other important factors; they should focus upon
the  development  of  forms  of  society  that  reduced
aggression  and  war  (such  as  the  introduction  of
international  commerce),  introduced  different  elements
of  a  republican  constitution  (the  French  Revolution
becoming  later  on  the  outstanding  “sign”  of  such  a
history),  and  that  may  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a
league  of  nations.  This  is  obviously  a  second,  richer
notion  of  cosmopolitanism,  but  one  presupposing  the
first.  It  flows  from the  former  in  the  sense  that  such
institutions help us to realize more fully the possibilities
inherent  in  our  nature,  and to  cope  with  our  unsocial
sociability.
(III) Finally, what about the epistemic role and status
of this cosmopolitan idea? The answer is not surprising.
No universal history should or even could aim a sum-total
of all past events. Instead, by using the idea as guiding
thread – another notion already to be found in Schlözer,
as cited above, but not clarified by him – helps to find
concepts  and  principles  for  selecting,  linking  and
organizing  historical  knowledge  in  a  certain  way.  The
idea  thus  has  a  regulative  function.  Still,  history  seen
from that  perspective  can  be  connected to  empirically
discoverable occurrences and developments.
There  might  be  other  perspectives,  of  course;  but
these  have  to  be  brought  to  the  fore  first.  Kant
emphasizes the sketchy nature of the Idea essay, it being
“only one of the thoughts that a philosophical mind (that
incidentally must be well-versed in history) might also toy
with from a different standpoint”.31 Kant does not claim
that the propositions he sets forth about the development
of  human  capacities,  the  mechanism  of  unsocial
sociability, and the resulting sequence of forms of social
or political order of humankind are already to be taken as
full-blown developmental principles of history. Rather, he
explicitly  aims  to  provoke  contemporary  historians  to
develop  better  ideas  and  frameworks.  This  is  further
evidence that his views should be seen as responding to
contemporary debates rather than internal problems of
his own philosophy only.
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Conclusion
It would be a misunderstanding to view my foregoing
considerations as a complete defense of Kant’s views. I
tried  to  add  an  important  facet  to  the  existing
interpretations.  What  this  contextualization  cannot
explain  (and,  a  forteriori,  defend)  are  the  strongly
teleological claims of his views on human history, or their
exact  relation  to  his  ethical  theory.  Even  then,  critics
might  either  reject  the  very  demand for  a  grand-scale
model  of  human  history,  or  at  least  claim  that  Kant’s
sketch is useless for, say, current historical research.  But
note that I have tried to reduce his claims about human
social  dynamics  to  their  most  simple,  largely  innocent
basic  points.  Given this,  and given the epistemological
modesty  of  his  claims  about  human  development,
perhaps things look better for a kind of reflection about
the  question  of  how  we  could  give  meaning  to  the
fragmented masses of historical knowledge.
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Chapter 4
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
Martin Holbraad
It may appear that the last thing that the study of ‘things’
needs  right  now is  another  manifesto,  as  the  echo  of
Spivak’s  1980s subaltern  radicalism (1998)  in  my  title
may  suggest.  As  archaeologist  Severin  Fowles  has
recently observed (2008, 2010), the rise of ‘the thing’ in
social theory at the turn of our century has emancipatory
tonalities that echo the emancipation of ‘the native’ (or
the  ‘subaltern’)  a  generation  earlier.  If  for  too  long
things,  under  the  guise  of  ‘material  culture’,  had
‘hibernat[ed]  in  the  basements  of  museology’,  as  Tim
Ingold puts it (2007: 5), their study in recent years has
been all about achieving their visibility: making the thing
manifest or,  in Peter Pels’ phrase, allowing it to ‘speak
back’ (Pels 1998: x).
To see why these are more than echoes of expression,
consider the analogy of purpose.  Notwithstanding their
variety,  late  20th  century  arguments  tagged  as  ‘post-
colonial’  and  valorised  as  ‘de-colonizing’  can  also  be
characterised  as  emancipatory  (sensu Argyrou  2002).
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This insofar as they typically take the form of what I will
call ‘widening the circle of the human’. The move turns
on a basic diagnosis of the colonial condition as, in one
way or other, a deficient attribution of humanity to the
colonial subject (the native, the subaltern): a denial of its
history, its agency, its subjectivity, its rationality, in short,
its human dignity. The response, then, takes the form of a
more equitable distribution of these attributes, a move to
globalise  the sense of  justice which they express,  in a
kind of extension of the global-political dominion of the
categorical imperative. The colonised subject is elevated,
its  subjectivity  recognised,  its  voice  heard.  The
conceptual  mould  of  the  agenda,  if  not  its  historical
precedent,  is  perhaps the emancipation of slaves,  from
relative  object-commodities  to  (relative…)  subject-
persons (cf. Guyer 1993).
An analogous agenda, argues Fowles, is pursued in the
more recent literature on the rise of the thing (material
culture  studies,  thing-theory,  ANT,  speculative  realism,
post-phenomenology  etc.).  Here  too  polemical  writing
has  been  motivated  in  large  part  by  a  diagnosis  of  a
deficit  of humanity – an obvious one when it  comes to
things,  of  course,  though all  the more powerful  for  it.
And the remedy too has been various species of widening
the circle of the human. ‘Agency’ has been the most vocal
term,  perhaps  due to  its  relative  neutrality,  though its
corollaries  of  personhood,  history,  voice,  freedom  and
responsibility,  and other dignities of the kind are never
far off in the emancipatory agenda. Indeed, the political
tenor of the move is certainly evident in these writings,
as  is  its  post-colonial  aesthetic.  Fowles  cites,  among
others,  Bruno  Latour,  who  calls  for  a  ‘democracy
extended  to  things’  (including a  ‘parliament’  of  them);
Danny Miller, who renounces the ‘tyranny of the subject’
and ‘the corpse of our imperial majesty: society’ in favour
of  a  ‘dialectical  republic  in  which  persons  and  things
exist  in  mutual  self-construction  and  respect  for  their
mutual  origin  and  mutual  dependency’;  and  fellow
archaeologist Bjørnar Olsen, who calls his colleagues to
‘unite in a defence of things, a defence of those subaltern
members of the collective that have been silenced and
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“othered”  by  the  imperialist  social  and  humanist
discourses.’ (Latour 1993: 12, Miller 2005: 45, 37, Olsen
2003: 100, all cited in Fowles 2008).
Now, the faint sarcasm of calling all this an agenda for
‘emancipation’  is  really  more of  an irony,  since I  have
subscribed to this agenda myself, along lines that are not
dissimilar to the ones Fowles describes – particularly in
the volume  Thinking Through Things, which I co-edited
and co-introduced with Ami Salmond (nee Henare) and
Sari  Wastell  (2007),  as  well  as  in  a  couple  of  single-
authored publications related to it  (Holbraad 2005 and
more explicitly  2009).  In the latter part of the present
paper  I  revisit  those  arguments  in  some  detail,  in  an
effort  to  clarify  what  I  have since come to see as the
somewhat confused way in which they bundle together
the two parallel agendas of Fowles’s analogy. As I shall
argue, however, this is worth doing, not in order to recoil
from the agenda of emancipating the thing, but to move
it forward. In a nutshell, I want to show that while the
approach set out in Thinking Through Things (henceforth
‘TTT’) is offered partly as a way of emancipating things
as such, the weight of its argument ends up subsuming
this task to that of  emancipating the people for  whom
they are important.1 If things speak in TTT, they do so
mainly by ethnographic association with the voice of ‘the
native’ – a kind of anthropological ventriloquism.
Hence  the  question:  might  there  nevertheless  be  a
sense in which things could speak for themselves? And
what  might  their  voices  sound  like?  Suitably
reconsidered and improved, I argue, the approach of TTT
is indeed able to articulate answers to these questions,
complementing the anthropological concern with native
voices  with  what  in  the  Conclusion  I  shall  call  a
‘pragmatological’ (cf. Witmore forthcoming) engagement
with the voices of things – voices which, to anticipate my
core  suggestion,  stem  from  the  contingent  material
characteristics  that  make  things  most  obviously  thing-
like. In order to prepare the ground for this argument,
we  may  begin  by  fleshing  out,  with  reference  to  the
recent  literature  on  things,  the  guiding  distinction
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between  emancipating  things  ‘by  association’  with
persons as opposed to emancipating them ‘as such’ – a
pretty tricky distinction, as we shall see, and subject to
all sorts of caveats.
Emancipation as the entanglement of persons and
things
In  line  with  Fowles’s  analogy  with  writings  in  post-
colonialism, the past twenty years’ or so literature on the
rise  of  the  thing  could  be  plotted  as  a  trajectory  of
increasingly  (self-consciously)  ‘radical’  attempts  to
dislodge or even erase the line that divides things from
people.  Consider,  just  as an illustration,  the shift  from
proposing that things acquire ‘biographies’ and a ‘social
life’ of their own through their complex involvement in
the lives of the people who engage with them (Appadurai
1986), to saying that the very distinction between people
and  things  (or  humans  and  non-humans)  should  be
eliminated  from  the  way  we  think  about  such
engagements  (Latour  1993,  cf.  Pinney  2005).  Or  the
difference  between  suggesting  that  people  and  things
emerge  out  of  each  other  dialectically  (Miller  1987,
2005) and claiming that in certain contexts they are best
conceived  as  being  identical  (Strathern  1988,  1990).
Such differences may be said to correspond to two broad
stages  on  the  axis  of  radicalism,  which,  following
Haraway (1991, cf.  Webmoor & Witmore 2009), I shall
tag  as  ‘humanist’  and  ‘posthumanist’  respectively.  The
distinction turns on contrasting stances to the ontological
division  between  humans  and  things.  Humanist,  then,
would be approaches that seek to emancipate the thing
in terms of  this  division,  while  posthumanist  would be
ones that do so by going beyond it. The move from one
towards the other, I argue, can also be understood as a
move  from emancipating  things  by  association,  i.e.  by
letting some of the light of what it is to be human shine
on them too, to emancipating them as such, i.e. showing
that they can radiate light for themselves – though in a
way that, as we shall see, is not altogether satisfactory.
Let us explore this with reference to some of the most
influential contributions to the literature.
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Danny  Miller’s  introduction  to  his  edited  volume
Materiality (2005, cf. Miller 1987) presents a transparent
example of what I’m calling a humanist approach, as well
as of  the emancipation  of  things  ‘by  association’,  with
reference to the role in the lives of humans, that such
approaches tend to imply. Miller is fully cognizant of the
importance to anthropological discussions of materiality
of ‘philosophical resolution[s] to the problematic dualism
between  people  and  things’  (Miller  2005:  41),  and
includes as an example his own preference for theorizing
the relationship between people and things in terms of
the  forms  that  emerge  out  of  a  Hegelian  dialectical
processes  of  objectification,  rather  than  through  the
‘mutual constitution of prior forms, such as subjects and
objects’  (2005:  9).  The  job  of  the  anthropologist,  he
argues  however,  cannot  be  simply  (or  complexly)  to
reinvent such philosophical wheels, not least because the
people he or she studies ethnographically so often have a
much  more  ‘commonsense’  understanding  of  things,
including all  sorts of ways of distinguishing them from
people, spirits and so on. Ultimately, Miller is saying, the
role  of  an  anthropology  that  is  seriously  committed  to
reflecting ethnographically on the world in which we live,
and to theorising what it is to be human, must recognise
and ‘respect’ (2005: 38) material objects and the implicit
as  well  as  explicit  ways  in  which  they  give  form  to
people’s lives. Its aim, through strategic combinations of
dualism-busting  philosophical  models  and ethnographic
sensitivity  and  empathy,  must  be  to  show  the  myriad
ways  in  which  ‘the  things  people  make,  make  people’
(ibid).2
It is perhaps not entirely clear how Miller squares the
circle (not to say wheel) of the contrasting demands of a
philosophical  impulse  to  overcome  dualism  and  an
anthropological  one  to  dwell  on  the  myriad  forms  in
which it may play itself out ethnographically.3 Still, what
he makes abundantly clear is that his heart lies with the
messiness of the ethnography, and the ‘vulgar’ study of
‘the way the specific character of people emerges from
their  interaction  with  the  material  world  through
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practice’ (Miller 2007: 26), as he and his students at UCL
have  been  doing  for  some  time.  If  he  is  interested  in
emancipating the thing from the ‘tyranny of the subject’,
that  is  because  doing  so  gives  us  a  more  profound
understanding of what it is to be human. Material culture
studies may displace an anthropology obsessed with the
imperium  of  the  social,  but  only  to  replace  it  with  a
better  anthropology  humble  enough  to  recognise  the
ways in which things also so pervasively contribute to our
humanity. Which is exactly the kind of stance I have in
mind when talking of humanism and its emancipation of
things by association.
Alfred  Gell’s  argument  in  Art  and  Agency (1998)
provides another example of this approach, though a less
straightforward one. Certainly, the idea for which Gell’s
landmark book most often gets cited, namely that things
can  be  understood  as  possessing  agency  in  the  same
sense as humans do, may well appear as an attempt to
emancipate things ‘as such’.  In contrast to,  say,  Miller,
the flag of emancipation (if such it is) is here pinned not
on things’  role in making human beings what they are
(although  this  is  a  central  concern  for  Gell  too),  but
rather on the extent to which things may themselves be
more  like  humans  than  we  might  assume.  Insofar  as
things  (e.g.  cars,  bombs,  effigies)  can be  construed as
indices of a prior intention, as they so often are (e.g. an
intention to make us late for work, Pol Pot’s desire to kill,
the blessing of a benign deity), they themselves become
something akin to humans, and thus could be said to be
emancipated as such rather than by association.
Nevertheless,  as  a  number  of  discussions  of  Gell’s
argument have tended to show, there is some ambiguity
as to how far agency really attaches to things themselves
in his scheme. Indeed, in reading the book, one is never
quite sure how seriously Gell wants us to take the, after
all, rather scandalous notion that things can be ascribed
with intentions. Part of the problem is that in his analysis
Gell  tends to treat  as equivalent  ascriptions  of  agency
that, ethnographically speaking, vary rather vastly in the
degree to which they are taken seriously by those who
94
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
engage in them. Broadly put, if swearing at one’s car for
failing to start is meant to be a phenomenon of the same
order as praying to an effigy,  then one wants to  know
whether the latter ascription of agency is supposed to be
taken as lightly  as the former surely should be (which
makes Gell look rather dismissive of devotees who take
their  prayers  and  effigies  very  seriously  indeed),  or
whether  the  agency  of  the  car  should  be  imagined  as
being as weighty as that of the effigy (in which case Gell
would look like a bit of a New Age mystic). Indeed, when
it comes down to it, it does seem that Gell’s scheme is
slanted towards the former option. As James Leach has
argued, a close reading of Gell  reveals that agency for
him is only ever an indirect attribute of things, its origins
lying ultimately with a human agent, whose intention the
thing in question only indexes – hence, for example, the
significant  distinction  Gell  makes  between  the
‘secondary’ agency of indices and the ‘primary’ agency of
the  intentions  they  are  abductively  surmised  to  index
(Leach  2007,  cf.  Gell  1998:  17-21).  Things,  for  Gell,
cannot  really be  agents,  if  by  that  we  mean  anything
more than the kind of attribution of agency involved in
swearing at a car for making us late. As Miller puts it in
his  own  critique,  ‘Gell’s  is  a  theory  of  natural
anthropomorphism, where our primary reference point is
to  people  and  their  intentionality  behind  the  world  of
artefacts’ (Miller 2005: 13). Indeed, Gell’s emancipation
of things by conferring them with agency turns out to be
more similar to Miller’s than may at first appear. Where
Miller  raises  the  profile  of  things  by  making  them
operative in the making of human beings, Gell does so by
making them operative in acts of human agency.
So,  in  sum:  humanist  approaches,  which  leave  the
ontological  distinction  between  things  and  people
unmodified, cannot but emancipate things by association.
The  whole  point  about  the  common  sense  distinction
between  people  and  things  is  that  the  former  are
endowed with all  the marks of dignity,  while the latter
are not.  So if  you want to emancipate the thing while
leaving the ontology untouched, then all  you can do is
find ways to associate it more intimately with the person.
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Post-human approaches,  by contrast,  can be seen as
taking up just  that  challenge:  they propose  a different
ontology of people and things and thus precipitate a re-
definition of their properties (i.e. rather than merely a re-
distribution of them across the person/thing divide). This
tack does indeed raise the hope of an emancipation of the
thing ‘as such’, although one immediately has to add the
proviso  that  ‘the  thing’,  following  its  ontological  re-
constitution, is no longer the thing as we ordinarily know
it.
Think, for example, of Latour’s denial of human/ non-
human purification in favour of the flat ontology of the
Actor  Network.  All  the  ‘entities’  that  modernist
purification takes as ‘people’ and ‘things’ are refashioned
analytically  ‘hybrid’  knots  of  mutually  transformative
relations.  Each  element  of  which  these  relations  are
composed (itself a relation – hence the network’s fractal
structure,  à  la  Strathern  2004  [1991])  is  an  ‘actant’
inasmuch  as  it  has  a  transformative  effect  on  the
assemblage (i.e. the contingent and analytically localised
aspect or moment of the Network.)
So agency for Latour is not the effectuation of a human
intention  (e.g.  as  it  is  for  Gell).  It  is  a  property  of
networks of relationships (hybrid ones, involving all the
elements  that  a  modernist  ontology  would  want  to
distinguish from one another) that emerges as and when
the  elements  they  involve  make  a  difference  to  each
other. The classic and much cited example being Latour’s
discussion of the gun debate in the USA (e.g. see 1999:
180).  The  responsible  agents  are  neither  the  guns
themselves (as the anti-gun campaigners argue) nor the
people who use them (as the gun-lobby would have it –
‘guns don’t kill, people do’). It is the hybrid assemblage,
or ‘collective’, which gun users and guns form together:
the ‘person-with-gun’.
There can be no doubt that, thus ontologically revised
or  redefined,  things  are indeed emancipated ‘as  such’.
The new kind of analytical entity that Latour proposes,
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the  hybrid  assemblage  of  humans  and  non-humans  in
mutual transformation, is an agent in as serious a sense
one might wish to take that term: its very constitution is
defined by  its  ability  to  act  as  such.  Indeed,  the  bold
political philosophy that Latour has been building on the
back  of  his  move  to  networks  of  things-and-people  in
recent years is testimony to this: ‘political representation
of  nonhumans  seems  not  only  plausible  now  but
necessary, when the notion would have seemed ludicrous
or  indecent  not  long  ago’,  he  writes,  and  raises  the
prospect of a ‘parliament of things’ (Latour 1999: 198).
Yet,  in  terms  of  the  framework  of  the  present
argument,  there  is  also  a  significant  irony  involved  in
Latour’s tack of emancipation. In order for him to avoid
emancipating things ‘by association’  to humans, as per
Miller  or  Gell,  Latour  ends  up  defining  them,  in  a
revisionist  move,  as associations  (assemblages,
collectives, networks), thus binding them to humans by
ontological fiat. This, however, begs a question: to what
extent and, if at all,  how does the dignity conferred on
the actants of a Latourian network rub off on the things a
pre-Latourian metaphysic  would call  ‘things’?  Does the
Latourian revision of the constituents of the world get us
any  closer  to  answering  our  question  of  whether  the
thing can speak? Of  course,  from a Latourian point  of
view, these questions are either meaningless or foolish.
There is no ‘thing’, other than in the modernist chimera.
To raise the very question – Can the thing speak? – is to
engage in an act of purification. One should rather bite
oneself  and  ask,  Can  the  thing  –  I  mean  the  actor
network! – speak? (Answer: yes.)
Yet, I want to suggest that something important is lost
in this act of analytical (because ontological) censorship.
Far  be  it  from  me  to  propose  any  kind  of  return  to
modernist  ontology  –  not  even  for  the  sake  of  an
anthropological commitment to vulgar common sense à
la  Miller.  Indeed,  I  am not  even  sure  at  this  stage  of
thinking  about  the  matter  whether  the  sense  of
dissatisfaction I express here points to a principled flaw
in Latour’s analytic or an accidental feature of the way
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Latourian analyses tend to get done. Still, so often when
reading such analyses one gets the impression that all
the  qualities  that  seem  peculiar  to  ‘things’  as  one
ordinarily  conceives  of  them  –  I  mean  the  aspects  of
things  we  would  ordinarily  tag  is  their  ‘material’
qualities, such as those studied by material scientists –
somehow get muted, lost in the Latourian translation. I
am not saying they don’t get a mention, or that they do
not  play  a  significant  role  in  Latour’s  often  highly
sophisticated empirical analyses, as well as those of his
followers.  For  example,  Latour’s  refutation  of  the
technological determinism of saying that guns kill people
does not stop him from emphasising the particular forms
of agency that a gun’s technological characteristics – the
mechanics of detonation, velocity, accuracy and so on –
contribute to the man-with-a-gun assemblage. What I am
saying  is  that  the  net  effect  of  Latour’s  ontological
amalgamation  of  such  characteristics  with  the  people
they act to transform renders them (or at least tends to
render them) corollaries of projects and concerns that a
lay non-Latourian account would interpret as irreducibly
human: what is important about Boyle’s air-pump is its
contribution to modernity (1993a), the significant thing
about sleeping policemen is that their concrete curvature
participates  in  the  patrolling  of  traffic  (Latour  1993b),
what the elements that make for a gun’s firing power do
is they engender the potential to kill (1999).
All  this  may indeed be  a  contingent  function  of  the
particular  questions  on  which  Latourian  analyses  have
been  put  to  work.4 Nevertheless,  one  can  make  the
principled point that Latour’s prime ontological revision,
namely  the  ‘symmetry’  of  treating  the  entities  that  a
modernist metaphysics purifies as persons ‘or’ things as
hybrid relations of persons ‘and’ things (see also Viveiros
de Castro 2002), renders any interest in those aspects of
things one would ordinarily view as distinctively  thing-
like considerably harder to pursue. Qualities one would
call  ‘material’  are,  as such,  always in deep ontological
entanglement  with the (also)  human projects  that they
help constitute, so one wonders whether in practice, let
alone in principle, a Latourian take on things could at all
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let one disentangle them and allow them to be explored
as  such.  One  suspects  that  with  the  metaphysical
bathwater  of  ‘materiality’  (as  opposed,  that  is,  to
‘humanity’)  goes  also  the  baby  of  ‘materials’  as  a
legitimate analytical concern.
This  way  of  putting  it  shows  how  close  this  worry
comes to one expressed recently by Tim Ingold (2007).
Fed  up  with  what  he  sees  as  perversely  abstract  and
intractably abstruse debates about ‘materiality’ in recent
years, Ingold urges anthropologists to ‘take a step back,
from  the  materiality  of  objects  to  the  properties  of
materials [... –] a tangled web of meandrine complexity,
in which – among myriad other things – oaken wasp galls
get caught up with old iron, acacia sap, goose feathers
and  calf-skins,  and  the  residue  from heated  limestone
mixes with emissions from pigs, cattle, hens and bears’
(Ingold 2007: 9).  Ingold, we may note, makes no secret
of  the  fact  that  his  manifesto  for  a  renewed  focus  on
materials  is  itself  metaphysically  motivated,  and bound
up  with  a  particular  way  of  viewing  the  relationship
between humans and things. Inspired by Gibson as well
as  phenomenology,  Ingold  sees  humans  and  things  as
submerged on an equal ontological footing in ‘an ocean
of materials’ (2007: 7). He writes:
Once  we  acknowledge  our  immersion,  what  this
ocean reveals to us is […] a flux in which materials
of  the  most  diverse  kinds  –  through processes  of
admixture  and  distillation,  of  coagulation  and
dispersal,  and  of  evaporation  and  precipitation  –
undergo  continual  generation  and  transformation.
The forms of things, far from having been imposed
from without upon an inert substrate, arise and are
borne along – as indeed we are too –  within this
current of materials. (ibid.)
One might  say  that  Ingold’s  tactic  for  emancipating
the thing involves a kind of inverse humanism (for this is
not  materialism as we know it),  in  which,  rather  than
raising things to the power of the human, humans and
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things  alike  are  factorised  down  to  their  primordial
material denominator: Life on Earth (ibid). Nevertheless,
my point here is that Ingold’s plea for materials can be
taken  independently  of  the  theoretical  agenda  from
which it may flow, and heeded as a powerful reminder of
a whole terrain of investigation that any attempt to take
things seriously – even to emancipate them in the terms
developed here – cannot afford to ignore.
Indeed,  it  is  with  Ingold’s  plea  for  materials  that  I
want to cut to the chase of what asking for things that
speak  could  mean.  The problem is  one  of,  if  you  like,
wanting to have one’s cake and eat it. Eating the cake, in
this case, is taking fully on board the post-human (e.g.
Latourian) point that a proper emancipation of the thing
must  eschew any principled distinction  between it  and
humans as a starting-point. Having the cake is finding a
way nevertheless to credit the Ingoldian intuition that a
full-hog  emancipation  of  the  thing  must  place  those
characteristics  that  are most  think-like or  ‘thingy’  (the
designation  is  purely  heuristic,  with  no  metaphysical
prejudice!) at the top of its agenda. Asking whether the
thing can speak, then, is to ask for it to speak on its own
terms – in its own language, if you like. Any interesting
answer to this question, I suggest,  would have to start
form the rather blatant  observation that it  would be a
shame if such a language – call it ‘thingese’? – turned out
to have no sonorities  of  what  we take to be the most
obvious distinguishing feature of so-called things, namely
their  material  characteristics.  It  is  in  answer  to  this
question that a critique of the argument of TTT may be
useful.
Rethinking through things
Plotted  onto  the  trajectory  of  increasingly  radical
attempts  to  erase  the  human/thing  divide,  TTT  should
probably  be  placed  at  the  far  posthumanist  extreme.
Indeed,  were  one  permitted  to  compound  this  already
horrible term, the argument of TTT is post-posthumanist,
in that it takes on board the Latourian suggestion that
the distinction between people and things is ontologically
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arbitrary,  but  adds  (contra  Latour  among others)  that,
this  being  so,  the  solution  for  emancipating  the  thing
must not be to bind it to an alternative ontological order
(e.g. that of the Actor Network), but rather to free it from
any ontological determination whatsoever. TTT, in other
words,  operates  within  the  economy  of  the  literature
announcing and articulating the rise of the thing, and its
self-conscious polemic purports to offer a corrective even
to  the  most  extreme  proponents  of  this  (otherwise)
common emancipatory goal. Let me indicate briefly how
our  attempt  to  emancipate  the  thing  was  supposed  to
work
As  put  forward  in  the  Introduction  of  TTT,  the
argument involved two key claims – one critical and one
positive. The critical move, which took off directly from
Strathern (see above),  went as follows.  If  in any given
ethnographic  instance  things  may  be  considered,
somehow,  also  as  non-things  (e.g.  an  artefact  that,
ethnographically  speaking,  is  a  human  being,  as  per
Melanesian  gifts,  or  a  river  that  is  a  spirit),  then  the
notion of a ‘thing’, anthropologically speaking, can only
have  a  heuristic,  rather  than  an  analytical,  role.  So
attempts to analyse the things we call objects, artefacts,
substances,  or  materials  in  terms  of  their  objectivity,
substantiality  or,  as  has  become  most  popular,  their
‘materiality’,  are  locked  in  a  kind  of  ethnographic
prejudice – they are, to use the dirty word, ethnocentric.
And  this  goes  also  for  attempts  theoretically  to
emancipate things by attributing them with all sorts of
qualities earlier shacklers would take to belong only to
humans,  such as  sociality,  spirituality,  and again,  most
popularly, agency. In other words, if what a thing may be
is  itself  an  ethnographic  variable,  then  the  initial
analytical  task  must  not  be  to  ‘add’  to  that  term’s
theoretical purchase by proposing new ways to think of it
– e.g. as a site of human beings’ objectification (Miller),
an  index  of  agency  (Gell),  an  on-going  event  of
assemblage (Latour), or what have you. Rather it must be
effectively to de-theorise the thing, by emptying it out of
its  many analytical  connotations,  rendering it  a  purely
ethnographic  ‘form’  ready to  be filled  out  contingently
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according  only  to  its  own  ethnographic  exigencies.
Treating the thing as a heuristic  (i.e.  just  as a tag for
identifying it as an object of study) was indeed, then, a
way for us to allow it to speak in its own terms – which in
ethnographic  principle  may  be  as  varied  as  there  are
things to listen to – from behind the clamour of social
theoretical attempts to theorise such a thing as the thing
as  such.  Things  do  speak,  ran  the  thought,  but  the
problem is how to hear them past all the things we say
about them.
If half of the way towards addressing this problem is to
empty out the notion of ‘thing’ of its contingently a priori
metaphysical  contents  –  thing-as-heuristic  –,  the  other
half is to formulate a way of allowing it to be filled by
(potentially)  alternative  ones  in  each  ethnographic
instance.  This  can be seen as the second and positive
emancipatory  move  of  the  TTT  argument,  which  is
captured by a complementary methodological injunction:
‘concepts = things’. The move is complementary in that it
follows  directly  from  the  issue  that  motivates  the
heuristic  approach  in  the  first  place,  namely  the
possibility – and in so many instances the fact – that the
things  we  call  ‘things’  might  not  ethnographically
speaking be things at  all,  or  not  in  the way we might
initially assume them to be. For note that the things-as-
concepts  injunction  is  determinedly  not proposed  as
some new theory of the thing. The idea is emphatically
not to propose some kind of revisionary metaphysic, to
the  effect  that,  where  people  have  so  often  assumed
things  and  concepts  to  belong  to  opposite  ontological
camps,  we should  all  from now on  recognise  them as
belonging  to  the  same  one  (viz.  the  kind  of  approach
Latour and Ingold advance in different ways, as we have
seen). To the contrary, the ‘things = concepts’ formula is
offered  as  a  further  methodological  clause  for  side-
stepping just such theoretical prescriptions. In particular,
it  is  supposed to foreclose a very real  danger  when it
comes to thinking anthropologically  about the different
ways  in  which  things  may  feature  ethnographically,
namely that of parsing them as different ways in which
people  may  think  about  (represent,  imagine,  socially
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construct)  them.  This  is  to  parse  ethnographic
alternatives to our metaphysic of things in terms of it – in
fact,  in  terms  of  what  nigh  all-thing  emancipators
consider its crassest version, namely the idea of inert and
mute  things  invested  with  varied  meanings  only  by
human fiats of representation. It is, in effect, to raise the
erasure of things to the power of a necessity for thinking
of them.
So the ‘concepts = things’ clause is meant to placate
just this danger. Put very simply: instead of treating all
the things that your informants say of and do to or with
things as modes of representing the things in question,
treat  them as modes  of  defining them.  The immediate
advantage  of  this  way  of  parsing  the  issue  is  that  it
renders wide open precisely the kinds of questions that
lie  at  the  heart  of  the  emancipatory  agenda,  namely
questions about what kinds of things ‘things’ might be.
Instead of merely offering sundry ways of confirming the
base  metaphysic  of  mute  things  invested  with  varied
meanings by humans, the things-as-concepts tack holds
up  that  very  ethnographic  variety  as  a  promise  of  so
many  ways  of  arriving  at  alternative  metaphysical
positions  –  whatever they  might  be.  If  every  instance
anthropologists would deem a different representation of
a  thing  is  conceived  as  a  potentially  different  way  of
defining  what  such  a  thing  might  be,  then  all  the
metaphysical  questions  about  its  character  qua ‘thing’,
what  materiality  might  be,  objectification,  agency –  all
that  is  now up for  grabs,  as a matter  of  ethnographic
contingency and the analytical work it forces upon us.
As  we  did  in  the  Introduction  to  TTT  itself,  let  me
illustrate the approach with reference to my own chapter
in  the  book,  in  which  I  elaborate  an  analysis  of  aché.
Aché is a mana-type term that Afro-Cuban diviners use to
talk  both  about  their  power  to  make  deities  appear
during  divination,  and  about  a  particular  kind  of
consecrated powder  that  they consider  as  a  necessary
ingredient  for  achieving  this.  The  terminological
coincidence, I argued, corresponds to an ontological one:
a diviner’s power is also his powder and the powder (qua
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consecrated) is also his power. Now, this is obviously a
counter-intuitive  suggestion,  of  the  order  of  ‘twins  are
birds’ (Evans-Pritchard 1956, cf.  Holbraad 2010). If  we
know what powder is at all, we know that it is not also
power in any meaningful sense (it’s  just  powder!),  and
much  less  can  we  accept  that  power  (a  concept  with
proportions  as  grand  as  Nietzsche  or  Foucault)  might
also be just powder (of all things!). Hence the classical
anthropological  type  of  question:  why  might  Cuban
diviners ‘believe’ such a crazy idea? For as long as our
analysis of aché remains within the terms of an axiomatic
distinction between things and concepts, we cannot but
ask the question in these terms. We know that powder is
just  that  dusty  thing  there  on  the  diviner’s  tray  (see
below). So the question is why Cubans might ‘think’ that
it is also a form of power. How do we explain it? How do
we interpret it?
Alternatively,  we could treat  the distinction  between
concepts and things merely as a heuristic device, as per
TTT’s first  move.  This would allow us to ask questions
about that powder that we would intuitively identify as a
‘thing’, without prejudicing the question of what it might
be, including questions of what it being a ‘thing’ might
even mean. Answers to such questions,  then, would be
culled  from the  ethnography of  all  the  data  we would
ordinarily be tempted to call people’s ‘beliefs’ about this
powder, including the notion that it is also power. As per
the second move of the TTT method (concept = thing),
we would treat such data as elements of  a  conceptual
definition of the thing in question. So: Cuban diviners do
not ‘believe’ that powder is power, but rather define it as
power.  Note,  crucially,  how this  way of  setting  up the
problem raises the metaphysical stakes. Since our own
default assumption is that powder is not to be defined as
power (it’s just a dusty thing, we assume), the challenge
now must be to  reconceptualise those very notions and
their  many  ethnographic  and  analytical  corollaries
(powder,  power,  deity  etc.  but  also  thing,  concept,
divinity  etc.)  in  a  way  that  would  render  the
ethnographically-given  definition  of  powder  as  power
reasonable,  rather  than  absurd.  It  is  just  this  kind  of
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analytical work I attempted to carry out in my chapter in
TTT (I shall cover more of that ground later).
At the time we presented this mode of analysis in TTT,
I for one imagined it as having cracked the problem of
the thing’s emancipation as I have been outlining it here.
Taken together, I thought, our argument’s two key moves
effectively opened up the space for things themselves, as
one  encounters  them  heuristically  in  any  given
ethnographic instance, to dictate their own metaphysics –
to dictate, if you like, the terms of their own analytical
engagement. Just what I have in mind when asking for an
approach that allows things to speak for themselves, in
their  own language!  Yet,  to see why I may have been
wrong, one needs only to contemplate how the prospect
of  things  speaking  in  the  ‘own’  language  in  this  TTT-
sense measures up to the Ingoldian caveat, namely that a
proper emancipation of  things ‘as such’,  whatever that
may  mean  or  involve,  should  place  their  material
characteristics centre stage – that things should speak in
thingese,  and  that  thingese  should  somehow  be  an
expression of things’ peculiarly material qualities. In the
sometimes  flamboyantly  programmatic  pronouncements
of the TTT Introduction, nothing is in fact made of such
qualities,  and  certainly  their  role  in  ‘thinking  through
things’ is left largely unspecified.
In fact, it is indicative that this first dawned on me (at
any rate)  when faced with a searching question  by an
archaeologist in a conference at which my co-editors and
I  presented  our  argument  (see  also  Holbraad  2009).
Being himself consigned to working with things without
the benefit of rich ethnographic information about them,
he  admitted,  he  found  himself  at  a  loss  as  to  how
archaeologists might deploy our approach to any effect.
Notwithstanding  our  claim to  have  found a  way to  let
things  speak  for  themselves,  our  argument  seemed  at
most a method for allowing the ethnography of things to
speak on their behalf – to set, indeed, the terms of their
analytical  engagement.  If  what  motivates  the  whole
approach is, as explained above, the fact that in varied
instances people speak of or act with things in ways that
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contradict our assumptions about what a thing might be;
and if, furthermore, it is just those ways of speaking and
acting around things that  are supposed to provide  the
‘content’  of  their  potentially  alternative  metaphysics;
then how might archaeologists,  for whom,  what people
might have said or done around the things archaeologists
call  ‘finds’  is  so often  the primary question? If  anyone
ever needed a way of letting things speak for themselves
that is the archaeologist, for whom things are so often all
he has to go on. Our unproblematised reliance on, and
unabashed love for, ethnography in our way of ‘thinking
through things’  is  of  no huge help.  The clue is  in  the
book’s subtitle: ‘theorising artefacts ethnographically’.
These misgivings go to the heart of the problem I wish
to  tackle  here,  and  are  tellingly  connected  to  another
worry that as a social anthropologist I have had myself
(privately!) about the TTT argument, namely the fact that
the analytical experimentations it seeks to promote seem
in one way or other to be wound around ethnographic
phenomena  one  might  broadly  call  ‘magical’  or  even
‘animist’ in one sense or other. Cigarettes that make Port
Morsby  inmates’  thoughts fly out  of  prison,  Maori  and
Swazi  legal  paraphernalia  that  have  metaphysical
efficacy,  shamanic  costumes  that  transport  Mongols  to
legions of skies, and family chests and photographs that
contain  their  life  force,  divinatory  powder  that  is  the
power to reveal deities: these are the things contributors
to  our  volume thought  through,  along with  the people
who ‘informed’ them ethnographically about them. In line
with  the  archaeologist’s  comment,  I  suspect  that  this
‘magical realist’ tenor of the chapters is not accidental.
The leverage for  thinking  out  of  the  metaphysical  box
that so entranced us as editors was owed, at least to a
large extent and at the first  instance,  to  the chapters’
ethnographic  magic,  to  coin  a  phrase,  rather  than the
specifically ‘thing-like’ character of their subject-matter.
It  emerges,  then,  that  TTT’s  claim  to  offer  an
emancipation  of  the thing along the lines  I  have  been
discussing is open to a critique that is analogous to the
one advanced  earlier  in  relation  to  Latour.  Latour,  we
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saw, emancipates the thing by entangling it ontologically
with persons – subsuming both under the terms of his
revisionary ontology of networks comprising people-and-
things. TTT does something similar,  though now at the
level of analytical methodology. It emancipates the thing
by  entangling  it  heuristically  with  all  that  the  people
concerned with it say and do around it, subsuming things
and their ethnographic accounts under the terms of our
revisionary  methodology.  Indeed,  just  as  a  Latourian
might object that to demand an emancipation of the thing
‘as  such’  is  flatly  to  deny  the  significance  of  Latour’s
ontology of networks, so we might want to contend that
that same demand merely contradicts our methodological
injunction of concept = thing. As far as TTT is concerned,
things  as  such  just  are what  our  ethnographic
descriptions  of  them define them to be.  Still,  if  this  is
emancipation  by  ethnographic  ‘association’,  the
Ingoldian bugbear remains: what of materials and their
properties?
Yet,  I  want  to  argue  that  the  force  of  this  line  of
critique  pertains  more  to  the  rhetoric  of  the  TTT
argument than to its  substance.  Suitably  reconsidered,
the  methodological  approach of  TTT is  indeed  able  to
give ‘voice’ to material characteristics, making analytical
virtue  of  them  as  such.  The  fact  that  this  prospect
remained mute in the way we pitched the argument when
we wrote it relates directly to the guiding homology with
which  I  began  this  paper,  between  the  postcolonial
agenda  of  emancipating  the  native  and  the  thing-
theoretical  one  of  emancipating  the  thing.  With
particular  reference  to  Viveiros  de  Castro’s  ongoing
project of de-colonizing anthropological thinking by using
ethnography to  subvert  its  most  domineering  (because
ontological) presuppositions (see Henare et al 2007: 8-9,
cf.  Viveiros  de  Castro  1998,  2002),  ours  was  pitched
above all as an attempt to put the ethnography of things
at  the  centre of  such an endeavour.  If  for  Viveiros  de
Castro the emancipation of the native in anthropology is
a matter of  opening up space for her ‘conceptual  self-
determination’ (2002) within it, then the TTT argument
amounted mainly to the addendum that the ethnography
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of (people’s engagement with) things is a prime site for
pursuing  this  goal.  In  other  words,  whatever
emancipation TTT might offer to things was rhetorically
subsumed under the older (but surely no less pressing)
political  agenda  of  emancipating  the  native.  Indeed,
TTT’s  two-step methodology reflected this directly.  The
‘thing-as-heuristic’ move opened up ‘things’ as a locus of
ontological  self-determination,  while  the  ‘concept  =
thing’ clause allowed the ethnography of what natives do
and  say  around  them  to  provide  it  with  ontologically
variable contents.
What, then, of the substance of this argument? Might
it, albeit inadvertently, provide a way for things to speak,
not  as  proxies  for  ethnographic  natives,  but  for
themselves? In a longer, fully written up version of this
paper I plan to use three examples of anthropological and
archaeological analyses of things in order to explore the
question concretely.5 Here I limit  myself  to making the
argument from first principles, and illustrating it briefly
with reference to my Cuban powder-is-power case.
It  all  depends,  of  course,  on what  one takes ‘things
that may speak’ to mean – what counts as a thing that
speaks  for  itself?  It  is  on  this  point  that  I  think  the
homology with Spivak’s question about the subaltern is
most instructive. We have already seen that attempts to
transpose  the  humanist  agenda  of  postcolonial
emancipation onto things by including them in ‘the circle
of  the human’  provide  only  half-hogged emancipations,
‘by association’. But we have seen also that there is an
alternative  to  humanism in  the  struggle  to  de-colonise
anthropology – not least in the rhetoric of TTT itself, as
well as in the work of Viveiros de Castro. Captured by
Viveiros’s slogan of ‘conceptual self-determination’, this
is the project of constructing an anthropology that opens
spaces for natives to set the terms of our anthropological
engagements with them, positing them as producers of
concepts  rather  than,  say,  consumers  of  ours.  Rather
than worrying about how far natives might (or should) be
considered as humans,  agents,  subjects  and so on,  we
should  be  asking  what  concepts of  humanity,  agency,
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subjectivity  and  more  our  anthropological  engagement
with  them  might  yield,  and  be  fully  prepared  to  be
surprised by what we find (sensu Strathern 2005). It is
this  notion  of  emancipation,  then,  that  I  propose  to
transpose onto things: things can speak insofar as they
can set the terms of their anthropological engagement by
acting as the originators (rather than the objects) of our
anthropological  conceptualisations.  Things can speak if
they can yield their own concepts.
This way of putting the matter already gets us much
closer  to  seeing  why  TTT  might  after  all  be  suited  to
stage  such  a  move.  Bracketing  for  this  purpose  the
underlying postcolonialist concerns to which it was put to
use, the ‘concept = thing’ formula speaks directly to the
problem at hand. All one needs to do is read the formula
backwards  (in  school  we  called  this  ‘symmetry  of
equality’): ‘thing = concept’. Indeed, the thought is in a
pertinent sense the reverse (though not the opposite) of
the one advocated explicitly in TTT. If there the formula
‘concept  = thing’  designated the possibility  of  treating
what  people  say  and  do  around things  as  manners  of
defining  what  those  things  are,  here  its  symmetrical
rendition ‘thing = concept’ raises the prospect of treating
the thing as a manner of defining what we (analysts now,
rather than natives) are able to say and do around it. At
issue,  to coin another phrase,  are a thing’s conceptual
affordances.
Indeed,  thinking  of  the  present  argument  as  a
symmetrical reversal of the one made in TTT also allows
us to flesh the thought out in Ingold’s direction, towards
the question of materials and their properties. As I noted
when  outlining  the  TTT  position,  the  promise  of
conceptual experimentation that it holds up is grounded
in ethnographic contingency. Having emptied the notion
of ‘the thing’ of any conceptual presuppositions of what
may  count  as  one,  we  fill  it  back  up  with  alternative
conceptualisations  drawn  from  the  contingent
ethnographic  data  we  find  around  it.  One  way  of
describing the procedure, it  strikes me, would be as a
form of  ‘empirical  ontology’,  where ‘empirical’  denotes
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its ethnographic grounding. So we may ask: what is the
equivalently  empirical  grounding  of  the  reverse
procedure  that  I  seek  to  articulate  here  for  things?
Following  through  on  the  symmetry  of  our  reversal-
strategy,  the answer can be found only in the material
characteristics  of  the  thing  itself.  What  was  empirical
about  (ethnographically  driven)  concepts  that  defined
things  must  now  be  so  about  (let’s  say,
‘pragmatographically’  driven)  things  that  now  define
concepts.  With what other ‘stuff’  can things feed their
conceptualizations than the very stuff that makes them
what they are, as heuristically marked ‘things’? The data
that make a (conceptual) difference, in this case, are no
longer what we hear and see people say and do around
things,  but  rather  what  we hear,  see,  smell,  taste  and
touch of the thing as we find it (heuristically) as such.
The difference from Ingold,  however,  is  that,  in  line
with  his  phenomenologically  inclined  vitalism,  he  is
content  to  revel  at  this  material  and sensuous level  of
things, to explore their mutual ‘enmeshment’ with people
and other organisms,  as well  as  their  ‘affordances’  for
them in  the  broader  ecology  of  living.  By  contrast,  in
raising  the  question  of  the  conceptual affordances  of
materials and their properties, my interest is not in the
ecology  of  their  material  alterations  but  rather  in  the
economy of their conceptual transformations: how their
material characteristics can dictate particular forms for
their conceptualization.  At issue,  if  you like, is  not the
horizontal  traffic of materials’  enmeshment in forms of
life, but rather what one might imagine as a vertical axis
of  materials’  transformation  into  forms  of  thought  –
mainly for fun, I’d call this the ‘intensional vertizon’ of
things  (to  mark  its  orthogonal  relationship  to
phenomenological notions of things’ ‘intentional horizon’
in,  say,  Husserl).  Simply  put,  this  vertizonal  movement
would be what ‘abstraction’ would look like were it to be
divorced  from  the  ontological  distinction  between
concrete (things) and abstract (concepts). Indeed, this is
just what the ‘thing = concept’ clause of our analytical
method  would  suggest.  Where  the  ontology  of  things
versus concepts would posit abstraction as the ability of a
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given concept to comprehend a particular thing, external
to itself, in its extension, the heuristic continuity of ‘thing
= concept’ casts this as a movement internal to ‘the thing
itself’  (to  echo  Husserl  again):  the  thing  differentiates
itself, no longer as an instantiation ‘of’ a concept, but a
self-transformation as a concept.
I am of course aware that this way of thinking takes us
into deep philosophical waters which I am incompetent to
chart (although one may note with pleasure that this is
exactly as it  should be: one would hardly hope for the
scandalous  idea  of  things  that  speak  to  have  tamer
philosophical  implications).  Indeed,  in  my  amateur
understanding,  there  is  a  line  in  Western  philosophy,
which runs from Heraclitus through Leibniz  and up to
Deleuze, that deals with many of the relevant problems.
Still,  adopting a distinctively anthropological slant with
reference  to  Marilyn  Strathern’s  notion  of  ‘partial
connections’  (1991),  Morten  Pedersen  and  I  have
elsewhere tried to articulate in some detail the analytical
implications  of  things’  capacity  for  vertizonal
transformation  –  we  called  this  form  of  self-motion
‘abstension’,  to  indicate  the  intensive  (as  opposed  to
extensive) character that abstractions acquire when they
are  thought  as  self-differentiating  transformations  of
things-into-concepts  (see  Holbraad  &  Pedersen  2009).
Rather  than  cover  this  ground  again  for  present
purposes, however, I close by showing what this kind of
analytical  movement  looks  like  with  reference  to  the
example  of  aché which  I  began  to  discuss  earlier.
(Indeed, in retrospect, it seems remarkable that this line
of argument was pasted over, not only in the Introduction
to TTT,  where the notion of a powder that is  power is
used as an illustration as we saw, but even in my own
chapter  in  the  book,  where  the  actual  analysis  of  this
material is carried out.)
If, as I have argued, the problem with TTT is that it
emancipates  the  thing  only  by  associating  it  in
ethnography  with  an  ontologically  emancipated  native,
then my analysis of  aché in my TTT chapter is certainly
an instance of this. We have already seen, for example,
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that the very problem that article was devoted to solving
–  what  might  a  powder  that  is  also  power  be?  –  was
ethnographically driven: it was not powder that told me it
is power, it was my diviner informants. And certainly, a
host of ethnographic data serve to frame and develop the
problem itself, as well as parts of its analytical solution.
Crucially,  for  example,  since what  powder  might  be  in
this instance depends on the notion of power, part of my
attempt to articulate the question involves developing its
various  dimensions  ethnographically.  In  a  nutshell,  I
provide an account of Afro-Cuban divinatory cosmology
based on informants’ responses, to show that for diviners
power consists in the ability to render otherwise absent
divinities  present  during  the  divinatory  ceremony,  and
that this power manifested in divination as the ‘signs’ the
diviners mark with their  fingers on the powder that is
spread in the surface of their divining board, which are
called ‘oddu’, and said to ‘be’ divinities in their own right.
On the basis of this ethnographic information, I go on to
show that the notion of a powder that ‘is’ power emerges
as  a  solution  to  an  age-old  theological  conundrum,
familiar in the anthropology of religion (e.g. Keane 2007):
apparently transcendent deities are rendered immanent
on  the  surface  of  the  divining  board,  allowing  those
present  in  the  divination  to  relate  to  them  directly.
Conceptualising powder as power,  then,  requires us to
understand  analytically  how  Afro-Cuban  divination
effectively  solves this  ‘problem  of  presence’,  to  recall
Matthew Engelke’s book on a related conundrum (2007).
And it is to this question that powder, finally, speaks:
Powder gives us the answer […]. As we saw, spread
on  the  surface  of  the  divining  board,  powder
provides  the  backdrop  upon  which  the  oddu,
thought of as deity-signs, ‘come out’.  In this most
crucial  of  senses,  then,  powder  is  the  catalyst  of
divinatory power, ie the capacity to make [deities]
‘come out’ and ‘speak’ […]. Considered prosaically,
powder  is  able  to  do  this  due  to  its  pervious
character, as a collection of unstructured particles –
its  pure  multiplicity,  so  to  speak.  In  marking  the
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oddu on the board, the babalawo’s fingers are able
to draw the configuration just to the extent that the
‘intensive’ capacity of powder to be moved (to be
displaced like Archimedean bathwater) allows them
to do so. The extensive movement of the oddu as it
appears  on  the  board,  then,  presupposes  the
intensive mobility  of powder as the medium upon
which it is registered. [In this way] powder renders
the motile premise of the oddu’s revelation explicit,
there  for  all  to  see  by  means  of  a  simple  figure-
ground  reversal:  oddu figures  are  revealed  as a
temporary  displacement  of  their  ground,  the
powder.  […]  This  suggests  a  logical  reversal  that
goes to the heart of the problem of transcendence.
If we take seriously  babalawos’ contention that the
oddu just are the marks they make on aché-powder
[…],  then  the  constitution  of  deities  as
displacements of powder tells us something pretty
important about the premises of Ifá cosmology: that
these deities are to be thought of [not as] entities,
but rather as motions. […]  If the oddu […] just are
motions […], then the apparent antinomy of giving
logical  priority  to  transcendence  over  relation  or
vice versa is resolved. In a logical universe where
motion is primitive, what looks like transcendence
becomes  distance  and  what  looks  like  relation
becomes  proximity.  [So,  qua motions,  the  deities
have  inherent  within  themselves  the  capacity  to
relate to humans, through the potential of directed
movement that]  aché-powder  guarantees,  as  a
solution  to  the  genuine  problem  of  the  distance
deities  must  traverse  in  order  to  be  rendered
present in divination. (Holbraad 2007: 208-9)
It in not an accident that the content of this analysis
(i.e.  the  relationship  between  transcendence  and
immanence)  is  recursively  related  to  its  form (i.e.  the
relationship  between  analytical  concepts  and
ethnographic things) – in the article itself I made much of
this.  Here,  however,  I  want only to focus on the latter
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question, to draw attention to the work powder does for
the  analysis,  by  virtue  specifically  of  its  material
characteristics. If ethnography carries the weight of the
analytical  problem,  in this  argument,  it  is  the material
quality of powder that provides the most crucial elements
for its solution. If deities are conceptualised as motions
to solve the problem of presence, after all, that is only
because  their  material  manifestations  are  just  that,
motions.  And  those  motions,  in  turn,  only  emerge  as
analytically  significant  because  of  the  material
constitution  of  the  powder  upon  which  they  are
physically  marked:  its  pervious  quality  as  a  pure
multiplicity  of  unstructured  particles,  amenable  to
intensive movement,  like the displacement  of  water,  in
reaction  to  the  extensive  pressure  of  the  diviner’s
fingers,  and  so  on.  Each  of  this  series  of  material
qualities inheres in powder itself, and it is by virtue of
this material inherence that they can engender vertizonal
effects,  setting  the  conceptual  parameters  for  the
anthropological analysis that they ‘afford’ the argument.
As an irreducible element of the analysis of  aché, it  is
powder that brings the pivotal concepts of perviousness,
multiplicity,  motion,  direction,  potential  and so  on  into
the  fray  of  analysis,  as  conceptual  transformations  of
itself, as per the ‘thing = concept’ clause. In that sense, I
submit, it speaks for itself – louder, in fact, than any other
element of the analysis presented.
Conclusion: anthropology and/or pragmatology
By way of conclusion, it may be worth clarifying a little
how  I  see  the  dividends,  as  it  were,  of  the  kind  of
amplification of things’ voices in anthropological analysis
that  I  have  sought  to  articulate.  In  particular,  it  is
important  at  this  point  to  be  rather  precise  about  the
degree  and  manner  in  which  this  way  of  sourcing
anthropological conceptualizations in things counts as a
way of emancipating them ‘as such’. Indeed: one might
be  tempted  to  object  that,  whatever  the  merits  of  the
case I have sought to make for things speaking ‘as such’
in  our  analyses,  their  emancipation  in  this  way
nevertheless remains unavoidably circumscribed by the
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human-oriented  agendas  to  which  these  analyses  –
anthropological  after  all  –  are  directed.  Sure  (the
objection  would  go):  powder  may  be  operative  in  the
analysis  of  my  Cuban  example,  providing  the  material
source for my conceptual abstensions, as I called them,
of  such  analytical  ingredients  as  perviousness,
multiplicity,  intensive  motion,  and  so  on.  Still,  these
ingredients  are  part  of  a  longer  recipe,  so  to  speak,
which  includes  not  only  things  like  powder,  but  also
divinities, diviners, their clients and so on. And what this
analytical recipe is meant to cook is an argument about
Cuban  practitioners  of  divination  –  that  is  people,  my
informants  –  and  how  we  may  best  conceive  of  their
notion that powder, in a divinatory context, is a form of
divine  power.  While  part  of  our  answers  to  such
questions, in other words, might be driven by things ‘as
such’  in  the  manner  I  have  indicated,  their
anthropological significance is nevertheless a function of
their  association,  in  the  economy  of  anthropological
analysis, with people and the ethnographic conundrums
they pose to us. So the aforementioned archaeologist’s
bemused  complaint,  it  seems,  remains  after  all:  could
things really speak without their association to human (in
this case ethnographically talkative) subjects?
The correct response, I would suggest, is to bite the
bullet. Anthropological examples such as the one on Afro-
Cuban powder indeed do not demonstrate that things can
speak of their own accord, and seem bound to continue
to render them subservient to the analysis of the human
projects  into which they enter.  Arguably,  however,  this
line  of  scepticism  is  contingent  squarely  on  the
anthropological – by which I mean also human-centric –
character  of  the  example.  Indeed,  while  admittedly
staying  within  the  economy  of  undeniably
anthropological analyses, what I have ventured to argue
is that such analyses may involve an irreducibly thing-
driven  component  or  phase  –  one  we  might  call
‘pragmatological’,  borrowing  somewhat  subversively  a
term coined,  tellingly,  by the archaeologist  Christopher
Witmore  (forthcoming).  Indeed,  while  the  analytical
difference things  can  make pragmatologically  might  in
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this  instance  be  gauged  with  reference  to  the
anthropological  mileage they give,  the very notion that
things might make such a difference of their own accord,
‘as  such’,  does,  it  seems  to  me,  ultimately  raise  the
prospect of pragmatology as a sui generis field of inquiry.
Allow  me,  then,  to  indulge  in  a  final  and  absurdly
programmatic  speculation.  Might  one imagine  a  thing-
centric  discipline  called  pragmatology  in  which  things’
material properties would form the basis of conceptual
experimentations that would be unmediated by, and run
unchecked from, any human projects whatsoever? I have
to  admit  that  my  own  conception  of  what  such  a
discipline  might  look  like  is  hazy  to  say  the  least…
Certainly, notwithstanding my earlier comments, I don’t
think archaeology would be enough to provide a model, if
only  because  archaeology  shares  the  anthropo-centric
slant  of  social  anthropology,  its  problem  being  mainly
that  its  otherwise  thing-oriented  methodology  suffers
from  a  deficit  of  human  conformation.  Theoretical
physics may come considerably closer, since so much of it
apparently  takes  the  form,  precisely,  of  radical
conceptual  experimentations  in  the  service  of
understanding the material forms of the universe. Still,
this  also  has  problems,  partly  due  to  physicists’  still
encompassing demand for causal explanation (a demand
that is certainly distinct, and possibly incompatible, with
our pragmatological concern with conceptualization). At
any  rate,  there  is  no  reason  to  limit  our  putative
pragmatology  to  physicists’  takes  on  matter,  to  the
exclusion of those of, say, chemists, biologists, engineers,
or,  indeed,  artists,  sculptors  or  musicians.  In  fact,  I
suspect the closest one might get to the kind of inquiry
pragmatology could involve would be an inverse form of
conceptual  art  –  construed,  of  course,  very  broadly
indeed. If the labour of the conceptual artist is supposed
to issue in an object that congeals in concrete form a set
of  conceptual  possibilities,  the  work  of  the
pragmatologist  would be one that issues  concepts that
abstend  in  abstract  form  a  set  of  concrete  realities.
Pragmatology, then, as art backwards.
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1. While my comments here speak to the argument as 
presented by all three of its authors, I do not claim that 
Salmond and Wastell would agree with the retrospective 
critique I develop here (although they may well do so, at 
least in part).
2. Chris Tilley (whose own dualism-busting efforts draw mainly 
on phenomenology), puts it most simply, in defence of the 
notion of ‘materiality’: ‘The concept of materiality is 
required because it tries to consider and embrace subject-
object relations going beyond the brute materiality of 
[things] and considering why certain [things] and their 
properties become important to people.’ (Tilley 2007: 17)
3. On this point Miller, for one, resorts to a rather elaborate 
metaphor about philosophical wheels and the 
anthropological vehicles they help along which does not, to 
my mind, express very clearly the relationship between the 
two analytical demands (see Miller 2005: 43-46).
4. There may exist out there a Latourian analysis of an 
assemblage of actants consisting only of the things we’d 
call things, though the prospect seems more speculative at 
present – see Harman  2009.
5. My favourite candidates are Pedersen’s forthcoming analysis
of shamanic costumes in Mongolia (Pedersen 2011), in 
which he claims that these artefacts ‘provide an analysis of 
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themselves’, Strathern’s commentary on Battaglia’s 
analysis of Sabarl pick-axes (Strathern 1991), in which she 
argues that these  artefacts ‘contain their own contexts’, 
and the archaeological debate about skeuomorphism, 
where, I want to argue, materials analyse each other 
through translating prior forms into novel contents 
(material analysis as concretions of abstractions).
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Chapter 5
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY: 
FOOD AND FIELDWORK
Sidney Mintz
Back in 1978,1 when thinking about food seriously was
becoming  a  crotchet  among  scholars,  Joseph  Epstein
wrote  a  column  for  The  American  Scholar about  the
subject:
Judging from the space given to it in the media, the
great number of cookbooks and restaurant guides
published annually, the conversations of friends – it
is very nearly topic number one. Restaurants today
are talked about with the kind of excitement  that
ten  years  ago  was  expended  on  movies.  Kitchen
technology-blenders,  grinders, vegetable steamers,
microwave ovens,  and the rest-arouses  something
akin to the interest  once reserved for cars....  The
time may be exactly right to hit the best-seller lists
with  a  killer  who  disposes  of  his  victims  in  a
Cuisinart (Aristides 1978:157-8).
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If  Professor Epstein  was so in awe more than thirty
years ago, he must now ponder with added bewilderment
– as should we all – what has happened since. One keeps
expecting the fascination with food to fade away but it
has not – anyway, not  yet. The anthropological study of
food-related  behavior  has  also  changed  and  expanded
radically during the last three decades, though no one is
ready  to  explain  its  momentum.  Some  years  back,
Christine  Du  Bois  and  the  author  (Mintz  and  Du  Bois
2003)  sought  to  document  briefly  in  text,  and  with
bibliographical underpinning, some of the major problem
areas this interest has entailed, to enable us to highlight
a few changes.  One such problem area has to do with
studies of single plants or animals,  food substances, or
ingredients – buckwheat or quinoa, shrimp or muskrats,
collagen  or  lecithin,  vinegars  or  oils.  It  is  with  that
problem area in particular,  in relation to anthropology,
that the following remarks are concerned.
Redcliffe N. Salaman's remarkable  History and Social
Influence of the Potato appeared in 1949, yet the number
of kindred studies that followed it during the subsequent
three decades or so was small. I wrote a book on sugar
(sucrose),  published  now  twenty-five  years  ago  (Mintz
1985).  Since  then,  similar  works  have  multiplied.  We
have  seen  books  on  maize  (Warman  2003),  saffron
(Willard  1999),  rhubarb  (Foust  1992).  potatoes
(Zuckerman  2000),  pasta  (Sirventi  and  Sabban  2000),
bananas  (Jenkins  2000),  eels  (Schweid  2002),  codfish
(Kurlansky 1997), wedding cakes (Charsley 1992), Coca
Cola (Pendergrast 1993, Foster 2008), two on guinea pigs
(Morales  1995,  Archetti  1997),  at  least  two  on  salt
(Kurlansky 2002. Laszlo 2001 [1993]), at least three on
rice (Ohnuki-Tierney 1993, Hess 1992, Carney 2001), at
least  two  on  milk  (Wiley  2010,  Valenze  2011
[forthcoming]), at least three more on capsicums (Long-
Solis 1986, Naj 1992, Schweid 1999 [1987]), and even a
quintet,  by  a  prolific  popular  food  writer,  on  peanuts,
popcorn,  ketchup,  and  two  on  tomatoes  in  America
(Smith  1994,  1996,  1999,  2000,  2002).  The
supplementary  list  of  volumes  since  2003  and  now
forthcoming  or  in  progress  is,  if  anything,  even  more
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intimidating.  Only  some  of  these  works  are  by
anthropologists  (I  have  starred  them  above).  But
anthropological books on food now float amid a veritable
sea of food studies. The anthropological interest in food
came about by a distinctive route. If we go back to two of
the  founding  food-centered  studies  by  American
anthropologists  –  Frank  Cushing's  essay  on  Zuñi
breadstuffs  (1920)  and  Franz  Boas's  work  on  salmon
among the Kwakiutl  (1921) –  we can see why.  Though
each focused on a single food, one plant and one animal,
their aim was to describe that food in cultural context.
Otherwise said, each dealt with a subsistence mainstay
that was food for all, inside what was conceived of as a
small, specific, geographically distinct society; and both
works  were  based  on  fieldwork.  Most  important,
production, distribution and consumption are treated in
each as integral – as coherent within a single social and
economic system. Trade was certainly known to the Zuñi
and  was  important  to  the  Kwakiutl,  yet  food-linked
economic activity appeared to be mostly endogenous.
Of  course  social  and  economic  boundaries  between
them  and  their  neighbors  were  crossed.  But  such
boundary crossing was noteworthy. Food-related activity
took place almost entirely within the society itself; and it
was, and was considered, absolutely critical to survival.
In  both  societies  the  issue  of  adequate  food  figured,
ceremonially and ideologically, in the lives of the people.
For anthropologists at that time, at least, the reasons for
studying food systems were crystal clear: how could you
know how the society worked, if you did not know how it
got and used its food? If one looks, for example, at Clark
Wissler's The American Indian (1917), in its time a bible
for  beginning  students  of  the  indigenous  peoples  of
North America, one discovers that Wissler's culture areas
are above all  food areas, built on Otis T. Mason's earlier
work on "ethnic environments" (Mason 1895).
How  better  to  begin  to  sort  out  the  complexity  of
indigenous hemispheric life than to look at which people
ate salmon, which acorns, and which maize? While some
groups,  such  as  those  of  the  Northwest  Pacific,  lived
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rather high on the hog (so to speak), most had it much
harder; none, especially to judge by their folklore, had it
easy. For all New World peoples food was, both literally
and  figuratively,  part  of  the  central  challenge  of  life.
Turning back to works on the aboriginal peoples whose
cultures most interested the anthropologists of a century
ago, we remember that those societies produced most of
what they consumed, and consumed most of what they
produced. Yet such societies were not isolates. Alexander
Lesser (1961) pointed this out in a brilliant paper, as had
others before him. Still, most of the economic activities
remained within definable  borders.  When anthropology
moved  away  from  societies  that  were  largely  self-
sufficient (or that the ethnographers  took to be largely
self-sufficient),  our  task  changed.  Our  ability  to  treat
production, distribution and consumption as a coherent
system ended, once that real (or in some cases spurious)
self-sufficiency disappeared. One simply couldn't write a
monograph about Muncie, Indiana that made it look like
Malinowski's Coral Gardens and Their Magic, or Firth's A
Primitive Polynesian Economy, no matter what sorts of
blinders the ethnographer wore.
The enlargement of anthropological focus beyond the
so-called "primitive"  came slowly,  even painfully; and a
full  recognition  that  the  job  requirements  for
anthropologists  had become different  arrived yet  more
uncertainly.  I  ask  your  forbearance,  in  commenting
briefly on that shift, by referring to my own experience.
More than half  a century ago, when such fieldwork by
anthropologists  was  still  rare,  I  worked  in  a  rural
proletarian community on the south coast of Puerto Rico.
Nearly everyone there worked in the sugarcane. Indeed,
one  could  argue  defensibly  that  the  community  was
defined by the activities of a foreign sugar corporation,
which employed nearly every inhabitant. To have tried to
picture  that  community  as  some  sort  of  isolate,  self-
contained, definable in terms of itself, would have been
as convincing as imagining it to be on the moon.
But understanding what had happened does not end
there. I discovered that much of the social fabric of that
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community would remind me more of what I had been
reading about in Malinowski and Firth than of Muncie,
Indiana, in spite of the industrial ambience. I would come
to conclude that this seeming contradictoriness was real.
Learning  about  sugarcane  and  sugar  production  was
essential  to  making  sense  of  people's  lives  there.
Understanding something about the Boston corporation
that  managed  its  production  and  sale  clarified  other
things about Puerto Rican life. Yet I knew I was making a
community  study,  even  while  realizing  that  the  local
economy was utterly dependent upon forces external to
it.  Its  people  were not  tribespersons or  peasants;  they
were rural proletarians (Mintz 1951). They had no means
of  production  beyond  their  labor;  they  were  nearly  as
stripped of such means as any dishwasher in a New York
City restaurant. They sold their labor power to a North
American  corporation.  They  produced  hardly  anything
that  they  ate,  ate  nothing  they  produced.  That  is  an
exaggeration,  but  only  a  slight  one.  Economically
speaking,  their  lives  would  have  been  empty  without
sugar.
Yet  their  lives  as  a  community  were  real  enough.
Indeed, in the tenor of daily life, they seemed to me in my
short  life  much  more  like  a  living  community  than
anywhere else I had lived up to that time. I saw sugar as
an  element  in  the  shaping  of  their  lives,  not  as  the
subject of my research. It was not until thirty-five years
later, when I decided to write a book on the history of
sugar, that I first began to think of myself as a serious
student of  a single substance.  It  was lecturing on that
book that  made me a student  of  food.  In  the question
period following a lecture on sugar history,  I  might  be
asked what I had to say about salt – about which I knew
nothing;  or  about honey,  of  which I  knew too little;  or
about Equal, or HFCS, or maple syrup – or why people
everywhere seemed to like sweet foods, anyway. It was in
response to my listeners' questions that I became serious
about the study of food. I recount this only to indicate to
the reader how accidentally one can – or anyway, I did –
wander into something like the anthropology of food.
127
SIDNEY MINTZ
The truth is, of course, that  Sweetness and Power is
not really  about food – it is about the rise of capitalism.
Sugar  (sucrose)  was  simply  an  illustrative  instance  of
that process,  a long thread in the social and economic
fabric of Western history – and the histories of peoples
then buried by western historiography.
While I think that sugar is interesting in its own right,
in  Sweetness and Power my interest in sugar was only
incidental. I was trying to uncover how holders of power
in the West were establishing themselves at an early time
in  the  world  outside  Europe  on  the  one  hand,  and
relating themselves in new ways to their  own laboring
classes on the other. I realized that one of the ways they
were discovering how to do so was by manipulating the
material  universe.  The  one  concrete  substance  that  I
knew about personally was sugar.
As the governing classes learned to take the measure
of their own people and of subjected peoples elsewhere,
we are able to see how the fates of different lands and
their inhabitants as producers and as consumers became
linked  in  various  ways  to  the  fates  of  particular
substances. In effect, the ruling classes of the societies of
the West,  who had long seen themselves as entitled to
enjoy both substances and experiences not available to
others,  must  have  been  beginning  to  think  more
consciously about what ordinary people might want – and
then, more importantly,  under what conditions it  might
benefit them, the rulers, to see that ordinary people  got
some of what they wanted. This is a highly original line of
thought if it turns up in societies where inequalities were
inherited –  to  control  others  and to benefit  from their
existence,  not  by  beating  them  with  a  stick,  but  by
offering them some carrots. In practice this doesn't work
so well with donkeys, about whom it is commonly said;
but  some  persons  thought  maybe  it  would  work  with
humans.  It  did;  and  it  does.  Gradually  a  social  and
economic  system was born,  within  which people  could
fashion  their  identities  as  much  from  what  they
consumed  as  from what  they  could  learn,  work  at,  or
create.
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Of course such a line of thought is highly speculative,
even though it may sound persuasive. But what we knew
about how capitalism as a system of  consumption  had
taken shape,  from writers  such as Marx,  Sombart  and
Veblen;  and  what  I  knew already  about  the  history  of
sugar, made it seem worth my while to look harder. Even
without the  inner story of sugar, some uncovering of its
nature in relation to human desires – and of the human
capacity to braid together desire and habit – the larger,
outer story of power might be narrated. But if I did only
that, we would not have an example of what I intended to
uncover. I hoped to show how, by looking at one revealing
niche of activity,  an ever-larger economic system could
be  discerned,  operating  pretty  smoothly,  though  not
entirely visible.
To achieve my aim, there had to be – at least for me – a
definable and concrete object of study.  Of course there
were  and  are  alternative  ways  to  study  sugar  or  any
other  such product.  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  more
useful to do a discursive analysis of books on power and
the  tropics;  or  to  study  the  history  of  capitalism on a
larger canvas, such as the general nature of human food,
the  ubiquitous  power  of  capitalism,  the  generalized
hegemony of its leaders. I even wondered about writing
about  the  works  of  whoever  wrote  about  sugar.  I  had
been studying those, and a lot of people, some of them
interesting, had indeed written about it.
But I would not have been able to do that work well.
Being  of  my  generation,  with  a  strong  liking  for  the
concrete, I went ahead with my own plan. That involved –
though I did not anticipate it as such at the time – putting
my ideas and what I learned within a framework of the
sort sometimes now referred to, not very respectfully, as
a "master narrative." I suppose the truth is that I am a
sucker for master narratives. Back when I was living on
the edge of a sugar plantation in Puerto Rico in 1948, it
surely  seemed  to  me  that  sugar  fitted  within  a  larger
chronicle of the rise of capitalism, of the use of forced
labor outside the capitalist heartland, of fin de siècle U.S.
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imperialism,  and of  the  long-term success  of  linking  a
safe  site  of  production  and  a  guaranteed  market  for
consumption: at home and in the colonies, and preferably
without others quite noticing it.
This looked to me like a lengthy chronicle, going back
as  it  did  for  nearly  five  centuries,  involving  Europe,
Africa and the tropical New World, using forced labor in
many  guises,  and  perfecting  a  characteristic  form  of
industrial organization, one that blended field and factory
into one efficient, productive and vicious enterprise. I did
not  see  any  of  those  features  in  sugar's  history  as
inevitable.  Indeed,  I  came  to  take  positions  on  the
relationship  of  slavery  to  capitalism,  and  on  the
geographical  locus  of  the  first  centers  of  industrial
production,  that  put  me  in  positions  that  no  orthodox
Marxist  or  economic  determinist  would  want  to  find
herself. And I surely did not believe that my version was
by any means the only such narrative of the past. In fact,
in  a  much  earlier  book,  I  had  put  together  unawares
much of the same story, taken from the mouth of a single
narrator (Mintz 1960).
In chronicling sugar, I wanted to be as objective as I
could. At times I wondered whether there might be some
way to get enough distance from my subject to attain the
objectivity  that  apparently  comes  with  successfully
situating  oneself  outside  of,  or  above,  the  capitalistic
system. I admit that some anthropological scholars had
apparently succeeded at doing that, and at first I wanted
to  do  it,  too.  But  when  I  thought  about  where  my
university salary came from; who pays for the fellowships
that my school supplies its graduate students; the light
that  proper  attention  to  politics  still  sheds  upon
plantation owners in  the right  places,  even today;  and
other such truths (not opinions) in today’s world – I could
not elude my feeling that I,  at  least,  was living within
capitalism, not floating invulnerably above it. I decided to
write my study of sugar in an old fashioned way: as if I
lived in a capitalist society myself, and so I did.
As Redcliffe Salaman's remarkable study of the potato
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eloquently  demonstrated,  the idea  of  studying a  single
plant,  animal,  food,  or  food ingredient  is  by no means
new; and work such as Boas's and Cushing's in an earlier
era makes plain that  anthropologists  had thought of  it
long ago. But it is worth noting afresh, because when we
look  at  Malinowski's  work  with  the  Trobrianders,  or
Firth's  with  the  Tikopia,  we  see  much  of  the  same,
because they could define social  groups that produced
what they consumed, and consumed what they produced.
In  such  analytical  works  production  and  consumption
were not amputated from each other; the near-obsession
with consumption that we have seen in food studies in
recent years was absent.  Put  simply,  in those societies
the relation between supply and demand was much less
influenced by market forces than is true for most of the
modern  world.  Missing  from  those  monographs  is
concern  with  the  economic  relationships  among
producers, and their influence over consumers. In those
societies producers did not aim at enlarging, changing,
or  cornering  a  part  of  the  market.  They  were  not
competing for buyers, nor were the consumers searching
for alternate sellers. Each economic act in those societies
was  also  a  social  act.  A  diminishing  supply  did  not
automatically result in price rises. When such indicators,
having to do with the nature of capital,  of  the market,
and of the market value of factors of production such as
labor, are not present, their absence signals that a fully
developed capitalism is still wanting. But I believe that it
is  near  impossible  to  study  food  production  or
consumption almost anywhere in the world today without
taking such forces into account.
In  the  modern  world,  the  extent  to  which economic
factors  become  deeply  interwoven  with  the  role  of
government  in  the  economy  makes  the  picture
additionally  complex.  For  example,  where  does  profit
stop and the FDA begin? Should ephedra be taken off the
market,  rather  than  being  sold  with  warnings  to  the
consumers?  Should  we  regulate  the  so-called
nutraceuticals  at  all?  To  what  extent  should  General
Foods lobbyists or sugar lobbyists – or for that matter,
congressmen underwritten by lobbyists – determine how
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the  food  triangle  is  depicted  graphically,  and  what
pictures and words go in it?
Now  the  interpenetration  of  government  and  the
private  sector  poses  almost  daily  challenges  to  our
conceptions of individual  freedom and the definition of
general  welfare.  If  one  contemplates  the  facts  about
food-borne  diseases  and  what  consumers  can  do  to
protect our children from the “modern” system of food
production,  we  have  a  wordless  but  eloquent
demonstration of our near total helplessness.
But  these  are  questions  with  which  our
anthropological ancestors did not have to deal when they
studied  food.  They  concentrated  on  other  food-related
matters,  such  as  coral  gardens  and  their  magic,  or
salmon  recipes  on  the  Northwest  coast.  In  very  large
measure, the doing of the anthropology of that earlier era
is gone, even if – one hopes – not forgotten. But we can
still study the way human beings behave, and the rules
and patterns of their behavior,  as did our forbears; we
can still  learn about different  value systems,  and their
internal  logics.  We  can,  in  short,  still  profitably  do
fieldwork, which is what we are supposed to be good at.
I was reminded of our distinctive methodological gift a
few years back, when I asked two colleagues if I might
read their unpublished manuscript. Professors Frederick
Errington and Deborah Gewertz had based what became
their book (2002) on the New Guinea fieldwork they had
carried out over two decades and on their recent Morgan
Lectures.  I  asked to read the manuscript because it  is
about sugar. In it they describe events leading up to the
creation of a plantation and the construction of a modern
sugar mill in Papua New Guinea. Since the history of the
industrial production of sugar goes back at least to the
17th century in the Caribbean region, I tend to associate
it  with  slavery  and  the  destruction  of  cultural  origins,
both  Native  American  and  African.  But  in  Papua  New
Guinea,  making  a  sugar  industry  was  intimately
associated  with  creating  a  nation  –  not  so  much  with
destroying  local  cultures,  as  with  aiming  at  the
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conception of a national culture.
The  early  planning  discussions  there,  Errington  and
Gewertz report, had to do with whether the Papua New
Guinea  sugar  industry  would  supply  only  the  national
population, or undertake to export sugar besides. Much
discussion concerned the quality of sugar to be produced,
as well  as  the quantity.  People  wanted PNG to have a
modern industry,  so the country would look modern to
the  outside  world.  So  both  quality  –  in  this  case,  to
produce fully-refined white, or the less “modern” brown –
and quantity were argued over. Once decided, the next
issue  became  that  of  location  and  employment.  On
grounds of fair play, and to avoid localism, the labor force
for  the  new  industry  was  to  be  drawn  from  peoples
across  the  nation  –  a  deliberate  attempt  was made to
avoid provincialism or "wantokism" (“one-language-ism”);
and by aiming to treat individuals  as equals,  the hope
was to contribute to the building of a national identity.
With  the  work  force  recruited  from every  part  of  the
country,  both to prevent kin, village or language-group
cliques  from  forming,  and  to  impose  equality  of
treatment on all,  the sugar industry became a bulwark
for fostering national feelings, as against local loyalties.
To at least some extent, the plan succeeded (or at least at
that  time  the  authors  thought  it  had.).  Errington  and
Gewertz had to learn about the sugar industry, as have
many other anthropological field workers before them in
other places; but what they learned shows the way that
the world is changing, and the power of anthropological
fieldwork  to  document  in  detail  the  changes  taking
shape.  When one reads what  was done with the labor
force  for  the  PNG  sugar  complex  –  organized  by  the
Booker-Tate  Corporation,  one  of  the  great  capitalistic
enterprises that lay behind the development of Caribbean
sugar – one is stunned to see to what extent the efforts
made  to  create  a  genuine  landless  wage-earning
proletariat  in  Papua New Guinea  paralleled  those  that
marked the  coming of  U.S.  power to  the Puerto  Rican
south coast, a century before.
Even  more  remarkable,  those  efforts  also  reveal
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provocative similarities to what happened sociologically
with  the  enslaved  Africans  brought  in  to  work  on
Caribbean  plantations  centuries  earlier.  What  I  mean
here is that a nation was being deliberately constructed;
in Caribbean history, pre-existing cultural patterns were
being deliberately broken down.
What I  read about  in  Errington  and Gewertz’s  book
was the imposition of a time-conscious industrial process
upon people in a newly-emergent nation – people whose
vision had been, and in large measure still is, conditioned
by kin group, village and linguistic group that provide the
circles  of  meaning  by  which  the  people  identified
themselves,  as individuals  and as group members.  The
sugar  industry  there  reveals  that  they  are  now  being
circumscribed  by  a  still  larger  circle  –  one  we  social
scientists  have  variously  labeled  with  terms  such  as
secularization,  industrialization,  urbanization,
acculturation  or  some  other,  but  which  also  end  up
meaning  at  some  point  “modernity”  within  global
capitalism.
I do not mean to suggest by this description that there
is some single interpretive or explanatory high road to
the  study  of  food  –  any  food  –  or  toward  our  richest
understanding of human behavior and its past. If we look
at  the  work  of  other  "sugar  scholars,"  after  this  brief
glance at Errington and Gewertz, we see how rich and
varied  are  the  approaches  that  serious  scholars  have
taken.  Monographs  by  historians  and  anthropologists
about  sugar,  no  two  of  them  alike  –  Ortiz  in  Cuban
Counterpoint, Moreno Fraginals in El Ingenio, Attwood in
Raising  Cane,  Scheper-Hughes  in  Death  Without
Weeping, Mazumdar in  Sugar and Society in China, and
many others – have advanced our understanding of the
relationship among substance, society and behavior; and
though sugar figures importantly in all of their work, it
would be mistaken to claim that they wrote "books about
sugar." My intention in this paper was to keep the notion
of concrete objects of study – in this instance, foods and
food substances, and one in particular – front and center.
Yet none of these books is only about sugar, even though
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each of them is very much about sugar. Their authors'
eyes were firmly fixed on the substance through which
their  protagonists,  and the social  forces of  which they
were part, interacted. Of this list of monographs, all of
them  excellent,  two  –  Death  Without  Weeping and
Raising Cane – were written by anthropologists, and both
display handsomely how the study of the material world
and the methods of anthropology can meet fruitfully in
fieldwork. The purpose of these remarks was to reflect
upon  fieldwork  and  the  study  of  foods  or  food-related
substances. But permit me to conclude by making a final
point.
My  aim  was  to  suggest  that  there  are  still  many
different ways to do anthropology, and within the subfield
of food studies that is still true. We food anthropologists
need to do careful fieldwork and lots of it. But we want it
to help us to understand,  if  possible, something larger
than itself. That is not always possible; and the fieldwork
can still  be well worth doing. But if we aim to reach a
larger  readership  than our  colleagues;  and if  we want
what we have found out and think to serve some useful
purpose  beyond  self-education,  we  should  aim  at
exploring the larger messages our data offer us.
Notes
1. This paper was first delivered as the David Skomp 
Distinguished Lecture on April 30, 2003, for the 
Department of Anthropology, Indiana University. It was then
published separately, the same year and with the same title,
by the Department. I have made a few small changes in the 
text for this online edition. It is posted here by permission 
of the Department of Anthropology, Indiana University. 
Requests for copies of the original lecture may be 
addressed to the Department of Anthropology, Indiana 
University, 701 E. Kirkwood Avenue, SB 130, Bloomington 
IN 47405.
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Chapter 6
COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN:
NOTES TOWARDS A SUPERFICIAL
INVESTIGATION
Philip Swift
Tiger and Bond stood in the shade of the avenue of
giant cryptomerias and observed the pilgrims, slung
with cameras, who were visiting the famous Outer
Shrine of Ise, the greatest temple to the creed of
Shintoism. Tiger said, ‘All right. You have observed
these  people  and  their  actions.  They  have  been
saying prayers to the sun goddess.  Go and say a
prayer without drawing attention to yourself.’
Bond walked over the raked path and through the
great  wooden  archway  and  joined  the  throng  in
front of the shrine. Two priests, bizarre in their red
kimonos and black helmets,  were watching.  Bond
bowed towards the shrine, tossed a coin on to the
wire-netting  designed  to  catch  the  offerings,
clapped  his  hands  loudly,  bent  his  head  in  an
attitude of prayer, clapped his hands again, bowed
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and walked out.
‘You did well,’ said Tiger. ‘One of the priests barely
glanced at you.  The public paid no attention.  You
should  perhaps  have  clapped  your  hands  more
loudly. It is to draw the attention of the goddess and
your ancestors to your presence at the shrine. Then
they will pay more attention to your prayer. What
prayer did you in fact make?’
‘I’m  afraid  I  didn’t  make  any,  Tiger.  I  was
concentrating on remembering the right sequence
of motions.’
‘The goddess will have noticed that, Bondo-san. She
will help you to concentrate still more in the future.
Now we will  go  back  to  the  car  and  proceed  to
witness another interesting ceremony in which you
will take part.’
—Ian Fleming, You Only Live Twice (1965) p.90-91
A superficial  citation,  to  be  sure,  but  deployed  with  a
more significant (I do not say deeper) end in mind: to pay
attention,  in  this  essay,  to  the  significance  of
superficiality  in  Japan.  By  this,  I  mean  the  well-
documented  tendency  of  Japanese  sociality  to  invest  a
serious amount of energy in the creation of surfaces.1 For
the  moment,  though,  let  us  stick  with  this  trivial
epigraph,  for  it  is  instructive.  In  You Only  Live  Twice,
James Bond – on a mission  in Japan –  is  instructed in
becoming  Japanese  by  Tiger  Tanaka,  head  of  the
Japanese Secret Service. As described by Fleming, James
Bond’s  Japan  is  a  kind  of  technicolor  theatre  state,
parcelled up in ritual. A country of pure exteriority that
Fleming  invents  by  papering  it  with  clichés  (so  often
italicised):  samurai,  sake,  Suntory  whisky,  ninja and
nightingale floorboards. How then to go undercover in a
world of surfaces? Not so difficult, when identity too is
just a façade. In a doubly dubious moment of mimesis,
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Double-O Seven play-acts at being Japanese by the easy
expedient of cosmetics: black hair dye and skin-tanning
lotion. Later on, Bond gives up his Japanese disguise in
favour of something even more implausible. He pretends
to be an anthropologist! (Fleming 1965: 121)
Ironies aside,  however,  consider the scenario quoted
above; the prayer exercise at Ise Shrine. Suppose, for a
moment,  that  an  anthropologist  were  present  at  the
scene,  loitering  perhaps  behind  a  giant  cryptomeria;
spying on the spy. Observing Bond perform a sequence of
actions and overhearing the subsequent bit of dialogue –
You did well…What prayer did you in fact make? – I’m
afraid  I  didn’t  make  any –  our  eavesdropping
anthropologist  might  well  be  led  to  ask  herself  the
following question: Did James Bond pray or not? After all,
he got the actions right, but then he says that actually he
didn’t pray; yet Tanaka, his mentor, seems to think that
he did. Which is it then? Our anthropologist is fazed, both
shaken and stirred. For while she is able to accept that,
on the surface, Bond seems to pray, what she most wants
to know is what’s  really happening deep down. Perhaps
she remembers reading Geertz and his Rylean doctrine of
thick description. The job of ethnography, she recalls, is
to  codify  occurrences  according  to  their  particular
significations,  to  sort  out  ‘real  winks  from  mimicked
ones’  (Geertz  1993:  16).  Well  then,  how  to  tell  the
difference  between  someone  making  a  prayer  and
someone faking one?
If I indulge in these fictional speculations, it is in order
to create a conceptual space for the staging of analysis.
Fleming’s account is a fabrication – obviously – but it is, I
suggest,  effective  nonetheless  in  terms  of  delimiting
certain aspects of the ethnographic problem of prayer in
Japan.  In  fact,  more  than  that  –  to  deploy  this  ersatz
example as a means of enacting my general thesis: it is
effective to the extent that it is fabricated.
To see how this passage of Fleming might turn out to
be  ethnographically  useful  –  in  spite  of  its  evident
exoticism,  its  double-O  orientalism  –  consider  the
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following description  offered by Thomas Kasulis  (2004:
27-8).  He  reports  on  the  sort  of  typical  exchange  he
would  have  with  the  businessmen  he  would  often  see
praying at a certain shrine in Tokyo.
‘“Why did you stop at the shrine?”’ asks Kasulis.
Says the businessman: ‘“I almost always stop on the
way to work.”’
Kasulis presses him further. ‘“Yes, but why? Was it
to give thanks, to ask a favor [sic], to repent, to pay
homage, to avoid something bad from happening?
What was your purpose?”
“I don’t really know. It was nothing in particular.”
“Well  then,  when you stood in front of the shrine
with your palms together, what did you say, either
aloud or silently to yourself?”
“I didn’t say anything.”
“Did you call on the name of the  kami [divinity] to
whom the shrine is dedicated?’
“I’m not really sure which kami it is.”
So  there  you  have  it.  Everything  happens  as  if  the
invocation is simulated, seemingly going no further than
the curve and contact of surfaces – clapping, bowing, and
the pressing of palms together.2 Roland Barthes possibly
gestures at this image of prayer as pure exteriority at the
end of  his  famous  meditation  on  the  ‘system’  he  calls
Japan.  ‘Empire  of  Signs?’  asks  Barthes.  ‘Yes,  if  it  is
understood that these signs are empty and that the ritual
is  without  a  god’  (Barthes  1983:  108;  2005:  149).
Certainly, the model ‘Japan’ that Barthes engineers is too
heavily invested with the elements of an idealized Zen,
with the result that his system puts too much stress on
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emptiness. At the same time, however, the merit of his
analysis is its disavowal of depth; instead, it traces planes
and sticks to surfaces. Consider, by contrast, a mode of
inquiry  that  moves  very  differently;  one  for  which
surfaces are encountered as obstructions, when what it
really  wants  is  not  more  walls  to  run  up  against,  but
windows to look through. Just such a model of method is
employed  by  a  Cambridge  Professor  of  Anthropology,
Alan  Macfarlane,  with  stumbling-block  consequences.
Writing of the goings-on at the Ise Shrine (where James
Bond ‘didn’t’  pray)  and  other  such  places,  Macfarlane
registers confusion:
There  is  no  God  or  gods  and  there  is  no  other
separate supernatural world. With what can ritual
communicate? When thousands visit the Ise shrine
or go to Buddhist or Shinto shrines and wash their
hands, clap, make little monetary offerings, write up
their wishes and hang them on trees, what are they
doing?
There is a widespread attempt to communicate with
something  spiritual…But  it  is  difficult  to  find  out
what exactly is happening. (2007: 186)
This  moment  of  incomprehension  reminds  me  of
nothing so much as the opening lines of the song, ‘For
What  It’s  Worth’,  by  Buffalo  Springfield:  There’s
something happening here/What it is ain’t exactly clear.
Here, from the point of view of a method fixated with the
location  of  foundations,  there  is,  as  Barthes
disconcertingly observed, ‘nothing to grab hold of’ (‘rien
à saisir’; 2005: 150). In other words, the problem would
seem  to  be  that  there  are  too  many  surfaces  and  no
evident  way  of  accessing  that  subterranean  zone  of
motivations that would make them intelligible. This issue
of  ‘access’  is  one  which,  for  example,  scholars  of
religious conversion – keener than believers in their need
to finally, really see just what is actually going on – have
rather quaintly called the ‘problem of observability’ (see
Cowan and Bromley 2008: 218).3 In short, the problem of
144
COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
what  we  might  call  the  credibility  gap  between  the
envelope  of  action  (clapping,  bowing)  and  the  interior
intention.
The  problem  surfaces  once  more  in  Nelson’s
ethnography of the daily life of a Shinto shrine in Kyoto,
when he  remarks  of  the  various  activities  that  shrine-
goers  engage  in  that  ‘the  observer  cannot  know  for
certain  what  degree  of  belief  accompanies  such  acts’
(Nelson  1996:  141;  cf.  136).  Now  this  is  a  perfectly
unobjectionable  statement,  quite  in  keeping  with
Nelson’s sensible emphasis on the importance of allowing
for  a  wide  range  of  motivations  (where  these  can  be
ascertained)  of  those  who  visit  the  shrine.  But  it  is
precisely  this  statement’s  seeming  reasonableness  that
makes me hesitate. That is to say, I am bothered by the
elementary epistemology it presupposes; for why, in this
particular case, should the observer suppose any degree
of association between such acts and certain inner states
(such as  beliefs)  that  might  authorise  them? Certainly,
nothing  in  Nelson’s  own  data  suggests  that  ‘belief’,
whether present or absent, has anything to do with the
activities that take place at Shinto shrines. If this is so,
then perhaps we have been using the wrong language,
for,  as  currently  articulated,  our  analytical  expressions
concerning these Japanese practices seem to be marked
by that ‘constitutive unhappiness’ that, as Latour (2004:
212)  says,  forever  hangs  over  the  language  of
epistemology;  the  sense  of  regret  that,  although  our
descriptions  can  never  get  beyond  the  surface  of
practice, this is what they ought to be doing if they aim
to reach that real,  interior space of explanation.  To be
sure,  as  with  other  analysts  of  Japanese  religiosity,
Nelson  makes  it  clear  that  ‘praxical’  (rather  than
‘creedal’) concerns count (1996: 121; cf. Reader 1991: 1-
22),  but  he  reaches  nevertheless  for  a  readymade
language  of  analysis  in  which  a  familiar  space  is
maintained for the possibility of the presence of belief. As
a  consequence,  the  same  doubts  and  concerns  about
surfaces remain, because they are lodged in the language
itself; hence the sense of uncertainty, vis-à-vis belief, is a
problem of our own making, for, rather like a frustrated
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dermatologist,  who  really  wishes  he  had  taken  up
neurology instead, we are left with a feeling that the skin
is all there is; and even if it isn’t, we would never know
anyway.
But what if the problem of ‘what exactly is happening’
(as  articulated  by  Macfarlane,  for  example)  was  a
problem best  left  at  the  level  of  the  surface  itself?  In
other  words,  if  the  Japanese  practices  we  have  been
considering  here  appear  to  be  much  less  cosmic  than
cosmetic – if, that is, they strike us as superficial – then, I
suggest, that is because the cosmological in Japan is so
often constituted at the cosmetic level. This, anyway, is
the  argument  I  intend  to  trace  out  in  the  rest  of  this
paper.  Paper – the very thinness of which we take to be
proverbial in our everyday definitions of the superficial.
But in Japan – and this is my point – surfaces might be
conceptualised  very  differently.  Paper,  that  is  to  say,
might not always be indicative of the trivial. Indeed, the
zigzagging strips of  paper (shide) often to be found in
Shinto shrines index the presence of divinities.
Cosmology  and  difference  deferred  –  the
anthropology of Japan
If my anthropological argument is inclined towards the
cosmological, then it does no more than follow a certain
recent  trend  within  the  discipline  (e.g.,  Taylor  1999;
Viveiros  de  Castro  2001;  and  especially  Handelman
2008). Of course, anthropological interest in cosmology is
by no means new – it goes back at least as far as Boas
(1996) who, in famously advocating the science he called
‘cosmography’,  was  himself  taking  a  cue  from
Humboldt’s  Cosmos,  that  massive  atmospheric  project
that  sought  to  relate  the  farthest  star  systems  to  the
thinnest skins of lichen ‘over the surface of  our rocks’
(Humboldt 1860: 68).  But if there has been a renewed
interest  in  the  cosmological  (a  move  not  without  its
critics, as I consider below), then this would not yet seem
to have had much impact on the anthropology of Japan,
that  distant,  disciplinary  star  at  the  outer  arm of  the
anthropological galaxy. While there are, assuredly, some
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outstanding  exceptions  (including  Clammer  2001;
Ohnuki-Tierney 1987; Yamaguchi 1977; 1991a; 1998),4 it
seems to me that indifference towards cosmology as a
possible resource for thought might be related to a more
general disciplinary suspicion towards the invocation of
difference.  To  simplify  considerably,  the  emergence  of
these doubts about difference was in part the result of
the  powerful  attacks  launched  against  orientalism
(spearheaded,  of  course,  by  Edward  Said).  But  the
inclination to tone down difference was also a reaction
against  certain  indigenous  discourses  (the  so-called
nihonjinron literature – or ‘theories of the Japanese’) in
which Japan is presented as so utterly other that only the
Japanese  are  capable  of  understanding  it  (Dale  1995).
Caught between orientalisms – ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ – the
easiest  exit  strategy  has  been  to  downplay  difference
altogether.  But  this  is  merely  a  methodological  dodge
that creates its own contradictions, for, as Clammer puts
it, the result has been that a discipline dedicated ‘to the
study of a particular Other, paradoxically fears the very
differences out of which its object is constituted’ (2001:
94).
Maybe,  therefore,  we  require  new  strategies,  new-
fashioned languages of analysis; in other words, we need
other words (though this paper is no manifesto; I am just
trying  to  feel  my  way  around).  Hence,  what  I  am  in
search  of  is  a  style  of  thought  that  would  –  as  the
philosopher François Jullien says of his own thinking on
Chinese thinking – succumb neither to a ‘lazy humanism’
that would efface all differences, nor to a ‘lazy relativism’
that  would  make  differences  absolute  and  inscrutable
(Jullien 2003: 17). Or, put differently – if you’ll pardon my
revision of an old trope – we would need to avoid the
Godzilla  of  orientalism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
Charybdis of universalism, on the other.5
It is therefore with an eye to the careful figuration of
difference that I aim to understand Japanese practices of
prayer, glossed as cosmological. But since, as Clammer
observes,  ‘The  question  of  difference  will  not  just  go
away’ (2001: 3), how can we address it? And what might
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a cosmological angle add to the endeavour? One possible
way  of  clarifying  these  difficult  issues  would  be  to
consider  some recent,  programmatic  remarks  made by
Jennifer Robertson, which are enlightening for the very
reason that they are not concerned with the cosmological
at all.
In an introduction to a handbook on the anthropology
of  Japan,  Robertson draws attention to the persistence
(in  Euro-American  accounts  of  Japan)  of  a  particular
figurative device used to evoke Japanese difference: the
metaphor  of  the  mirror  (Robertson  2005:  6-7;  cf.
Robertson 2002).6 The device that Robertson has in mind
is  the  age-old  trope  of  symbolic  inversion;  that  is,  the
perception and construction of other societies as being
exactly  contrary  to  our  own,  of  which  a  classic  and
ancient  instance  is  Herodotus’  description  of  the
Egyptians  who  (in  opposition  to  the  Greeks)  do
everything back to front – the women urinate standing
up;  the  men  urinate  sitting  down,  etc.7 It  is  the
enantiomorphic effect of mirrors – their exact reversal of
the image in reflection – that makes them so obviously
attractive for the figuring of other societies (Fernandez
1986). And Japan came to be figured in the same way.
Indeed, inversion as a means of conceptualising Japanese
otherness  became  such  a  commonplace  in  Western
descriptions  that  Chamberlain was able  to  dedicate an
entry  to  ‘Topsy-turvydom’  in  his  quirky,  turn-of-the-
century dictionary of Japanese culture (2007: 512-514).
To slightly different effect, Ruth Benedict (1967) took up
the mirror and deployed it for partly satirical purposes,
angling it at Japan and America in such a way as to make
one wonder  which culture it  was that  was topsy-turvy.
While  sympathetic  to  Benedict’s  efforts,  Robertson  is
critical of ethnographies such as hers which resort to this
mirror-imaging  technique,  and  she  stresses  the
connection  between  this  Japan-as-mirror  literature  and
the popular conception of anthropology as a ‘mirror’ of
and for ‘culture’ (as it was for Kluckhohn, for example).
As she observes, mirrors are quite capable of other tricks
as well;  so seemingly deep,  they may act as solipsistic
traps,  specular  deceptions  (Robertson  2005:  6;  2002:
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786; cf. Fernandez 1986).8
In  addition,  according  to  Robertson,  it  is  also  the
ubiquity  of  this  particular  tropological  technique  that
accounts  for  the large  number  of  books  on Japan that
feature  the  word  ‘mirror’  in  the  title  (2005:  6-7).
Robertson only cites one example, but something of the
range can most easily be grasped in the most superficial
way  possible,  by  simply  tallying  up  the  book  titles:
Mirror, Sword and Jewel; A Japanese Mirror; The Empty
Mirror;  The Monkey as Mirror, and so on and so forth.9
To be sure, it is hard to see otherwise why these titular
mirrors  keep  reappearing,  unless  (the  whims  of
uninspired  editors  notwithstanding)  we  were  to  put  it
down  to  some  strange  phenomenon  of  specular
proliferation. The latest addition to this mirror literature
is  Alan  Macfarlane’s  Japan Through the Looking Glass
(2007),  a  curious  kind  of  magical  mystery  tour  of  the
country;  and,  certainly,  some  of  the  criticisms  that
Robertson levels at the Japan-as-mirror literature could
be applied even more forcefully here. For instance (and
with  acknowledgement  to  Lewis  Carroll),  Macfarlane’s
Japan is seemingly a place where the people are able to
‘believe  six  impossible  things  before  breakfast’  (2007:
153).10 It  is  an  exceptional,  paradoxical  and  therefore
almost  unintelligible  culture,  which  Macfarlane  signals
many times over by saying that the Japanese ‘mirror’ is
difficult to see into (2007: 204, 212, 213, 215, 229, etc.)
As for the Japanese environment, it is:
a magical landscape of the kind which I had only
previously  encountered  in  fairy  stories  and  the
poetry of Wordsworth, Keats and Yeats. This is the
last  great  fairy-land on earth,  but  it  did  not  take
Disney to create it. (2007: 47-8)
It  is  perhaps  no  great  surprise  why  Macfarlane’s
mirror is difficult to look into, if it keeps getting steamed
up by sentimentality of this sort. In the end, however, for
all  his  talk  about  the  incommensurability  of  Japan  –
which, whatever one makes of it, at least has the merit of
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stressing  difference – he ends up saying that Japan can
only  be  made  intelligible  if  it  is  ‘put  into  a  universal
frame which would bring it back into our comprehension’
(2007: 213; italics mine).  But then, whither difference?
Like the Cheshire Cat, it vanishes.
Returning  to  Robertson,  her  criticisms  assuredly  hit
the mark with regard to books like this. Her own concern
is,  I  take  it,  with  finding  a  way  of  figuring  difference
differently,  without  recourse  to  mirror-imaging  which,
she writes, ‘can deflect recognition of the need to learn
more about Japan on terms relevant to the dynamic and
intertwined histories of localities and subjective cultural
formations and practices within that country’ (2005: 6). I
take her point. In addition, I freely admit that my effort
here,  to try to imagine how a cosmology might  inform
certain  practices  at  shrines,  necessarily  abridges  and
compresses all manner of local formations and histories.
And  yet,  Robertson’s  critique  is  too  all-encompassing,
linking, as it does, mirrors as tricky instruments for the
imaging of Japanese culture to the titular mirrors of so
much  literature  on  Japan.  Because,  as  she  recognises
elsewhere (2002: 791), it is not only anthropologists who
do things with mirrors and, equally, their epistemological
capacity  as  imaging  devices  may  be  only  one  of  their
functions (see Viveiros de Castro 2007: 165). For indeed
– the trope of mirror-imaging aside – Robertson overlooks
an  alternative  possibility  that  would  account  for  the
prevalence of the mirror in writings on Japan, which is
that it might in fact be conceptually indebted to Japanese
thought  itself.  Thus,  one  such  source  of  the  mirror
metaphor is, I suggest, the historical Japanese practice of
naming  descriptive  or  historical  accounts  as  ‘mirrors’
(kagami) because they purport to ‘reflect’ some place or
series  of  events.11 But  the  image  of  the  mirror  has
alternative sources as well, because in Shinto shrines it is
very often the case that divinities reside  within mirrors.
This  is  exactly  what  I  would  regard  as  the  crucial
cosmological angle that Robertson’s account passes over.
But  before  exploring  what  the  consequences  of  this
might be for a cosmological understanding of Japanese
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practices  of  prayer,  I  want  to  weigh  up  a  specific
criticism of cosmology as a resource for anthropological
thinking. In the first paper published in this series for the
OAC,  Huon  Wardle  (2009)  takes  up  the  topic  of
cosmopolitics,  by  way  of  an  evaluation  of  a  debate
between Ulrich Beck and Bruno Latour that was enacted
in the journal, Common Knowledge. Wardle’s argument is
acute  and  powerfully  stated,  and  –  if  I  understand  it
correctly – aims, by means of Kant’s notion of common
sense,  to  create  a  space  for  an  ethical  and  reflexive
subjectivity, as part of a more cosmopolitan conception of
anthropology.12 But  the  part  of  his  argument  that
concerns  me  here  is  his  rebuke  of  the  use  of  explicit
cosmological contrasts – ‘us’ and ‘them’ stagings – of the
kind made by Viveiros de Castro (whose work is  often
championed by Latour). Says Wardle: ‘the refinement of
pristine indigenous cosmologies – elaborately articulated
symmetric fictions – that provide the foil to a critique of
“Western”  society  is  unsustainable’  (2009:  22).  I  must
confess that finding an adequate response to this doesn’t
come easily, except to say, lamely no doubt, that I do not
wholly  agree.  I  remain  of  the  view  that  difference,
deployed tactically in something like this fashion, is still a
viable device for arriving at anthropological insights (see
Robbins 2002). Nevertheless, my intent here is much less
ambitious  and  I  have  no  designs  on  scaling  up  a
cosmology and ascribing it to something massive called
‘Japan’.  My  aims  are  considerably  more  local  and
superficial. But it is also partly for these same reasons
that I am not sure that Kantian insights would be of much
help to my argument either.  Though I  cannot  claim to
know much about Kant’s thesis of common sense (beyond
Wardle’s  excellent  exposition),  his  writings  on  religion
make  me  hesitate.  His  universalizing  pretensions  and
strong moral sense of what should constitute reasonable
religion lead him to treat all manner of diverse practices
as the same in so far as they are equally ineffective. For,
as  Kant  has  it,  ‘Differences  of  external  form  [den
Unterschied  in  der  äußern  Form]…count  equally  for
nothing’ (1998: 168) in so far as belief in the sensuous
and  transgressively  technical  nature  of  ritual  or
adherence to inflexible dogma erases all differences, as
151
PHILIP SWIFT
he says, between the Tungus shaman, the Bishop and the
Connecticut Puritan (Kant 1998: 171).
But  Kant’s  anti-ritualism  and  thorough  distrust  of
surfaces  allow  me  to  foreground,  by  means  of
cosmological contrast, the Japanese practices of praying
at shrines with which my inquiry is concerned. For here,
it is, in part, precisely the sensuous and technical aspects
– the surfaces – of ritual form that make it efficacious.
And this is where cosmology comes into the picture. Of
course,  in  our  everyday  talk,  we  might  be  liable  to
assume  that  cosmology  must  refer  to  something  of
gigantic size and infinite depth (deep space) or to stories
of absolute origin (Big Bangs) (Tresch 2005: 352), but the
cosmology  I  aim  to  model  here  is  arranged  along  its
surfaces  and  is  open  to  the  efficacy  of  simulation.  In
characterising it as ‘cosmetic’, I do not mean to refer to
make-up per se – though how curious that we give the
name  of  foundation to  that  thinnest  skin  of  emulsion,
sponged across a face! Rather, what I intend is to exploit
this obvious etymological relation between cosmetics and
cosmos, in order to imagine how a cosmology might be
constituted  in  facades  and  fabricating  practices.13
Practices  of  prayer  in  Japan  seem  difficult  to  fathom
because,  at  depth,  there  appears  to  be  little  there.  In
fact, such practices, we might feel, almost smack of the
theatrical  (what  Kant  would  denounce  as  ‘pious  play-
acting and nothing-doing’; 1998: 168). But such feelings,
I  would  hazard,  are  arguably  the  kinds  of  anxieties
triggered  when  a  ‘depth  ontology’,  as  Daniel  Miller
christens it, comes up against a counterforce of thought
that  takes  surfaces  seriously.  As  Miller  goes  on  to
observe, the devaluation of outsides, of the ephemeral, as
somehow lacking content ‘becomes highly problematic…
when we encounter  a cosmology  which may not  share
these assumptions, and rests upon a very different sense
of ontology’ (Miller 1994: 71).
Belief or efficacy?
Japanese  practices  that  centre  on  shrines  are
thoroughly pragmatic engagements. I recall once, almost
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ten years ago, paying a visit to the Hitomaru Shrine in
Akashi (western Japan). With me came Maeda-san (the
owner of a prominent local business selling soy sauce), in
his  early  seventies  though  very  much  genki (fit  and
cheerful), with a puckish sense of humour. Having made
some  perfunctory  prayers  –  tossing  a  coin  into  the
offering box, clapping and bowing – I decided to buy an
ema, a votive plaque. With the felt-tip in my hand, still
thinking about what I ought to write, Maeda-san shouted
at  me across  the  precinct,  ‘The  god  won’t  understand
English!’ (kami-san wa eigo wakarahen de); both a joke
and  a  dismissal.  Notice  here  that  there  is  no  talk  of
believing,  just  a  half-serious  concern  with  getting  the
language right. It strikes me now that what Maeda-san
was getting at was the question of efficacy – the issue of
whether or not the message would work. And, in its way,
this  crucial  sense  of  efficacy,  to  my  mind,  recalls  the
lesson  of  Niels  Bohr’s  horseshoe.  The  story  goes  that
someone once asked Bohr whether he believed that the
horseshoes hanging over his door would bring him luck.
‘No,’ he replied, ‘but I am told that they bring luck even
to those who do not believe in them’ (Elster 1983: 5). Not
belief then, but efficacy. As Pirotte points out, the famous
physicist  was,  at  that  moment,  articulating  animist
principles (2010: 203).14
I guess that, were we to take this story seriously – to
take it in and nail it above all our doors, as it were – our
accounts  of  Japanese  shrine-going  might  gain  a  little
more felicity (to advert to a term of J.L. Austin’s; Austin
1962). This is so because, although much is made of the
sheer  performativity  and  pragmatism  of  everyday
Japanese religious practice, scholars who write on these
matters  often  end  up,  anyway,  in  the  position  of
assuming some inner space populated by beliefs or some
similar ‘backstage artiste’ (another Austinian expression;
1962:  10).  To  give  an  instance:  in  an  excellent  and
thoroughgoing  ethnography  of  quotidian  religion  in
Japan, Reader and Tanabe confront the well-documented
ethnographic  problem  ‘that  people  sincerely  purchase
amulets but do not really believe in them’ (1998: 129).
From this they deduce that such activities do not involve
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what they call ‘cognitive belief’ and they caution against
‘the  common  error  on  the  part  of  investigators’  to
suppose  that  an  inner  domain  of  well-formed
representations  must  be  motivating  the  surface  of
practice (1998:130-31).  Nevertheless,  rather than draw
(what  I  would  regard  as)  the  obvious  animist
consequences  from  this  observation,  they  go  on  to
suggest that the system of practice is founded on what
they designate as ‘affective beliefs’, by which they mean
intimate  and  emotional  attachments  to  such  things  as
amulets (1998: 129-31). Yes – but why persist in calling
these  ‘beliefs’?  Something  of  the  confusion  of  their
position is, I think, evident when they try to explain that
there are, of course, multiple means of apprehending a
world, hence, ‘cognition and intellectual thought are not
the only ways by which the world can be affirmed and
believed in’  (1998: 129; my emphasis).  But to say that
there are many ways, beyond the cognitive, in which a
world  can  be  believed  in  is  still  to  suppose  that  the
foundational relation is one of belief. This is exactly the
problem with  the  notion  of  ‘affective  belief’;  it  merely
consecrates the concept of belief and establishes it at an
even more fundamental level.
In an argument that lacks even the nuance of Reader
and Tanabe’s  discussion,  Martinez,  writing of  a  fishing
community  in  Western  Japan,  engages  in  an
inconsequential excursus on Japanese religion in general
in  which she  seems to  say,  on  the one hand,  that  the
Japanese don’t believe, and then, on the other, that after
all, they do (2004: 70-72). In a mild rebuke of Reader and
Tanabe’s position, Martinez claims that Japanese popular
religiosity  should not  simply be understood as praxical
and pragmatic because, ‘the belief in spirits and ancestor
worship still holds a powerful place in the lives of many
Japanese’, and anyhow, she says straight away, to overly
focus on the pragmatic is to overlook ‘issues of  power
and  politics’  (2004:  72).  The  reader  is  then  dutifully
referred  to  Asad’s  (1994)  seminal  deconstruction  of
Geertz’s thesis on religion. All  well  and good,  perhaps,
but  I  find it  strange that  someone  who is  able  to  cite
Asad’s argument can so casually and uncritically speak of
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Japanese ‘belief in spirits’. In discussions such as these,
everything  happens  as  if  forty  years  of  sustained  and
critical  anthropological  attention  paid  towards  the
concept of belief never took place.
Of  course,  none  of  this  is  to  suggest  that  Japanese
practices do not involve the ideational,  the conceptual,
etc. Rather, to chime in with the findings of Inge Daniels
(2003;  2010),  relations  with  divinities  in  Japan  are
neither  established  by  means  of  belief  nor  are  they
conceptualised in these terms.
The efficacy of the artificial
And  so,  at  last,  on  to  matters  cosmological.  In  an
influential article (Yamaguchi 1991b), the implications of
which  have  not,  I  think,  been  fully  appreciated,  the
anthropologist  Masao  Yamaguchi  draws  attention  to  a
Japanese presentational technique known as  mitate (lit.
‘seeing-standing’). This is a kind of imaging technique for
the conceptualisation of something presented in terms of
something else distant or absent. In the process, a kind
of  conceptual  contiguity  is  established  that  directs
attention  to  the  invisible  or  virtual  dimensions  of  the
thing so presented. To illustrate this, Yamaguchi cites an
example  from  the  famous  tenth  century  Pillow  Book
(Makura no sôshi):
‘In this episode a princess asks her ladies-in-waiting
what  name  they  would  give  a  scene  of  a  snow-
covered  mound  in  a  garden.  One  of  them
immediately replies,  “The snow on Mount  Koro in
China”  (Koro  is  the  mountain  well  known  in  the
classics  for  the  beauty  of  its  scenery  after  a
snowfall).  The  image  of  the  snow-covered  mound
was given a mythological dimension by associating
it  with  a  well-known  image  from  the  Chinese
classics’ (1991b: 58).
Here, a relation of reference is established between a
present object (a snow-covered mound in the garden) and
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an absent one (a Chinese mountain). The former playfully
‘quotes’  the latter.  It  is  for this reason that Yamaguchi
refers to mitate as an ‘art of citation’. But as Yamaguchi
makes clear (1991b: 64), the technique of  mitate is not
limited to rarefied contexts such as this; it is extensively
deployed  in  the  presentation  of  offerings  to  divinities
(kami). Thus, in her ethnography of ascetic practices on
Akakura Mountain in Aomori Prefecture, Schattschneider
(herself  drawing  on  Yamaguchi)  describes  how
worshippers  actualize  this  technique of  mitate in  their
presentation  of  offerings  to  the  mountain  divinities
(2003: 55-56). The offerings themselves are constructed
and arranged as microcosmic ‘citations’ of the mountain
itself;  thus,  glutinous  rice  cakes  (mochi)  ‘are  carefully
piled in the shapes of miniature mountains. Mounds of
raw rice  are  shaped  into  perfect  cones.  Offered  metal
bells are sculpted into vertical, mountain-like towers’. In
such ways, these offered objects are so many simulations
of the mountain itself (2003: 56; cf. Nobuo 1994: 38).
Note  that  this  bringing  into  relation  that  mitate
achieves  cannot  easily  be  reduced  to  a  process  of
metaphor. According to Yukio Hattori, mitate is rather ‘a
powerful procedure for the realization of novel creations’
(Hattori 1975: 192; my translation). In a similar regard,
Yamaguchi  himself  likens  the  notion  of  mitate to
Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum; in the sense, I
suppose,  that  the  objects  mobilized  by  mitate are  not
merely copies, but things that are capable of establishing
their own realities (1991b: 66).15 In any case, what the
concept of mitate articulates is a notion of the efficacy of
artificial,  material  creation.  Artificiality  is  effective,
because it is artificial – to say this is merely to repeat the
insight of Chikamatsu, that great 17th century innovator
of  the  bunraku puppet  theatre  (see  Bolton  2002:  739,
744). Or, to put it another way, we find in this idea the
recognition  that  the  deliberate  mobilisation  and
manipulation  of  forms,  on  a  cosmetic  level,  can  have
cosmological consequences.
All  of  this  is  especially  pertinent  to  the  Japanese
practices  of  prayer  with  which  I  began  my  inquiry,
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because, as Yamaguchi remarks (borrowing his argument
from Masakatsu Gunji’s study of the aesthetics of festival
practices; Gunji 1987), ‘Japanese gods do not appreciate
true  things;  they  do  not  accept  things  that  are  not
fabricated by means of a device’ (1991b: 64).16 To recall
the  Geertzian  injunction  that  troubled  our  fictional
anthropologist, on the need to sort out real prayers from
mimicked  ones,  it  is  as  if,  in  this  case,  the  mimicked
prayer is the real one – so long as it is well fabricated.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we turn to mirrors again. Mirrors are
often the supports or containers (go-shintai) within which
the  kami (gods)  reside  –  kami being  almost  always
aniconically evoked. The go-shintai (lit. ‘body of divinity’)
may actually  be  any  number  of  things  –  a  painting,  a
mountain, a sword, a waterfall, etc. But mirrors are said
to  be  the  most  common  containers;  not  that  anyone
would  know  however.  The  go-shintai is  generally
concealed at the back of the shrine, inaccessible to the
public. But there are mirrors that are regularly displayed
in shrines, as evocations of brightness and purity. These
visible  mirrors are associated with  the most  important
object  among  the  ‘three  imperial  regalia’  (sanshu  no
jingi), this object being itself a mirror that permanently
remains,  concealed  in  multiple  boxes,  at  the  Grand
Shrine  of  Ise,  in  Mie  Prefecture.  Ise  enshrines  the
imperial  divinity  of  the sun,  Amaterasu Ômikami – the
deity, incidentally, to whom James Bond did his simulated
praying. But it is with a myth of this mirror that I want to
end; a myth first recorded in the early eighth century,
and systemically simulated ever since.17
According  to  this  myth  (called  Iwato-biraki,  or
‘opening  of  the  rock  door’),  the  kami of  the  sun,
Amaterasu, shuts herself up in a cave and so the whole
world goes dark. The other divinities devise a scheme to
lure her out again. Assembling before the cave door, they
suspend a mirror from the branches of a tree while one
of them, the divinity Ame-no-Uzume begins to dance in a
frenzy  of  possession.  All  the  kami laugh  and,  hearing
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their  laughter,  Amaterasu  opens  the  cave  door  in
curiosity.  On seeing herself  reflected in the mirror,  she
believes she is looking at another, superior divinity; while
frozen in this moment of bewilderment, the other  kami
block the cave mouth. Light is restored to the world.
Now, a lot could be said about this; but I feel I have
already said more than enough. The mirror, as a device,
is efficacious  because it  simulates.  Commenting on the
myth, Schattschneider suggests that
‘Life itself is thus founded on an initially illusory act
of representation, a potent confounding of presence
and absence, merging the imitative image with the
represented thing itself’ (2004: 145).
If this myth contained a credo – which it doesn’t; it’s
not deep enough for that – we could well refer to it as the
Doctrine  of  Original  Sim,  the  myth  of  the  genuinely
artificial.
As Arata Isozaki (2006: 154) observes, in a discussion
of the Ise Shrine and the efficacy of fabrication: ‘the gods
always reveal themselves at the invitation of mimicry’.
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University College London. Hence, once again, thanks are 
owed to Martin Holbraad, Ioannis Kyriakakis, and Fabio 
Gygi.
1. For example, Buruma (1995); Hendry (1993); Köpping 
(2005); McVeigh (1997; 2000); Yamaguchi (1977). In 
arriving at the ideas presented here, I have also drawn 
inspiration from both Hay’s and Zito’s studies of the work of
surfaces in Chinese cosmologies (see Hay 1994; Zito 1994).
2. I should make it clear that this inference, that the 
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businessman’s prayer is merely superficial, in so far as it is 
in want of something else, is emphatically not one made by 
Kasulis. Indeed, he is intent on challenging any such notion;
his argument being that practice of this sort is an attempt 
to establish existential connections with divinities in Japan 
(See Kasulis 2004: 28-37). The problematic of prayer is a 
useful entry point into issues of Japanese religious practice.
Reader (1991: 1-2), for instance, begins his own overview 
on Japanese religion with a similar vignette.
3. For a critique of these sociological assumptions by means of 
Japanese ethnographic materials, see Swift (forthcoming).
4. It is worth recalling that Sahlins (1999: 407-9) too made a 
case for taking Japanese cosmology seriously, by way of a 
critique of an argument (one of the contributions in Vlastos 
1998) that much of the form of sumo wrestling can be 
explained by the fact that it is a modern invention. Indeed, 
the Japanese anthropologist Yamaguchi Masao (1998) has 
explored the cosmological dimensions of sumo and its 
relations to kabuki theatre and the emperor system. For 
Yamaguchi, sumo is clearly a dynamic historical formation, 
in which the cosmological and the commercial are mutually 
implicated. I therefore fail to understand how the editor of 
the collection to which Yamaguchi is a contributor can state
that Yamaguchi ‘implies that this very Japanese “tradition” 
might well fall into the category of a modern invented 
tradition’ (Martinez 1998: 13). Yamaguchi’s exposition is 
certainly subtle, as the editor points out, and it is precisely 
because it is that it contains no such simplistic implications.
5. The anthropologist John Clammer has argued this point 
(with regard to the understanding of Japan) with singularity
clarity (Clammer 2001). But see also the collection of 
papers edited by Gerstle and Milner (1994), a project by 
various Asian Studies scholars to recover ‘otherness’ in the 
light of Said’s critique.
6. These remarks that Robertson includes in her introduction 
were, as she makes clear, in fact first published in 1998 
(Robertson 2005: 4).
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7. Hdt. 2.35 (Herodotus 1988: 145). For the classic study of 
such mirror operations in Herodotus, see Hartog (1988).
8. As Yamada (2009) has recently documented of what he calls 
the ‘magic mirror effect’ of two-way traffic in 
representations of Zen – when those others we thought we 
were representing pick up our depictions in order to 
represent themselves, then the mirrors multiply to such an 
extent that all that would seem to be left is the dazzling 
spectacle of representations rebounding endlessly. 
Similarly, writing of the problems that foreign 
anthropologists face in attempting to represent Japan, 
Caillet (2006: 11) comments that it can seem as if ‘our 
positions disintegrate into a game of mirrors without end’ 
(‘un jeu de miroirs sans fin’).
Be that as it may, Robertson’s critique of mirror-imaging is 
valuable, but it is hardly new. Horton and Finnegan (1973) 
already raised a number of these points almost forty years 
ago (see also Nagashima’s essay in the same volume).
9. The references are, respectively: Singer (1997); Buruma 
(1995); Wetering (1987); Ohnuki-Tierney (1987); and 
Vlastos (1998). And fanciful no doubt, but is Ian Fleming’s 
title, You Only Live Twice, not also suggestive of a certain 
mirror-like doubling?
10. Accordingly, Macfarlane deliberately identifies himself with
Alice (2007: 4), but he might just as well be Dorothy in The 
Wizard of Oz, for, in its supersaturated strangeness, Japan 
is the Emerald City and to be in Kansai is to be told, like 
Toto, that we’re not in Kansas anymore.
11. Among numerous examples, one could cite the Great 
Mirror (Ôkagami), a history of the Fujiwara aristocratic 
lineage, or the Great Mirror of Love Suicide (Shinjû 
ôkagami) that documented a series of scandalous double 
suicides – a source of much popular fascination during the 
early 1700s. Or the Complete Mirror of Yoshiwara 
(Yoshiwara marukagami), a sort of guidebook (from 1720) 
to the Yoshiwara pleasure quarters in Edo (i.e., Tokyo).
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12. I haven’t the space to do justice to Wardle’s exposition, 
except to say here that his observation (2009: 3; cf. 19) that
Latour’s ‘comparative anthropology’ may well be too 
‘insufficiently comparative’ is, I think, especially well made.
13. I say that this etymological relation is obvious – it is, at 
least, to classicists. But I have found little work in 
anthropology that has explored its implications. An 
exception is Lamp’s (1985) fine study of Temne ritual 
masking in Sierra Leone. A further exception, recently 
discovered, is, as I ought to have expected, Lévi-Strauss, 
who puts it to use in his analysis of Caduveo body painting 
(Wiseman 2007: chap. 6, esp. 146).
14. I cite Elster’s version of the anecdote. Needless to say, I do 
not agree with his interpretation of it.
15. Joy Hendry (2000: 180) has attempted to utilize 
Yamaguchi’s argument in her ethnography on Japanese 
theme parks, but her ensuing analysis make abundantly 
clear that she hasn’t understood it. Attacking a vague post-
modernist position that she attributes to no one, she 
attempts to counter it by employing Yamaguchi’s discussion
of mitate as simulation which, she says, is ‘close to the 
original meaning of Baudrillard’s “simulacrum”, a term too 
easily translated as “fake”’. Apart from wondering to whom 
this final caution is supposed to apply (who, after all, is all 
too easily making such equations?), one can only imagine 
Baudrillard laughing (somewhere in hyper-reality) about 
this straight-faced appeal to his original meaning! Hendry 
then goes on (in the same paragraph) to associate mitate as
simulation with Platonic Forms, seemingly unaware that 
Plato was the arch-enemy of simulacra.
16. For Gunji’s original discussion see Gunji (1987: 88-89).
17. The myth and its subsequent history have very recently 
been treated by Mark Teeuwen (Teeuwen and Breen 2010: 
chap. 4).
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Chapter 7
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
MATERIAL EMBODIMENTS OF SHIFTING
MEANINGS
John McCreery
Prologue
I invite you to imagine a tourist visiting Japan. She has
seen a number of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.
Friends take her to Yokohama’s Chinatown for dinner. On
the  way  to  the  restaurant  they  stop  for  a  look  at  a
Chinese temple, the Guandi Miao. The vivid colors and
baroque  decoration  of  the  Chinese  temple  contrasts
sharply with the subdued simplicity of Japanese Buddhist
temples and shrines (Figures 1, and 2). The red face and
piercing eyes of the Chinese deity on this altar (Figure 3
differ  dramatically  from  the  lowered  eye-lids  and
meditative serenity of the Japanese Buddhas (Figure 4)
she has seen. In Japanese Shinto shrines, the gods are
not  visible  at  all  (Figure  5).  The  question  she  asks  is
simple  but  profound:  “Why  do  Chinese  gods  look  like
that?”
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When,  however,  we  turn  to  the  anthropological
literature on Chinese religion, we discover, as Wei-Ping
Lin  points  out,  that  anthropologists  have  paid  little
attention to the material  forms that gods take in their
statues  on  Chinese  altars  (2008:454-455).  Instead  of
looking  closely  at  god  statues  to  discover  what  they
might tell us about the gods in question, we have tended
to look through god statues in search of something else.
The statues themselves are treated as arbitrary signs, as,
in  effect,  texts,  whose  material  form is  of  no  intrinsic
interest.
If we adopt, instead, an art historical or connoisseur’s
perspective, we encounter a different approach. Here the
primary focus of interest is iconographic details that that
identify the god or the style in which the statue is carved,
with the style then further specified geographically and
historically.  Once  again,  however,  the  existence  of  the
statue is taken for granted.
In  the  Japanese  context  in  which  our  tourist  asks,
“Why  do  Chinese  gods  look  like  that?”  her  question
points  to  larger  issues.  We  have  noted  that  the
demeanour of  Japanese Buddhas is noticeably different
from that of Chinese gods. The contrast sharpens when
we turn  to  Shinto  shrines,  in  which  there  are  no  god
statues at all; Shinto deities remain invisible. If we go a
step  further  in  enlarging  our  context,  we  encounter
Protestant Christianity, Judaism and Islam, religions that
taboo any  attempt  to  represent  deity  in  anthroporphic
images.
Lin tells us that in Wan-nian, the village in Taiwan
where she did her fieldwork, she was told that,
Gods are formless. When you call them, they come!
(2008: 459)
They are three feet above your head (Gia-thau sann-
chioh  u  sin-bing;  Jutou  sanche  you  shenming)!
(2008:460)
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They have no shadows and leave no trace (Lai bo-
iann, khi bo-cong; Lai wuying, qu wuzong).
Why, then, are there statues of gods on Chinese altars?
Lin asks a spirit medium,
Why do people need god statues, and what is the
relationship between gods with and without form?
(2008:460)
The medium responds,
Everyone respects and prays to gods, but they ‘have
no  shadows and leave  no  trace,’  so  people  carve
statues to make the gods settle down where they
want them. That means to contain them inside the
statues. People should worship the statues, so that a
special bond grows between gods and worshippers.
If  the  bond  is  strong,  the  spirit  won’t  leave.
(208:460)
As  Lin  points  out,  the  medium’s  interpretation  has
several  implications:  people  need  images  in  order  to
believe. Images are places for gods to reside. They also
facilitate a particular kind of relationship.
God statues  make the  formless  omnipresent  gods
settle down and build a stable connection with the
villagers,  who  worship  them  in  return  for
protection;  this  creates  a  strong  reciprocal  bond
between the villagers and the gods. (208:460)
The  remainder  of  Lin’s  paper  provides  a  wealth  of
evidence for this interpretation and focuses, in particular,
on  steps  taken  to  localize  the  god’s  attachment  to  a
particular community. We may note, however, that while
this paper explains in detail how god statues are made,
consecrated, and localized, it contains no answer to the
question why Chinese god statues depict Chinese gods in
the way that they do. We are neither shown or told what
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these particular statues look like. And one nagging, but
fundamental, issue remains. Lin’s informants tell us that
Chinese  worshippers  require  images  to  reinforce  their
belief and, further, that god statues contribue to creation
of strong reciprocal bonds. But why should this be, when
worshippers in other traditions do not require images —
in fact, their traditions forbid them?
We are still, then, at the point described by Alfred Gell
in  “The Technology  of  Enchantment,”  when he says  of
Bourdieu’s  sociological  approach  and  Panofsky’s
iconographic approach that the former, “ never actually
looks at the art object iteself,” while the latter, “treats art
as a species  of  writing”  and thus fails  to  consider  the
object itself, instead of the symbolic meanings attributed
to it (2009: 10). My purpose here is to consider what we
might learn by going a step further and considering the
object itself.
Adding the Material, Thickening the Description
In this case the object itself is a god statue, the statue
of Guandi that sits  on the altar of the Guandi Miao in
Yokohama’s  Chinatown.  To  learn  more  about  it,  I
compare it with other representations of Chinese gods,
including, in particular, other images of Guandi himself. I
want  to  emphasize,  however,  that  the  approach  taken
here  is  to  add  investigation  of  the  material  forms  in
which  Guandi  is  represented  to  advance  a  deeper
understanding that also includes the other approaches to
Chinese religion sketched above. It does not propose to
replace them.
The  approach  I  employ  is  inspired  by  Claude  Levi-
Strauss’ injunction in the “Overture” to The Raw and the
Cooked to  search  for  the  logic  in  tangible  qualities
(1970:1)  and  by  Clifford  Geertz’  call  for  thick
descriptions in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973). The
model I attempt to follow, however, is that provided by
Victor Turner in  The Ritual Process (1969), enriched by
recent discussions of the importance of material cultures
and  objects  to  cultural  understanding  (Miller,  1998;
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Candlin and Guins, 2009). It is, in other words, informed
by  Turner’s  approach  to  ethnography  but  also  a
contribution to what Daniel Miller calls the second stage
in the development of material culture studies, in which
the  goal  is  to  demonstrate,  “what  is  to  be  gained  by
focusing  upon  the  diversity  of  material  worlds  which
become each other’s contexts rather than reducing them
either  to  models  of  the  social  world  or  to  specific
subdisciplinary concerns” (1998: 3).
Context is, however, a particularly tricky issue. When
Levi-Strauss looks at tangible qualities,  he is searching
for universal structures that shape cultures everywhere
and pointing to binary contrasts,  e.g.,  the raw and the
cooked,  that  appear  fundamental  in  human  thinking
everywhere. His context is all of humanity. Geertz directs
our  attention,  instead,  to  the  richness  of  layered
meanings  that  interpreters  of  culture  must  seek  to
unpack in particular situations.  He leaves unanswered,
however,  a  fundamental  question:  where  does  the
relevant context begin or end?
Is  it  found  in  that  place  and  moment  where  the
observation  is  made  or  the  informant’s  comment
collected? Our tourist is looking at a statue of Guandi in a
temple in a Chinatown located in Yokohama, Japan. Is the
significance of what she sees confined to this particular
temple in this particular location? Or to what someone
she meets at the temple may tell her? Or, this being the
twenty-first century, should we take as authoritative the
account provided on the temple’s Website? If not, how far
should we search for connections, in Chinese culture and
history?  In  specific  Chinese  or  religious  traditions?
Across  the  length  and  breadth  of  Asia?  There  is,  I
suggest,  no  a  priori  answer.  Depending  on  the
observation,  any  and  all  of  these  contexts  may  be
relevant.
When  working  in  a  conventional  social  science
framework,  the  limits-of-context  problem  is  easy  to
overlook.  We  pre-select  the  scope  of  our  research,
develop an hypothesis within it, then search for evidence
174
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
that  confirms  or  contradicts  the  hypothesis  we  are
testing.  The  same  is  true  when  doing  qualitative
research, if we start with a well-defined topic. The topic’s
definition defines the limits of relevance.
Invert  the  problem,  however,  and  start  with  the
observation,  the  tangible  thing  itself,  a  case  of
something,  but  we  don’t  yet  know  of  what.  As
ethnographers  we  are  not  supposed  to  make
assumptions.  But,  as  noted in  The SAGE Handbook  of
Case-based Methods,
From a trans-disciplinary perspective,  what unites
different kinds of cases, regardless of the discipline,
is that all cases are complex and multi-dimensional
objects of study. Furthermore, all cases are situated
in  time  and  space,  as  are  the  disciplines  within
which they  might  be situated.  Arguably,  therefore
all cases, as objects of study, need to be described
in an ever-increasing and changing variety of ways,
and each of these ways may in fact be representing
something ‘real’ about the object of study as well.
(2009: 141-142)
Thus, for example, when I wrote “Why don’t we see some
real  money  here?”  (1990)  I  began  by  observing  the
difference between spirit money and offerings of food in
Chinese rituals.  I  wanted to know why the money was
mock money,  while  the food was real  food.  Combining
ideas  from  Levi-Strauss  and  James  Fernandez  and
looking at the ritual process, I developed the hypothesis
that the food asserts a relationship; the money restores
social  distance.  In  “Negotiating with demons”  (1995) I
began  with  the  text  of  a  Taoist  exorcism  and  three
approaches  to  analyzing  magical  language,  as
performative  act,  metaphor,  and  formalized,  restricted
code. Each did, in fact,  show something real about the
case  in  hand,  and  together  the  three  approaches
produced  a  richer  thick  description  than  any  one
approach by itself.
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In this case, I will focus on why some representations
of  gods  are  fully  rounded  figures,  seated  or  standing,
some  in  dynamic  poses,  while  others  are  literally  flat
tablets on which a title is written. I will argue, in a Levi-
Straussian  mode,  that  this  contrast  embodies  the
difference between abstract, and thus absolute, claims to
authority  and  concrete,  more  personal  relationships,
rooted in reciprocity that opens the way for exchanges of
gifts  and  favors.  I  will  situate  this  argument  in  a
Geertzian  thick  description  that  builds  on  existing
scholarly analyses of Chinese gods that relate the ways in
which  gods  are  envisioned  to structure and change in
Chinese society. I will speculate on possible extensions of
this  analysis  to  comparisons  between  Chinese  popular
religion and other religious traditions.
First,  however,  we  need  some  empirical  grounding.
Here  my  model  is  Victor  Turner,  who  taught  us  that
anthropologists  always  work  with  three  kinds  of  data:
What we observe, what the people whose lives we study
tell  us about what we see,  and information from other
places, ideas and other data that inform interpretation.
All are parts of the puzzle from which the anthropologist
attempts to construct a convincing picture of the whole
of what he is writing about. The place to begin, however,
is the way in which the people we study explain their own
symbols. I begin, then, with the contents of the Yokohama
Guandi  Miao  website  (http://www.yokohama-
kanteibyo.com/). 
A Twenty-First Century Chinese Temple in Japan
The  Yokohama  Guandi  Miao  website
(http://www.yokohama-kanteibyo.com/ ) is in Japanese. Its
intended audience appears to be Japanese tourists who
flock to Yokohama’s Chinatown to enjoy a local but exotic
experience.  The top  page  displays  a  link  to  Yokohama
Chinatown’s  own  official  website
(http://www.chinatown.or.jp/).  Three  additional  buttons
are  indicated  on  the  photograph  of  the  temple’s  main
gate that is the single largest visual element on the page.
Button  No.  1  opens  a  description  of  the  gate,  which
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towers 12 meters above street level. Its elaborate wood
carvings are covered with gold leaf, and two dragons sit
(one on each side) on the top of its roof. Button No. 2
opens  a  description  of  the  stone  slabs  with  images  of
dragons  cavorting  in  the  clouds  that  frame  the  stairs
leading up to the gate. Imported from Beijing, the slabs
are single pieces of stone, each weighing four and a half
tons.  A  third,  cloud-shaped  blue  button  reads,  “Go
inside.”
The camera has now moved through the gate, and the
temple proper fills the frame. Now there are five buttons
that point to information on visually interesting details.
Button No. 3 describes the colorful tiles on the roof. Like
the stone slabs to which Button No. 2 pointed, these, too,
were specially ordered from Beijing. They are attached
with special hooks to enhance rain and wind resistance.
Dragons  and other  beasts  made of  glass  complete  the
rooftop  decorations.  Button  No.  4  describes  four
elaborately carved stone columns, two with dragons, two
with images of  Guandi  in action.  These were imported
from Taiwan. Button No. 5 describes  the main incense
burner and notes that it is one of five incense burners.
Those who wish to worship are directed to purchase five
sticks of incense, one for each of the burners. Button No.
6 shows the reception building where incense and spirit
money  can  be  purchased.  Button  No.  7  describes  the
stone lions that guard the temple, noting that they were
imported from Taiwan and survived the fire that in 1986
destroyed  the  previous  version  of  the  temple.  Another
blue cloud invites the visitor to enter the temple.
Now  the  image  contains  five  pictures,  each  with  a
button of its own. The largest, which fills three quarters
of  the  frame,  shows  the  main  altar,  where  a  seated
Guandi,  stroking  his  long  beard,  looks  straight  toward
the  visitor.  Button  No.  8  reveals  the  following  brief
description.
The divine form of Guanyu, a Chinese general who
lived around 160 a.d. His loyalty and fidelity have
made him a god of commerce worshipped around
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the world. On his left stands his adopted son, Goan
Ping, on his right his faithful follower Zhou Zang.
Both also receive worship.
Beneath this description are four phrases highlighted in
blue,  indicating prayers for  which Guandi  is  especially
efficacious:  traffic  safety,  business  success,  entrance
exams, and study.
Buttons No. 9, 10, and 11 point to descriptions of other
deities  worshipped  at  the  temple:  Earth  Mother,  the
Bodhisattva  Kwannon,  and  Tu-di  Gong.  These  also
include  areas  in  which  these  deities  are  particularly
efficacious. Earth Mother, for example, is especially good
for those who pray to be safe from disasters and to enjoy
good health.
To  the  left  of  screen  is  a  menu  offering  additional
information. Here we can discover that this temple is is
the fourth in a series, the first of which was built in 1873,
shortly  after  the  opening  of  the  port  of  Yokohama  in
1859. The site was enlarged in 1886 and a larger temple
built  in 1893.  That temple  was destroyed in the Great
Kanto  Earthquake  of  1923.  The  second-generation
temple that replaced it was destroyed by Allied bombing
in  1945.  Its  replacement,  the  third-generation  temple,
was destroyed by fire in 1986,  though miraculously its
god  statues  remained  unharmed.  Construction  of  the
current temple was completed in 1990. We can also learn
that  as  Chinese  began  to  emigrate  overseas  in  large
numbers during the 19th century, temples dedicated to
Guandi were built in Chinatowns the world over.
With  these  facts  in  mind,  we  turn  now  to
anthropological  and  historical  discussions  of  Chinese
gods.
Celestial Bureaucracy, The Limits of Metaphor
When our  tourist  asks,  “Why  do  the  gods  look  like
this?” the first answer that comes to mind is that Chinese
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conceive  of  their  gods  as  celestial  bureaucrats.  They
wear  official  robes,  and  their  temples  resemble  the
yamen  from  which  imperial  officials  governed  the
Chinese empire. Their ranks correspond to the scale of
the territories for which they are responsible. On closer
inspection, however, all of these propositions turn out to
be dubious.
The  idea  that  Chinese  conceive  of  their  gods  as
celestial bureaucrats was forcefully articulated by Arthur
Wolf  in  the  “Introduction”  to  Religion  and  Ritual  in
Chinese  Society  (1974),  a  collection  of  papers  that
marked a pivotal moment in the anthropological study of
Chinese religion and framed subsequent debates. Should
Chinese religion be treated as an integrated whole tightly
linked to Chinese social structure or a motley bricolage
of traditions that, as Donald Deglopper put it (Personal
communication; see also 1974: 43-69), stood in relation
to Chinese society as the colors refracted by the oil on
the surface of a puddle stand to the water in the puddle,
a far looser and more liquid relationship?
When this collection appeared, the dominant theories
in  the  anthropology  of  Chinese  society  were  the
structural-functionalism of  Maurice  Freedman’s  studies
of  lineage  organization  and  the  standard  marketing
regions  of  G.  William Skinner.  Synthesized  by  Stephen
Feuchtwang, they provided a plausible grounding for the
notion  that  Chinese  spirits  fall  into  three  broad
categories,  gods,  ghosts and ancestors. Ancestors were
kin  whose  descendants  looked after  their  worship  and
afterlife.  Ghosts  were  prototypically  hungry  ghosts
without descendants, angry at their fate. The gods were
the  spiritual  counterparts  of  government  officials,  the
celestial bureaucrats in charge of dispensing both favors
and punishments to those whose lives they ruled.  Like
their  earthly  counterparts,  they  formed  a  spatial
hierarchy,  with officials  at  different  levels  in charge of
smaller or larger geographical areas.
Subsequent  research,  however,  would  enormously
complicate this picture. Shahar and Weller’s Unruly Gods
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(1996) provides numerous examples of deities who slip
betwixt-and-between  Wolf’s  categories.  Gods,  it  turned
out,  frequently  started  their  careers  as  demons.  The
Wang-yeh, whose demonic role is to spread plagues, are
one example (Katz, 1995). Powerful females like Guan-yin
and  Mazu  had  no  obvious  place  in  what  should  have
been, in principle, an all-male officialdom. The local gods
of the soil, Tu-di Kong, were frequently said to have been
virtuous individuals  raised to divine status after death;
but  the  territories  they  governed  were  at  a  level  far
below  that  to  which  imperial  China’s  bureaucracies
extended. There is also the awkward fact that the last of
the Chinese empires on which the celestial bureaucracy
is  supposed  to  be  modeled  had,  by  the  time  that  the
anthropologists  cited here began their  research  in  the
1960s and ‘70s, long since ceased to exist. The Republic
of  China  had  been  founded  in  1911,  and  the  Peoples
Republic of China had followed in 1949.
A  case  might  be  made  for  similarity  between  the
powers and habits of modern Chinese bureaucrats and
their imperial predecessors. That argument could then be
extended  to  the  proposition  that  Chinese  worshipers
approach Chinese deities in a way analogous to that in
which  they  approach  mortal  officials.  But  as  Steve
Sangren asks, “If gods are modeled on peasants’ images
of  officials,  why officials  so different  from any in most
peasants’ experience?” (1987: 130). Adam Chau, writing
about  his  observations  in  Shaanbei,  notes  that  in
northern China, too, people liken deities to bureaucrats.
He then goes on to note, however, that,
The  relationship  between  local  state  agents  and
ordinary peasants in Shaanbei is strained, to put it
mildly. Indeed, the image of local bureaucrats in the
minds of Shaanbei peasants is most negative: they
take things away from you but rarely give anything
back (2006:73).
Expectations of bureaucrats and expectations of gods
appear  to  be  strikingly  different.  In  Way  and  Byway
180
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
(2002),  historian  Robert  Hymes  proposes  that  Chinese
deities  are  conceived  in  terms  of  two  analytically
separate models,  one bureaucratic,  the other personal.
On  the  one  side  are  officials.  Described  abstractly,  in
terms of name, rank, and title, these gods are temporary
appointees who represent a multilevel authority imposed
from the outside. On the other are individuals with rich
biographies;  stories  about  their  miracles  are  legion.
Instead  of  appointed  officials,  these  are  extraordinary
persons,  with  inherent  powers  enhanced  through  self-
cultivation. They enter into direct, dyadic relations with
persons and places and are see as permanent fixtures in
the  localities  where  they  are  worshipped.  In  these
respects,  they  resemble  the  gods  worshipped  in  Wan-
nian,  the community studied by Lin Wei-ping,  who like
the  Daoist  immortals  studied  by  Hymes,  traveled  to  a
particular place where they settled, where their statues
are not only consecrated to bring them to life but also
localized through rites that attach them to this particular
place.
From this perspective, however, the Guandi who sites
on the altar in the Guandi Miao in Yokohama’s China is
problematic.  He  is,  on  the  one  hand,  an  intensely
individual god. He has a rich biography, elaborated with
stories  of  numerous  miracles.  He  epitomizes  abstract
virtues, loyalty and righteousness; but is also said to be
particularly efficacious in dealing with problems related
to  traffic  safety  and  achieving  business  and  academic
success. His virtues and powers are his own; but the god
who occupies his statue may, in fact, be only a delegate,
like those said to be worshipped in his place in thousands
of  temples  throughout  China  and  around  the  world.
Neither  his  virtues  nor  his  stories  attach  him  to  one
particular place. He is, on the contrary, a favorite deity of
overseas  Chinese,  who  have  taken  him  with  them  as
traveled to new places in search of new opportunities.
From from being a deity with strong local ties, Guandi is,
arguably, the most cosmopolitan of Chinese gods.
Not  surprisingly,  how  Guandi  is  perceived  and  the
stories  told  about  him  vary  from  place  to  place  and
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speaker to speaker. How he is seen and represented has
been  subject  for  centuries  to  a  process  that  Prasenjit
Duara calls “superscription,” elaboration and editing to
suit a variety of purposes (1988:778). In this respect he
resembles Lü Dongbin, the Daoist immortal of whom Paul
Katz writes that, “more than one Lü Dongin existed in the
minds of the late imperial Chinese” (1996: 97). One way
of summarizing the argument of this essay would be to
say that, like the murals of the Yongle Gong studied by
Katz, god statues that represent Guandi are works of art
that “have not been adequately used as sources for the
study  of  Chinese  hagiography”  (1996:72);  with  the
additional  caveat  that,  like  the  historical  documents
analyzed by Duara, Chinese god statues are also subject
to superscription. They, too, can be elaborated and edited
to  fit  various  purposes.  These  depend,  in  at  least  one
important  respect,  to  how  the  relationship  between
worshipper and god is conceived.
The Importance of Being Ling
One point on which anthropologists of China and their
informants appear to agree is that gods are supposed to
be ling, i.e., efficacious. How ling should be interpreted is
the focus of several attempts to explain the relationship
between  Chinese  deities  and  the  mundane  realities  of
Chinese society.
To Sangren,  ling embodies a logic that pervades the
whole of Chinese culture and, “can be fully understood
only  as  a  product  of  the  reproduction  of  social
institutions and as a manifestation of a native historical
consciousness”  (1987:  2).  Ling refers  to  situations  in
which  Yang,  the  principle  of  order,  encompasses  and
overcomes Yin, the principle of disorder. Deities are ling
because  they  operate  at  the  margin  where  Yang
confronts Yin.
Chau offers a more mundane interpretation that turns
on a familiar saying, ren ping shen, shen ping ren (people
depend on gods and gods depend on people). A god, he
says,  is  ling,  efficacious,  when  the  god  responds
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effectively to his worshippers’ prayers, which leads to the
hong huo (red heat) of ritual celebration, which enhances
the god’s reputation and makes the god appear more ling
(2006:9).
In  his  review  of  Miraculous  Response,  Feuchtwang
agrees that Chau is onto something by focusing on the
Durkheimian  social  effervescence  that  reflects  and
sustains a god’s  reputation for being  ling.  What is left
unaccounted for, he observes, is the “disavowal of human
agency”  involved  in  attributing  efficacy  to  the  god
(2006:978).
Like Sangren, Feuchtwang bases his own analysis on
the notion of collective representations that precede and
define  the  attribution  of  ling  to  deities.  Feuchtwang,
however, is not content with a cultural logic that, while
pervasive in Chinese rites and religion,  is  so pervasive
that  it  ceases  to  account  for  the  different  local  and
historical contexts in which ling appears. He agrees that
ling appears at the margins that define the spaces and
times in which Chinese individuals find themselves but
argues  that  the  frames  of  reference  are  multiple  —
household, community, region, and, only ultimately, China
as a whole (Feuchtwang, 2000).
These  brief  summaries  hardly  do  justice  to  the
complex and subtle arguments of which they are, at best,
caricatures. The gods may be Yang overcoming Yin, mark
boundaries on several  levels  of  territorial  hierarchy,  or
have won reputations for efficacy reinforced by lavishly
decorated temples and noisy  celebrations.  But,  why do
they look like that? Why do they display the particular
tangible  qualities  that  motivate  our  tourist’s  question?
What  if,  in  fact,  some  representations  replace  ling,
efficaciousness  in  addressing  specific  requests,  with
uncompromising authority? This is an issue to which we
will  soon  return.  First,  however,  we  consider
iconography,  the  details  by  which  art  historians  and
collectors  identify  particular  deities  and  styles  of
representation.
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The Collector’s Eye
Keith Stevens is a collector. According to his  Chinese
Gods: The Unseen World of Spirits and Demons (1997) he
became interested in the iconography of Chinese deities
in 1948 and, by the time he wrote this book, had visited
more than 3,500 Chinese temples in China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong,  Macao,  and across  Southeast  Asia.  His  personal
collection  included  over  1,000 god  statues  and 30,000
photographs of temples and images. He had documented
the legend and folklore surrounding approximately 2,500
deities.
Stevens  candidly  describes  his  book  as,  “An
introduction  to  the  imagery  of  Chinese  deities  and
demons and their legends and beliefs in relation to the
common  people,  as  observed  from a  Western  point  of
view”  (1997:11).  His  description  of  Chinese  popular
religion  is  consistent  with  what  anthropologists  have
written.  There  are,  he  notes,  two  orders  of  deities:  a
higher order of gods associated with Daoist and Buddhist
pantheons  and  a  lower  order  of  humans  deified  for
exceptional  accomplishments  while  alive  or  miraculous
powers  after  death.  The  deities  on  Buddhist  altars
generally  appear  in  conventional  sets;  those  on  Daoist
altars or in the temples of popular religion tend to be a
more  mixed  lot.  Broadly  speaking,  he  says,  there  are
three standard forms of images.
1) In  Buddhist  images,  the  faces  are  calm  and
characterless,  lacking  distinctive  features.  The
deities  are  dressed  in  simple  priestly  robes  and
cross-legged.
2) Daoist  images  may  lean,  stand  or  be  seated.
Characteristic features include black beards, tiny
Daoist crowns, and hands holding either a gourd
or fly switch.
3) The standard deity of popular religion is a seated
scholar-official  with  a  full  black  or  red  beard,
holding  a  tablet  with  both  hands  in  front  of  his
chest.  Alternatively  his  hands  may  rest  on  arm
rests  or  his  knees,  or  one  hand  may  clutch  his
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official  girdle.  Alternative  elements  include  the
cap, crown or helmet.
These  standard  forms  are  only  prototypes  with
numerous variations. Buddhas may be depicted standing,
and  the  deities  who  serve  as  their  guardians  may  be
demonic in appearance. Daoist images include figures on
mythical  beasts,  like  Zhang  Dao-ling  on  his  tiger.  As
previously noted, the deities of popular religion include
females and demonic figures whose scowls and gestures
are inconsistent with official restraint.
Of  particular  interest,  however,  is  the  way in  which
Stevens describes his research. Deities can, he notes, be
identified  in  several  ways,  including  titles  on  placards
associated with them or the names of their temples. The
groupings in which they appear may also be indicative.
Some  are  easily  identified  by  distinctive  iconographic
features.  But  for  others there is  no recourse but what
informants say, and this may be problematic. Here it is, I
believe, worth quoting Stevens at length.
A  major  problem  has  involved  the  contradictory
stories  and  legends,  with  the  temple  staff  giving
different  versions  during  successive  visits.  These
contradictions would appear to be due to sheer lack
of interest on the part of the temple custodian or to
an unwillingness to admit to a foreigner ignorance
of  the  identity  of  the  deities  in  their  temple.
Suggestions are usually offered in a confident voice,
suggesting unequivocal accuracy. It is only later, on
revisiting  and perhaps  talking  to  others,  that  the
positive identification becomes less certain.  It  has
been  somewhat  surprising  to  me how little  many
temple  watchmen,  devotees  and even god-carvers
know of the myths, legends and histories behind the
deities in their own temples and shops (1997:11).
Our  second  collector,  Liu  Senhower  ( 劉 文 三 ),  the
author of The God Statues of Taiwan, brings an insider’s
perspective  to  Chinese  popular  religion.  Born in  1939,
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Liu  was  a  child  during  World  War  II.  He  has  vivid
memories  of  his  mother,  a  true  believer  in  popular
religion, who made sure that everyone in his family knew
how to light incense, bow and worship properly.  These
memories were reinforced when his father was drafted
by the Japanese army and sent to Hainan and his mother
prayed day and night for his safety. Then came the Allied
bombings and hearing his mother repeating the names of
the gods as the family huddled together in their air raid
shelter. A story circulated among their neighbors about a
bomb  that  fell  into  a  fishpond  instead  of  the  village,
diverted by divine intervention. As an artist, author and
collector,  Liu  knows intellectually  that  god  statues  are
simply blocks of wood, brought to life as works of art by
the  god-carver’s  craft.  When  he’s  tired  or  troubled,
however,  they  seem to  be  something  more.  Liu  has  a
Chinese intellectual’s mixed feelings about the gods, with
nuances added by his personal history. He has, however,
no  trouble  identifying  the  thirty  gods  whose  statues,
background  and  iconography  he  presents  in  his  book.
These  are  all  among  the  most  popular  and  best
documented gods.
With these two collectors to  guide  us,  let  us  return
now to our tourist in Yokohama, looking at the statue on
the altar of the Yokohama Guandi Miao (Figure 6).
Describing Guandi
What our tourist sees is an image consistent with the
classic description of Guanyu, the hero who would later
be  deified  as  Guandi,  in  The  Romance  of  the  Three
Kingdoms. 
Xuande [Liu Bei] took a look at the man, who stood
at  a  height  of  nine  chi,  and  had  a  two  chi  long
beard; his face was the color of a dark jujube, with
lips  that  were red and plump; his  eyes were like
that  of  a  crimson  phoenix,  and  his  eyebrows
resembled reclining silkworms. He had a dignified
air,  and  looked  quite  majestic.
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(http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Romance_of_the_Thre
e_Kingdoms/Chapter_1#11) 
The first  of  our collectors,  Keith  Stevens,  notes that
the  legends  surrounding  Guangong  have  become  the
subject  for  prints,  story  tellers,  operas  and  plays.  He
recounts two examples with a more earthy tone than the
stories that appear on the Yokohama temple’s  website.
According to the first,  Guanyu was a simple bean curd
hawker who rescued a girl from an evil magistrate, whom
he killed. He then fled and joined the army. Near Beijing
he encountered a butcher who challenged passersby to
lift  a  400-lb  stone  off  the  well  in  which  he  stored  his
meat. Guanyu lifted the stone, took the meat, and was
pursued by the butcher, who turned out to be Zhang Fei.
The  two  were  fighting  when  Liu  Bei  intervened.
According to the second, when Guanyu was captured by
Cao Cao, he and the wives of Liu Bei were given a single
room  to  share.  Guanyu  stood  by  the  door  all  night
holding a candle, to avoid any hint of impropriety.
Liu Senhower provides two additional tales. According
to one, collected in the countryside in Taiwan, the Jade
Emperor, the supreme god in the popular pantheon, had
come  down  to  earth  to  investigate  conditions  there.
Appalled  by  the  human misbehavior  he  discovered,  he
was about to punish humanity with devastating disasters
and  plagues.  Hearing  of  these  plans,  Guangong
prostrated himself before the Jade Emperor and tearfully
begged the Jade Emperor to show mercy instead. That is
why, the tale says, Guangong’s face is red, from all the
crying he did.  According to the second,  which,  I  note,
also  found  its  way  into  my  field  notes,  some  Chinese
believe  that  Guangong  became  the  Jade  Emperor,
promoted to the position during the 19th century.
The  effect  of  these  tales,  considered  as
superscriptions, is to further humanize Guandi. The awe-
inspiring general starts out as a simple beancurd hawker.
He may have inhuman self-control; but, like other men,
he is subject to sexual temptation. He can cry until he is
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red  in  the  face.  He  may,  like  the  founder  of  a  new
Chinese dynasty, rise from humble origins to the highest
power  in  the  land.  But  as  Robbie  Burns  once said,  “A
man’s a man for a’ that.” This god remains approachable.
The  opposite  is  true  of  another  superscription
described by Duara.
In 1914 the president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai,
ordered the creation of a temple of military heroes
devoted  to  Guandi,  Yuefei,  and twenty-four  lesser
heroes. The interior of the main temple in Beijing,
with  its  magnificent  timber  pillars  and  richly
decorated  roof,  was  impressive  in  the  stately
simplicity  of  its  ceremonial  arrangements.  There
were  no  images.  The  canonized  heroes  were
representedby their spirit tablets only (1988: 779).
Here there is no mention of  ling, no humanizing detail.
The  message  is  clear  and  unequivocal,  a  pure  and
uncompromising assertion of the value of loyalty.
Neither  wholly  abstract  and  dehumanized  nor
dynamically  ling in appearance, the seated Guang Di on
the  altar  of  the  Yokohama  Guandi  Miao  falls  between
these extremes, nicely positioned for a god who is both
an  epitome  of  classic  virtue  and  willing  to  lend  a
worshipper  a  hand  with  a  traffic  accident,  a  business
problem,  or  passing  a  school  entrance  exam.  What
happens  to  the  god,  however,  when  his  image  is
globalized?
When  Liu  analyzes  the  historical  and  cultural
background  to  Chinese  popular  religion  in  Taiwan,  he
frequently  employs  a  style  of  functional  analysis  that
anthropologists  associate  with  Malinowski.  The  central
premise is that Chinese emigrants to Taiwan, struggling
to reach and then to carve out new lives on the island
found themselves in uncertain and frequently dangerous
circumstances.  They  venerated  gods  who  offered
supernatural  aid:  Mazu,  for  saving  them  from  the
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dangers of the four-day sail from the mainland to Taiwan;
Tu-di-gong  for  protecting  against  storms,  drought  or
other  threats  to  the  harvest;  Bao-sheng-da-di  for
protection against and cure of illness.
In this context,  Guandi stands out as the epitome of
values essential to social order: 仁 (ren, benevolence), 義
(yi, righteousness), 禮 (li, propriety), 智 (zhi, wisdom), and
信 (xin, honesty). His legendary strictness in keeping his
promises has made him a favorite deity of businessmen
as  well  as  soldiers.  His  lack  of  association  with  any
particular set of material dangers may, in addition, make
him especially apt as a symbol of morality elevated above
the sorts of worldly concerns that motivate worshippers
looking for ling. It is thus, I suggest, that since the Qing
dynasty, we have found him paired with Confucius, with
his  wu miao (military temples)  built  alongside the  wen
miao (temples  of  culture)  in  which  Confucius  is
venerated. It is thus, too, I suggest, that of all the gods in
the  popular  pantheon,  he  is  the  one  being  celebrated
globally as a symbol of Chinese culture.
Divine Body Language
At  this  point  we  should  all  be  ready  to  concede  of
Guandi  what  Robert  Weller  (1994)  has  said  about
Chinese  religion  and  ritual  in  general.  The  forms  are
familiar. The possible meanings ascribable to them seem
endless.  They  resemble  the  chemicals  suspended  in
saturated liquids, ready to precipitate in a multitude of
forms depending on what is added to them.
Are  we  left,  then,  with  a  generalization  of  Adam
Chau’s  conclusion  about  his  Longwanggou  case  in
Shaabei?
No “interpretive  community”  has  emerged  out  of
the cacophonous and “saturated” jumble of texts to
present  clearly  “precipitated”  meanings  and
ideological or theological statements (2006:97).
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Let us look once again at the tangible  qualities  of  the
statue  of  Guandi  at  which  our  tourist  is  looking  and
compare  them with  other  images,  first  of  Guandi  and
then of other deities.
Google  searches  for  “Guandi,  ”  “Guangong,”  and
“Guanyu”  yield  thousands  of  images.  In  most  of  those
clearly identifiable as god statues, we see what we might
call  “sedate  dynamism.”  In  the  seated  figures  the  god
seems alert but relaxed. He strokes his beard. His feet
are planted on the ground, but his legs are spread but
not rigidly squared off. In standing poses the right leg is
thrust forward.
The significance of  these  poses  emerges  in  contrast
with  other  deities.  The  Jade  Emperor  is  represented
sitting  four-square,  looking  straight  ahead,  his  hands
joined  in  front  of  his  chest  (Figure  7).  In  some
communities, he is represented only by a tablet bearing
his title. He is seen as “too awesome and too powerful to
be represented by an image….Among the Fukienese in
particular, his spirit was believed to reside in the ash of
the main incense pot on the primary altar table in the
temple  dedicated  to  him,  and  not  even  a  tablet  is
permitted” (Stevens, 1997: 53).
Other spirits who are typically represented by tablets
include  ancestors  and  Confucius.  In  the  case  of
Confucius, we know that until 1530 sculptural images of
the Sage were found in state-supported temples all over
China  and,  “the  icons’  visual  features  were  greatly
influenced  by  the  posthumous  titles  and  ranks  that
emperor  conferred  on  Confucius  and  his  follows,”
treating them, in this respect, like Daoist and Buddhist
deities. This treatment aroused the ire of Neo-Confucian
ritualists,  who  led  a  successful  campaign  to  replace
images  with  tablets  and  posthumous  titles  with  the
designation “Ultimate Sage and First Teacher” (Murray,
2009: 371).
Compared to the Jade Emperor,  Guandi  seems more
relaxed,  more  human.  But  compared  to  other,  more
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dynamic, images, his statues seem sedate. Consider, for
example,  Zhen Wu, Lord of the Dark/Profound Heaven,
possessor  of  spirit  mediums,  who is  barefoot,  with  his
feet resting on the snake-  tortoise  who symbolizes  the
North, the most Yin of all directions (Figure 8). We have
noted the legend that describes Guandi as a tofu maker
before he became a soldier.  A similar legend describes
Zhen  Wu  as  a  butcher  and  the  snake-tortoise  as  his
intestines, torn out in an act of repentance for killing so
many  living  things  while  plying  his  butcher’s  trade.
Guangong  is  sometimes  depicted  standing,  but  his
statues  are  never  so  dramatically  dynamic  as those  of
Nazha,  the  Third  Prince,  whose  statues  depict  him
standing  on  his  wheels  of  fire  and  wielding  his  spear
(Figure  9).  In  some  images,  Guangong  appears  to  be
frowning, but his face is never so distorted as those of,
for  example,  the  goddess  Mazu’s  demonic  attendants
Shungfenger, Fair Wind Ears, and Chianliyan, Thousand-
Mile Eyes (Figure 10).
With  these  examples  I  have,  I  would  argue,  briefly
sketched an iconographic continuum that stretches from
tablets inscribed with text to demonic or once-demonic
figures  whose  dynamic  poses  or  expressions  express
more humanized,  more magical  forms of  divine  power.
The  statues  of  Guandi  mentioned  here  represent
authority  humanized,  accessible  to  human  sentiments,
but  fundamentally  righteous.  But  what  of  other
superscriptions more tailored to the modern world?
Guangong Globalized
Google  searches  turn  up  a  number  of  images  from
manga and video games in which the pre-divine Guanyu,
the hero from The Romance of  the Three Kingdoms is
depicted as a warrior superhero. He glares with intent
fury at enemies outside the frame. His robe is slipped off
one or both shoulders to reveal a heavily muscled body.
In some his pose is similar to that of Nazha on Taiwanese
altars.  He is  shown swooping  down thrusting  with  his
halbred. Here, however, I turn to another superscription,
Guangong (not, we must note Guandi), as a symbol and
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salesman for China and Chinese culture.
I  refer  here  to  another  website,  World  Guangong
Culture ( 世 界 關 公 文 化 , http://www.guangong.hk/). Here,
the hero deified as Guandi (Emperor Guan) is presented
as Guangong (Honorable Guan). Di, a Chinese character
associated  with  divine  or  imperial  status,  has  been
replaced by gong, which, while formerly the the highest
of five orders of nobility and translated “Duke,” is now a
common honorific,  applied,  for  example,  to a father-in-
law.
First  up  in  the  list  of  dignitaries  whose  statements
appear on the site is PRC President Hu Jintao, who says,
In current era, culture has increasingly become the
important  source  of  national  cohesion  and
creativity.  In  addition,  it  has  increasingly  become
the important factor of the comprehensive national
power competition.
He does not mention Guangong by name.
Next  is  Lui  Chun  Wan,  chairman  of  the  board  of
directors  of  the  World  Guangong  Culture  Promoting
Association,  who,  after  reviewing  Guangong’s  history,
concludes that,
We  believe  that  the  rich  and  colorful  Guangong
Culture  will  become  a  strong  force  to  unite  the
Chinese people from home and abroad!
There  is,  however,  no  mention  in  his  comments  of
miracles,  of  magical  response,  of  ling.  In  this
superscription,  however,  Guangong is not reduced to a
title on a tablet, an impersonal abstraction.
The standing image of Guangong chosen to brand the
World  Guangong  Culture  Promotion  Association  shows
the god standing and striding confidently forward (Figure
11).  In  this  conspicuously  cleaned  up  version  of  more
192
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
traditional depictions of the deity, all traces of armor and
glittering gold have been removed. The green of the robe
is a paler, more subtle hue than the the blue or green of
the  more  traditional  representation.  The  overall  green
tone  of  the  image  may  reflect,  I  speculate,  current
“green”  concerns  with  the  state  of  the  global
environment.
While he does carry his halberd, this version of the god
has  a  warm,  modern  look,  more  like  a  prosperous
businessman striding forward to shake your hand than a
model of warrior virtues. The “magic” in this image is no
longer  the  traditional  ling but  instead,  I  suggest,  the
economic miracles to be expected from doing business
with China.
Beyond China
As  we  return  to  where  we  started,  it  is,  I  believe,
important  to  recall  that  our  tourist  is  looking  at  the
statue of Guandi in a Chinese temple in Yokohama. Our
analysis  so  far  has  included  only  Chinese  data.  Our
tourist’s question, however, is motivated by the contrast
between what  she  sees  at  the  Yokohama Guandi  Miao
and  what  she  has  seen  elsewhere  in  Japan,  especially
when  visiting  Shinto  shrines.  There  the  gods  are
invisible,  posing the question why Chinese temples are
filled  with  god  statues,  full-figured  anthropomorphic
representations of gods, while Japanese shrines are not.
Some  might  question  whether  an  anthropologist
should  consider  such a  question  at  all.  Isn’t  it  wrong,
especially when studying religion and ritual, to rip what
we see from its cultural context? Isn’t  this the kind of
speculation for which such 19th century predecessors Sir
James Frazer, the author of  The Golden Bough, were so
roundly  condemned by such critics as Sir E.  E.  Evans-
Pirchard who called their work telling “If I were a horse”
stories?
But no, this is not what our 19th century predecessors
were  up  to.  Frazer  and  his  contemporaries  were
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constructing speculations about the prehistoric origins of
religion,  a  topic  for  which  the  direct  evidence  is  very
slim,  indeed.  What  I  propose  here  is  to  extend  the
method that Robert Weller describes when, having shown
that Wolf’s thesis that Chinese gods are bureaucrats is,
at best, only party true, then goes on to say,
At a deeper level these cases force us toward some
position  like  Wolf’s:  that  Chinese  religious
interpretation  moves  hand  in  hand  with  social
experience (1996: 21).
The classic Durkheimian vision in which religion mirrors
society may be too simplistic. We now recognize that,
Religion is not a reflex of Chinese social structure,
or even of class, gender, or geographical position. It
is  instead  part  of  an  ongoing  dialogue  of
interpretations,  sometimes  competing  and
sometimes cooperating (1996:21).
We can, however, go a step further and recognize that
the  on-going  dialogue  that  Weller  describes  extends
beyond the borders of China. Chinese ideas and images
have been absorbed and adapted throughout East Asia
and,  in  some  cases—one  thinks  of  Chinese  medicine,
martial arts, fengsui, the Yin and the Yang—have spread
worldwide,  carried  now by  film,  video  games  and  the
Internet  as  well  as  overseas  Chinese  and  other  East
Asian  diasporas.  To  explore  these  transmissions  and
transformations in search of pan-human patterns is far
from telling “if I were a horse” stories. It is, instead, the
sort  of  thing  that  historians  do  all  the  time  when
engaging  in  comparative  research  within  or  across
regions or eras, a task that can now be grounded in a
rich  and  growing  body  of  scholarship.  In  the  case  of
China, we are not dealing with speculation about what
happened  in  prehistory.  If  anything,  we  confront  the
opposite  problem;  the  relevant  literature  is  enormous
compared  to  the  number  of  scholars  who  research  it
(McCreery, 2008: 304-305).
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In this context,  there is,  I  would argue,  much to be
said for  embracing the “methodological  fetishism” that
Arjun  Appadurai  (1986:5,  cited  in  Brown,  2009:142)
ascribes  to  material  culture  studies.  Brown’s
“Praesentia” (2009: 177-194) and Michael Taussig’s “In
some way or another one can protect oneself  from the
spirits  by  portraying  them”  (2009:  195-207)  offer
numerous  opportunities  for  close  comparison  with  Lin
Wei-Ping’s  findings  concerning  the  consecration  and
localization of god statues in Wan-nian. Closer attention
to Chinese god statues reveals not only a richly detailed
iconography  but  also  general  principles  that  have
broader implications. They make inescapable the larger
question: Why are Chinese gods, like the gods of Hindu
India and ancient Greece and Rome, Christian saints and
Christ himself represented in human form?
The kami venerated in Japanese shrines are concealed
from their worshippers. Only priests may see the sacred
regalia in which they reside when invited to participate
in Shinto ceremonies (Nelson, 1997). We have seen that
when  held  in  greatest  awe,  the  Jade  Emperor  is  also
invisible: a feature he also shares with the gods of the
Old Testament, Calvin and the Holy Koran.
What  we  see  here  in  tablets,  books  and  other  non-
anthropomorphic  forms of  material  representation is,  I
would  argue,  a  precise  analogue  to  Maurice  Bloch’s
description of ritual language as a language deliberately
impoverished to force particular interpretations (cited in
McCreery,  1995:  158).  Abstraction  and  formalization
assert  unimpeachable  authority.  Conversely,  however,
concrete representations, and especially those that take
a  full-figured  anthropomorphic  form,  render  the  gods
approachable,  transforming  them  into  patrons  with
whom it is possible to form particularistic relationships in
which both emotion and exchange can be used to secure
the gods’ favor.
In this paper we have seen anthropologists whose eyes
are  focused  beyond  what  they  see,  on  theories  that
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purport to explain how Chinese culture or society works.
We  have  seen  collectors,  whose  iconographic
perspectives  draw  our  attention  back  to  the  visual
evidence that our eyes provide and noted the diversity of
stories that add meaning to what we see. The author has
sketched  one  dimension  of  a  visual  grammar,  a
continuum  that  extends  from  authority  abstracted  in
inscribed  tablets  to  power  expressed  in  near-demonic
forms.
There are no final answers here. If, however, we open
our eyes to the tangible qualities we find in Chinese god
statues,  we  will,  I  suggest,  be  able  to  write  thicker
descriptions, descriptions that challenge our theories and
demand more subtle ones, theories that may, at the end
of  the day,  enable  us to  situate  Chinese  religion  more
firmly in relation to religion as a human phenomenon.
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Figure 1: The Yokohama Guandi Miao (Exterior)
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Figure 2: Sengen Jinja (a Shinto Shrine)
Figure 3: Guandi on the altar of the Yokohama 
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Figure 4: Japanese Buddha
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Figure 5: Shinkoyasu Jinja (Interior)
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
203
Figure 6: Guandi at the Yokohama Guandi Miao
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Figure 7: The Jade Emperor
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Figure 8: Xuantianshangdi
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Figure 9: Nahza, The Third Prince
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Figure 10: Thousand-Mile Eyes
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Figure 11: Guangong on the Guangong World Culture
Chapter 8
AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND
THE GROTESQUE: 
THE ARROGANCE OF COSMIC DECEIT, AND
THE HUMILITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
Joanna Overing
The place of humour
My  strongest  memories  of  Piaroa  people  of  the
Venezuelan Amazon Territory involve experiencing their
humour. The ludic was vital to their everyday life. These
were  people  who  were  lovers  of  slapstick  and  witty,
outrageous play on words. There was their punning, their
satire  and  irony,  where  the  use  of  the  apt  and
mischievous trope was given especially high value. It was
through  hilarity  that  I  felt  I  actually  understood  my
Piaroa teachers. It was then that I felt at one with them.
I will dwell upon the connection between this love of
slapstick, the apt pun and their  egalitarian antipathy to
hierarchy, rules and regulations. To begin to understand
this link between a love of laughter and the feeling for
social and political equality of both men and women, it is
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necessary  to  consider  the  absurd  grotesqueries  of
creation time hubris,  which the Piaroa shaman unfolds
through  his  singing  narrations  of  mythic  time,  as  he
conducts his daily healing ceremonies. My main interest
is  in  this  telling of  the monstrous  modes of  power set
loose in creation time by the creator gods – and of course
their  repercussions.  We  find  that  the  stress  upon  the
grotesque in these healing narratives is strongly related
to the shaman’s thorough understanding of the dangers
in  the  present  day  of  the  monstrous  modes  of  power
unleashed by the gods when they created the world. It is
through exploring these mighty, but highly dodgy, powers
of creation time that we (as anthropologists) can begin to
understand  their  connection  to  the  rich  social
philosophies of folly that are attached to the egalitarian
practices of Piaroa people as they interact in ‘today time’
sociality.
Along the way, I shall unfold the two diseases of folly
and madness that Piaroa people may experience in the
course of everyday life. The names of these two illnesses
are  ki'raeu and  ke'raeu.  The  former,  ki'raeu,  was  a
comparatively  minor  disease  of  social  irresponsibility
which  could  lead  to  such  errant  behaviour  as  crazy
laughter,  promiscuity,  wandering  at  will  –  and  also
diarrhoea.  Sufferers  of  such  symptoms  are  considered
victims, led to their waywardness (such as their excessive
use of orifices) by the social irresponsibility of others who
perhaps taunt, or are unduly arrogant toward, them. The
taunter  blatantly  displays  a  lack  of  regard  to  familial
matters and good etiquette, which leads their victim into
a state of minor madness.
Ke'raeu –  in  contrast  to  ki’raeu –  is  a  much  more
serious threat to the social fabric: its symptoms involve
more violent display, such as accompanies the madness
of  hubris,  paranoia,  extreme  arrogance  –  and  also
murder. As happens today, characters in mythic time also
fell foul of both illnesses, with behaviour becoming truly
grotesque when ke'raeu seriously set in. We find a major
irony  here.  These  stories  speak  of  the  original  violent
creation,  acquisition  and  stealing  of  grotesque  powers
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that would allow for the culinary arts. However, it was
these  very  toxic  powers  that  led  eventually  to  the
creation of beautiful, but dangerous culinary skills that
enable Piaroa people today to achieve the sort of life that
they could consider to be human.
Sociology, Political Anthropology
It is important to note that my exploration of Piaroa
understandings  of  the  grotesque  and  other  modes  of
power is intended as a foray into political anthropology.
For instance, I find that certain comparisons of modes of
power can be highly enlightening. For example, in Greek
myth,  Zeus,  who  becomes  sovereign  of  the  whole
universe, gets away with hubris and excessiveness, while
Wahari (the creater god of Piaroa people) does not. Why
this difference? To answer such a question, we need to
widen our horizon of concerns greatly to understand its
importance. Obviously, the cultural context (for instance,
the  aesthetics  of  living  together)  and  histories  (within
which  modes  of  power  are  enacted)  vary  considerably
with regard to matters of social and political value. It is
certainly legitimate to question the worth of comparing
the political values of a Greek city state with those of an
Amazonian village. On the other hand, with our horizons
expanded,  we  might  well  find  gold.  In  comparing  the
political concerns of the citizens of Thebes with those of
a Piaroa village I discovered that they shared a number
of egalitarian values and practices. For instance, in both
cases it is particularly the women, as chorus, who take
responsibility  for  unfolding  to  the  people  the
irresponsible actions of a tyrant – or a shaman  – gone
mad.
Perhaps we need to understand that an aesthetic  of
living may well  play  a  large  part  within  most  political
agendas. For quite a long time political anthropology has
been deeply in need of new sociological ways of thinking,
talking, examining – and most importantly imagining.
Exploration  of  this  kind  is  needed  to  open  up
sociological categories and ways of thinking and even to
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begin  to  understand  the  extraordinary  political
repercussions  (and  lessons)  emerging  from  the
respective  fates of  these  two creator  gods –  Zeus and
Wahari.  The  former  is  king  of  hierarchy,  teaching  its
‘wonderful attainment’.  As for Wahari,  it  originally was
his  desire  to  create  for  his  world  a  moral  order
comprised of equals. However, it was his plight that he
was  foiled  in  following  through  with  his  plan.  On  the
other hand, he did succeed in creating a people who held
tight to his original dream of creating a moral order of
equals. They also had the intelligence to understand how
difficult it is to actually achieve this state of existence –
one capable of creating beings who were actually human.
Modes of Power
I shall begin by sketching some of the basic characters
within  Piaroa  cosmology  and  the  modes  of  power
attached to each:
First  there  is  Tapir/Anaconda: This  monstrous,
almighty, subterranean Tapir/Anaconda let loose all those
mighty powers that eventually allowed for an animated
existence  on  earth.  The  great  granite  outcrops  of  the
ancient  Guianese  landscape  are  the  result  of  his
defecation:  Lying  beneath  the  earth,  he  propelled  his
waste upwards, like worm casts, to sit on Earth's surface.
His granite shit became the source on earth for all 'life
force' of a sensual sort: it thus plays a crucial role in the
empowerment of  each Piaroa individual:  the casing for
their beautiful,  interior 'beads of life'  is  made of  these
potent defecatory granite upcastings of Tapir/Anaconda.
It is this casing that allows for their 'life of the senses'
and  thus  all  of  their  physical  capacities.  When  the
terrifying  and  violent  Tapir/Anaconda  wandered  along
the  earth's  surface,  s/he  wreaked  mayhem  in  his/her
wake.
Next there is Kuemoi: Tapir/anaconda was the father
of Kuemoi who became the Master of Rivers and Lakes.
Tapir/Anaconda  grew  Kuemoi  within  the  womb  of  the
Mistress of the lake, feeding him with wildly poisonous
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hallucinogens from the rust of the sun and the centre of
sky  down  of  the  sun.  Through  these  hallucinogenic
powers  from  the  dreadful  heat  of  the  sun,  Kuemoi
became  the  father  of  all  cultivated  food.  He  was  the
creator  of  all  those  forces  that  belong  to  the  culinary
arts: gardening, hunting, curare, cooking fire. He is also
a tyrannical, grotesque, little madman and is portrayed
as a diabolical buffoon, raucously laughing with each plot
he hatches, shrieking in outrage when foiled: he stamps
his feet when foiled: a figure of high comedy, not tragedy.
When  overtaken  by  total  madness,  he  runs  endlessly
around  in  circles.  (He  reminds  me  of  Robert  Nye's
depiction  of  the  devil  in  Merlin:  “He  grins  like  a  fox
eating shit out of a wire brush; the Devil is 'snoring as
loud as a pig'; 'he giggles and he writhes'”). This is the
hilarious, absurd and mockable side of wickedness.
The main aim in  life  for  Kuemoi  is  to  gobble  up as
many  beings  of  the  domain  of  the  jungle  as  possible.
Coming out of water, he was the evil cannibal predator of
all beings of the jungle. He stalked all jungle beings as
food. He lusted after their meat. He devoured them raw,
he ate them cooked. To catch them used cunning and an
odious use of  guile  and sorcery.  He was the master of
horrid traps!  The king of  stealth!  The trap he enjoyed
most  was  his  own  daughter,  'Maize'.  When  she  was
sleeping,  he  filled  her  womb  with  piranha  fish  and
electric eels - as a seductive trap for the handsome young
men of the jungle, who then became his meal at night. He
created all  creatures nasty to jungle beings,  each as a
trap to catch them for a meal: the jaguars and all other
cats, ticks, biting insects, the stingray, poisonous snakes.
He  is  the  father  of  opossum  and  electric  eel,  the
grandfather  of  bat,  vulture,  quarrelling,  sting  ray  and
boils.
He was the owner of what the Piaroa call the 'crystal
boxes  of  tyranny,  treachery,  and  domination'.  He
epitomizes  excessive  power  –  the  power  of  the  true
tyrant. Kuemoi released all the horrors from these boxes
of  primordial  powers full  blast  into this  world.  Kuemoi
was the owner of the ‘crystal boxes of Night’. It was he
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who in great glee released night and all  its dangerous
creatures into earthly space. All of these vicious beings
are Kuemoi's  weapons. In fact  all of Kuemoi's creations
serve  as  his  weapons,  including  the  culinary  arts.  All
have powers either to kill or to poison. He transformed
himself during his escapades as jaguar, vulture, mudfish
or anaconda.
Through all  this  he achieved the clothes of  physical
might. A small, but monstrous two-headed figure, Kuemoi
had  one  head  to  eat  meat  raw,  and  one  to  eat  meat
cooked.  Kuemoi  is  the  archetypically  evil  figure  of
creation time – and its most ridiculous. This very foolish
god  who  has  all  the  knowledge  of  the  culinary  arts
speaks  nonetheless  to  a  highly  sophisticated  theory  of
ethical behaviour and to the side of human nature (as the
Piaroa  perceive  it)  that  gives  all  human  beings  the
potential for odious and wicked behaviour. A deep cruelty
drove Kuemoi and the use of his might. The power of his
thoughts,  that  had  their  source  in  the  poisonous
hallucinogens  he  took,  though  sufficiently  mighty  to
create  the  culinary  arts,  continually  poisoned  his  will.
Overtaken  by  total  madness,  Kuemoi  always  acted
without reason.  He had no dignity.  Evil  here is clearly
associated  with  knowledge  and  thus  with  too  much
power.  Kuemoi  had  far  too  much  of  both.  He  ever
experienced an extreme poisoning of his emotions (the
disease that the Piaroa call  ke'raeu – paranoia, hubris,
the  desire  to  murder).  This  condition  of  suffering
poisonous unmastered knowledge is firmly attached to an
imagery of madness and buffoonery. The political lesson
is clear.
Then  there  is  Wahari: The  greatest  adversary  of
Kuemoi in creation time was Wahari, the Master of the
Jungle,  and  the  creator  god  of  the  Piaroa.  As  such,
Wahari was the opposite side of the coin to Kuemoi's evil
– at least at the start of creation time. Wahari, who was
also created through Tapir/Anaconda's efforts, was fed on
different hallucinogens from those given Kuemoi. Wahari
was given the power of earthly space, of the day, light
and sociality (although in the end it all went wrong). He
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with his brother, worked together to create many of the
aspects of terrestrial space that made it habitable. They
took  the  sun and moon from their  homes beneath  the
earth,  and  jumped  with  them  into  the  sky  to  give
themselves  light  by day and night.  Wahari  created air,
breeze  and  the  skies  for  the  comfort  of  the  earthly
creatures of his domain. He created all branch animals
and birds of the jungle.  The hummingbird,  eagle  hawk
and the lapa were the most important manifestations of
his power.  They were his transformations, his thoughts
and  as  such  his  sons.  He  used  the  force  of  the
hummingbird to fly above and beneath the earth in his
flying  canoe.  He,  like  Kuemoi,  had  mighty  powers  of
transformation. He too had the power of cunning, guile
and the arts of trickery, combined with mighty sorcery.
But Wahari had the benevolent desire to create a good
life  for  his  inhabitants  of  the  jungle.  He  wanted  to
provide them with the civilised conditions for a human
life  on  earth,  including  the  culinary  arts,  and  the
capabilities  for  civilised  sociality  and  social  virtue.  He
spoke the principles of a moral social life for his people.
Certainly at the beginning of creation time,  he was the
god of unity and accord, including that which should hold
within the family. But Wahari strongly wanted to capture
the culinary arts from his father-in-law, Kuemoi. With this
desire  began  a  treacherous  cosmic  comedy  of  errors.
None of Wahari's benevolent desires were accomplished
in  creation  time  –  and  that  is  its  tragic  irony.  The
narrations tell how Wahari begins mythic time with the
gift of social finesse,  but the moment he tries to trade
with Kuemoi,  cosmogenesis  becomes a bag of tricks,  a
high comedy (then tragedy) of errors. The genre of the
bawdy grotesque slips in the end to true tragedy.
Creation  Time  Hubris  and  its  Landscape  of
Monsters
This we can gather through the tales about creation
time  and  the  shaman's  skilled  performance  of  the
hilarious,  bawdy,  grotesque  episodes  of  mythic  time
through which the ludicrous conditions of being human
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are disclosed. The narrations disclose the subtle lessons
of  two-edged  folly  –  that  which  is  good,  engendering
health  and  well-being,  and  that  which  is  disastrous.
Erasmus' sermon on Lady Folly would fit well here.
Creation time, much as with Sophocles’ Oedipus cycle,
moves  from a  kind  of  naughty  irony,  filled  with  crazy
jokes such as reversing heads and buttocks or grabbing a
penis hovering in the air in order to create men. They
also tell of mistakes that lead to intentions backfiring, for
example when putting up the sun and moon, and in the
antics of monkeys. Finally, a more grotesque, dark place
of  the  tragedy of  hubris emerges,  where excess  pride,
arrogance,  greed  tend  to  lead  to  the  ruin  of  the
transgressors.  We here find similarities  with Foucault's
reading of Sophocles’ Oedipus, whereby the downfall of
Oedipus  is  caused  not  by  innocence,  but  a  monstrous
excess  of  knowledge,  and  too  much  power.  This  rings
true  with  the  experiences  of  Wahari.  There  are  also
similarities  to  the  often  erratic  destiny  and  suffering
found in the historical tyrants of Sophocles’  time, with
their tendency to rely on their own  solitary knowledge,
rather  than  solving  problems  by  conversing  with  ‘the
people’ and other ‘knowledgeable’ advisors. Such lack of
regard  can  lead  easily  to  ‘real’  tyranny,  which  is
associated with the tendency to excess. This in turn leads
to the hubris and asociality of tyrants who misuse power.
In dwelling on these problems, classical Greece comes up
with democracy as a solution.
All  of  the  vignettes  from  the  shamanic  narrations
below come from the cycle on the origin of the craziness
disease,  k'eraeu.  This  disease  gives  you  delusions  of
grandeur and paranoia. It is the 'fall down’ disease, the
'go  round  and  around  disease',  the  'twirling  circles'
illness. K'eraeu is the most deadly illness you can get and
the most destructive malady of folly imaginable. It leads
to deranged intentionality. You can die from it and with it
you are very likely to damage and kill others.
Here  is  the  history: Creation  time  becomes  the
battleground  between  the  two  powerful  creator  gods,
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Wahari and Kuemoi, and ends with a cannabilistic war of
all  against  all.  Wahari  tries  to  trade  with  Kuemoi,  to
acquire his powerful hunting spells and powers for the
cultivation  of  plants;  in  turn,  Kuemoi  tries  to  poison
Wahari with his powerful hallucinogenic drugs, in order
to capture and eat him. So Wahari stealthily tries to steal
from Kuemoi the means to civilised life. He tries to rob
all the edible fruits and vegetables from Kuemoi's great
tree of life. But suffering from the poisons of Kuemoi's
spells, Wahari instead becomes desperately ill, thirsty; he
lusts after women and spends many years chasing after
foreign  beauties.  He  becomes  insufferably  arrogant,
destroying all of his personal relationships with kin. He
sells his sister to the Master of White Man's Goods for 6
boxes of matches; he sodomises her, an event that leads
to the birth of his son Diarrhoea, whom he tries to kill.
He suffers  hubris:  his  mockery infuriates  his  relatives,
who take revenge, by further zapping him with Kuemoi's
disease, k'eraeu, the craziness illness: his head hurts, he
runs in circles.  It  makes him want to kill.  The terrible
twirling  circles  of  k'eraeu really  captures  Wahari:
maddened,  he announces that  all  of  his  own creations
(people) will suffer this disease. He wanders in the world,
lost, arrogant, beautiful. However, he returns again and
again to steal  Kuemoi's  powers for civilised eating.  He
manages to steal Kuemoi's daughter (after cleaning her
womb of piranha fish). Next comes a god-awful series of
battles  between  Wahari  and  Kuemoi,  where  they  both
indulge in villainy, thievery, trickery, deceit and disguise,
traps and general mayhem. In hilarious episodes, Wahari
often outwits Kuemoi because he foresees his intentions.
He manages to give Kuemoi diarrhoea and causes him to
rape  his  own  daughter  (Wahari's  wife).  Kuemoi  runs
round and round in circles.
Wahari  becomes  crazier  and  crazier  as  he  becomes
increasing zapped by Kuemoi's poisons. On one occasion
Wahari becomes locked in the midst of a  k'eraeu circuit
comprised of the narrow translucent streams of  k'eraeu
descending  from four  of  Kuemoi's  mountains.  He then
falls into Kuemoi's trap of poisoned hunting charms, filled
with vulture down, sky rust, centre of the sky down. He
217
JOANNA OVERING
goes off hunting and then fishing, through yet other traps
set by Kuemoi, and manages to kill, not a deer, but his
much beloved old grandmother. He cries and wails at this
mistake.
Wahari then decides to create his own culinary arts:
He tries to create his own fire, his own sweet and wild
fruits  and  hunting  paraphernalia,  but  he  fails  badly,
These  are  tales  usually  told  with  rather  hard-edged
slapstick comedy. Each and every creation was false and
perverse  because  of  Kuemoi's  poisoning  of  his  will,
making Wahari crazy. At one point he tries to kill his own
brother. The more he tries to create the culinary arts, the
more Wahari proclaims his own greatness – as master of
the universe, the jungle, and the rivers. It was his hubris
that  created  the  forces  of  a  monstrous,  perverted
culinary arts. His 'fire' blossomed as skin disease, burns,
and boils,  a  fire that scorched but  could not cook;  his
cures backfired on the user and became the miscarrying
of women and the bleeding of adults from the mouth, the
anus, the vagina; his hunting charms became paralysis,
his fish hooks, sore throat... All these useless, poisonous
creations became the diseases that human beings suffer
today and not the useful artefacts for civilised living that
Wahari  so  desired  for  them.  These  creations  today
impregnate human  beings  with  disease.  As  in  Greek
myth, life for human beings is not easy; the gods made it
so.
How do humans receive all these horrors? This is
the story:
It was when Wahari invited most of the people beings
of the jungle to a great feast. He gets them drunk and
then transforms them into animals, to become game for
him to hunt and eat. He takes away all their powers for
thought and intentionality  and gives them instead all of
his perverse creations. The animals will not suffer them,
but  instead  they  will  pass  them  on  to  human  beings.
Piaroa people thus  do receive Wahari's artefacts, but in
the  form  of  diseases  given  to  them  by  the  animals.
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Wahari, the star of mythic time, becomes its worst villain,
all due to his mistakes and his arrogance.
Today,  human  beings  (ironically)  have  to  use  the
dangerous  forces  for  the  culinary  arts  that  were
originally let loose by Kuemoi, not Wahari. All of Wahari’s
efforts turned out to be useless. In fact, it is only earthly
human  beings  who  can  use  the  powers  created  by
Kuemoi.  There  are  all  sorts  of  dangers  there  for  folly
(their intentions can so easily be poisoned by Kuemoi's
deadly  powers).  Today,  human  beings  must,  through
everyday hard work, manage the culinary arts on their
own, transforming the ugly and dangerous powers for the
hunt  and  the  gardens  into  beautiful  forces,  safe  for  a
civilised life. They must cleanse their vegetables and fruit
from the poisons of Kuemoi and all their game and fish
from those of Wahari. And, they must deal with the fact
that the game they eat is really human in origin.
The relation between the culinary arts and the arts
of conviviality:
This everyday work of the culinary arts and civilised
sociality  is  at  the  same  time  accomplished  through  a
good  deal  of  practice  in  the  comic  arts.  Indeed  the
practice of the arts of conviviality become a sign that the
powers they use are those of civilised eating, a practice
which keeps hubris at bay.  The wisdom of folly is highly
valued.
On the other hand, there is no resolution of the great
conflicts  of  mythic  time.  The  villainy  of  the  ludicrous,
ironic,  treacherous practices  of  creation  time generate
the ambiguous conditions for the humans who live today
on earth – civilised eating, civilised sociality – are all to
be acquired at great cost, with great difficulty, with great
suffering, and with a good dash of treachery. We who use
the  powers  of  the  cannibal  god,  Kuemoi,  can  also  be
poisoned  into  greedy,  arrogant  behaviour.  The
domesticated Piaroa can hardly separate themselves in
any absolute way from the animal other. As human beings
they are hardly innocent. This takes us to the genre of
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the grotesque, that genre that retains to the bitter end its
unresolved conflicts and ambiguities.
The Genre of the Grotesque: the mythic narratives
and the unresolved incongruities of history:
Mythic imageries of the grotesque and the absurd are
not unusual. The French scholar, Vernant, speaks of the
robust, multi-layered imagery of mythic narrations, their
hilarity and the intellectuality attached to them. And, we
may  add,  their  strong  connection  to  particular  social
philosophies, to distinctions of moral worth, to treasured
ways of doing things. He calls for deeper cross-cultural
comparison  of  mythic  styles  (with  which  I  strongly
agree).  Is  there  a  particular  style  of  mythic
presentations? I suggest that the genre of the grotesque
is  one  such  widespread  style.  The  powers  sufficiently
mighty for creation are typically violent dramatic stories,
as we see from Vernant's own disclosure of the ancient
Greek mythology, and ours from Amazonia.
The  story  of  creation  time  is  one  of  poisoned
intentionalities,  of cosmic follies: it is a story of greed,
hubris and mental derangement.
The genre of the Grotesque is calculatingly used by the
narrator of Piaroa myths in unfolding, disclosing, evoking
the  deep  absurdities  of  human  existence  and  its  pre-
conditions  as  played  out  in  creation  time.  Wisdom
depends on understanding the message of the grotesque.
We need to pay attention to such messages.
The 18th and 19th centuries had a pejorative view of
the grotesque, judging it a vulgar species of the comic,
deprived of  the serious.  In general  it  was viewed as a
genre of ludicrous exaggeration, a genre of the fantastic.
However, more recent responses (Kayser 1963, Thomson
1972) have understood it otherwise, stressing its power
to  speak  to  reality.  They  note  that  its  explosive  force
serves to make us see the real world anew. It jolts one
into  a  transformation  of  perspective  on  what  reality
might be.
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Some relevant points with regard to this re-assessment
of the genre of the grotesque to our understanding of the
mythic narration performances are the following:
1) The genre of the grotesque (also read as the genre
of  mythic  narrative)  is  more attached to realism
than fantasy. It  is  extravagant,  but not fantastic.
However strange the grotesque world is, it is also
our  world.  The mythic narration,  in  partaking of
this  genre,  has  as  its  first  and  foremost  aim  to
express  the problematic nature of existence, and
its preconditions, to unfold the absurdities of our
life,  its  ambivalences,  as played out  originally  in
the ironic grotesquery of creation time.
2) The  comic  is  necessary  for  the  genre  of  the
grotesque to work. There is its playfulness and its
terror,  its  confusion  and  interplay  of
heterogeneous  elements:  the  monstrous  and  the
ludicrous; humans, animals, and vegetables. There
are its paradoxes and ironies (the creator of fire
devouring  meat  raw),  and  also  its  shock  tactics
(Wahari eating stew discovers he is eating his own
son). We react to the slapstick experience of such
horror  with  glee,  as  opposites  continually  clash.
We laugh at the tale of deceit, trickery, mischief,
hubris,  illness,  death,  cannibalism,  treacheries,
greed,  general  mayhem.  Part  of  the  glee  comes
from the  question  ever  rising over  'who are  the
victims? who the victimisers?
3) There  are  the  physical  deformities,  the  (bawdy)
bodyliness of it all (see Bakhtin). We have the 2-
headed  god  of  culture;  the  huge  sexual  organs,
male  and  female  (Think  of  Cronus'  enormous
member).  Wahari,  creator  of  people,  transforms
himself  into  the  monster  supreme deity  beneath
the  earth,  the  dangerous  chimerical
Tapir/Anaconda,  preying  intently  on  his  own
kinsmen.
4) The  most  distinctive  trait  of  the  grotesque,
according  to  Thomson  (1972),  is  the  unresolved
nature of grotesque conflict, separating it out from
neighbouring genres  (e.g.  the  absurd).  In  Piaroa
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myth, this grotesquery of the origin of culture is
never resolved – Wahari did not succeed (Zeus did,
but earthlings didn't). Thus, the forces for creation
continue into today  as the uncleaned product  of
the deadly  hallucinogens that the creator god of
the culinary arts withdrew from the rust of the sun
andthe  heart  of  the  armadillo.  The  gods  were
creators and as such, killers.
5) The  emotional  and  intellectual  tension  continues
through  the  story:  it  is  one  of  poisoned  and
poisonous  intentionalities.  Despite  the  human
capacities of  Piaroa people  (their  capabilities  for
the culinary arts,  for  reasoned intentionality  and
therefore  sociality),  there  remains  this  deep
ambiguity to being human. For as humans they are
hardly  innocent.  Their  reflections  upon  alterity
recognise  that  the  violence  of  foreign  politics
demands from the start an unleashing of poisonous
forces from themselves not so very different from
those  of  exterior  others  –  or  the  gods  (Overing
1996).
Ironic practices of the everyday
How should we as anthropologists interpret the Piaroa
reactions  to  their  absurd  universe?  We  have  then  the
ironic  performances/rituals  of  everyday  life  among  an
egalitarian people who love their freedom and also their
sociality.  These are a people  who are very fond of  the
comic;  they find the practice of  folly  essential  to  their
well-being:  a  very  Amazonian  way  of  thinking.  My
interest is how such a cosmogenesis and the philosophy
of the absurd that comes from it (as understood by the
Piaroa) are linked to their social psychology and to their
egalitarianism. As we know, our own social theory of the
comic is indeed weak, as too that of the grotesque.
For insight, we might be wise to turn to the likes of
Vico on the political use of tropes (the more hierarchical
people’s values the more literalness is approved of) and
Kenneth Burke on true irony being attached to  a deep
humility  with  regard  to  our  own frailties.  We  need  to
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think about an irony that does not make us 'superior' to
the enemy, for we have some of the same attributes as
he/she – and indeed we are indebted to this enemy. (For
Piaroa,  the gods are cannibal predators, and so are the
Piaroa themselves). 
Perhaps it is with lessons from the Taoist Monks (e.g.
see Peter Berger) that we might begin to understand the
comic  as  a  mode  of  knowledge.  Thus  perhaps  the
Amazonian case is  not totally  alien.  Let us look at the
connections:
1) The role of the jokester shaman leader has much in
common with the raucously laughing Taoist Monk.
For both, the comic is a mode of knowledge.
2) The  humour  of  both  is  forthcoming  from  a
profound  sense  of  the  incongruities  (lack  of
reason) of the universe, and of human behaviour
within it.
3) There is a strong use of tropes. According to Peter
Berger, the Ch'an/Zen way of teaching is through
parables, through riddles, and  most solutions are
in the form of jokes. 
4) What  is  more,  a  self-mocking humility  is  taught.
The Piaroa shaman is the teacher of this attitude of
the world – he starts with the children when they
are  five  years  old.  Success  in  the  ability  of  not
taking oneself seriously is a good test of whether
liberating, true learning has taken place, one that
is  conducive to the deconstruction of reality, with
the disclosure of all its incongruities – albeit the
shaman's job, but to a lesser, yet important extent
by each individual.
Berger  lists  these  components  of  a  comic
philosophy (as followed by the Taoists):
1) The  diagnosis  of  the  world  as  a  mass  of
incongruence
2) The radical  debunking of pretensions of grandeur
and wisdom (the breeder of hubris)
3) A spirit of mocking irreverence
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4) A  profound  discovery  of  and  appreciation  of
freedom
Such a list fits as well the attitudes and teachings of
the  Piaroa  shaman  who  teaches  of  the  importance  of
humility – in light of the enemy within – and stresses at
all  times the craziness  of  the expression  of  anger  and
arrogance,  true  signs  of  a  tyrannical  temperament
destructive of the accomplishment of a human sort of life.
These are the lessons of the two diseases of craziness:
k'iraeu and k'eraeu.
These  are  also  philosophical  insights  that  lead  to  a
stress  on  the  immense  importance  to  sociality  of  the
accomplishing affective comfort. The hierarchical and the
literal are both too direct for affective comfort and well-
being. The hierarchical and the literal can too easily and
treacherously poison intentionality.
The  comic,  the  social  and  the  creation  of  a
counterworld
Finally,  a  word  on  the  notion  of  comedy  as  a
counterworld  and  as  'anti-rites'.  See  M.  Douglas  and
others on the notion that jokes are an intrusion of the
comic into everyday life. They see jokes as 'anti-rites',
rebellious  of  ordained  patterns  of  social  life.  They
understand  the  comic  as  a  temporary suspension  of
social structure!
However, for many Amazonian peoples, folly lies at the
heart of the social. Far from the comic as an intrusion
into  everyday  life,  the  view  is  that  the  human  social
condition can only be accomplished through the spirit of
folly. Through an understanding of an ironic, grotesque
cosmogenesis,  Amazonian  peoples  tend  to  stress  the
value  of  playing  out  in  social  life  a  sociable  'humble
irony'. For example, with Piaroa, ludic practices allow for
sociable  living  and  working  together.  They  enable  the
bringing up of children, feeding them, curing them, and
most important, teaching them the arts and decorum of
Folly. In other words, ironic practice allows them to deal
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with the poisonous forces within that  are at  the same
time  conducive  to  a  human  way  of  life.  These  are  a
people who recognise well  the happiness of foolery, its
poetics and also its necessity, its health-giving properties.
In Amazonia often the achievement of the social forms
a counterworld that protects against all those absurdities
of  the  universe. Thus  the  ironic  practices:  a  spirit  of
mocking  irreverence,  a  debunking  of  all  those
pretensions of grandeur and wisdom, but coated with a
good dose of well-considered humility in the face of it all.
For those absurdities not only always intrude upon the
everyday, they also rest within each person, corporeally
so to speak. At any moment, and you never know, anyone
can suffer k'iraeu (promiscuity, crazy laughter...) and any
shaman could be attacked by k'eraeu (paranoia). This is
the misery of cosmic Folly. It is the comic as a mode of
knowledge  that  provides  insight  into  this  downside  of
folly: by knowing it, and practising in its light, we can, for
a time at  least,  fool  the cosmic  comic  incongruities  of
existence and of this world on earth. The latter being an
environment  created  by  means  of  poisonous,  deadly
hallucinogens.
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Chapter 9
HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANAMORPHOSIS
Alberto Corsín Jiménez
‘the most admirable operations derive from very weak
means’
– Galileo Galilei (1968: 109)
‘Not just judgments about analogy but judgments about
proportion inform any organization of data.’
– Marilyn Strathern (2004 [1991]: 24)
‘A strange thing full of water’
– Michel Serres (1995: 122)
I open with a myth of origins:
All  political  thought  evinces  an  aesthetic  of  sorts.
Dioptric anamorphosis, for instance, was the ‘science of
miracles’ through which Hobbes imagined his Leviathan.
An  example  of  the  optical  wizardry  of  seventeenth
century clerical  mathematicians,  a  dioptric  anamorphic
device used a mirror or lens to refract an image that had
deliberately  been  distorted  and  exaggerated  back  into
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what a human eye would consider a natural or normal
perspective. Many such artefacts played with pictures of
the  faces  of  monarchs  or  aristocrats.  Here  the  viewer
would  be  presented  with  a  panel  made  up  of  a
multiplicity  of  images,  often emblems representing the
patriarch’s  genealogical  ancestors  or  the  landmarks  of
his estate. A second look at the panel through the optical
glass, however, would recompose the various icons, as if
by magical transubstantiation, into the master’s face.
Noel Malcolm has exposed the place that the optical
trickery  of  anamorphosis  played  in  Hobbes’  political
theory  of  the  state  (Malcolm  2002).  According  to
Malcolm,  the  famous  image  of  the  Leviathan  colossus
that furnishes the title-page of Hobbes’ book came as an
inspiration  to  Hobbes  following  his  encounter  with  a
dioptrical  device  designed  by  the  Minim  friar  Jean-
François Nicéron. Nicéron’s design involved a picture of
the faces of  twelve  Ottoman sultans which,  on looking
through  the  viewing-glass  tube,  converged  into  the
portrait of Louis XIII (Malcolm 2002: 213). Seduced by
the  structural  symbolism  through  which  such  optical
illusions  could  be  used  to  represent  relations between
political persons (e.g. between the state and its subjects)
(Malcolm  2002:  223),  Hobbes  commissioned  an
iconographic  representation  of  similar  effects  for  the
title-page  of  his  book.  Here  the  image  of  the  colossal
Leviathan rises over the landscape energized by a mass
of small figures. These morph by congregation into the
body of the monarch, that hence takes a life of its own. A
projection onto a one-dimensional surface of the dioptric
trick,  the  figure  of  Leviathan  aimed  to  capture  the
political innovation of Hobbes’ theory of representational
personification.  For  Hobbes,  the  aggregation  of  the
political will of multiple individuals into an overarching
sovereign  person  brought  about  a  political
transubstantiation:  the  Many  became  the  One,  which
contained, but also transcended, the Many. This is why
for Hobbes the theory of  (political)  representation is  a
theory of duplicity and duplication: it calls for the critical
capacity to see oneself as both the creator of a political
object (the body politic) and its subdued servant; both a
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distant outsider to the body and in partial identity with it.
This entails, as Malcolm puts it, ‘a curious structure of
argument that requires two different ways of seeing the
relation  between  the  individual  and  the  state  to  be
entertained at one and the same time.’ (Malcolm 2002:
228)
Building on the implications of Malcolm’s analysis for
our  theories  of  the  state,  Simon  Schaffer  has  recently
offered a phantasmagorical reinterpretation of the place
of optical illusionism in political perspectivism (Schaffer
2005). For Schaffer, the dioptric capacity to ‘see double’
is in fact but  a first  step towards the cancelling of  all
visions but the sovereign vision.  According to Schaffer,
dioptrics  enables  this  parallax  shift  because  it
rationalizes as illusory all political perspectives that do
not  conform with the One:  outside  the body politic  all
visions are but the visions of political phantoms (Schaffer
2005:  202;  on  parallax  shifts  see  Žižek  2006).  In
seventeenth  century  politics  this  was  easily
accomplished, according to Schaffer, because outside the
rule  of  sovereign  law –  as  Hobbes  noted  –  lay  only  a
chaotic  state  of  nature,  shaped  by  mistrust,  fear,
witchcraft  accusations  and  the  mischievous  play  of
invisible  phantoms.  The rise  of  Leviathan exterminated
the  invisible,  neatly  aligning,  in  a  supreme gesture  of
political  illusionism,  the  planes  of  the  natural  and  the
phantasmagorical.
* * *
This paper offers anthropological insight into a certain
fashion  of  Euro-American  intellectual  practice,  namely,
the  operations  through  which  knowledge  comes-unto-
itself as a descriptive register (of other practices). I am
interested  in  the  cultural  epistemology  that  enables
knowledge to become an enabler itself: what the growth
of knowledge – or its rise as an expression of enablement
– looks like. What does knowledge need to grow ‘out of’
for such an escalation to become meaningful or, simply,
visible?
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The  making  visible  of  knowledge  as  an  object  of
growth  has  an  anthropology  to  it.1 It  involves  playful
operations  with  social  ideas  of  size  and  vision,  and is
materialized  in  a  practical  epistemology  where  the
optical plays an intriguing culturally salient role2. Optics
makes size an effect of exploration. It makes things big
and small in different proportions, intensities and shapes.
It  provides  a  form  or  carrier  for  the  expansions  and
contractions  in/of  knowledge.  There  is  a  seductive
analogy  between  how knowledge  has  been rendered a
mode of enablement in some Euro-American social theory
and the perspectival technique known by art historians
as anamorphic illusionism. (This should not be taken as
pejorative: an illusion can be both hopeful and delusive.)
As  a  praxis  or  craft  of  optical  deformation,  the
anamorphic  offers  a  useful  imago for  the  cultural
comportment  of  some  aspects  of  Euro-American
knowledge (De la Flor 2009).
As  will  come  evident  throughout,  a  source  of
inspiration for what follows has been the work of Marilyn
Strathern.  Of  her  own  experimentation  with  narrative
and  analytic  strategies  in  Partial  Connections,  she
described the use she made of the imagery of the fractal
(Cantor’s Dust) in that book as ‘an artificial device’ that
allowed  her  to  ‘experiment  with  the  apportioning  of
“size” in a deliberate manner.’  (Strathern 2004 [1991]:
xxix) My interest in the anamorphic lies likewise in its
use as a tool for making explicit how social theory and
critique size themselves – that is, how ‘size’ has become
an idiom for what theory does.
A rather obvious and yet rarely acknowledged route
through which the imagination of ‘size’ has made its way
into  the  sociological  canon  is  via  the  descriptive  and
analytical  purchase  afforded  by  relations  of  magnitude
known as ‘proportions’. The analogy between enablement
and  escalation  that  I  drew  above  –  the  image  of
knowledge as an expression of escalating enablement – is
a  case  in  point.  There  is  an  important  and not-always
acknowledged  current  in  Euro-American  social  theory
and  philosophy  that  refracts  the  work  of  knowledge
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through  the  operations  of  a  proportional  imagination.
Proportionality  becomes  the  enabling  mechanism  of
knowledge: how knowledge escalates out of itself.
Take  the  Leviathan.  Hobbes’  iconographic  choice
makes  the  Leviathan  appear  as  a  supreme  trickster
figure, at once enabling and concealing its own source of
agency. The state’s power figures as an aesthetic effect:
the  effect  of  a  parallax  shift,  the  alignment  of  two
perspectives  in  one  optical  illusion.  Importantly,  the
illusion  is  held  in  place  through  the  work  of  a
proportional  imagination:  ‘the  relation  between  the
individual  and the state’,  as Malcom puts it,  is  tricked
into view and held stable as a proportional artifice. The
One and the Many stand in a political relation to each
other  because of  their  proportional  relationship.  As  a
symbolic form, the meaningfulness and ‘comparability of
phenomena  rests  on  preserving  proportion  or  scale.’
(Strathern 1990: 211) Nicéron’s dioptric lens generates
the  perspective  from which  knowledge  of  the  political
surfaces. ‘The political’ emerges as a modern theoretical
object thanks to the effect of the anamorphic artifice: it is
what the world looks like from the point of view of the
lens.  Anamorphosis  situates  and  aligns  the  world  of
political theory for us.
The  anamorphic  operates  a  second  effect  on  the
workings of knowledge, which I shall call ‘reversibility’.
Reversibility  describes  the  double  and  simultaneous
vision required to grant theoretical status to an object.
When  commenting  on  the  illusionary  character  of
Hobbes’ Leviathan, Malcolm described it as ‘the curious
structure of argument that requires two different ways of
seeing the relation between the individual and the state
to be entertained at one and the same time.’  (Malcolm
2002: 228) The  relational character of sovereign power
emerges  thus  as  another  effect  of  the  anamorphic
artifice. It is a produce of having to hold simultaneously
an  internal  and  external  vision  on  the  images  of  the
twelve  sultans  and  Louis  XIII’s  emblem.  Not  without
reason,  Simon  Schaffer  described  the  methodological
exigency underpinning our encounter with the phantom
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qualities of the Hobbesian body politic as ‘seeing double’
(Schaffer 2005). Moving in and out of the dioptric lens –
performing  the  anamorphic  –  lends  political  theory  its
relational purchase.
The  rest  of  this  paper  explores  the  hold  that
proportionality and reversibility have over the make-up of
social theory. It may be read as an exploratory foray into
the cultural analytics of some aspects of Euro-American
knowledge,3 and in this sense as an investigation into the
novel  anamorphic devices through which contemporary
social  theory  may  be  generating  its  escalatory  effects.
Some  comments  are  also  made  in  passing  about  the
contemporary  economy  of  knowledge  as,  itself,  an
anamorphic configuration.4
* * *
Let me start with a rich and evocative account of how
architects visualize their building projects by sociologist
Albena  Yaneva.  Her  field  site  is  the  Office  for
Metropolitan Architecture (OMA),  the workplace of the
famous Dutch architect, Rem Koolhaas; and her focus is
the work carried out  by architects  at  OMA during the
design and development of a number of models for the
new exhibition hall at the Whitney Museum of American
Art in New York (Yaneva 2005). Yaneva writes from a self-
confessed social studies of technology perspective,  and
indeed  declares  that  in  her  account  ‘the  architectural
office  will  be  studied  in  the  same  way  that  STS  has
approached the laboratory.’ (Yaneva 2005: 869)
The  ethnography  starts  from  the  premise  that
‘knowing  through  scaling  is  an  integral  aspect  of
architectural practice’ and the author sets as her task to
describe  ethnographically  the  so-called  enigma  of  the
‘rhythm of scaling’ (Yaneva 2005: 870, 868). The scales
that  Yaneva  takes  to  task  here  are  differently  sized
models  of  the  Whitney  building  project.  Architects  in
OMA  work  with  two  scale  models  of  the  projected
building:  a  small-scale  model,  which  is  quickly  put
together by architects to provide a sketchy and abstract
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materialization of the basic concept guiding the project,
and which includes a number of site constraints, such as
urban  and  local  zoning  regulations  or  client
requirements; and a much larger scale model, which is
used  to  fine-tune  the  small  model  by  fleshing-out  its
concrete details.
The small and large models are set up in two adjacent
tables  and  architects  spend  a  good  amount  of  time
moving from one table to the next, “‘scaling up’, ‘jumping
the scale, ‘rescaling’ and ‘going down in scale’”, in the
vernacular  terminology  used  by  Yaneva’s  informants
(Yaneva  2005:  870).  In  moving  between  tables  and
models, architects spend a considerable amount of time
working  with  an  instrument  known as  a  ‘modelscope’,
which is used to explore the inside of the small model. By
inserting a miniature periscope into the model, architects
redeploy themselves as human users of the building. ‘The
modelscope’, an architect tells Yaneva, ‘gives you a view
that is like the scale of that model. So, you get to express
the space at that scale. It gives you the opportunity to
move around spaces you ordinarily can’t get into and to
see  how they look… We are able  to  see  how space  is
inside.’ Yaneva further notes that ‘minimized to the scale
of  the  tiny  model,  [the  architect]  is  exploring  these
microscopic spaces like in Gulliver’s travels, he ‘enters’
the spaces  and experiences  them.’  (Yaneva  2005:  876)
Having cruised the inside of the small model, architects
then  assemble  to  discuss  possible  changes  in  the
architectural layout of the building, which are later given
concrete expression in changes made to the large model.
The scoping in and out of the small and large models is
a  recursive  process:  ‘Scaling  up’,  writes  Yaneva,  ‘is
immediately  and  reversibly  followed  by  scaling  down.’
(Yaneva 2005: 883) However, as times goes by, the larger
model  inevitably  amasses  more  information  and  detail
than the smaller one, for it is to the larger model that the
insights  gained  from  exploring  the  small  model
eventually get transported and where they get reflected.
Thus, the larger model grows in power and information
by  gathering  the  produce  of  the  recursion.  But
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importantly, Yaneva insists, this does not mean that the
design involves a linear or evolutionary movement from
the small model to the large model. The small model is
not  a  pre-condition,  or  an evolutionary antecedent,  for
the  revelation  of  proper  and  useful  knowledge  at  the
level  of  the  larger  scale  model.  Rather,  the  design  is
simultaneously  present  in  the small  and the large,  the
before and after of every recursion, the scoping in and
out through which architects multiply the versions and
the trajectories of the design. According to Yaneva, the
shape the project  finally  takes emerges  gradually  as a
form of extended and ubiquitous co-presence in the time
and  space  of  all  such  scalar  operations.  As  ‘it  passes
through  these  trials,’  she  says,  ‘it  becomes  more  and
more visible, more present, more material, real. ‘Scaling’
is not a way to fit into reality; rather, it is a conduit for its
extraction.’ (Yaneva 2005: 887)
There are two points I would like to make about the
architects use of scaling as a method of knowledge and
design. One is the extraordinary ease with which it sits
next to Gulliver’s Travels. The second is what this figure
of scale takes for granted.
It  is  certainly  worth  noting how Jonathan Swift  and
Yaneva resort to  a similar  imagination of  size  to make
their arguments carry force. For both size is important; it
helps render certain insights valuable and visible. In fact,
literary  theorist  Douglas  Lane  Patey  has  described
Gulliver’s  Tales as  ‘laboratory  experiments  based  on
difference of size’ (Patey 1991: 827), much like Yaneva
describes  her  ethnography  of  architecture  as  a
laboratory study in the ‘rhythm of scaling’.
Of course, Swift’s use of size has long attracted the
attention of literary theorists for its satirical effects. It is
satire that size aims for. I want to suggest, however, that
one may explore the use of size in Swift not for its effects
on something else, but for its effect on itself – that is, on
its own self-apprehension as a body of knowledge. Size,
then,  as  a  vehicle  for  making  knowledge  an  adequate
expression of itself.
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There is a wonderful episode in Gulliver’s Travels that
captures something of what I am hoping to convey here,
namely, the extent to which knowledge comes in different
sizes. At Brobdingnag, the land of the giants, Gulliver is
taken to court for  the diversion of  the Queen and her
ladies.  Impressed  by  Gulliver’s  demeanour,  the  King,
‘who had been educated in the Study of Philosophy, and
particularly Mathematicks’, suspects of Gulliver being ‘a
piece  of  Clock-work…  contrived  by  some  ingenious
Artist.’  He therefore sends for  three  great  Scholars to
examine Gulliver’s shape and make-up. The scientists all
agree that Gulliver ‘could not be produced according to
the regular Laws of Nature’. However, an opinion that he
was an ‘embrio’ was rejected, as was his characterisation
as an ‘abortive Birth’; nor could he be a dwarf, because
his ‘Littleness was beyond all degree of comparison; for,
the Queen’s favourite Dwarf, the smallest ever known in
that  Kingdom,  was near  thirty  Foot  high.’  (Swift  2002
[1726]:  86-87)  Thus,  ‘After  much debate’,  the  scholars
finally sentenced that Gulliver
was  only  Relplum  Scalcath,  which  is  interpreted
literally,  Lusus  Naturae [a  freak  of  nature];  a
Determination  exactly  agreeable  to  the  Modern
Philosophy of Europe, whose Professors, disdaining
the  old  Evasion  of  occult  Causes,  whereby  the
Followers of Aristotle endeavour in vain to disguise
their  Ignorance,  have  invented  this  wonderful
Solution  of  all  Difficulties  to  the  unspeakable
Advancement  of  human  knowledge.  (Swift  2002
[1726]: 87)
The episode is emblematic of Swift’s mordacity, and in
particular his dislike of the new Modern science of the
Royal Society, epitomised here in the figure of the three
scholars. For Swift, modern science falls trap to tautology
(circular  and  self-explanatory  arguments,  such  as
something being a ‘freak of nature’) inasmuch as ancient
science did. But the episode is further remarkable for its
defence  of  size  as  comparative  epistemology.  Gulliver
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does  not  survive  comparison,  not  against  dwarves,
embryos or abortive births, so he is in the last instance
catalogued as a freak of nature. Not even the use of a
‘Magnifying-Glass’  can  help  the  scholars  reach  an
agreement on what Gulliver may be.  They size him up
and they size him down, only to conclude that he is not a
product  of  nature.5 Thus,  for  Lane  Patey,  ‘Swift’s  play
with  perspective  (relative  size  and  its  implications)’
ultimately enacts the question: ‘what is there in us that
survives  comparison  –  what  that  cannot  be  rendered
ludicrous,  shameful,  or  disgusting  when  magnified  to
Brobdingnagian  proportions  or  shrunk  to  Lilliputian?’
(Patey  1991:  826)  Said  differently,  in  Brobdingnag
country,  Gulliver  lacks  ontology  because  he  is  out-of-
proportion with the world.
My second remark on architects’ use of scaling as a
method of knowledge builds on this question about size
and the proportionality of the world. In Yaneva’s account,
what  is  at  stake  is  how  the  project  grows  and
consolidates its own size, or how it finds in the small and
large  models  different  capacities  to  deploy  different
aspects  of  the  design.  The  qualities  of  the  design  are
therefore  allowed  to  emerge  through  the  recursive
travelling  between  models  of  different  size.  Thus,  the
scale that dominates is that of size. I want to suggest,
however, that Yaneva’s ethnography provides some room
for speculating about an alternative scale; to imagine the
architects  looking into the models  for  certain  qualities
other  than  those  of  adjustment  to  size.  For  example,
when the  effect  that  a  giant  red escalator  has  on  the
interior  of  the exhibition  hall  is  examined through the
modelscope,  the  architects  agree  that  the  escalator
needs to be moved to a different spot within the hall. We
are  left  in  shades  as  to  what  exactly  motivates  the
relocation,  although  Yaneva  intimates  that  the  ‘scaling
team  engages  in  a  dialogue…  [about]  dispositions,
objects  they  see  inside  the  model,  spatial  transitions,
material properties of the foam [used to build the model],
proportions and shapes.’  (Yaneva 2005: 875) Things do
not quite fit together for the architects, but it is no longer
clear  that  this  fit  is  a  question  of  scale.  Thus,  the
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adjustment that the architects appear to be looking for
now seems to aim for a different kind of harmony, or an
equilibrium of different proportions.6
Adjustments to scale
In an age of computer technology, the use that OMA’s
architects make of the use of scale models may appear a
little surprising for those of us who are new to the field of
architecture. But in fact, as historian of architecture Paul
Emmons has shown, the use of scale and scalar drawings
has played a fundamental part in architectural practice
throughout  history  (Emmons 2005).  For  example,  from
‘the  middle  of  the  second  millennium  BCE,’  writes
Emmons, ‘a statue of Gudea, leader of the City State of
Lagash in present day Iraq, is seated with a building floor
plan resting on his lap. Also on the tablet are a stylus and
a  scale  rule,  showing  fine  divisions  of  the  finger
measure.’  (Emmons  2005:  227).  Like  Yaneva,  in  his
historical survey Emmons draws too an analogy between
the  use  of  scale  in  architecture  and  Swift’s  Gulliver
travels, and the 17th century scalar imagination at large.
Thus,  he  compares  Swift’s  use  of  scale  with  that  of
Voltaire’s in Micromégas, and identifies further in Robert
Hooke’s Micrographia a locus of general influence for the
period.  Hooke,  who  was  a  Surveyor  for  the  City  of
London  and  designed  himself  a  number  of  buildings
along with his friend Christopher Wren, ‘transferred his
familiarity with scale from architectural drawing to the
microscope.’  (Emmons  2005:  231)  Published  in  1665,
Micrographia described Hooke’s use of a microscope to
make  observations  of  miniature  aspects  of  the  natural
world, such as fly’s eye or a plant cell. The book became
an immediate best-seller of its day.
Of interest for our purposes here is Hooke’s mode of
use and relationship to the microscope. Emmons cites a
passage in the Micrographia which echoes in fascinating
ways how Yaneva’s architects scooped in and out of the
small and the large scale models.  ‘Hooke organised his
microscopic  observations’,  writes  Emmons,
‘progressively  from simple to complex,  like a geometer
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ascending from point, line, plane to volume and the chain
of being from mineral to vegetable and animal. He began
with observing the point of a pin under the microscope…
He next analysed a dot made by a pen, and in a scalar
reverie imagined this dot as the earth in space.’ However,
Hooke was also aware that this amassment  of  detail  –
from  the  simple  to  the  complex  –  required  a  second
operation  to  remain  epistemologically  productive.  He
went at quite some effort to keep the observations made
inside the scale of  the microscope at a par with those
made outside the microscope. As Emmons puts it, ‘Hooke
explained his method determining the microscope’s scale
of  magnification  by  looking  with  one  eye  through  the
microscope  as  the  other  naked  eye  examines  a  ruler,
simultaneously  engaging  both  scales.’  (Emmons  2005:
231, emphasis added) This simultaneous engagement of
both  scales  echoes  the  parallax  shift  of  Hobbes’
Leviathan:  an  illusion  of  epistemological  and  political
efficacy enabled by the dimension of reversibility at work
in the anamorphic. I shall come back to this point later.
Emmons concludes his observations on the historical
importance of scale for architecture by commenting on
architects’  contemporary  use  of  computer  software  to
generate  1:1  or  full  scale  CAD  projections  of
architectural  designs.  For  Emmons,  the  use  of  CAD
technology  emulates  a  Cartesian  approach  to  the
generation of objects, where things can be described or
plotted  through  systems  of  notational  or  algebraic
relations.  Thus,  the  use  of  CAD-enabled  full  scale
drawing ‘makes it more likely that the designer looks at
the image as an object rather than projecting oneself into
the  image  through  an  imaginative  inhabitation.  Scale
sight is not an abstraction; it is achieved through judging
the  size  of  things  in  relation  to  ourselves.’  (Emmons
2005: 232) His ‘handbook advise’,  then,  is  to  ‘learn to
think  within  a  scale  rather  than  translate  from actual
measure.’ (Emmons 2005: 232) Against Cartesianism, for
Emmons,  the  ‘empathetic  bodily  projection’  of  scale  is
‘critical  to  imagining  a  future edifice.’  (Emmons  2005:
232)
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Of Emmons’ description of the history of architectural
practice there are two aspects that I would like to hold in
view.  The  first  deals  with  the  proportionality  of
architecture as a skill and trade; the second, to which I
shall  return  later,  with  the  deployment  of  the  ‘double
vision’ that is entailed in the practice of scoping in and
out of scale.
Emmons’  concern  is  with  current  architectural
practice, where scale fares as a context-free metric, and
advocates instead a return to ‘judging the size of things
in relation to ourselves.’ This form of empirical judgment
echoes  what  Yaneva  called  a  ‘rhythm  of  scaling’:  an
iterative  re-proportional  exercise  through  which  the
world  sizes  its  ontology  (its  human  and  non-human
landscape) to a proper shape and form.
In fact, architectural practice provides in this context
an  interesting  place  for  seeing  not  only  the  work  of
proportionality at play, but its recurrent entanglement in
larger debates about the epistemic structure of scientific
knowledge.  David Turnbull,  for example,  has described
how  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  about  structural
mechanics the use of proportionality in medieval  times
enabled the construction of imposing and majestic Gothic
cathedrals such as Chartres. According to Turnbull,
In  the  absence  of  rules  for  construction  derived
from structural laws problems could be resolved by
practical  geometry,  using  compasses,  a  straight-
edge,  ruler,  and  string.  The  kind  of  structural
knowledge  which  was  passed  on  from  master  to
apprentice related sizes  to  spaces and heights  by
ratios,  such as half  the number of  feet  in  a  span
expressed  in  inches  plus  one  inch  will  give  the
depth of a hardwood joist…. This sort of geometry is
extremely  powerful;  it  enables  the  transportation
and  transmission  of  structural  experience,  makes
possible  the  successful  replication  of  a  specific
arrangement  in  different  places  and  different
circumstances, reduces a wide variety of problems
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to a comparatively compact series of solutions, and
allows  for  a  flexible  rather  than  rigid  rule-bound
response  to  differing  problems....  Essentially  it
enables  a  dimensionless  analysis  precluding  the
need  for  a  common  measure.  Geometrical
techniques in this case provide a powerful mode of
communication  that  dissolve  problems  of
incommensurability  that  the  use  of  individual
measurement  systems  might  otherwise  have.
(Turnbull 2000: 69)
Turnbull  is  interested in the constitution of  what he
calls ‘knowledge spaces’. These are the ‘kinds of spaces
that  we  construct  in  the  process  of  assembling,
standardising,  transmitting  and  utilising  knowledge’
(Turnbull 2000: 12). Western science is in this respect no
different  from  other  knowledge  systems,  such  as
indigenous  or  amateur  knowledge  systems.  What
distinguishes the epistemic robustness of technoscience,
rather, is its development of a corpus of techniques and
protocols  that  enable  knowledge  to  move  and  travel
beyond  localised  sites  of  production.  The  further
knowledge can travel, the more coherent and robust its
epistemic  make-up.  This  is  why  for  Turnbull  one  can
imagine  the  architectural  site  of  a  cathedral  in  no
different  terms  from  those  of  a  laboratory  (Turnbull
2000: 66-67). All that it takes is identifying an analogical
‘scalar’  denominator:  something  that  can  operate  the
changes in scale required for knowledge to cohere and
travel. For Turnbull, in the context of medieval cathedral
building this task was performed by the ‘template’:
Three major ‘reversals of forces’ are achieved with
this one small piece of representational technology;
one person can get large numbers of others to work
in concert; large numbers of stones can be erected
without the benefit of a fully articulated theory of
structural  mechanics  or  a  detailed  plan;  and
incommensurable  pieces  of  work  can  be  made
accumulative (Turnbull 2000: 68).
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Turnbull’s focus on proportionality as a tool for sense-
making provides  a vivid example of  the terms through
which knowledge is said to ‘grow’ as an epistemic object.
The work of proportionality suffuses knowledge with an
ontological  structure.  In  Turnbull’s  account  this  is
actually  so  in  two  senses.  On  the  one  hand,
proportionality is what masons used to calculate the fit
between  spaces  and  heights.  The  proportion  is  the
vehicle for lending the world a certain height, length and
width.  But  the  imagery  of  proportionality  is  also  what
underpins  Turnbull’s  very  own  analytical  explanations.
Thus, in an echo of the Galilean epigram that heads this
paper – ‘the most admirable operations derive from very
weak means’  –,  Turnbull  writes  of  how the use of  the
template by masons enabled ‘one person… [to] get large
numbers  of  others  to  work in  concert’.  This  is  a  truly
Archimedean  metaphor,  where  a  sociological  effect  is
made visible by imagining agency as a leverage of sorts.
Architectural optics of volumes
The  movements  in  size,  the  dynamics  of
aggrandizement  and  miniaturisation  that  Turnbull
describes  as  characteristic  of  the  epistemic  work  of
science, are nowhere rendered in so vivid a style as in
Bruno  Latour’s  historical  ethnography  of  Pasteur’s
microbiology.  According  to  Latour,  amongst  Pasteur’s
greatest achievements is his translation of the interests
that nineteenth century farmers and veterinarians had in
the anthrax bacillus into the discourse and practices of
bacteriologists.  This Pasteur accomplishes by becoming
himself  a  ‘microbe  farmer’:  by  removing  a  cultivated
bacillus  from  the  ‘outside’  real  world  of  farming  and
veterinary science and isolating and culturing it ‘inside’ a
sanitised  laboratory  space.  Whereas  in  the  former  the
‘anthrax  bacilli  are  mixed  with  millions  of  other
organisms’  and  therefore  practically  invisible  to  the
scientific  gaze,  in  the  latter  ‘it  is  freed  from  all
competitors  and  so  grows  exponentially’,  ‘growing  so
much’  that  it  ‘ends  up… in  such large  colonies  that  a
clear-cut pattern is made visible to the watchful eye of
the  scientist.’  (Latour  1983:  146)  The
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inside:outside::visible:invisible  equation  creates  and
enables different zones of empowerment and agency for
different actors. Thus,
the asymmetry in the scale of several phenomena is
modified:  a  micro-organism  can  kill  vastly  larger
cattle,  one small  laboratory can learn more about
pure  anthrax  cultures  than  anyone  before;  the
invisible micro-organism is made visible;  the until
now interesting scientists  in his lab can talk with
more  authority  about  the  anthrax  bacillus  than
veterinarians ever have before. (Latour 1983: 146)
Translation works therefore as a sort  of  rebalancing
mechanism, where Pasteur stands as fulcrum: the messy
and  cloudy  world  of  outside  farming  and  veterinary
diseases  is  funnelled  through  the  inside  of  Pasteur’s
laboratory to crystallise and make visible a new balance
of  powers.  Pasteur’s  laboratory  becomes  a  lever  for  a
new  distribution  of  power.  In  Latour’s  succinct
formulation:
The change of scale makes possible a reversal of the
actors’  strengths;  ‘outside’  animals,  farmers  and
veterinarians  were  weaker than  the  invisible
anthrax bacillus; inside Pasteur’s lab, man becomes
stronger than the bacillus,  and as a corollary,  the
scientist  in  his  lab  gets  the  edge  over  the  local,
devoted,  experienced  veterinarian.  (Latour  1983:
147)
In these and other accounts Latour uses the imagery
of  scale  to  produce sociological  explanations.  He sizes
objects and agencies up and down vis-à-vis each other to
make  certain  sociological  effects  visible.  A  similar
appraisal  of  the Latourian project  has been offered by
Simon Schaffer, who has remarked on the extent to which
‘The  model  of  the  lever  plays  a  fundamental  role
throughout  Latour’s  oeuvre:  scientists  achieve
astonishing reversals  of  force by rendering lab objects
commensurable  with  the  forces  of  the  world,  then
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manipulating  the  former  to  shift  the  latter.’  Schaffer
notes  how  in  his  descriptions  Latour  chooses  an
‘Archimedean point’  around which he then proceeds to
effect  an  ‘inversion  of  scale’  letting  certain  beings
(human  or  nonhuman)  ‘move  forces  apparently  more
powerful than’ them (Schaffer 1991: 184).
Latour  is  certainly  aware  of  the  choice  of  imagery
through  which  he  fleshes-out  his  epistemology.  Of  his
Pasteur article, ‘Give me a laboratory and I will raise the
world’,  he  writes  that  ‘I  used  in  the  title  a  parody  of
Archimedes’s famous motto’ because ‘[t]his metaphor of
the  lever  to  move  something  else  is  much  more  in
keeping with observation than any dichotomy between a
science and a society.’ (Latour 1983: 154) His point, quite
rightly,  is  that  the  reception  and  endorsement  of
Pasteur’s scientific advances by French society cannot be
explained by a simple dichotomic framework of Science-
Society encounters. Rather,  one needs to attend to the
different strategies and practices through which a variety
of  partisan  interests  are  recruited  and  converted  into
laboratory skills and techniques, and vice versa, the way
in which the laboratory and its infrastructural equipment
gets  deployed  and  travel  outside  the  laboratory  walls
sensu stricto. In other words, the way in which Pasteur
becomes a farmer and farmers becomes Pasteurians.
Notwithstanding  this  declaration  of  epistemological
self-awareness,  what  remains  intriguing  is  the  long
lineage of proportional epistemologies to which this style
of sociological reasoning and argumentation belongs. In
We have  never  been  modern Latour  comments  on  the
Hobbes-Boyle  controversy  by  observing  how  Hobbes
insisted on denying what was ‘to become the essential
characteristic of modern power: the change in scale and
the  displacements  that  are  presupposed  by  laboratory
work.’  (Latour  1993:  22)  For  Latour,  the  laboratory
performs  for  modernity  the  role  of  a  ‘theatre  of
measurement’ or instrument for size-making, and indeed
it  is  the self-explicitation  of  size  that  in  his  own work
becomes his analytic trademark. His sociology fares as a
sociology of size, or rather of the fluctuations of size.
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The term ‘theatre of measurement’ is Michel Serres’
(1982).  It  is  used  by  Serres  to  describe  ‘the  scene  of
representation  established  for  Western  thought  [by
ancient  Greeks]  for  the next  millennium.’  It  marks the
‘instauration  of  the  moment  of  representation’  by
philosophy,  an  instauration  brought  about  through  the
use of ‘a perspectival geometry, of an architectural optics
of volumes’ (Serres 1982: 92). This is a wonderful phrase
that captures much of what I have been dwelling on up to
this point. Serres’ argument builds on the tale of Thales’
measurement of the height of the great pyramid. Thales
accomplishes this feat by placing a post in the sand. As
the sun sets, the triangular shadows cast by the pyramid
and post are then compared. In so doing, Thales invents
thus ‘the notion of a model’ (Serres 1982: 86):
By comparing the shadow of the pyramid with that
of  a  reference  post  and  his  own  shadow,  Thales
expressed  the  invariance  of  similar  forms  over
changes of scale. His theorem therefore consists of
the infinite  progression or reduction of size while
preserving the same ratio.  From the colossal,  the
pyramid, to the small, a post or body, decreasing in
size  ad  infinitum,  the  theorem  states  a  logos  or
identical relation, the invariance of the same form,
be it  on a giant or a  small  scale,  and vice versa.
Height  and  strength  are  suddenly  scorned,
smallness  demands  respect,  all  scales  and
hierarchies  are  demolished,  now  derisory  since
each  step  repeats  the  same  logos  or  relation
without any changes! (Serres 1995: 78)
Steven Brown, who has commented on the originality
of  Serres’  oeuvre  for  social  theory  at  large,  glosses
Serres’ analysis thus:
Here  truly  is  the  ‘Greek  miracle’  –  one  man
dominates  a  mighty  pyramid.  In  this  ‘theatre  of
measurement’  invented  through  the  simple act  of
placing a peg in the sand, it is as though everything
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changed place. The weak human overcomes ancient
hewn  stone,  the  mobile  sun  produces  immobile
geometric  forms…  There  is  an  interaction  or
communication  between  two  diverse  partners
(Thales,  Pyramid)  which  involves  a  switching  or
exchanging  of  properties  (weak/strong,
mortal/durable). (Brown 2005: 220)
We are back, then, to the Archimedean image of the
leverage. The world’s intelligibility holds itself  together
through an image of ontological balance. Whatever the
world turns out to be – however and wherever we locate
its sources of agency – this will  always ‘net-out’  as an
exchange  of  equations:  weak/strong,  mortal/durable,
cathedral/template, gigantic/infinitesimal, etc. The use of
a proportional imagination allows social theory to net-out
its descriptive projects in ontological fashion.7
Proportions in perspective
Of  course,  in  some  sense,  the  importance  of
proportionality for architectural, and indeed socio-spatial
reflection  at  large,  has  always  been  a  matter  of
perspective – of optics. The origins of perspective in the
fifteenth  century  have  long  been  traced  back  to  the
renaissance of classical proportionality. As Martin Jay has
observed, ‘Growing out of the late medieval fascination
with  the  metaphysical  implications  of  light  -  light  as
divine  lux rather  than  perceived  lumen -  linear
perspective came to symbolize a harmony between the
mathematical  regularities  in  optics  and  God’s  will.’
Pictorial  and  aesthetic  preoccupations  shifted  from  a
religious interest in objects to ‘the spatial relations of the
perspectival  canvas  themselves.  This  new  concept  of
space was geometrically  isotropic,  rectilinear,  abstract,
and uniform.’ (Jay 1988: 5-6) Thus, famously, for Erwin
Panofsky Renaissance perspective realised reflexivity as
a  spatial  gaze  (Panofsky  1993  [1927]).  The  difference
between classical and renaissance perspective is one in
the  mode  of  occupying  space  and  imagining  spatial
relations.  In  the  Renaissance,  the perspective  marks  a
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mode of taking the world in by looking through it. This is
different from the classical disposition of bodies in space,
which  remains  anchored  in  the  physical  mimesis  of
experience and bodily movement (Iversen 2005). We may
say  that  Renaissance  perspectivalism  introduces
epistemological  gradients  to  the  way  we  look  at  the
world:  perspective  does  not  drive  us  to  a  singular
epistemological residence. There are differences between
‘looking  at’  and  ‘looking  through’  something;  the
movement of the gaze through space – the achievement
of depth and the skewing of  vision through off-centred
displacements – generates different sorts of friction. In
this context, rather than, or beyond its comprehension as
a geometrical  or  symbolic  form, the way Panofsky did,
perspectivalism  may  be  seen  instead  as  a  ‘general
capacity for producing effects’ (Damisch 1997 [1987]: 41,
my translation).
What  kind  of  effects  are  those  the  deployment  of
perspective produces? Very early on in the theorisation of
perspectivalism,  Renaissance  writers  already  described
Brunelleschi’s architectural use of perspective (for it is
Brunelleschi who is widely acknowledged for discovering
the  technique  of  perspectivalism),  for  its  very  special
effects  on  making  objects  diminish  in  size.  Hubert
Damisch  cites  Antonio  Filarete’s  famous  Trattato  di
archittettura, where the use by Brunelleschi of a mirror
to help frame the lineaments of whatever the architect
needs  to  represent  is  praised  for  ‘making  easily
observable the contours of those things closer to the eye,
whilst  those  that  are  farthest  away  will  diminish
proportionately in size.’ (cited in Damisch 1997 [1987]:
68)  The  observation  is  common:  Antonio  di  Tucci
Manetti,  an  early  biographer  of  Brunelleschi,  likewise
describes  perspective  as  a  ‘science  which  requires  to
determine  well  and  with  reason  the  diminutions  and
augmentations…  of  things  close  and  afar’  (cited  in
Damisch 1997 [1987]: 70-71). An acknowledged novelty
of  perspectivalism,  then,  seems  to  lie  in  the  cultural
salience  lend  to  the  technical  capacity  for  making
variations  in  size  visible.  Moreover,  size  becomes  an
effect of scoping: a consequence of zooming-in and out of
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representation. A spectator can enter a picture’s plane so
long as she can keep certain proportions in place. The
world  inside  the  painting  is  therefore  made  to  appear
geometrically  co-extensive  with  the  world  outside.  An
ontological continuity between pictorial and world space
is  obtained  through  the  friction  and  play  entailed  in
making things big and small.
In its original formulation, the question of perspective
raised yet another cultural complex with epistemological
significance,  namely,  the problem of  reflexive  distance.
The experiment or demonstrations for which Brunelleschi
is regarded as the discoverer of perspective involved two
paintings of the Baptistery of St. John and the Palazzo de’
Signori,  both  long  lost.  The  only  eye-witness  account
describes the Baptistery painting as being executed on a
small  wooden  panel.  Once  the  painting  was
accomplished,  Brunelleschi  drilled  a  small  hole  in  the
panel at the point which would represent his equivalent
viewpoint on the Baptistery’s plane (the vanishing point).
He then invited spectators to peer through the hole from
the back of the panel at a mirror held in front to reflect
the painting.  (In  passing,  let  me draw attention to the
emphasis that Filerete’s account of the drawing places in
how it is the sharp use of ‘one eye’ that will best bring to
life the full power of the perspectival illusion (Damisch
1997  [1987]:  69).)  It  remains  uncertain  whether
Brunelleschi  realised he needed to control  the viewing
distance for spectators to replicate his original point of
view on the Baptistery (Damisch 1997 [1987]: 98; Kemp
1990: 13, 344-345). What Brunelleschi’s experiment did
accomplish,  however,  was  to  throw  into  relief  the
significance  of  distance as  an  epistemological  figure.
There is a proper distance between our holding the world
in view and the world’s presentation or disclosure of its
forms. A subtle shift is introduced: between the point of
view on the world and the  relational  variance through
which the view obtains.
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Anamorphosis
The  relation  between  perspectivalism  and
proportionality  assumed  a  number  of  forms  from  the
fifteenth to the seventeenth century.8 In keeping with the
optical  trope,  Martin  Jay  has  identified  at  least  three
scopic regimes of modernity: Cartesian perspectivalism,
of the symbolic kind analysed by Panofsky; the so-called
art  of  describing,  where  the  viewer  is  drawn  to  the
surface  or  material  qualities  of  objects  and  not  their
relational  disposition  in  space;  and,  finally,  baroque or
anamorphic  modernity  (Jay  1988).  It  is  with  the  latter
that I am concerned here.
Anamorphic  illusionism deployed  the epistemological
power  of  relational  variance  to  its  full.  Anamorphic
projections of objects are distorted such that it takes the
use of a special device or manoeuvre to have the object
restored  to  its  original  form.  Remember  the  Leviathan
and Nicéron’s dioptric device. Sometimes it is the use of
a  special  kind  of  lens  that  does  the  trick  of
reconfiguration;  sometimes  the observer  is  required to
skew her vision, for example, by approaching the picture
at a particular angle. As Lacan famously argued, vision is
here confronted with a blind spot of conscious perception
(Lacan 1979). The object stares back from a point of view
that  remains  oblique  to  us.  In  the  Brunelleschian
demonstration, what is excluded is the other eye: the eye
that does not look through the peephole and yet which is
reflected back from the vanishing point.  This  one-eyed
optics is intriguingly reminiscent of Hooke’s microscopic
vision, where one eye holds the scale of the miniature in
view  whilst  the  other  is  focused  on  the  scale  of
representation.  It  further echoes the ‘seeing double’ at
play in the Leviathan’s optics. An eye is constructed that
is  therefore  simultaneously  internal  and  external  to
vision.9 The eye becomes the optical metaphor through
which  the  body  is  made  visible  as  a  conduit  of
dis/proportional relations: the bodies of the architect, the
micrographer and the perspectival illusionist holding the
world to account by virtue of a ‘double vision’.  Double
vision  foregrounds  thus  the  body  as  a  figure  of  scale
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between the natural and the social worlds. In Margaret
Iversen’s  formulation,  ‘The  real  in  the  scopic  field  is
formed  when  the  eye  splits  itself  off  from its  original
immersion in visibility and the gaze as  objet petit a [as
unattainable object of desire] is expelled.’ (Iversen 2005:
201)  A  split  eye  that  signals  in  turn  the  birth  of  the
Baroque  as  an  aesthetic  of  the  uncanny:  an  aesthetic
‘which consisted in making something visible, in being a
pure  apparition  that  made  appearance  appear,  from a
position just on its edges’ – and which citing Paul Klee,
Christine Buci-Glucksmann describes as ‘to see with one
eye  and  consciously  perceive  with  the  other’  (Buci-
Glucksmann 1994 [1984]: 60).
Under the scopic regime of the anamorphic, then, the
illusions of knowledge undergo a transformation from a
concern  with  proportionality  to  an  obsession  with
reversibility – with the illusions of double vision – the eye
that sees inside/outside itself. It is indeed in these terms
that  Deleuze  described  too  the  anamorphic  as  the
condition  of  possibility  of  the  Baroque  age  –  and  by
extension  of  our  neo-Baroque  contemporary.  In  his
lectures on Leibniz about the rise of perspectivalism in
the  development  of  projective  geometry  Deleuze  asks,
recalling  Leibniz’s  thought,  ‘What  produces  a  point  of
view?’, to which he answers, ‘That regional proportion of
the world that is clearly and distinctively expressed by an
individual in relation to the totality of the world that is
expressed  confusingly  and  obscurely.’  (Deleuze  2006
[1980/1986/1987]:  37,  emphasis  added,  my translation)
However, in his book on the expressiveness of Baroque
thought  as  a  philosophy  of  curvature  and  sensuous
shadows, which represents Deleuze’s mature reflections
on  Leibniz  (Deleuze  1993),  this  very  same  thought  is
rendered  somewhat  differently:  ‘every  point  of  view’,
writes Deleuze there, ‘is a point of view on variation. The
point of view is not what varies with the subject… it is, to
the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject
apprehends a variation (metamorphosis),  or:  something
= x (anamorphosis).’ (Deleuze 1993: 20)
What  is  at  stake  in  the  holding  of  the  world  as  an
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ontological  infinitude  of  variance,  Deleuze  realizes  in
editing his lecture notes on Leibniz for publication, is not
the movement of proportional changes through which the
world  transforms  itself,  but  the  condition  of  variance
itself:  ‘The infinite presence in the finite self is exactly
the  position  of  Baroque  equilibrium or  disequilibrium.’
(Deleuze  1993:  89)  What  is  of  interest  to  Baroque
thought, therefore, is no longer the proportions through
which the world holds itself together, but the distortions
and  disproportions  (the  shadows)  that  call  for  its
deformation (anamorphosis).10 It is the anamorphic, the
politics of the gigantic and the exaggerated – of variance
as a sense of amplitude,  expansion and/ or subsequent
contraction  –  that  characterises  and  is  worthy  of
commentary  in  modernist  thought.  The  anamorphic
becomes  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  modern
society.
The economy of knowledge
Let me change registers for a moment and turn to the
knowledge economy.
Much  has  been  written  about  it  so  I  will  be  very
selective  today on the aspects  I  want  to  focus  on.  My
concern is the relatively recent discourse on knowledge
as a social product. It is the explicitly ‘social’ dimension
of knowledge that I am interested in here.
Prompted  by  recent  developments  in  intellectual
property  law,  legal  theorists  and  information  and
knowledge  economists  have  turned  to  the  Internet  for
understanding  the  emergence  of  new  distributed  and
collaborative  platforms  for  the  production  and
consumption of online media. There is a sense in which
the velocity of distribution, circulation, modification and
consumption of new media by an expansive community of
users imprints the nature of such an exchange economy
with  a  distinctive  ‘social’  dimension  (Benkler  2006;
Lessig 2008). The social is here identified with a sense of
expansion,  velocity  and  online  presence.  This  is  a
relational economy of knowledge where the social is the
outcome  of  people  being  partners  in  the  exchange  of
knowledge for one another. We may push the analogy by
250
HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
saying that if  there is no knowledge and no exchange,
then, in this economy, there is no sociality – or at least no
productive sociality  (Shirky  2008).  It  appears  that
knowledge,  economy  and  the  social  are  therefore
conceptualised  as  some  kind  of  substitutes  for  one
another.  Karin  Knorr-Cetina  and  Alex  Preda  have
described  this  allegedly  mutual  transparency  of
knowledge,  economy  and  the  social  to  each  other  as
being  founded on  (again  using  an  optical  metaphor)  a
‘specular epistemology’ (Knorr-Cetina & Preda 2001: 34).
The work that the specular performs here reminds us of
Emmons’  rendition  of  CAD-enabled  full  scale
architectural  drawing,  where  a  computer-generated
object is presumed to map transparently, one-to-one, to
the future edifice. Architects work with the model as if it
was the real building. Thus, both the specular and the ‘as
if’ function seem to operate with an underlying principle
of substitution which  regardless of the changes in scale
does not neutralize the importance of size. The computer-
generated  building  is  scale-free  but  it  is  sizeable
nonetheless;  as  Michel  Serres  said  of  Thales’
accomplishment,  it  ‘expresses  the invariance of  similar
forms over changes of  scale.’  (Serres 1995: 78)  Social
theory  and  philosophy  thus  no  longer  need  scale  to
deliver  impressions  of  size.  We  could  say  that  the
substitution  has  effected  a  sort  of  proportional
equivalence that allows one to stop thinking of  size  in
terms  of  scale  but  which  retains  a  sense  of
dimensionality.  In  the  context  of  the  new  economy  of
knowledge, this is patently obvious: knowledge has a size
because  the  economy  has  a  size  and  because  society,
naturally, has a size too!
Such  specular  epistemology  points  to  a  second
characteristic  of  those  approaches  to  knowledge  that
take  for  granted  its  sociological  condition,  as  if
knowledge  were  indeed  a  sociological  object  per  se.
Knorr-Cetina  distinguishes  between  ‘interiorized’  and
‘exteriorized’ theories of knowledge. The former focuses
on knowledge as something to be wrought and struggled
with,  sometimes  with  care,  often  with  effects  that  are
distressing, maybe even painful. Knowledge is something
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that is put together through time and whose permanency
and  stability  is  often  transitory  and  contingent.
Exteriorized theories of  knowledge,  on the other hand,
see knowledge as a ready-made object upon which other
forces exert their pressure. Knowledge is here imagined
as  an  object  of  sorts,  a  commodity  or  resource  to  be
transacted, stored, managed or appropriated in different
ways.  The  idea  that  knowledge  can  be  put  to  work
alongside  other  objects  of  political  economy,  such  as
governance,  interdisciplinarity  or  user-centred  designs,
partakes of the specular epistemology described above,
because  insofar  as  knowledge  is  treated  as  a  self-
contained  object  it  can  sit  comfortably  next  to  other
political  objects.  ‘Knowledge’  and  ‘governance’,  for
example, are specular to each other because arguments
can  be  made  about  one  as  if refracted  or  optically
accommodated  through  the  other.  They  function  as
proportionate forms for each other.
If exteriorized theories of knowledge treat knowledge
as an ‘unspecified ‘it’’, ready to be grasped and deployed
in policy circles, interiorized theories, on the other hand,
bring  ‘into  focus  knowledge  itself,  breaking  open  and
specifying the processes that make up the ‘it’’.  (Knorr-
Cetina & Preda 2001: 30) In her study of the cultures of
contemporary  science  (molecular  biologists  and
physicists),  Knorr-Cetina  has  unpacked  some  the
processes  that  interiorize  knowledge  as  an  epistemic
form (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Her focus is what laboratory
work does to scientific knowledge: the reconfiguration of
objects  and  human  relationships  that  take  place  in
laboratory  settings.  According  to  Knorr-Cetina,  what
laboratory  work  accomplishes  in  essence  is  the
adaptation and reconfiguration of natural processes and
objects  to  suit  the  spatio-temporal  requirements  of
scientists.  In  a  laboratory  a  scientist  can  resist  the
natural tendencies and properties of an object in at least
three  ways:  (i)  she  ‘does  not  need  to  put  up  with  an
object  as it is, it can substitute transformed and partial
versions’;  (ii)  she  ‘does  not  need  to  accommodate  the
natural  object  where  it  is,  anchored  in  a  natural
environment’,  and;  (iii)  she  does  not  need  to
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‘accommodate  an  event  when  it  happens’;  she  can
‘dispense  with  natural  cycles  of  occurrence  and  make
events happen frequently enough for continuous study.’
(Knorr-Cetina 1999: 27) Under such conditions
Laboratories  recast  objects  of  investigation  by
inserting  them  into  new  temporal  and  territorial
regimes.  They  play  upon  these  objects’  natural
rhythms  and  developmental  possibilities,  bring
them together  in  new numbers,  renegotiate  their
sizes, and redefine their internal makeup… In short,
they create new configurations of objects that they
match  with  an  appropriately  altered  social  order.
(Knorr-Cetina 1999: 43-44, emphasis added)
The  image  of  re-combinatorial  and  re-configurating
processes  draws  of  course  on  a  familiar  genealogy  in
science  and  technology  studies.  The  ‘partial  versions’
that  are  substituted  for  natural  objects  in  laboratory
experiments echo for example the ‘partial  connections’
that relate difference in Donna Haraway’s famous cyborg
assemblages  (Haraway  1986:  37).  Manipulating  a
laboratory object’s internal rhythms and developmental
possibilities  is  not  unlike  what  a  cyborg’s  prosthetic
extensions  realize  by  way  of  supplementary  or
accelerated capacities. The experimental and the cyborg
both operate as scale-shifting devices: they bring about
enhancements that are of a different order of magnitude
to their original state. ‘The one component is of different
order from the other, and is not created by what creates
that  other.  They  are  not  built  to  one  another’s  scale.’
(Strathern 2004 [1991]: 39) They both create extensions
beyond  a  1:1  equivalence.  Importantly,  as  Strathern
points out, such enhanced capacities work because the
partial  versions  ‘are  neither  proportionate  to  nor
disproportionate  from  one  another.’  (Strathern  2004
[1991]: 36) There is a displacement, an extra-effect, that
echoing  Deleuze  we  might  describe  as  a  ‘variation
(metamorphosis), or: something = x (anamorphosis).’
There  is  also  central  place  warranted  to  bodies  in
cyborg politics. In
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a cyborg world… people are not afraid of their joint
kinship  with  animals  and  machines,  not  afraid  of
permanently  partial  identities  and  contradictory
standpoints.  The  political  struggle  is  to  see  from
both  perspectives  at  once because  each  reveals
both  dominations  and  possibilities  unimaginable
from  the  other  vantage  point.  Single  vision
produces  worse  illusions  than  double  vision or
many-headed  monsters.’  (Haraway  1990:  196,
emphases added)
The  architect,  the  micrographer,  the  illusionist,  the
microbiologist… and the  cyborg.  The  eye  becomes  the
optical metaphor through which the body is made visible
as  a  conduit  of  dis/proportional  configurations.  Double
vision foregrounds the political body as a figure of scale
of natural and social relations.
Conclusion
If I may sum up my argument to this point, I have tried
to  elucidate  the  terms  of  a  proportional  analytic
underpinning in profound ways modernist  social theory
and philosophy. This is characterised by the work of scale
and  size  as  modes  of  explicitation  of  knowledge.  The
point  is  worth  underscoring:  it  is  not  that  knowledge
takes a size (which in a very crass sense it certainly does)
but  that  it  becomes  self-explicitated  as  an  epistemic
object  in  terms  of  size  and  scale,  and  in  particular
through  movements  of  aggrandizement  and/or
miniaturisation. The epistemic productivity of knowledge
appears in this context as being premised on an analytic
of  what  may  be  described  as  a  play  of  scopic
deformations. The figure of anamorph, I have suggested,
may work as both an epistemic and political  imago for
these kind of effects.
The anamorphic provides us also with an interesting
commentary on anti- or non-modernist social theory, or in
the words of Martin Jay, with the point of view afforded
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by  a  scopic  regime  that  operates  at  the  margins  of
modernity, within the vicinity of its material wreckages.11
A point of view, then, apprehended as such from its own
displaced  remainders.  Anamorphism is  what  modernity
looks like when residual vision (the other eye) pushes its
discarded bodies centre stage. When the object, that is,
stares back. In this sense, if there is a form of aesthetic
elicitation that takes the point of view of the non-modern
for granted (including non-human persons and objects),
that  would  certainly  be  the  anamorphic.  We  may
therefore say that the anamorphic is the analytics that
elicits ‘perspectivism’  itself  as an analytic;  the analytic
that allows an object-centred epistemology to come into
view.
In  a  beautiful  image,  Michel  Serres  has  described
Thales inauguration, his emplacement of the peg in the
sand, as ‘a strange thing full of water’: the creation of a
‘logos-proportion’  capable  of  providing  accounts  of
‘objects whose appearance and birth are independent of
us and which develop by themselves in relation to other
objects of the world’: things that are born from air, fire or
water, and that do not attend to the laws or rules of kings
or gods. The Nile floods to which Thales was a witness
washed away the fields’ crops and his ‘proportion’ came
to the rescue of, indeed, a strange world full of water: a
world which demanded a new logos to measure the land,
re-establish  the  cadastral  register,  net-out  the
outstanding  balances  between  creditors  and  debtors
(Serres 1995: 122).
Today the proportion has dried-up the world again. In
their examination of the status and place of atlases in the
history  of  objectivity  (and  the  wider  history  of
epistemology),  Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have
searched for a type of explanation that is ‘on the same
scale and of the same nature as the explanandum itself.’
In their own words,
If  training  a  telescope  onto  large,  remote  causes
fails to satisfy,  what about the opposite approach,
scrutinizing  small,  local  causes  under  an
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explanatory  microscope?  The problem here  is  the
mismatch  between  the  heft  of  explanandum  and
explanans, rather than the distance between them:
in  their  rich  specificity,  local  causes  can  obscure
rather than clarify the kind of wide-ranging effect
that is our subject here… Looking at microcontexts
tells us a great deal – but it can also occlude, like
viewing an image pixel by pixel. The very language
of  cause  and  effect  dictates  separate  and
heterogeneous  terms:  cause  and  effect  must  be
clearly  distinguished  from  each  other,  both  as
entities  and  in  time.  Perhaps  this  is  why  the
metaphors of the telescope and the microscope lie
close to hand. Both are instruments for bringing the
remote and inaccessible closer. But relationships of
cause  and  effect  do  not  exhaust  explanation.
Understanding can be broadened and deepened by
exposing  other  kinds  of  previously  unsuspected
links  among  the  phenomena  in  question,  such  as
patterns  that  connect  scattered  elements  into  a
coherent whole. (Daston & Galison 2007: 36)
Although  they  surreptitiously  subscribe  to  the
language of  scale  and the  playful  operations  of  scopic
deformations,  the  call  to  attend  the  problems  of  ‘The
mismatch  between  the  heft  of  explanandum  and
explanans’,  as  they  put  it,  is  of  course  a  call  to  re-
describe  the  weights  that  inhere  in  the  forms  of  the
explainer  and  the  explained;  in  other  words,  a  call  to
creatively re-imagine the dis/proportions that exist in the
languages of social-scientific explanation. We need, they
are  suggesting,  forms  of  explanation  that  escape  our
proportional imagination. It is about time a flood washed
ashore a new strange thing full of water.
Notes
1. On the importance of visualisations for the history of 
science, see Wise (2006)
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2. On materialized epistemologies see, for example, Pamela 
Smith’s work on ‘artisanal epistemologies’ (2004) and Peter
Galison on the ‘epistemic machinery’ of elementary particle 
physics (1997).
3. The praxicology of the anamorphic recalls Don Ihde’s 
description of the camera obscura as an ‘epistemological 
engine’, involved in the Renaissance configuration of 
knowledge as something instrumentally generated. For 
Ihde, the camera obscura operates two optical 
transformations with epistemic effects:
The first is one of escalation — from Alhazen's 
observation of an optical effect; to da Vinci's camera as 
analogue for the eye; to Locke’s and Descartes’ 
analogue of camera to eye to mind — by which the 
camera is made into a full epistemology engine. The 
second is the inward progression of the location where 
‘external’ reality, itself an artefact of the geometry of 
the imaging phenomenon, interfaces with the ‘inner’ 
representation. For da Vinci, the interface of 
external/internal occurs “in the pupil”; for Descartes, it 
is the retina; and, still continuing the camera 
epistemology, contemporary neuroscience locates it in 
the brain. (Ihde 2000)
What Ihde calls ‘escalation’ describes the kind of relation of
magnitude that I have called proportionality. The movement
between internal and external domains corresponds to my 
use of the term reversibility.
4. I should add that an interest in the laboratory runs through 
the essay as a possible topos of our contemporary 
anamorphism.
5. The disputation is reminiscent of the ‘relation of a child 
which remained twenty six years in the mothers belly’ 
which Monsieur Bayle published in the Philosophical 
Transactions in 1677 (cited in Daston & Galison 2007: 68) 
and which exemplifies the general fascination with the 
anomalous and the disproportionate that inflects the 
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Enlightenment’s epistemic way of life. Size figures thus as a
contemporary epistemic quality.
6. Phillipe Boudon makes a distinction between architecture 
and architecturology (the study of architecture as a 
conceptual practice). According to Boudon, architecture 
confronts scale not as a given but as an epistemological 
‘shift’: architects encounter scale and proportionality as 
something to work with rather than upon (Boudon 1999). 
Scale is something that one does to a project, rather than a 
geometric or physical constraint; it is a ‘mode of shifting’ 
one’s conceptual take on an architectural challenge 
(Boudon 1999: 10). Thus, the criteria employed to relocate 
the giant red escalator in Yaneva’s account above, would 
fare as one such ‘mode of shifting’. It would provide an 
answer to the question, ‘how does the architect give 
measurement to space?’, which is, for Boudon, the 
architecturological question par excellence (Boudon 1999: 
15).
7. The netting-out of ontology accomplishes purity of form: the 
birth of logos or reason as pure relationality. Thus, Serres 
observes how
Thales demonstrates the extraordinary weakness of the 
heaviest material ever worked, as well as the 
omnipotence, in relation to the passing of time, of a 
certain logical structure: of the logos itself as long as 
we redefine it, no longer as a word or statement, but, by
lightening it, as an equal relation; even softer because 
the terms balance each other, obliterate each other so 
that all that remains is their pure and simple relation. 
(Serres 1995: 78, emphasis added)
The ontological robustness of logic, then, appears in this 
context as the result of a proportional equation. 
Proportionality is prior to relationality. The world endures 
as an intelligible object for as long as we can provide some 
kind of proportionate account of it.
This proposition sets the place of ‘measurement’ in reason 
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in a new perspective. Andrew Barry, for example, has 
brought attention to the central role of the history of 
measurement in mediating and configuring the relationship 
between science and political economy (Barry 1993). For 
Barry, the instrumentation of measurement has been key to 
generating political metrologies: ‘measurement and other 
forms of scientific representation have been deployed in the
regulation of social and economic relations over large 
‘geographical’ areas of space.’ (Barry 1993: 464) In his 
account this is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, in
that ‘If measurement has become a central resource for the 
regulation of space, it has only been so to a great degree 
since the mid-nineteenth century - the period in which 
science has become articulated with the moral, political and
economic objectives of imperialism; and more recently with 
those of transnational industry and government.’ (Barry 
1993: 467) My suggestion here, however, is that 
measurement has been integral to how all forms of 
epistemic knowledge have conceptualised themselves in the
modern age. (Note that Serres’ account is of course a 
modern account.) Measurement, or what I call 
proportionality, is the shape that modern knowledge takes 
every time it gets actualised.
8. For example, the relation between perspective and 
proportion inflected the manufacture of objectivity in 
scientific practice too. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
have commented on the case of Bernhard Siegfried Albinus,
professor of anatomy at Leiden, who produced ‘several of 
the most influential eighteenth-century anatomical atlases’ 
(Daston & Galison 2007: 70). In their words,
worried lest the artist [who drew the illustrations under 
Albinus’ guidance] err in the proportions, Albinus 
erected an elaborate double grid, one mesh at four 
Rhenish feet from the skeleton and the other at forty, 
the positioned the artist at precisely the point where the
struts of the grids coincided to the eye, drawing the 
specimen square by square, onto a plate Albinus had 
ruled with a matching pattern of “cross and straight 
259
ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
[sic] lines.” This procedure, suggested by Albinus’s 
Leiden colleague, the natural philosopher Willem ’s 
Gravesande, is strongly reminiscent of the Renaissance 
artist Leon Battista Alberti’s instructions for drawing in 
perspective (Daston & Galison 2007: 73).
9. David Topper has argued against what he calls the 
‘postmodern’ use of anamorphosis for sustaining 
subjectivist or relativist epistemological positions (Topper 
2000). In his rendering, a postmodern account of 
anamorphosis would emphasize the either/or version of an 
image: either you see the twelve sultans or you see Louis 
XIII. Instead, he makes a cognitive argument about the dual
nature of visual perception. With James J. Gibson, he 
suggests that human perception can hold the ‘concurrent 
specification of two reciprocal things’ or ‘in-between 
perceiving’ (Topper 2000: 118, 116). A classic example is 
our holding together in one integrated vision the flat-depth 
distinction between a painting’s surface and the surfaces of 
the objects represented inside the painting (Topper 2000: 
117). Notwithstanding the fact that some anamorphs are so 
distorted that their viewing for the first time will require a 
wholesale surrendering of ‘concurrent’ perception, I think 
his argument about ‘in-betweenness’ is nonetheless part 
and parcel of the historical analytic of reversibility: the 
mode of knowledge that can hold simultaneously internal 
and external expressions of itself.
10. The place of the uncanny in thus intuited in the work of 
optics. Andrea Battistini recalls in this respect an early 
observation of Emanuele Tesauro, who ‘marked the 
maximum wit of the optical emblems, “which, for certain 
proportions of perspective, through strange and ingenious 
appearances, make you see things that you do not see.”’ 
(Battistini 2006: 19, emphasis added)
11. Hence the baroque’s obsession with still life and material 
carcass.
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Chapter 10
LANCE ARMSTRONG:
THE REALITY SHOW (A CULTURAL ANALYSIS)
Lee Drummond
Seven successive Tour de France victories, anointed four
times  as  Sportsman  of  the  Year  by  the  United  States
Olympic Committee, countless other awards, a mound of
books,  magazine  exposés,  and  newspaper  articles
accusing and defending Lance Armstrong of wrongdoing,
a  small  army  of  lawyers  launching  suits  and  counter-
suits,  multimillion-dollar  endorsement  deals,  and  it  all
came  crashing  down  around  him  that  fateful  day  in
January 2013 when he walked out and took his seat on
the  set  of  the  most  sacred  shrine  of  the  American
conscience: The Oprah Winfrey Show.
The  show is  America’s  Confessional,  and  Oprah the
Grand Inquisitor. In front of millions, under the blazing
studio  lights,  she  can  extract  confessions  of  sins
concealed for years by the most distinguished among us.
From best-selling authors of  bogus  books  to repentant
celebrities, Oprah has them in tears, telling all between
car-giveaways and painkiller commercials. The CIA could
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have saved all the expense and bad press over its secret
prisons and waterboarding – just trundle Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed out on stage and Oprah would have had him
singing  like  a  canary  in  time  for  top-of-the-hour  cable
news.
And what about the audience for Lance’s confession,
those  couch  potato  voyeurs  who  experience  life  as  a
bizarre combination of talk shows, reality TV, cable news
breaking  stories,  sitcoms,  and  HBO/Showtime  movies,
that is to say, what about us – the great American public?
With her dramatic unveiling of Lance’s charade, Oprah
bestowed the ultimate gift on that audience, better even
than  those  fabled  car-giveaways.  For  a  few  brief
moments,  before  we  had  to  return  to  our  troubled,
occluded lives, she allowed us to experience a true, pure
feeling, hot as a poker, bright as a laser: the  righteous
indignation that  wells  up  inside  the  American  breast
when we encounter  a  fundamental  betrayal  of  trust,  a
scam far worse than Bernie Madoff’s (who merely stole
from the rich), a con that subverts the balance of the way
things  are  and  are  supposed  to  be.  Lance  was  our
ultimate  athlete-hero,  and  in  many  ways  our  ultimate
American Hero of recent times, far more impressive and
sponge-worthy than a Super Bowl quarterback (for all the
weeks  of  hype,  really  just  a  flash-in-the-pan,  forgotten
until next season), a muscle-bound home-run slugger, or
an unlikely sort-of-black president with a lawyer’s golden
tongue.  Day  after  day,  year  after  year,  mile  after
torturous  mile,  Lance  wore  that  yellow  jersey,  the
leader’s  emblem  of  the  Tour  de  France.  And  –  the
sweetest  treat  of  all  –  this  gaunt,  determined  young
Texan  from  the  outskirts  of  Dallas  wore  it  proudly
through throngs of spectators right there in that citadel
of anti- American snobbishness: France.
Lance’s  betrayal  of  the  public  trust  was  especially
painful because he was the ultimate underdog, the hero-
image we Americans somehow manage to embrace while
riding roughshod  over  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  was  a
modern miracle that he should have been on that bicycle
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seat  at  all,  that  he  should  even  have  been  alive.  At
twenty-five,  with  his  reputation  as  a  top  cycling
competitor  already established,  he was diagnosed with
advanced  testicular  cancer,  a  cancer  that  had  already
spread  to  his  brain  and  lungs.  Following  surgery  and
chemotherapy he was given less than a 50-50 chance to
live.  Survival,  let  alone  a  return  to  sports,  seemed  a
remote possibility.  Yet with excellent physicians and an
innovative regimen of chemotherapy, he not only survived
but three years after his surgeries won the first of his
Tour  de  France  victories.  His  is  a  remarkable  story,
perhaps  the  most  impressive  come-from-behind  living
legend of American history. And, cruelest of ironies, all
made possible by that fount of life-giving, life-extending
wonders, the pharmaceutical industry, which was later to
strike him down.
Lance  Armstrong  was  an  athletic  prodigy,  endowed
with  remarkable  stamina  from  childhood  and,  quite
probably, from birth. While still in junior high school he
became  attracted  to  endurance  sports  –  swimming,
running, bicycling – and, seeing a poster for an “Iron Kids
Triathlon,”  entered  the  competition.  He  won.  He  was
thirteen years old. Two years later he was ranked first in
the under-19 category of the U. S. Triathlon. At sixteen,
he became a professional triathlete. In 1988 and 1989,
aged 18 and 19, he held the title of national sprint-course
triathlon  champion.  Two  years  later  he  became  a
professional  in  the  world  of  international  cycling
competition,  and  put  together  an  impressive  series  of
victories which culminated in his first Tour de France win
in 1999. The scandal that erupted around him in later
years should not detract from the remarkable gifts of a
truly  exceptional  human  being.  Rather,  it  adds  to  the
tragedy: that one so gifted should feel he needed an edge
to remain on top.
But . . . It is precisely at this point, when our moral
compass  seems  fixed  on  a  steady  bearing,  that  it  is
necessary  to  question  the  basis  of  our  certitude,  to
question whether we inhabit a neatly partitioned social
world in which some deeds and people are good, some
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evil,  and  in  which  we  know  for  a  certain  fact  when
someone – Lance Armstrong in this case – crosses the
line,  goes  over  to  the  Dark  Side.  Oprah,  with  her
enormous  audience  of  other  right-thinking  Americans,
does  not  question  the  premise  that  good  and  evil  are
clear to all, necessary anchors to secure us in a rapidly
changing, often bewildering world. Nor does anyone in
her parade of penitents appear to question that premise;
they know the secret wrongs they have done and, under
the  blazing  studio  lights  and  Oprah's  doe-eyed  gaze,
confess all to the Grand Inquisitor. It is necessary to ask,
in short,  whether Lance Armstrong's  deeds violated all
that is good and decent in human life or whether, just
possibly, those deeds actually cast their own inquisitorial
light on our basic values. In the very midst of the public
firestorm of outrage, it is necessary to ask whether Lance
is  so  awfully  bad.  [Do you perhaps recall  the old  joke
circulating during the trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez,
two enterprising teenagers who took a drastic shortcut to
their  inheritance  by  doing  away  with  their  parents  in
their  Beverly  Hills  mansion:  “So we shot-gunned Mom
and Dad – was that so awfully bad?”]
When one begins to turn the Inquisition back on itself,
to  consider  what  the  Lance  Armstrong  affair  reveals
about  our  basic  values,  it  is  at  once  apparent  that
Americans  have  quite  specific  expectations  of  their
athletes. By far the most important, and general, of these
is  that  the star athlete displays  his  God-given  physical
talent: he performs feats of  natural prowess before the
stadium throngs, the crowds lining the race course, the
multitudes of those couch potatoes slumped in front of
their  giant  flat  screen  HD  sets.  Not  to  get  too  Lévi-
strauss on a readership that has mostly turned its back
on  the  master,  Americans  believe  in  a  fundamental
division  between  Nature  and  Culture.  And  the  star
athlete is the embodiment of The Natural (as played by
Robert Redford). His body is his temple, and anything he
does  to  defile  that  temple  is  dealt  with  harshly  by
bureaucratic  agencies  established  to  identify  any
violation  of  that  ideal.  [And  by  high  school  football
coaches  who  forbid  beer  –  and  even  sex  –  for  their
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Friday-night wonders] Drug tests have become the norm
in professional  sports:  the football  or basketball  player
who  tests  positive  for  cocaine  or  other  mind-altering
drugs faces suspension. Gone are the days when Mickey
Mantle could walk up to the plate drunk as a skunk and
swing  for  the  bleachers.  But  far  worse  than  these
debilitating drugs is the use of drugs intended to improve
performance: steroids and blood-doping chemicals of all
sorts are part of a growing pharmacopeia of the Great
Satan of professional athletics, the dreaded and despised
performance-enhancing  pharmaceuticals.  These  evils
subvert the Natural Order of things.
The  Lance  Armstrong  affair  has  put  one  little
bureaucracy in particular in the spotlight: the U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency. Created in 2000 to enforce strictures on
drug use by Olympic athletes, its lab-coated inquisitors
conduct  their  studies  under  the  Agency's  slogan,
"Inspiring  True  Sport."  Examining  their  goals  in  some
detail  is  at  least  as  revealing  of  American  values  as
reading  those  fanciful  documents,  The  Declaration  of
Independence and the  Constitution,  drafted by a small
group  of  wealthy  white  slave-owners  in  the  late-
eighteenth century:
To be the guardian of  the values and life lessons
learned through true sport. We hold the public trust
to:
Preserve  the  Integrity  of  Competition —  we
preserve  the  value  and  integrity  of  athletic
competition  through  just  initiatives  that  prevent,
deter and detect violations of true sport.
Inspire  True  Sport —  we  inspire  present  and
future  generations  of  U.S.  athletes  through
initiatives  that  impart  the  core  principles  of  true
sport — fair play, respect for one’s competitor and
respect for the fundamental fairness of competition.
Protect the Rights of U.S. Athletes — we protect
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the right of U.S. Olympic and Paralympic athletes to
compete healthy and clean — to achieve their own
personal  victories  as  a  result  of  unwavering
commitment and hard work — to be celebrated as
true heroes. (www.usada.org)
“.  .  .  to  compete  healthy  and  clean  .  .  .”  The  self-
righteous obtuseness of the mediocrities who formulated
these goals does justice to Ward Cleaver, that all-knowing
disciplinarian who dispensed his sage advice every week
to keep The Beaver in line.
What  is  wrong,  misled,  or,  frankly,  stupid  about  the
pretentious goals of the U. S. Anti-Doping Agency? Why
should we not look to them as an admirable statement of
a fundamental morality that all the world, particularly the
world of professional athletics, should embrace?
The principal problem with those goals is that they fail
to  recognize  that  the  dichotomy  Nature  /  Culture
embraced by Americans is in fact an elaborate cultural
construct,  a  contrivance  which  owes  little  to  the  joint
physical and social endowments of a human being. The
crucial fact the lab coats ignore is that there has never
been a “natural” man or woman “to compete healthy and
clean” in anything. Our bodies are the product of some
three  million  years  of  an  evolutionary  process  which
mixed – and often mangled – discrete physical abilities,
technical expertise, and social skills. If it possesses any
distinguishing feature at all – and that is quite debatable
– what we choose to call “humanity” is a loose and ever-
shifting  assemblage  of  biology  and  culture.  For  a  few
technocrats  to  stroll  into  this  rats  nest  and  begin  to
dispense  ill-formed  opinions  in  the  guise  of  scientific
findings is laughable, and terribly sad.
But  even  if  we  set  aside  these  big-picture
considerations  drawn  from  paleoanthropology  and
cultural anthropology, the antics over at the U. S. Anti-
Doping  Agency  appear  quite  limited  in  scope.  Let  us
begin by granting their premise that professional athletes
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should be required, under penalty of exclusion from their
sport,  to  refrain  from  tampering  with  their  “natural”
abilities  through  “unnatural”  performance-enhancing
measures. This proves to be a slippery slope.
For  starters,  how do the lab coats identify precisely
which  chemicals  are  to  be  placed  on  their  Index  of
forbidden drugs? The American pharmaceutical industry
is  a  multibillion-dollar  enterprise  devoted  to  creating
more and more new drugs (which they tout as being far
more effective than their earlier products, whose patents
soon expire and fall prey to cheap generic replacements).
In tandem with America’s official “war on drugs” (and we
all  know  how  well  that’s  going),  the  FDA  and  other
bureaucracies  like  the  Anti-Doping  Agency  face  the
impossible task of keeping up with, let alone regulating
the  flood  of  new drugs  hitting  the  market  every  year.
Where  the  general  public  is  concerned  (the  trodden
masses without  its own army of  lobbyists  in the Gucci
Gulch  corridors  of  Congressional  office  buildings),  the
best  these  agencies  can  do  is  require  the  giant
pharmaceutical  corporations  to  issue  disclaimers  and
warnings  when  they  showcase  their  products  in
commercial  spots  on  Oprah  and  the  evening  news:
“Feeling depressed?  Take our  new anti-depression  pill!
It’ll make you feel great! . . . Well, actually, it may make
you  want  to  kill  yourself.  But,  hey,  your  doctor  will
prescribe it!”
Closely  related  to  the  challenge  posed  by  new
pharmaceutical  drugs  is  the  burgeoning  group  of
vitamins, minerals,  and other “nutritional supplements”
which, because they are deemed “natural,”  fall  outside
the  purview  of  the  FDA  and  similar  agencies.  When
Mother June sent The Beaver down to the corner grocery
store to pick up a few things for supper, her shopping list
didn’t include items such as acai, ginkgo, kava, bilberry,
satvia,  or  senna.  There  are  thousands  of  these
substances, whose effects on the human body are known
only  vaguely.  And  when  used  in  their  purified  or
processed  form  and  in  an  enormous  variety  of
combinations,  it  is  anyone’s  guess  what  their  short  or
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long-term effects may be. Suppose that Lance and other
professional  athletes,  rather  than raiding the  medicine
chest, paid a visit to the local herbalist, who gave them a
god-awful tasting brew compounded of berries from the
New Guinea highlands, roots from the Amazonian forest,
leaves from the Manchurian steppe. After a few weeks of
hooking down this stuff, they went out and did amazing
things on the race course or playing field. Would our little
band  of  inquisitors  at  the  USADA  hastily  revise  their
regulations  and  go  forth  to  strip  medals,  return  prize
money,  and  generally  insure  that  athletes  “compete
healthy  and  clean”?  We are  a  little  further  down that
slippery  slope,  and  picking  up  speed  (but  hopefully
without any “unnatural” lubricants!).
And here’s another curve ball – no  shit spit: Suppose
Lance  et  al decide  to  frustrate  the  lab  coats  who
routinely sample their urine and blood for tell-tale traces
of  proscribed  substances.  Instead,  they  find  a  few
medical  technicians  of  their  own,  physicians  and
therapists  at  the  vanguard  of  an  established  and
expanding  field:  ultrasound  treatment.  Long  used  to
reduce inflammation, relieve osteoarthritis, and promote
post-surgery healing, innovative ultrasound treatment is
found by these pioneers to strengthen muscle growth and
significantly  improve  stamina.  A  few  weeks  of  regular
treatment have all the performance-enhancing effects of
steroidal  and  blood-doping  chemicals,  but  without  the
unpleasant side effects (you can still get it up!). Natural?
Unnatural?  Permissible?  Proscribed?  If  the  officials
decide such treatments confer an unfair advantage, what
will  they  say  about  deep-tissue  massage?  Whirlpool
baths? The slope grows steeper.
On a not  altogether  whimsical  note,  we may extend
this  inquiry  to  a  quite  different  scenario.  Rather  than
take a risk with any physical means of improving their
games,  suppose  that  “Slammin”  Sammy  Sosa,  Mark
McGwire,  and  Barry  Bonds  discovered  a  remarkable
sports  hypnotist.  Under  deep  hypnosis,  they  were  told
over and over, “You are a very good long-ball hitter. You
will hit many home runs. You may now wake up and head
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for  the  ball  park.  But  first,  that  will  be  five  hundred
dollars.” They then proceeded to hit record numbers of
home runs and garner an impressive list of rewards until
the  whiskey-bloated  lawyers  in  Congress,  finding  it
unfashionable to hunt  Communists,  hauled them in for
forced testimony that forever tarnished their outstanding
careers.
Taken  together  these  examples  seriously  undermine
the  moral  certitude  exuded  by  USADA  bureaucrats,
Oprah,  her  vast  audience,  and  the  “wrongdoers”
themselves. Still, we are just coming to what is by far the
slipperiest part of our downward rush, as represented by
the equipment and facilities which are integral to athletic
competition.  Virtually  every  athletic  event  (perhaps
excepting only nekked female mud-wrassling, which has
not  yet  been  designated  an  Olympic  event,  tant  pis)
involves the use of complex, manufactured artifacts in a
specialized, often fantastically expensive setting such as
the ball park or Olympic stadium. Kevin Costner’s  Field
of Dreams is built  on a tract of bulldozed urban blight
rather than an Iowa cornfield, and only after the city fat
cats  have  stuffed  a  whopping  bond  issue  down  the
throats of the rube citizens.
Even  a  seemingly  simple  mano-a-máquina
arrangement like a man on a bicycle is hedged around by
a  host  of  technical  and  financial  matters.  The  bicycle
itself is not two centuries old; before that the particular
combination  of  physical  ability  and  mental  toughness
required to win a Tour de France was likely expended
harvesting crops in a seigniorial  manor.  Today’s  racing
bicycle is a piece of cutting-edge technology, the product
of  advanced  metallurgy,  engineering,  and  aerodynamic
tests  conducted  in  a  wind  tunnel.  Lance  Armstrong’s
bicycle  (rather,  bicycles  since  he  required  a  stable  of
them for a single Tour de France) was a $10,000 machine
with  incredible  lightness  and  tensile  strength.  That
machine was  essential  to  his  victories.  Its  importance
cannot  be  overstated.  Suppose  that  somewhere  in
Bulgaria,  Romania,  or  Something-or-other-istan  there
lives  a  strapping  farm  lad  with  the  metabolism  of  a
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Galapagos turtle  and a dream of  himself  in the yellow
jersey leading the pack through the tortuous course of
the  Tour.  The  only  bicycles  available  to  him,  however,
weigh twenty-five pounds and have tires that would fit a
light truck. Unless some wheeler-dealer promoter spots
the lad and plucks him out of his rural oblivion, he will
grow  old  picking  beets  and  riding  his  two-wheeled
clunker around the town square.
Even when an athlete’s equipment is minimal, as, say,
with a Speedo suit worn by an Olympic diver or swimmer
(but not  too minimal – none of those scandalous Riviera
codpieces for our Natural Man), the facilities required for
the sport are monumental. Greg Louganis, the Olympic
diving  sensation  of  the  1980s,  grew  up  in  southern
California  around  swimming  pools,  trampolines,  and
diving coaches (he was later to become yet another star
penitent  on  The  Oprah  Winfrey  Show).  The  Olympic
diving pool  for the ten-meter platform and three-meter
springboard  where  Louganis  launched  his  remarkable
aerial displays is at least sixteen feet deep, not exactly
Mom and Dad’s backyard above-ground Target special.
Had  Greg  grown  up  in  Bayou  country  as  one  of  the
Swamp  People,  learning  how  to  dive  off  the  dock  of
granddaddy’s  crawfish  hole,  he  is  unlikely  to  have
perfected his signature reverse 2½ pike.
These examples could be compounded endlessly,  and
all  underscore  the  crucial  fact  ignored by  the  narrow-
minded lab coats of the USADA that their so-called “true
sport” involves the seamless meshing of physical ability
and technical expertise. It  is almost certainly true that
these technocrats are kept too busy compiling lab reports
and  giving  legal  testimony  to  keep  up  with  the  vastly
more  interesting  scientific  discoveries  in  the  field  of
paleoanthropology. Tool use has long been thought to be
a distinctive feature of the human species:  long before
language evolved to anything like its present state early
hominids  were feeding and protecting themselves  with
the  help  of  stone  tools.  The  human body  and  nervous
system (including the brain) evolved to promote tool use;
such is our Natural Man. Moreover, it now appears that,
274
LANCE ARMSTRONG
contrary  to  previous  anthropology  textbook  wisdom,
stone tool use actually  preceded the appearance of the
entire  Homo genus.  The earliest  stone tool  users (and
possibly  makers)  were  not  humans  at  all,  but  an
australopithecine  lineage  that  flourished  over  three
million  years  ago.  The  most  famous  member  of  that
lineage  (whose  claim  to  natural-ness  might  now  be
challenged  by  the  USADA!)  is  Lucy  (in  the  sky  with
diamonds). Her conspecifics,  Australopithecus afarensis,
were using stone tools to butcher carcasses some half-
million  years  before  the  appearance  of  the  Homo line
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/science/12tools.htm
l). Human evolution was in large part a consequence of
tool use, not the reverse.
* * *
Hurtling down this slippery slope,  we at last  plunge
over the edge of a vast precipice (like James Bond in the
adrenaline-pumping opener of  The Spy Who Loved Me)
into a dark and bottomless sea. We have encountered and
must now face (sink or swim!) a stunning paradox:  An
athlete’s  physical  body  is  in  fact  less natural  than the
implements / tools / machines he employs to display his
skill. For the ancestors of those artifacts created his body
millions  of  years  before  all  the  recent  hype  about
biotechnology engineering a race of cyborgs. The human
body is basically a particular sort of artifact, which we
happen to find very special (since we inhabit one).
How  might  this  revelation  affect  our  deeply  rooted
belief  that  Nature  and  Culture  are  fundamentally
separate? If that dichotomy now appears far too nuanced
and convoluted for bureaucratic dullards to comprehend,
let  alone regulate,  what are we to make of  our strong
feelings,  our  love,  of  the  athlete?  If  not  a  display  of
unblemished physical perfection, what is it  about “true
sport” that we celebrate, even worship?
Ironically a clue to the answer to these questions is to
be  found  in  the  very  language  of  those  who  regulate
athletics:  their  goal  is  to detect  and banish the use of
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“performance-enhancing  drugs”  because  they  seek  to
insure the  integrity of performance. Anyone can ride a
bicycle, but only a very few can ride at speed over the
two thousand  miles  of  jumbled  terrain  of  the  Tour  de
France.  We like to see people who can do things very
well.
But  only  certain  things.  Warren  Buffet  is  an
exceptional performer when it comes to making money,
but  we  don’t  throng  the  streets  of  Omaha  to  catch  a
glimpse of its Oracle. And we don’t award him any gold
medals (since he already has most of the gold). Nor do
we celebrate the people skills and networking abilities of
those we send to Congress; in fact, we’d much rather tar
and feather that lawyerly vermin.
What we value about  performance is intrinsic to the
meaning of the word: it is  an activity involving display
and focused attention. The performer, as an individual or
member  of  a  small  group or  team,  behaves  before  an
audience in a way that engages, excites and rivets the
attention of that audience. He is the catalyst essential to
transforming the humdrum doings  of  daily  life  into  an
event.
We have been hurled over the edge of a slippery slope
into the sea below, but we now find ourselves in troubled
waters.  If  we  as  right-thinking,  fair-minded  Americans
insist  or  acquiesce  in  our  government  and  its  lackeys
regulating  the  performers  among  us,  what  are  we  to
think about the highly discrepant treatment we apply to
those  individuals?  Performers  come  in  all  stripes.  We
bestow  attention,  even  adulation,  and  riches  on  them
based  on  their  ability  to  engage  and  excite  us.  Some
accomplish this on the playing field,  some on the race
course, some on the three-meter board and still others on
stage, film, CD, or even, to invoke a rapidly disappearing
world,  through  the  written  word.  Yet  if  it  is  superb
performance  we  value,  why  should  we  apply  different
standards  to  the  outstanding  performers  among  us?
Particularly now that we have seen how intractable the
Nature / Culture opposition is, and in deference to the
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cherished  American  value  of  fair  play,  should  we  not
demand  that  all  our  performers  adhere  to  the  same
standards of conduct?
Perhaps,  to  the  delight  of  the  bureaucrats  in  the
USADA, we should greatly extend their mandate, tasking
them  with  the  responsibility  of  insuring  that  all  our
performers  are  “healthy  and  clean”  exemplars  to  the
general public and, especially, to our young people who
emulate them.
Yet as the inquisitors begin their new assignment, they
immediately encounter some deeply disturbing material.
Having  decided  to  begin  their  new  studies  with  the
performance-arts  equivalent  of  Olympic  gold  medalists
and,  their  arch  villain,  Lance Armstrong,  they  compile
CDs, DVDs, and journalistic accounts of a musical group
which over the decades has provided the most successful
spectacles of any type of performance, including sporting
events such as the Super  Bowl.  That group goes  by a
whimsical  name:  The  Rolling  Stones.  The  lab  coats
confirm persistent and shocking rumors that a prominent
member of that group, one Keith Richards, is often under
the influence of a variety of controlled substances and,
horror of horrors, sometimes performs on stage while in
that condition. Moreover, they learn that the leader of the
group, a Mick Jagger, is said on occasion to do the same,
prancing around the stage like the drug-crazed maniac
he apparently is. Considering the blatant disregard these
performers show for their bodies and, far worse, for the
multitudes that idolize them, the USADA must act swiftly.
Using  their  expanded  authority,  they  act  to  strip  The
Rolling  Stones  of  every  musical  award  the  group  has
received over the past half-century. And the bureaucrats,
supported by a phalanx of lawyers, take steps to impound
and seize the fortune the group has amassed through its
illegal  activities.  They  embark on the daunting task  of
removing  the  group’s  songs  from  YouTube  and  other
social  media  while  confiscating  any  CDs  and  DVDs  it
locates in stores and online.
Having sniffed out this flagrant violation of our basic
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values, the lab coats are distressed to find that the stench
goes far deeper than contemporary musicians caught up
in  the  narcissistic  drug  culture.  Additional  research
documents that major figures in literature were anything
but “healthy and clean,” and, even more alarming, that
their  work  is  tainted  by  unmistakable  signs  of  their
substance  abuse.  On  reviewing  the  novels  and  short
stories of Ernest Hemingway the investigators find that
all exude the strong bouquet of liquor, and that the blood-
alcohol content of his later work in particular should be
incorporated in its titles:  Islands in the Stream (of Rum)
for example. Fearful of the harmful effect Hemingway’s
conduct may have on the millions of Americans required
to  read  his  poisonous  books  in  school,  the  authorities
make every effort to eradicate that influence by seizing
copies of his books and expunging references to him in
textbooks.  And  just  as  they  did  with  Lance Armstrong
and  his  trophies,  they  strip  Hemingway  of  his  Nobel
Prize.
As the expanded USADA digs deeper into the field of
literature,  they  find  other  cases  that  require  their
inquisitorial  attention.  They  discover  that  the  nation’s
youth, already the victims in a raging war on drugs, are
subjected throughout middle school and high school to
the  poetry  of  an  especially  pernicious  figure:  the
notorious  opium  addict,  Samuel  Coleridge.  Like
Hemingway,  Coleridge  not  only  made  no  secret  of  his
drug abuse but wove it  into the body of his work with
dark,  disturbing  images.  In  the  Rime  of  the  Ancient
Mariner, which millions of our children are required to
read at a young and impressionable age, we find deeply
troubling passages:
Alone, alone, all, all alone,
Alone on a wide wide sea!
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony.
The many men, so beautiful!
And they all dead did lie;
And a thousand thousand slimy things
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Lived on; and so did I.
I looked upon the rotting sea,
And drew my eyes away;
I looked upon the rotting deck,
And there the dead men lay.
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray;
But or ever a prayer had gusht,
A wicked whisper came and made
My heart as dry as dust.
* * *
All in a hot and copper sky,
The bloody sun, at noon,
Right up above the mast did stand,
No bigger than the moon.
Day after day, day after day,
We stuck, nor breath nor motion;
As idle as a painted ship
Upon a painted ocean.
Water, water, every where,
And all the boards did shrink;
Water, water, every where,
Nor any drop to drink.
The very deep did rot: O Christ!
That ever this should be!
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
Upon the slimy sea.
About, about, in reel and rout
The death-fires danced at night;
The water, like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue, and white.
Coleridge’s final outrage, which prompts the lab coats
to drastic action in removing his name from the record of
world literature, is that he actually composed a large part
of one of his most famous poems, Kubla Khan while in an
opium  stupor.  Even  Coleridge’s  decadent  English
contemporaries  were  scandalized  by  his  audacity  in
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publishing  his  hallucinations  as  poetry.  Clearly,  such
behavior  is  unacceptable  to  anyone  who  values  the
integrity of performance.
* * *
The  integrity  of  performance.  At  this  point  in  our
inquiry it is difficult to know just what that phrase might
mean. Readers will  appreciate that the previous pages
have been an exercise in reductio ad absurdum (although
an  occasional  reader  with  ties  to  the  Moral  Majority
might endorse these arguments to the letter!), a fixture
of philosophical and mathematical thought since the pre-
Socratics. If we approve the punishments meted out to
Lance Armstrong for his use of performance-enhancing
drugs,  then  we  must  condone  punishment  for  other
exceptional performers who have done the same. If that
course  of  action  is  untenable,  then  our  treatment  of
Lance  Armstrong  is  seriously  in  error.  Something  is
deeply amiss in the American socio-logic.
To  begin  to  understand  what  that  might  be,  it  is
necessary to employ the classical reductio argument in a
way that departs from the formal proofs of Russell and
Quine. In the matter before us there is no unambiguous
truth-value:  [It  is  not the case that A implies B and A
implies not-B] does not apply. The law of contradiction, a
bulwark  of  traditional  philosophy,  is  of  no  help  here.
Why? It is because the Lance Armstrong affair, like every
cultural phenomenon, obeys a “logic” that owes far more
to Camus than to Russell. What most Americans accept
as unquestionably true – the need to assure that athletic
performers be “healthy and clean” – is shot through with
ambiguity and irresolvable conflict. Our moral compass is
not  fixed  on  a  true  course  because  there  is  no  true
course; an unflinching examination reveals that compass
to be  spinning haphazardly  from one point  to  another.
Any certain truth one proposes is therefore incomplete
and  mistaken,  and  to  insist  on  it,  particularly  by
legislating it, is an absurd undertaking. It is a page from
Camus’ Rebel, not Russell’s Principia.
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It  seems  the  only  honest  approach  for  a  cultural
analysis of the Lance Armstrong affair and, by extension,
American society in general, is to identify key  dilemmas
at the heart of our set of basic values.  [For a detailed
presentation of this proposal, see Chapter 3, “A Theory of
Culture  as  Semiospace”  of  American  Dreamtime,
available  at  www.peripheralstudies.org].  Any  credo  put
forward as a  guide  for  behavior,  especially  the  all-too-
common odious variety which regulates and punishes, is
inevitably skewed, a one-sided distortion of an underlying
absurdity.
The key dilemma (or “elemental  dilemma,” following
James Fernandez) in the Lance Armstrong affair  is  the
irresolvable conflict posed by an extraordinary individual
being  both  an  autonomous  actor  and a  social  being
subject to the laws and standards of a group composed of
highly diverse but mostly ordinary individuals. We value
his exceptional performance yet at the same time insist
that  he  conform  to  rules  set  by  all-too-unexceptional
people who want to live in a mediocre world.
The  unhappy  marriage  between  the  individual  and
society is a fundamental feature of human life, but it is
particularly strained in the United States. Only in Camus’
world would the slave-owner Thomas Jefferson draft what
is  arguably  the  best-known  sentence  in  the  English
language: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all  men are created equal .  .  .”  Founded on absurdity,
American  society  over  the  past  two-plus  centuries  has
become a land of irresolvable contradictions (we are the
logician’s  excluded  middle,  the  “or”  symbol  in  the
Principia proposition: *2 ⋅ 11 ⊢ p  ∼p⋁
Nowhere is  this  more evident  than in the matter of
competition. Created equal, everything in life urges us to
get  ahead.  Of  course,  it  is  impossible  to  get  ahead
without leaving others behind. During the first decade of
the 21st century financial inequality in the United States
has returned to the extremes reached during the boom-
and-bust era of the late 1920s that precipitated the Great
Depression:
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The Wealth Distribution
In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated
in a relatively few hands. As of 2010, the top 1% of
households  (the  upper  class)  owned  35.4% of  all
privately  held  wealth,  and  the  next  19%  (the
managerial,  professional,  and  small  business
stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of
the people owned a remarkable 89%, leaving only
11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and
salary workers). In terms of financial wealth (total
net worth minus the value of one's home), the top
1% of households had an even greater share: 42.1%
(“Wealth, Income, and Power,” G. William Domhoff
<http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/we
alth.html>).
If  competition  for  wealth  and  social  status  has  now
largely  played  out,  with  one  per  cent  of  Americans
owning nearly half of the country’s financial resources,
we non-one-per-centers are left with a burning need that
has no real-world economic outlet. How can one hope to
get ahead when the odds are so terribly long?
It  seems  that  American  culture  has  generated  two
complementary  responses  to  the  agonizing  problem  of
increasing inequality and wage-servitude in this land of
golden opportunity: spectator sports on a massive scale;
and  television  reality  shows.  While  politicians  of  a
declining Roman republic of the 2nd century BC devised
the scheme of “bread and circuses” to keep their masses
from rising up in protest  at  their  corrupt  regimes,  the
American establishment has hit on a more stringent plan:
forget the bread and concentrate on the circuses.
Sporting events have lost most of their former appeal
as  local  affairs  in  which  ordinary  people  could
participate:  While  kids  still  play  ball  in  vacant  lots  on
occasion (when they  aren’t  exercising their  thumbs on
their  iPods)  and while  a  few oldsters  still  slog  around
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softball  diamonds  in  community  parks,  much  of  the
participatory  nature  of  sports  has  lapsed.  Instead,
enormous Colosseum-like structures have been erected
in  our  cities,  and  every  four  years  an  entire  sports
complex – a sprawling athletic village – is built to host
the Olympic Games. Those kids still playing Little League
baseball  are  inculcated,  sometimes  violently  by  dads
frustrated  by  their  own  mediocrity,  with  the  hallowed
American value of competition. Yet only a tiny fraction of
those  kids  wind up in  the big  leagues,  The Show that
mesmerizes the herd made up of their former teammates
who  did  not  make  the  cut.  Baseball,  our  unofficial
national  pastime,  has been transformed almost  beyond
recognition  over  the  past  several  decades.  Billionaire
owners trade millionaire players in a 21st century slave
market and send them out to play in immense stadiums
erected  as  municipal  shrines  at  taxpayers’  expense,
stadiums with  roofs,  climate  control,  and Astroturf  for
grass.  Games played at  night  under  batteries  of  lights
with  near-freezing  temperatures  outside  have  become
the norm for the World Series (the exigencies of cable TV
coverage  demand  it).  And  the  playing  season,  already
long, has been extended to pump up the bottom line. The
team itself has become a specialized corporate unit. The
boys of summer have become the designated hitters and
base runners of November.
Even  with  their  new  corporate  structure  and  big-
screen  HDTV  appeal,  however,  spectator  sports  have
taken a back seat to a phenomenon that has exploded at
the heart of American popular culture: reality shows. In a
sense,  MLB,  the  NFL,  and  the  NBA  serve  up  sports
programming that is itself  a genre of reality television,
since  they  are  unscripted  displays  of  American
competitiveness in action. But the definitive shows that
have  completely  transformed  American  television  are
much  more  recent  than  corporate-based  sports.
Productions of the 1970s such as The Dating Game, The
Newlywed Game, and The Gong Show prepared the way
for  shows  of  the  late  1990s  and  2000s  that  took  the
television  industry  and  the  American  public  by  storm.
The  phenomenal  success  of  the  now-iconic  shows
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Survivor and  American  Idol have  ushered  in  a  new
viewing environment with a myriad of shows that feature
competition as the supreme value in virtually every facet
of  American  life.  Participants  in  these  shows  do  not
simply  go  on  vacation  to  exotic  locales  (Survivor,  The
Amazing  Race),  enjoy  singing  and  dancing  (American
Idol,  Dancing with the Stars), work at advancing in the
world  of  business  (Apprentice),  form  romantic
attachments  (The  Bachelor and  The  Bachelorette),  or
even, in what may well be the most pernicious of these
shows, play the little-girl game of dress-up (Toddlers &
Tiaras). JonBenét’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave.
Participants do none of these real world things; instead
they  engage in  contrived  and  cutthroat  competition  to
see who can do reality-show things best, who can be the
winner.
As  traditional  religious  faith  and  church  attendance
wane even in this land of Puritan ancestry, it would not
be an exaggeration to suggest that reality television has
become the new national religion, one that engages and
excites tens of  millions of  viewers and keeps the most
popular shows at the top of rating charts. From week to
week, we can’t wait to see who gets voted off  Survivor
and who the nasty judges of American Idol send home in
tears.  It  is  a “religion” based, not on Christian love or
Islamic  orthodoxy,  but  on  raw,  unbridled,  in-your-face
competition.  However,  the  bitter  irony  of  reality
television  is  that  the situations  and made-for-television
personalities  and  dramas  of  the  shows  are  hopelessly
artificial, distorted and contrived versions of competitive
life in an American society which has already picked the
winners – that tiny one per cent who own and control the
bulk of the nation’s resources. The reality of American
life,  its  stark  inequality,  racial  hatred,  rampant  gun
violence,  perpetual  war,  untreated  medical  conditions,
prisons  (for-profit!)  bursting  with  a  population  that
dwarfs  that  of  Solzhenitsyn’s  Gulag  –  none  of  this  is
touched  on  in  the  breadless  American  circuses  that
enthrall us. For all too many of us, the multitudes that
make up the shows’  audiences,  actual life is  incredibly
alienating  and  painful,  and  so  we  eagerly  grasp  at  a
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fictional reality composed of the basest stereotypes and
passed off as genuine.
In  The  Future  of  an  Illusion Freud  lays  out  a
formidable and chilling argument in which he describes
monotheistic world religions as a collective case of a self-
delusion  neurosis,  a  neurosis  cultivated  by  people
incapable of facing life’s problems without a cognitive /
affective crutch. And in  Civilization and Its Discontents
he  extends  that  argument  to  civilization  as  a  whole:
human society is a fabric of palatable lies,  woven over
the  ages  to  disguise  irresolvable  conflicts  within  each
individual  psyche.  Here  is  the  reality  which  our  new
national  religion,  reality  television,  does  everything  to
conceal.
In  its  tentative  encounter  with  its  host  culture  –
ourselves  –  American  cultural  anthropology  has  paid
insufficient  attention  to  these  fundamental  arguments
which  come to  us  brilliantly  presented  in  the  work  of
Camus  and  Freud.  Instead,  that  faltering  academic
discipline  has  preferred  virtually  to  ignore  Camus’
penetrating  analysis  of  modern  society  and  to  dismiss
Freud and the psychoanalytical approach as inadequate
to the task of the description and analysis of social action
(and  incidentally  has  tarred  Lévi-Strauss’  profound
thought with the same brush). Although anthropologists
may occasionally  speak of  cultural  analysis  as  cultural
criticism,  that  discussion  is  generally  confined  to
economic and political topics. But the problem before us
goes deeper; it goes right to the heart of the system of
basic values we profess to embrace. As suggested above,
a close analysis of those values reveals them to be shot
full  of  contradiction  and  ambivalence.  Rather  than
pursue  that  line  of  thought  rigorously,  cultural
anthropology  as  it  has  developed  in  the  United States
tends  to  put  a  happy  face  on  social  life,  taking as  its
program  the  elucidation  in  meticulous  detail  of  the
symbolic composition of culture – essentially an exercise
in hermeneutics which celebrates the intricate structure
of  its  subject,  and  not  the  discordant  systems  of  non-
meaning integral to the key dilemmas of American and
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any culture.
It is much nearer the truth to regard culture, not as a
treasure  trove  of  a  people’s  vital  essence,  but  as  a
disease, a virulent outbreak which infects and poisons its
carriers.  To  approach  culture  from  this  perspective
requires  the  anthropologist  to  examine  and  dissect  it
with the cold, analytical precision of the pathologist.  It
requires  Nietzsche’s  coldness,  which  he  advocated
repeatedly  to little avail.  [For applications of  this idea,
see  Culture,  Mind,  and  Physical  Reality:  An
Anthropological  Essay,  and  Shit  Happens:  An
Immoralist’s  Take  on  9/11  in  Terms  of  Self-Organized
Criticality, available at www.peripheralstudies.org] In its
advanced  pathological  state,  it  is  essential  that  the
anthropologist approach his analysis of American society
as a pathologist would a diseased organism, seeking out
the specific toxins and tumors which are in the process of
destroying it.
In  that  analysis,  a  particularly  malignant  tumor
attached  to  vital  organs  of  our  society  is  the  body  of
reality  shows;  these  sap  whatever  creative  energy
survives in a sadly diminished America. Those shows are
so virulent because they tap directly into the core tissue
of  American  values:  to  tame  the  wilderness  through
individual effort; to make something of oneself starting
with the very little available to the immigrant; or again,
in  a  phrase,  to  compete  and win.  It  is  often  said  that
American  society  owes  its  distinctive  character  to  the
experience  of  pioneers  and  settlers  faced  with  a  vast
frontier which they had to conquer or die in the attempt.
[See the classic work by Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land:
The American West as Symbol  and Myth] If  the grand
design of American culture may be described in this way,
then  one  might  suggest  that  the  historical  theme  is
repeated in the host of reality shows now inundating the
airways.  That  suggestion  would  come  with  a  crucial
disclaimer,  however,  which  we  owe  to  Marx’s  famous
observation in Eighteenth Brumaire:
Hegel  remarks  somewhere  that  all  great  world-
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historic facts and personages appear, so to speak,
twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy,
the second time as farce.
The tragedy of America is part of the larger tragedy of
the  Americas.  It  is  the  story  of  genocide  and
environmental  degradation  on  an unprecedented  scale,
perpetrated by European explorers and colonists turned
loose  on  the  New  World,  turned  loose  and  intent  on
enriching themselves, on  winning regardless of the cost
in human lives and established ecosystems:
The discovery of America was followed by possibly
the greatest demographic disaster in the history of
the world. [The Native Population of the Americas
in 1492, William M. Denevan, ed., 1992]
The  extent  of  the  carnage  and catastrophe  was  not
widely  acknowledged  for  centuries  after  the  event,
although lone and immediately  discredited voices were
raised from the beginning (the work of Bartolomé de las
Casas being an outstanding example).  It might be hoped
that the mistake would have been corrected by the young
discipline of cultural anthropology,  which in the United
States came of age through exhaustive studies of Native
American societies.  [See the impressive volumes of the
Bureau  of  American  Ethnology]  To  its  lasting  shame,
however, the foremost authorities on those groups, Alfred
Kroeber,  dean  of  American  anthropology,  and  Julian
Steward,  editor  of  the  canonical  Handbook  of  South
American Indians, grossly underestimated the indigenous
population  of  the  Americas.  In  a  flagrant  display  of
professorial  arrogance,  Kroeber  and Stewart  dismissed
population figures of thirty-five to fifty million advanced
by  Las  Casas  and  other  scholars  as  the  inflated  and
fanciful  work  of  non-specialists.  Instead,  Kroeber
proposed a figure of 8.4 million and Steward 15.6 million.
[“Native American population.” American Anthropologist,
n.s., vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1-25. Alfred Kroeber, 1934; Julian
Steward,  Handbook]  With  their  influence  in  the  field,
those  numbers  were  not  seriously  challenged  for
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decades.  They provide a jarring contrast with the best
current estimates of indigenous population at the time of
Columbus’ arrival: 54 to 75 million. [see Denevan] Tens
of  millions  perished  from smallpox,  measles,  influenza,
and massacres, and the response by anthropologists was
to count moccasin beads and record the quaint customs
of the few survivors.
On a smaller scale, the tragedy of America unfolded in
an especially agonizing manner: in the Rocky Mountain
west  with  the  coming  of  the  mountain  men  and  their
exploitation by the first of the robber barons, John Jacob
Astor and his American Fur Company. Perhaps no figure
in  American  history  or  legend  is  imbued  with  the
independence and supreme competence of the mountain
man:  living  by  his  wits  in  a  wild  and  hostile  land,  he
survived hunger, bitter winters, and Indian attacks. And
not only survived,  he triumphed.  In the best  American
tradition, he won. At least for a couple of decades. Even
before the beaver began to run out and European tastes
changed  to  silk,  legendary  mountain  men  like  Jim
Bridger,  John  Colter,  and  John  “Liver-Eating”  Johnson
(most  definitely  not the individual  portrayed by Robert
Redford  in  Jeremiah  Johnson)  felt  the  pressure  to
abandon their  independent  lifestyle  in  favor of  a  more
regimented existence as employees of a fur company. It
was  a  fundamental  change  in  a  nascent  American
culture: the freest of men became pawns in a new world
of big business crafted by Astor and later robber barons
such as Leland Stanford and Cornelius Vanderbilt. Astor
and  the  others  had  learned  the  secret  of  capitalist
alchemy: how to change the blood and sweat of others
into gold for themselves.
With  the  advent  of  reality  television,  the  tragedy  of
America  has  returned  as  farce.  Astor  and  the  robber
barons  have  given  way  to  an  even  more  crushing
economic  force:  multinational  corporations  which
sponsor  television  shows  carefully  designed  by  media
giants  to  bring  in  the  circus  audiences  with  their
consumer  dollars  (an  insidious  refinement  of  the  early
Roman political palliative, with the masses now supplying
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bread  for  their  masters).  The  most  popular  shows,
Survivor and  American  Idol,  have  replaced  immensely
brave and talented personalities like Bridger and Johnson
with  shallow  caricatures  of  heroes  and  heroines  who
submit themselves to the abuse of the shows’ directors
and judges in return for a shot at fame and fortune. It is a
pathetic  charade  of  competition  in  which  even  the
supreme American value, winning, has lost its meaning,
become a minor ripple in the onrushing torrent of 24/7
cable news. Who were last year’s winners of Survivor and
American Idol?  Or the year  before,  or  the year before
that? No one knows; no one cares; it doesn’t matter at
all;  the  circus  opens  tonight  under  the  big  top/screen
with a new cast of stunted, superficial characters ready
to endure any humiliation for a moment of glory. And we,
the American multitudes, will be glued to our sets.
In  what  Nietzsche might  have  called  an  example  of
world-historical irony, one season of Survivor managed to
take things beyond farce into sheer travesty and thereby
expose  a  fundamental  but  contingent  premise  of
American  culture:  competition  and  reward  are
inseparably  linked.  Who  could  disagree  with  that
premise, which is the basis of the American experience
from grade school to the grave, the underlying force at
school,  at  work,  at  play,  and,  in  its  distilled  essence,
reality television? You compete,  win, and are rewarded
with trophies, money, adulation. You compete, lose, and
are rejected and forgotten.
As with all previous seasons,  Survivor embraced this
premise in its 2009 installment: Survivor: Tocantins – The
Brazilian  Highlands.  Set  on  the  Tocantins  River,  a
tributary of the Amazon in north-central Brazil, the show
followed  its  usual  format  of  dividing  the  sixteen
contestants  into  two  “tribes,”  thus  underscoring  its
adventure theme of primitive life in exotic locales. The
names selected for the two tribes were Jalapao, after the
region of Brazil where the show was filmed, and Timbira,
the name of an actual tribe of Brazilian Indians whose
survivors lived about a hundred miles from the Survivor
camp. It would be interesting to know the circumstances
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behind the selection of the latter name; apparently it was
done to add a touch of local color – American contestants
playing at being actual indigenous Brazilians. The series
unfolded with the usual  ridiculous tasks,  back-stabbing
alliances,  hidden  immunity  idols,  the  exile  island,  and
elections to vote out unpopular players. The final election
ended,  as  always,  with  a  Sole  Survivor,  who  took  the
million-dollar prize and became a television personality
for a few days. Competition and reward, two sides of a
coin.
The travesty perpetrated by the show’s directors on an
unknowing  and  uncaring  American  audience  was  in
selecting  “Timbira”  as  a  catchy  name  for  one  of  the
show’s  “tribes.”  For  everything  in  actual  Timbira  life,
with its traditional homeland a bare hundred miles away,
contradicts the premise of competition-reward etched in
American thought and exploited in the  Survivor series.
Had  the  directors  and  writers  for  Survivor:  Tocantins
bothered  to  do  more  than  superficial  background
research in selecting a site for the 2009 show, they would
have discovered an anthropological classic,  The Eastern
Timbira
<http://ia700305.us.archive.org/1/items/timbira/nimuend
aju_1946_timbira.pdf>,  by  one  of  the  foremost
ethnographers  in  the  discipline’s  brief  history,  Kurt
Nimuendajú.
The Timbira are one of several groups associated with
the Gê linguistic-cultural stock found throughout central
Brazil(others  include  the  Sherente,  Shavante,  and
Apinayé). [In addition to Nimuendajú’s monograph, for a
thorough discussion of  Timbira  culture see  The Dream
and the Dance: A Comparative Study of Initiatory Death,
available  at  www.peripheralstudies.org]  A  prominent
institution  of  these  groups,  and  one  elaborated  in
intricate detail  by the Timbira, is the log race. For the
race the Timbira form two teams whose membership is
based on one of several dual divisions, or moieties, in the
social organization of the village (age set moieties, rainy
season moieties, plaza group moieties, ceremonial group
moieties  –  theirs  is,  indeed,  an  intricate  society).  The
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teams  travel  several  miles  from  the  village  into  the
galleria forest,  where  they  cut  two  sections  of  burity
palm,  each weighing 150-200 pounds.  The race begins
with  a  member  of  each  team  shouldering  the  heavy,
cumbersome log and running at  full  speed toward the
village. When he tires the log is handed off in mid-stride
to a second runner and so on until the exhausted runners
reach  the  village  and  deposit  their  logs  in  designated
ceremonial locations. A classic competition with a race to
the finish line? A race with winners and losers (hopefully
none  of  whom  have  ingested  performance-enhancing
drugs that could be detected by a Timbira chapter of the
USADA)? No, on the contrary, the Timbira undertake the
grueling  competition  for  its  own  sake:  it  is  a  race  in
which the purpose is  to race, not to celebrate a winner
and denigrate the losers.
Log races form the national sport not only of all the
Timbira  (p.  141  f.),  including  the  Apinaye,  but
probably of all Northwestern and Central Gê. None
of  the  other  numerous  observances  that
characterize the public life of  these  tribes has so
deeply roused the attention of civilized observers.
This is primarily because, next to the girls’ dances
in  the  plaza,  log  racing  is  the  most  frequently
repeated  ceremony;  further,  it  stands  out  for  its
dramatic impressiveness.
And  now  we  come  to  the  feature  that  remains
incomprehensible  to  Brazilians  and  leads  to  his
constantly ascribing ulterior motives to this Indian
game:  The  victor  and  the  others  who  have
desperately  exerted  themselves  to  the  bitter  end
receive not a word of praise, nor are the losers and
outstripped  runners  subject  to  the  least  censure;
there are neither triumphant nor disgruntled faces.
The sport is an end in itself, not the means to satisfy
personal or group vanity. Not a trace of jealously or
animosity  is  to  be  detected  between  the  teams.
Each participant has done his best because he likes
to do so in a log race. Who turns out to be the victor
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or loser makes as little difference as who has eaten
most at a banquet (Nimuendajú 1946: 136, 139).
The  farce  Marx  chronicles  in  Eighteenth  Brumaire
pales  in  comparison  with  the  travesty  of  Survivor:
Tocantins, Had old Karl been around to view the show, it
would  have  had  him  clawing  at  his  carbuncles  and
begging for mercy: Stop! No more of the utter absurdity
of human existence! (After all, that is supposed to obey
the  laws  of  historical  determinism,  not  chaos).  Louis
Bonaparte, that caricature of Napoleon, doesn’t begin to
compare with the mediocrities paraded on Survivor.
* * *
In  its  obsession  with  competition  and  reward,
American culture manages to trivialize  athletic  activity
beyond recognition, to destroy the inherent joy of doing.
Running or riding a bicycle, along with hitting a baseball,
throwing a football, swimming, and skiing may be done
for the sheer enjoyment of the activity,  of experiencing
one’s body in concerted motion. Breath-hold diving over
a coral reef, open-water swimming in Puget Sound (see
Edwin  Dobb’s  brilliant  essay,  “Immersed  in  the  Wild”
<http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.11/immersed-in-the-
wild>),  skiing  a  winding  mountain  trail  beneath  a
stratospheric blue sky, running for miles along a deserted
country road, can be, like the Timbira log race, ends in
themselves,  instances  of  genuine  re-creation that
transport the individual to another realm of being. That
experience is close to the exhilaration described by those
13th century Provençal troubadours, whose gai saber or
joy-in-knowing/doing  Nietzsche  commemorated  in  The
Gay  Science,  echoing  his  own  dedication  to  careful
experimentation (suchen and  versuchen) rather than to
methodical system-building. To resort to a term no longer
fashionable, it is about the quest.
It  becomes almost  impossible  for  us to  capture that
sense of exhilaration when our daily existence is subject
to a practice that governs American life:  keeping score.
292
LANCE ARMSTRONG
What did you get on the Chem test? How fast did you run
the mile? How did you do on the SATs? What number is
on  your  paycheck?  How big  is  your  house?  Your  car?
Even,  for  God’s  sake,  your  dick?  (Time  to  email  that
order for Viagra – comes in a plain brown wrapper! But,
oops,  definitely  a  performance-enhancing  drug!).  All
these  questions  and  countless  others  like  them  are
distilled in what we do for fun – or have others do for us:
sports. Guys who could not manage even to run the bases
sit  slumped  in  seats  at  Yankee  Stadium,  cradling
scorecards they can barely  see over their  beer bellies,
but  they  keep  score.  The  activity  itself,  the  lived
experience of superbly conditioned athletes on the field is
reduced to a pile of lifeless statistics, the raw material for
an endless stream of other numbers that eventually lead
to selecting The Winner, the Sole Survivor in American
society’s reality show of Life.
These absurd questions and activities which permeate
and shape all of  life in America conceal a monumental
irony, a cosmic joke: Our obsessive need to keep score, to
identify  and reward  those  who are  very  good  at  what
they do, may well lead to missing or misinterpreting truly
exceptional  individuals  who  fall  outside  the  limited
perspectives of the all-too-ordinary individuals who pass
judgment on them.
There is a story here, really an apocryphal anecdote (it
is  an  Einstein  story  and,  like  most,  probably  is
apocryphal).  It  concerns an organization that is  one of
the  most  prominent  scorekeepers  in  the  country  and,
increasingly,  around the world: the Educational Testing
Service,  creator  and  administrator  of  the  SATs  which
have impacted the lives of oh-so-many Americans. From
an early age children with some intelligence are taught
to dread the SATs; they are told that a high score may
advance their chances of becoming a professional  or a
manager  of  some sort,  and thus  joining that  shrinking
middle class (nineteen per cent and going down) which
Domhoff described (see above).  A low or even average
score may doom a child of a family with ordinary means
to a difficult life of labor and menial jobs; he will sink into
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that vast pool of eighty per cent of the population who
are just surviving. The story goes like this:
It  seems  that  when  the  ETS  was  just  getting
organized  in  the  late  1940s,  its  button-down
executives  were  anxious  to  determine  the
effectiveness  of  the  math  section  in  particular  –
mathematical facts being irrefutable, they wished to
calibrate  their  set  of  questions  so  that  the  test
would accurately identify how students performed
on a scale of  dull  to brilliant.  Since the ETS was
located in the intellectual Mecca of Princeton, New
Jersey, someone had a bright idea: just up the road,
at the Institute  for Advanced Study, there was an
individual who was making quite a stir in the world
of  mathematics  and  physics,  one  Albert  Einstein.
Why not have him take the SAT math test they had
just  put  together?  Certainly  he  would  establish  a
benchmark  against  which  young test-takers  could
be ranked. So they approached Einstein, he agreed,
and they sat him down with the test. Now a major
portion of the math SAT tests a student’s ability to
discern a pattern in a series of numbers. A question
would supply a four-number series, say 2-4-6-8 and
a multiple-choice set  of  possible  answers,  say 16,
24,  10,  1.  The  student  is  required  to  select  the
answer which best  fits the pattern established by
the  four-number  series,  in  this  case  the  “10.”  As
Einstein went through this section of the test,  for
each question he thought of an equation that would
fit each of the multiple-choice possibilities. Then he
picked the answer which gave him what he found to
be the most  interesting  equation  –  almost  always
not the answer the test designers wanted.
This  little  experiment  doubtlessly  disappointed  the
ETS executives, but judging from the content of the SAT
math test  which has been inflicted on students for the
past sixty-plus years, its results did nothing to dissuade
them from their course of action. Einstein was obviously
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an anomaly, an oddball, and his toying with their sacred
exam could safely be disregarded.
A thought  which  might  have  given  them pause,  but
clearly did not occur to the right-thinking, compete-and-
win executives of the ETS, is that if anomalies occur in so
highly  structured  a  world  as  theoretical  physics,  what
bizarre  deviations  from  agreed-on,  socially  acceptable
norms might be found in other walks of life? In order to
keep score it is necessary to have an authoritative scale,
a means of ranking and grading individual performance.
But  there  are in  this  life  those  rare individuals  whose
extraordinary gifts defy ranking;  they go off the scales
fixed by mediocrities like the executives of ETS. People
are different, and a few people are so vastly different that
it is senseless to tabulate, to score their performance. In
a catch phrase from the failed cultural revolution of the
late 1960s, now but a sad and haunting memory, there
are indeed the haves and have-nots,  but there are also
the have-something-elses.  Those remarkable individuals
either go off the charts or, more often and tragically, fall
between  the  cracks  of  the  charts.  In  that  case  their
exceptional  ability,  which  initially  establishes  them  as
stars (or what our punitive society would call “persons of
interest”)  dooms  them to  censure  and  sometimes  ruin
when they allow their  exceptional  abilities,  whether  in
mathematics  (John  Nash),  chess  (Bobby  Fischer),
engineering  (Nikola  Tesla),  aviation  (Chuck  Yeager),
philosophy (Friedrich Nietzsche), poker (Stu Ungar), or,
in the case at hand, bicycle racing (Lance Armstrong), to
run afoul of standards of acceptable behavior.
Even if we insist on maintaining scales to rank people,
we encounter the next insuperable obstacle: There is not
a single scale or even a few which adequately evaluate
individual ability. Rather, there is a tangled multitude of
scales  which  cross-cut  and  often  conflict  with  one
another, so that any attempt to implement one hopelessly
distorts  the over-arching truth of  boundless  difference.
As  a  thirteen-year  old  Lance  Armstrong  already
possessed an unprecedented combination of raw physical
ability  and mental  determination.  Yet  everything about
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his society  and his immediate circumstances – he was,
after all, named after a star wide-receiver of the Dallas
Cowboys;  such  was  his  family  tradition  –  led  him  to
embrace organized sport  as the means of  realizing his
potential.  And that  decision,  taken in  the  context  of  a
judgmental  and  punitive  society,  proved  his  undoing.
None of us can experience or perhaps even imagine the
tremendous stamina and mental  toughness  required to
stay at the head of the pack of the Tour de France, day
after day, year after year, but all too many of us are quite
prepared to thwart those remarkable displays, to declare
them illegal, not sufficiently “healthy and clean” for the
fearful and vengeful herd of non-entities that makes up
American society.
A parting thought:
The vast sea of seven billion human beings awash on
this fragile planet, those multitudes, are akin to the night
sky  –  dark,  without  depth  or  substance,  obscure,
formless. That sea makes up a background for the stars,
each  star  impossibly  isolated  from  the  others,  alone,
blazing in the dark immensity of space, each with its own
history, its birth, evolution, and death. There is no race
course,  no set of standardized tests,  no  contest of any
description that a star must strive to win. The star’s light
radiates aimlessly,  forever,  illuminating the darkness of
space and imparting to it whatever form it may possess.
Here or there its beams happen to strike a random atom,
perhaps, on the rarest of occasions, an atom in the retina
of a sentient being . . .  That is all there is, that is the
“career” of the star. Here or there . . . here or there an
individual star blazes so brightly that it consumes itself,
devours its own matter,  reaching the point  at  which it
collapses  in  on  itself  in  a  spectacular  explosion,  a
supernova  of  cosmic  proportions,  incinerating  or
scorching everything around it. Then it sinks into oblivion
forever. Lance Armstrong.
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Th-th-th-that’s all folks!
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Chapter 11
RITUAL MURDER
Jean La Fontaine
Ritual murder is a phrase used by many people but what
does it actually mean, or imply? To remind you – ritual is
a religious performance and embodies authority; its aim
is public, the personnel that perform it and, ideally, their
actions,  are  specified  and  cannot  be  varied  without
weakening its efficacy.1 Its aim benefits those for whom it
is  performed.  Ritual  concerns  the  sacred  and  it  is  a
truism of anthropology that it  also invokes the highest
cultural legitimacy, activating spiritual powers, whether
they be of gods, spirits, or ancestors, in order to achieve
a beneficent result.
Murder is, by contrast, immoral and illegal; it is an act
carried out in secret that attracts a severe penalty. In all
societies killing human beings is subject to some form of
regulation that define what is illegitimate killing, that is
to say murder.2 Murder commonly pollutes the murderer
who must be ritually cleansed; the victim’s kin incur the
duty to seek vengeance or compensation. In Western i.e.
Christian doctrine all killing is wrong: thou shalt not kill;
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in other societies there may be exceptions to a general
rule. These exceptions generally designate categories of
person who are virtually  rendered non-human by  their
exclusion. Killing them is not murder. In Bugisu, where I
first worked, sorcerers and homosexuals were excluded
in this way; killing them was not murder and entailed no
blood guilt. Murder then is the opposite of a religious act;
it  is  the  prototype  of  illegitimate  action.  Murder
performed  as  part  of  a  ritual  implies  the  existence  of
religious  acts  which are not  legitimate  and which are,
like murder, illicit and morally wrong. Ritual murder is
thus an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms and for any
anthropologist this requires investigation.
Several  forms  of  killing  may  also  be  referred  to  as
ritual murder. There is also a common synonym, human
sacrifice, which is used in much the same sense. What
the killings seem to have in common is a link to the realm
of spiritual  power.  One of  the aims of  this  paper is  to
compare these concepts and show that whereas human
sacrifice involved real killings, ritual murder is a much
more shadowy concept, invoked often enough to describe
grisly  events  or  denigrate  particular  communities,  but
never pinned down by reliable evidence. In fact, as I shall
argue, the idea of ritual murder is just that, an idea that
in  Britain  represents  the  epitome  of  evil  and  which
denotes  the  alien  nature  of  other  people  outside  what
may be known as “the civilised world” or, worse still, the
horror  of  the  evil  within.  In  this  respect  it  resembles
witchcraft. I shall come back to this.
While  it  is  sometimes  said  that  academics  are  too
prone to spend their time arguing about definitions and
distinctions  I  would  argue  that  such  discussions
frequently lead to clarification of ideas and this is my aim
here.  In  my  approach  though,  I  follow  the  French
historian Muchembled who wrote of the risk carried by
an  analysis  of  ideas  without  taking  into  account  their
social context; this is the risk that “the investigator will
describe  his  own  mental  processes  rather  than  the
subject of his research” (Muchembled 1960:141). That he
wrote  this  in  an  article  about  witchcraft  makes  his
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remarks even more relevant.  To  avoid  this  risk  I  shall
consider try to give at least some of the social context of
the relevant ethnography.
The  impetus  to  write  this  paper  was  given  by  the
reactions  evoked  by  a  film  in  the  television  series,
Dispatches,  which  some  of  you  may  have  seen.  It
concerned  a  series  of  murders  in  Uganda  that  were
referred to both as ritual murder and as human sacrifice,
although I would argue that they were neither. This set
various  anthropologists,  myself  included,  against  the
film-makers  who  can be  said  to  represent  the  general
(British) public, although I am aware that journalists are
usually believed to be more sceptical than most people.
Professor  Pat  Caplan  wrote  an  article  about  this
controversy  for  Anthropology  Today (26 (2)  4-7)  which
provides a useful summary of what happened. The cause
of  this  major  disagreement  between  film-makers  and
anthropologists  was  the  alleged  existence  of  a  rapid
increase  of  killings,  particularly  of  children,  who were
murdered  and  then  mutilated.  It  was  this  that  was
referred  to  as  “child  sacrifice”  or  ritual  murder.  In
support of their view the film-makers relied heavily on a
man who confessed to having killed 70 individuals but to
have reformed. He claimed to be mounting a campaign
against  child sacrifice.  Most  of  the anthropologists  did
not believe him, recognising the type of Christian leader
whose conversion gains added lustre from the contrast
with the blackness of former sin, and considering what
people say as weak evidence without reliable information
on what  they  do  or  have  done.  While  the  film-makers
reported that they had been told by reliable witnesses of
multiple  killings  and  mutilations,  a  Ugandan
anthropologist from Makerere referred to the situation as
“hysteria”  and  linked  it  to  the  popularity  of  Nigerian
(Nollywood) films in which such killings feature. A series
of  fairly  heated emails  were exchanged most  of  which
found  their  way  to  Adam  Kuper’s  London  Review  of
Books blog.
Caplan’s  aim  was  not  to  decide  either  way  but  to
300
RITUAL MURDER
discuss the two main topics she thought had been raised
by  the  controversy:  the  first  concerned  “the
interpretation  of  witchcraft  and other  forms of  alleged
ritual  killings  in  contemporary  Africa  …”  while  the
second, which I  shall  not consider,  had to do with the
media  and  what  she  calls  ‘public  anthropology’.  She
argued  that  anthropologists  are  inclined  to  interpret
allegations of witchcraft as ideas and moral values in the
classical tradition, implying that this leads them to deny
the reality of such beliefs. She does not spell out whether
she  means  that  they  deny  that  people  actually  are
witches or that what they do works. She points out that,
in  an  alternative  view  of  ‘occult  phenomena’:  “some
anthropologists  working  in  Africa  have  accepted  that
there  has  indeed  been  an  increase  in  allegations  of
witchcraft,  but  also  in  its  material  manifestations,
including killing and the removal of body parts….” Here
killing for  body  parts  is  identified  with  witchcraft;  the
other material manifestations are not specified. So, not
only is there a dispute between anthropologists and the
journalists about what is going on in Africa but there are
opposed  views  among  anthropologists.  I  shall  try  and
show  that  this  situation  is  in  part  a  confusion  of
terminology.
I  turn now to what we know about killings that are
linked with beliefs in occult phenomena and I start with
human sacrifice.
Human sacrifice
The killing of a living creature as a ritual offering to a
god or spirit used to be termed a blood sacrifice, an old-
fashioned term that focuses attention on the spilling of
blood. The blood may be important, less in itself, than as
a  manifestation  of  the  dispatch  of  a  victim’s  life  as
offering  to  the  spiritual  being  or  beings  to  whom the
ritual is addressed. Usually a return is expected in the
form  of  good  fortune,  whether  generalised  or  as  the
granting of a particular prayer. Blood sacrifice might also
be used to cleanse sufferers from sin, prevent misfortune
or failure and avert evil. In some cases the blood spilled
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was human.
However, not all sacrifices entail the spilling of blood;
victims were killed in other ways and in some societies,
and on some occasions, it was actually important  not to
spill the victim’s blood. The reference to blood has been
dropped now and we consider sacrifice in general. This is
a  part  of  rituals  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  though
usually the offering takes the form of an animal or even a
bird. Most anthropologists in the field in Africa have seen
at  least  one  of  these  sacrifices,  usually  involving  a
chicken  or  a  goat.  The  more  valued  the  creature
sacrificed, the greater the honour done the recipient of
the offering.3
The most valuable of all life is that of a human being
and human sacrifice, where it occurred, was the greatest
possible ritual gift. Human sacrifice has been recorded in
many  parts  of  the  world  although,  as  historians  have
pointed  out,  executions  and  other  killings  of  human
beings  have  sometimes  been  wrongly  interpreted  as
human  sacrifice  (Wilks  cited  in  Law  1985).  The  most
famous  example  is  perhaps  that  of  the  Aztecs,  whose
human sacrifice allegedly consisted of a heart taken from
a living victim.
There is evidence that human sacrifice took place in
antiquity  in  societies,  including  some  in  what  is  now
Britain, bordering the Roman and Greek Empires, whose
members  sacrificed  only  animals  and  birds.  Rituals
including it have been described by outside observers. In
Central America the practice of human sacrifice among
the  Aztecs  and  Incas  was  recorded  by  the  invading
Spaniards in early modern times and in parts of Africa by
the  Europeans  who  came first  as  traders  and  then  as
colonisers. There is most information on human sacrifice
in Africa where it has been described in relatively recent
times by travellers,  missionaries and by officials of the
colonising powers, so I will draw largely on that material
as summarised in a useful article by the historian Robin
Law.4 There is no doubt that this killing took place as part
of public rituals and was considered legitimate.
302
RITUAL MURDER
In  Africa,  human  sacrifice  was  a  practice  largely
confined  to  some  kingdoms  of  West  Africa,  such  as
Asante,  Benin,  Dahomey,  Calabar  and the riverine Ibo,
although  disregard  of  human  life  was  much  more
widespread.5 Human beings were sacrificed as offerings
to  gods  and  to  the  dead,  particularly  dead  kings  and
other  elite  forbears.  In  the  West  African  kingdom  of
Dahomey,  a  regular  ritual  of  remembrance  offered  to
dead kings, known as the Annual Customs, required the
sacrifice of human victims to strengthen the dead rulers’
spiritual powers and by showing the filial piety, engage
them on behalf of his successor. It also demonstrated the
mundane power  of  the ruler  and the legitimacy  of  his
position (Law 1985), the former function being explicitly
recognised by one such ruler, King Kpengla of Dahomey,
who explained succinctly the need for human sacrifice to
a European enquirer in the 1780s as follows: “You have
seen  me  kill  many  men  at  the  Customs.  This  gives  a
grandeur to my Customs, far beyond the display of fine
things which I buy. This makes my enemies fear me and
gives me a name in the bush.”6
In  West  Africa,  as  in  ancient  China  and  elsewhere,
funerals  might  entail  the  killing  of  human  beings  to
accompany the dead. A great ruler might be buried with
his  wives  and/or  members  of  his  entourage to provide
him  with  a  suitable  retinue  in  the  afterlife.  The
individuals who were killed were not, strictly speaking,
sacrificed, since they were not killed as offerings either
to  the  gods  or  the  spirit  of  the  dead  king  or  ruler.
Moreover  it  is  alleged  in  some  cases  that  the  close
associates of the dead man volunteered to die, much as
Indian  widows  were  traditionally  expected  to  commit
suicide  on  the  funeral  pyre  of  their  dead  husband7.
Nevertheless, the term human sacrifice may be used to
refer to these practices, since the additional deaths were
an integral  part of  the funeral  ritual.  In  parts  of  West
Africa, individuals might also be killed as messengers to
the dead in addition to the normal human sacrifices. Fear
of  the  approaching  colonial  powers  resulted  in  many
human sacrifices to avert military disaster.
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Killings  as  offerings  to  the  dead  may  not  seem  to
Westerners to be sacrifices, in that they are not offerings
to  gods.  However  in  many African  religions,  ancestors
are  holy  beings,  with  spiritual  powers  to  reward  or
punish  their  descendants.  There  may  be  some
recognition of a vaguely conceptualised creator god but
as  a  remote  deity,  uninterested  in  human  affairs;  the
ancestors are usually the spirits to whom one appeals for
help in trouble. Thus in Dahomey when human sacrifices
were made “to water the graves of the ancestors” they
were  as  much part  of  their  religion  as  other  religious
festivals. Hence we may call these sacrifices and where
the victim was human they were human sacrifices.
Two patterns among the selection  of  victims can be
seen. The victim for sacrifice may be chosen either as a
particularly  pure  or  valuable  human  being:  a  child,  a
virgin  or  a  young  warrior;  alternatively  the  opposite
choice  is  made;  the  victim  is  an  outsider:  captive,
representative  of  a  defeated enemy,  or  a  slave.  Slaves
might also be bought to be sacrificed, thus avoiding the
need to kill a member of the community. However, where
the tally of captives and slaves was inadequate, victims
might be taken by force from among them.
The  Greeks  and  Romans  offered  blood  sacrifices  to
their  gods  but  they  were  never  human  sacrifices,
although  both  they  and  the  Greeks  kept  slaves  whom
they  might  have  sacrificed.  In  fact  the  Romans
characterised  some  societies  on  the  margins  of  their
empires as barbarians because they did perform human
sacrifices.  The  failure  to  draw  a  distinction  between
human beings and animals which the existence of human
sacrifice implied, was to both Greeks and Romans clear
evidence of the lack of civilisation of those people who
practised it. Those they conquered, such as the tribes in
what is now Britain, were strongly discouraged from the
practice. In the early centuries of the Christian Era from
which  this  information  comes  there  were  increasing
number  of  Christians  within  the  Roman  Empire  who
believed that the death of Jesus was “a full, perfect and
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sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the whole world”8 and it
rendered  any  sacrifice,  not  merely  unnecessary,  but  a
failure  of  faith.  Pagans  who  offered  sacrifices  to  their
gods were barbarians.  Thus sacrifice and in particular,
what  was  sacrificed,  was  a  powerful  symbol  for  both
communities,  dividing  them and  justifying  to  each  the
inferiority of the other.
Human sacrifice is no longer practised, even in those
societies  where  it  used  to  be  part  of  the  traditional
religious rites. Apart from the disapproval of the Romans,
the spread of Christianity in territories taken as colonies
by European powers, starting with Spain and Portugal in
southern America in early modern times, have rendered
it immoral and illegal in many areas where it used to be
practised. Islam, spreading southwards from North Africa
into Africa south of the Sahara, put an end to the practice
in  the  north  of  many  West  African  states  and  further
colonisation by the European powers in the nineteenth
century has forcibly ended the practice in the southern
areas9.  There may be talk of its revival in independent
West African states where it has only been a century or
so since the practice was stopped, but the stories are, so
far, only unconfirmed rumours. There has been no public
revival of the practice. But people persist in associating
Africa  with  human  sacrifice.  Since  the  practice  is
abhorred in Britain it is also seen as ritual murder.
There are also practices that are sometimes confused
with  human  sacrifice  or  considered  to  be  necessarily
linked to it. Cannibalism is not an inevitable consequence
of human sacrifice nor are the victims dismembered for
use in some other way, although the Aztecs were reputed
to eat the hearts of human sacrifices. Some peoples, in
many different parts of the world – the Ijo of West Africa
are an example – ate parts of their dead enemies as a
means of magically taking over their strength. Marshall
Sahlins  describes  with  some gusto  similar  practices  in
Fiji (Anthropology Today 19 (3) 3-5). Such practices have
been referred to as ritual cannibalism, since they have
magical  and  spiritual  connotations  to  the  participants.
However,  in  Africa,  although  animal  sacrifices  were
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normally eaten at the end of a ritual, in a feast whose
participants were carefully selected for their relation to
the  spirit  (usually  an  ancestor)  in  whose  honour  the
sacrifice  had  been  offered,  human  sacrifices  were  not
eaten. Speaking generally, cannibalism, even as a ritual,
was always much less frequent than human sacrifice.
The rationale for  eating human sacrificial  victims or
enemies who had been killed in battle, was that power
was thought to be inherent in parts of the human body,
even after death. The same belief lies behind the use of
body parts in ‘medicines’10 records of which in Africa go
back as far as the 17th century.  These ‘medicines’  are
magical  concoctions  but  their  purposes  are  purely
secular; they are put together by specialists, who charge
for  their  services  and they  purport  to  ensure  success,
wealth and the confounding of enemies. The magicians
often referred to as witchdoctors may employ killers to
obtain what they need or may kill themselves. The use of
human body parts is said to give the 'muti'  very great
power. This is a form of magic or sorcery, concocted in
secrecy  for  the  benefit  of  the  sorcerer’s  client  and  of
course  to  increase  the  renown  and  wealth  of  the
magician.  Universally  stigmatised  as  ‘bad’  or  ‘evil’  the
practice has nevertheless been reported widely in Africa.
The early records of this ‘medicine’ came from West
Africa  but  it  probably  occurred  elsewhere  as  well.  In
modern times, from the end of the twentieth century to
the present, murders for the purpose of making medicine
(the South African term  muti may be used)  have been
reported in large numbers from South Africa and from
much of East Africa. The murders of albino Tanzanians
for  ‘muti’  were  widely  publicised  in  the  international
press.  The  acquisition  of  body  parts  does  not  always
require killing. Some unfortunate victims have been left
alive after limbs have been severed.
The “child sacrifices” in Uganda were killings for such
magical purposes. The police reported that some corpses
lacked  limbs  or  organs.  (Killing  was  not  always
necessary; in Kenya recently two men have been arrested
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for dealing in body parts obtained from a crematorium).
But murders for body parts are not offerings to any god
or spirit but killings for gain: both the client who orders
and the magician/ sorcerer who prepares the ‘medicine’
profit  by  the  death.  While  the  belief  in  the  power  of
human body parts may be called magical thinking, as can
the idea that albino body parts have greater power than
normal African ones, the killing is not part of any ritual.
Children  and  young  people  may  be  chosen  as  victims
more often because of their purity and the potential for
growth in their bodies, but their selection may be simply
the more mundane one of greater ease of capture. We do
not know, as everything about these ‘medicine’ killings is
secret until the mutilated body is found. Whereas human
sacrifice was performed openly and as part of rituals that
were believed to benefit the community, these murders
are furtive and hidden,  fuelled  by  individual  ambitions
and  the  lust  for  wealth  and  power.  They  are
manifestations of continuing belief in the power of magic
(or sorcery if you prefer) but not of witchcraft which has
never  rested  on  material  proof  except  the  misfortunes
that  are,  with  hindsight,  attributed  to  it.  Killings  for
‘muti’  are  openly  condemned  by  members  of  the
communities  where  they  take  place  but  they  are  not
human sacrifices or even ritual murders.
Ritual murder
If  ritual  murder  is  not  human sacrifice  or  killing to
obtain ingredients  for  powerful  magic,  what  is  it?  The
term implies a killing to obtain spiritual powers that are
not  recognised  as  morally  right,  but  are  evil  and
dangerous.  So  far  from  being  the  same  as  human
sacrifice it is its antithesis.
It is in Western Europe that one finds this idea of ritual
murder and it has a long history. In the second century
AD,  Christians  may have despised the religion of  their
pagan neighbours for the blood spilt in their rituals, but
much worse allegations were made against these small
dissident  groups  within  the  Roman body  (Rives  1995).
Christians  were  said  to  worship  their  god  in  secret,
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performing rites in which there were sexual orgies, often
incestuous  and  cannibal  feasts.  The  central  act  of  the
ritual  was  the  killing  and  eating  of  a  child  or  baby,
perhaps stolen for the purpose. Since the early Christians
were  forced  to  conceal  their  gatherings,  meeting  in
secret,  the  conviction  that  they  were  engaged  in
shameful acts seemed plausible. In AD 177 in Lyons, a
number of Christians were publicly tortured and killed by
the  Roman  authorities  and  these  allegations  played  a
large part in their condemnation. Some of those who died
cried out denials of the accusations, proof of the role they
had had in these horrible deaths.
When  Christianity  became  the  dominant  religion  in
Europe,  the  idea  of  secret  groups  practising  ritual
murder did not disappear; Christian authorities took over
the myth that had earlier been used to justify their own
persecution.  Like  their  Roman predecessors  they  used
the  accusation  of  ritual  murder  to  denigrate  and
persecute opponents. In this case it was those divergent
religious  communities  such  as  the  Waldensians  or  the
Cathars who were designated heretics and accused of it.
Centuries later, in a more elaborate development of the
story,  ritual  murder  was believed  to  be  carried out  by
covens  of  witches,  gathering  to  worship  the  devil  and
feast on the flesh of human sacrifice.
They  represented  the  opposite  of  all  that  was
considered good and their pleasure was to do evil  and
ultimately to destroy society. The rituals they performed
were the opposite of Christian services: they took place
at night, not in the daytime and in secret locations, not in
public buildings that were known and open to all; most
sinister  of  all,  the  rites  included  practices  that
represented all  that was believed to be against  human
nature: cannibalistic feasts, incest and other perversions.
It was these ideas that triggered the infamous witchhunts
of early modern Europe.
The picture that I have drawn was built up gradually
during the centuries.  The people who were accused of
ritual  murder,  or  suspected  if  they  were  not  accused,
308
RITUAL MURDER
were people seen as non-believers, outsiders, whose very
existence  threatened  the  fabric  of  society.  Belief  in
hidden  conspiracies,  secret  societies  whose  members
aimed to rule the world, were rife from the eighteenth
century onwards. Subsequently Jews, Freemasons, and,
in  twentieth  century  America,  conspiracies  of
communists, were seen in a similar light, as people of evil
intent,  whose  aim  was  to  destroy  society  as  it  then
existed. It is important to recognise the historical depth
of our beliefs in a secret and conspiratorial group, the
epitome of evil characterised by the ritual killing they are
believed  to  indulge  in.  The  depraved  actions  of  these
hidden beings are very similar  to those of  witches the
world  over:  they  commit  incest,  kill  and  eat  human
beings and commit the most lurid crimes. This is part of a
cultural definition of evil, just as beliefs in witchcraft as a
manifestation of evil, are part of the world view of most
Africans (see Pocock,  Parkin et  al  The Anthropology of
Evil.11
The colonisation of Africa may have suppressed human
sacrifice but it allowed for the development in Europe of
the  myth  of  ritual  murder  in  another  direction.  The
former  existence  of  human  sacrifice  in  West  Africa
encouraged  the  most  sinister  beliefs  about  African
culture.  Events  in  Africa  seemed  to  confirm  these  as
realistic  portrayals.  From  the  end  of  the  nineteenth
century onwards there were outcrops of serial killings in
different parts of Africa that local people claimed were
the  work  of  human  beings  who  had  transformed
themselves into animals, usually leopards or lions. Given
the belief that occurs in many parts of Africa that witches
can  transform  themselves  into  wild  animals  for  the
purpose of killing and ‘eating’  other human beings,  an
anthropologist would expect that both the killing and the
eating  were  spiritual  rather  than  actual.  However  the
deaths were real and the death blows appeared to have
been  dealt  by  an  animal,  showing  wounds  apparently
inflicted by teeth and claws,  although sceptics claimed
that  these  mutilations  might  be  inflicted  by  special
weapons designed to conceal the fact that the killer was
another  human  being.  Given  the  existence  in  Sierra
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Leone,  where  the  first  such  cases  emerged,  of  secret
societies  of  witches  associated  with  leopards  it  was
thought that these societies might be to blame and that
the killings were offerings to their secret shrines. Some
witnesses  claimed to have seen leopards  attacking the
victims, others claimed that the murderers were human
beings  disguised  as  leopards.  The  European  colonial
servants  who  were  responsible  for  the  areas  in  which
these murders occurred and who shared to a greater or
lesser extent existing fantasies about Africa were unable
to decide whether the killings were ritual murder or not.
But reports of the deaths contributed to a whole genre of
literature that embedded the notion of ritual murder ever
more deeply into the European imagination.12
Ritual murder is still murder and hence a crime. If we
treat it as such, we have to consider what the evidence
for it  is.  Over the course of history,  many people have
been  accused  of  ritual  murder  and  many  have  been
executed for it, but the evidence for their guilt has been
unsatisfactory from a modern point of view. Two kinds of
evidence have been accepted as ‘proof’ of participation
in ritual murder: first accusations by people who claimed
to have suffered the evil attacks and/or to have seen the
secret  meetings  or  secondly  confessions  from  the
accused,  in  former  times  often  extracted  by  torture.
Checks  as  to  whether  personal  malice  or  pre-existing
quarrels were the cause of accusations seem not to have
been made although the accused have often claimed that
the allegations  were the  result  of  malice.  Independent
evidence  or  material  evidence  such  as  would  be
demanded in a prosecution today has never existed. Yet
the idea persists because it represents in a dramatic form
what  is  the  ultimate  in  inhuman  evil  and  by  contrast
emphasises what it is to be human.
At the end of the twentieth century people across the
world  asserted their  belief  in  rituals  that  included  the
sacrifice  of  children  as  offerings  to  the  devil.  In  the
United  States,  Britain,  Europe,  Australia  and  New
Zealand accusations were made. The rituals were said to
include  a  modern  sin,  that  of  the  sexual  abuse  of
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children,  but  in  other  respects  they  resembled  the
accusations  made  across  early  modern  Europe  and
included allegations of human sacrifice and cannibalism.
But when investigated,  the evidence for  the conviction
that ritual murder was being perpetrated was very like
that  of  early  modern  Europe:  allegations,  often  from
children, and the ‘confessions’ of adults who claimed to
have been participants. There was no forensic evidence.
As  one  journalist  put  it,  despite  modern  sophisticated
techniques of investigation, police found: “no bodies, no
bones, no blood, nothing”.
Yet seven years after the ritual abuse panic died down,
when a little boy’s mutilated body was found floating in
the Thames, some of the same people who had publicised
their  belief  in  Satanism  claimed  it  as  justifying  their
beliefs.  The  Catholic  Herald  proclaimed:  “Boy’s  torso
prompts  new ‘Satanic  abuse’  fears  (March 2002).  Was
this  the  proof  of  ritual  murder  that  had  not  been
available before? It was presented as such in the media.
Amazing  detective  work  by  the  Metropolitan  Police
traced the child, referred to as Adam, first by the police
and  later  from  its  use  in  the  media,  by  everyone  in
general.  Medical  science  showed  the  mutilations  had
been  performed  after  death.  The  origin  of  the  only
garment  he was wearing,  shorts,  were traced by  their
label. Forensic science indicated from the contents of his
stomach  where  he  had  originally  come  from,  Nigeria,
from a village in the south-east of the country. This is all
material  evidence on  which  conclusions  may be  based
and it  can  only  be  challenged  by  similar  but  contrary
evidence.
Yet, despite the good work of the police, they could not
show why Adam was killed and then mutilated or who did
it.  Nevertheless  his  death  continues  to  be  cited  as
evidence for the existence of  ritual  murder.  It  was the
fact that ‘Adam’ was found to be African turned attention
to the possibility of ritual murder. According to one BBC
report, (BBC News July 9th 2002 accessed April 13 2010)
police were investigating whether Adam’s death “was a
West  African voodoo killing involving human sacrifice.”
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The  use  of  the  term  voodoo  is  an  example  of  how
ignorance about a non-Christian religion can support this
myth of ritual murder. Vodun is a religion that developed
in  the  Caribbean  among  West  African  slaves,  from  a
mixture  of  Catholic  Christianity  and  the  traditional
beliefs  preserved  in  memories  of  their  homeland.  Its
rituals do not include human sacrifice, but the whites in
the  Caribbean,  for  reasons  that  were  partly  political,
claimed it was devil worship and that evil reputation has
clung to it ever since. Voodoo became a term denoting
evil magic and ritual practices, even in Africa.13
When  it  was  discovered  that  the  child  Adam  was
probably brought to London from Africa, which has for
centuries  been  subject  to  myths  about  ‘The  Dark
Continent’,  certain  people  hastened  to  claim  that  it
‘proved’ the truth of satanic ritual abuse and of human
sacrifice continuing to occur among the ‘uncivilised’. The
general attitude has been described very nicely by David
Pratten who wrote: “…Africa represented a blank space
in Europe’s collective imagination and could therefore be
populated  by  all  manner  of  invented  creatures,
sometimes  noble,  sometimes  monstrous,  that  were  the
visual  and  visceral  products  of  European  fears  and
desires”  (Pratten  2007:9)  Over  simplistic  ideas  about
‘leopard societies’  and secret organisations that kill for
pleasure,  have  influenced  Christian  missionaries  in
Nigeria and kept the idea of ritual murder alive.
While Sanders (2001) has done a good job of pointing
out  how  the  continued  emphasis  on  the  African
provenance  of  ‘ritual  murder’  has  deepened  existing
prejudices  about  Africa  and  Africans,  he  stuffs  all  the
evidence  of  British  cultural  concepts  into  that  vast
portmanteau  labelled  The  Other.  Unfortunately  this
neither  illuminates  nor  analyses  the  ethnographic
material that is thus bundled together. What I have tried
to  do  here  is  to  show  how  British  concepts  of  evil  –
particularly  the  ideas  of  ritual  murder  and  human
sacrifice – emerge in the way they think about the African
killings. 'Ritual murder' is a European representation of
great evil; its historical origin has been demonstrated by
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historians who have demonstrated its role in generating
the Christian pursuit of witches in early modern Europe.
It  is  hardly  surprising  then  that  the  present  rash  of
accusations of witchcraft against children (which I have
no  had  time  to  deal  with)  owes  as  much  to  Christian
fundamentalist missions as to ‘traditional’ African ideas
of witchcraft. In today’s Africa the Pentecostal belief in
Satan’s demonic servants as the source of the power of
witchcraft links the two concepts firmly together into a
single contemporary image of the grossest evil.
Beliefs in ritual murder and in witchcraft are similar
cultural traditions and both are worthy of anthropological
study  and  of  comparison,  since  if  it  is  to  be  anything
anthropology  must  be  comparative.  While  I  have  not
attempted this yet, a brief indication of the differences
and similarities between the concepts might be a fitting
end to this article.
Both  the  idea  of  ritual  murder  and  the  concept  of
witchcraft concern activities and persons who do not, as
far as we know, exist. While real people may be accused,
the evidence supporting the accusations is not rationally
founded or supported by hard evidence So we are talking
about ideas, not behaviour, but ideas that motivate strong
reactions. The actions and the people who perform them
represent evil in its most extreme forms. The actions of
witches and in  ritual  murder  include the same acts  of
evil:  incest,  sexual  perversion,  infanticide  and
cannibalism; the cannibalism fills a lust for human flesh,
rather  than  any  ritual  or  symbolic  requirement  which
may surround cannibalism in societies that do undertake
it  This  may be  what  makes  it  so  evil.  In  effect,  these
persons are inhuman and their lack of humanity may be
further  emphasised  by  attributing  to  them nonsensical
reversals of behaviour. By opposition then, both concepts
define not merely inhuman but human nature, not merely
evil  but  the  bounds  of  what  is  permissible  in  human
society.
Both  concepts  also  are  linked  to  the  distribution  of
unfortunate events although the power raised by ritual
313
JEAN LA FONTAINE
murder  is  not  directed  by  individuals  against  their
personal  enemies.  But  neither  allows  for  the  random
event, drawing everything into a framework of human (or
near human)  causative power.  Moreover both concepts
embody the possibility  of  social  destruction whether of
social life or of interpersonal relations and relate this to
the  power  of  evil,  whether  generated  by  organised
groups or  seen in  individual  malice.  Evil  can and may
destroy the world.
Of course there are differences. In Western society evil
is  characterised by a group whose individual  members
act  in  concert  to  worship  the  fount  of  all  evil,  their
demonic  master.  Witchcraft  is  essentially  a  matter  of
individuals,  although  Western  witches  undertook  a
collective worship of Satan. While African witches may
attend communal feasts, the emphasis usually lies on the
debts created by the provision of the flesh, the substance
of the feast that create indebtedness between provider
and  receiver.  Hence  perhaps  the  elaboration  of
differences in behaviour and appearance of witches, the
unnatural  human  beings,  that  does  not  appear  to
characterise participants in ritual murder. Indeed ritual
murder does  not  depend on the people  who enact  the
killing being inhuman, merely evil. Ritual murder, then,
brings  destructive  evil  within  the  range  of  human
possibilities.
Notes
1. Ritual is also used as a technical term in the psychological 
disciplines to indicate an individual’s repetitive behaviour 
that has meaning but no material effect or purpose. It is 
usually not public but may be secret without incurring the 
designation of evil unless it disregards customary rules or 
breaks the law. Like public ritual it must be invariant and 
may benefit the performer. I am not concerned with that 
here.
2. See Bohannan, P. (ed.), 1960. African Homicide and Suicide, 
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Oxford University Press.
3. Evans-Pritchard recorded that Nuer might offer a wild 
cucumber if no animal were available but that it was clear 
that this was merely a stand-in and an undertaking to 
perform the usual sacrifice when possible.
4. See Law, R., 1985. Human Sacrifice in Pre-Colonial West 
Africa, African Affairs, 84 ( 334) 53–87.
5. Speke records seeing the King of Buganda shoot the head off
a passing slave to demonstrate to his European visitor the 
effectiveness of the guns he had bought from Arab traders.
6. Dapper History of Dahomey, cited in Law p74.
7. Given the pressure of the expectation of the husband’s kin 
and of society in general, it is hard to say that widows who 
committed ‘suttee’ as it was called, always died absolutely 
voluntarily.
8. Book of Common Prayer – service of Communion.
9. Historians have pointed out that the fact of human sacrifice 
was used by some apologists for the slave trade to justify 
selling slaves because otherwise they might be taken for 
sacrifice (Law op.cit.)
10. The term denotes a concoction, made by specialists for 
their clients, which is magically rather than materially 
effective. It is thus not medicine in a modern Western 
sense, which is why I use the word in inverted commas.
11. See Parkin, D. (ed.), 1991. The Anthropology of Evil, 
Blackwell.
12. I think it no coincidence that Lawrence Pazder, author with 
Michelle Smith, first his patient and later his wife, of 
Michelle Remembers, a book which had a considerable 
influence in generating belief about Satanic Abuse in the 
USA in the 1980s, had once been a missionary in Nigeria
13. Bettina Schmidt explains vodun as it is properly called. See
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La Fontaine, J. (ed.), 2009. The Devil’s Children, Ashgate.
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Chapter 12
AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
Daniel Miller
I welcome the development of internet forums such as
the  Open Anthropology Cooperative and  Medianth. One
question  they  raise  is  what  we  might  use  such public
sites for as opposed to more conventional publications. I
guess one answer I have seen is draft papers. Another,
which I will explore here, is for taking arguments beyond
those  likely  to  be  accepted  for  publication  in  more
conventional media. In this instance I am going to take
an actual publication and extract three of its component
arguments. I will then take them a bit beyond the form
they are given in that publication, simply because I didn’t
think more extreme readings would be acceptable, and
also because, despite  being a self-proclaimed extremist
(2010:1-11) I am not at all sure if I even agree with them.
But  like  any  academic  I  see  an  intellectual  merit  in
pursuing such logics, and I would hope that they also suit
these public forums as a means for provoking debate.
The publication these excerpts are taken from is called
Tales from Facebook (Polity April 2011). As it happens, it
319
DANIEL MILLER
is a rather unconventional publication in its own right. It
consists  of  twelve  portraits  of  individual  Trindidadians
written in a similar style to a previous book of mine The
Comfort of Things (2008) and uses these to consider the
impact of Facebook on these individuals, although each
also thereby also seeks to  make some academic point.
These are followed by three short essays. One takes the
question  of  how  Trinidadian  Facebook  is;  the  second
looks  at  15  tentative  theses  about  Facebook  more
generally;  and  the  third,  which  is  summarised  in  this
paper, develops an extended analogy between Kula and
Facebook in order to construct an anthropological theory
of the latter.
The  three  propositions  I  propose  to  push  to  more
extreme lengths here are as follows:
1) That  Facebook  radically  transforms  the  premise
and direction of social science.
2) That  Facebook  is  a  medium  for  developing  a
relationship to god.
3) That Facebook, like Kula, is an ideal foundation for
a theory of culture mainly because Facebook and Kula
are practically the same thing.
I  am  optimistic  that  academics  will  find  grounds  for
disagreement with these three assertions.
Proposition  1:  Facebook  radically  transforms  the
premise and direction of social science.
SNS (Social Network Sites) are already a major global
phenomenon.  While  some  of  the  initial  sites  such  as
Cyworld in South Korea have largely remained regional,
Facebook is approaching 500 million users spread right
across the world. Where Facebook is banned in China,
QQ is  used on  an  average  day  by  111 million  people.
Other major populations such as Brazil are dominated by
alternative social networking sites such as Orkut, though
shifts can be rapid as,  for example,  currently in South
East  Asia  with  the  migration  in  the  last  year  from
Friendster  to  Facebook.  Other  sites  with  different
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functionality  such  as  Twitter  and  Foursquare  are  also
emerging as potentially highly significant.
The  starting  point  for  this  proposition  is  that  such
developments fly in the face of the central tenets of social
science. Foundational to Western social science has been
the  belief  that  human  societies  exhibit  a  slow  but
constant trajectory away from what are taken to be an
earlier state in which people lived in communities, based
around  close  kinship  ties  and  devotion  to  immediate
social relationships. Whether starting from the writings
of  Tonnies,  Durkheim or Simmel,  social  scientists  have
assumed  that  under  such  conditions  we  do  not  study
people just as individuals, but rather each person can be
understood as a site of social networking. This became
the premise for the development of anthropology. With its
emphasis  on  kinship,  any  given  person  was  seen
primarily  through  their  place  in  such  a  network,  for
example the category of being someone else’s `mother’s
brother’. So, long before Facebook, networking acted as
a kind of shorthand for the way social science understood
small-scale and traditional societies.
In contrast to anthropology, sociology was principally
concerned with the consequences of an assumed decline
from  this  condition  as  a  result  of  industrialisation,
capitalism and urbanism.  Still  today  many of  the most
influential books in sociology such as Putnam’s  Bowling
Alone (2001)  or  Sennett’s  Fall  of  Public  Man,  (1977)
along with works by Giddens, Beck and Bauman remain
clearly within this dominant trajectory. In all such work
there is an assumption that older forms of  tight social
networking colloquially characterised by words such as
community or neighbourhood are increasingly  replaced
by the dominance of  individuals  and individualism.  My
own recent book The Comfort of Things based on a single
street  in  London  gave  strong  confirmation  to  such
arguments,  since  households  proved  to  be  largely
detached from those who lived nearby and often from all
other  forms  of  community  or  wider  social  groupings
(2008).
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How  then  should  social  science  respond  to  an
extraordinary phenomenon that has arisen within the last
decade and most  especially  during the six  years  when
Facebook has been in existence? When the internet first
developed  similar  claims  were  made  about  its
revolutionary impact on social science theory. Research
by myself and Don Slater (2000) was among the first to
show  that  that  while  the  internet  may  be  hugely
important in other ways the evidence for this `reversal’
in macro social change towards individualism was very
limited. At that time we were keen to pour cold water on
any such speculation that the internet somehow flew in
the face of conventional social science. We pointed out
that just because one could find extensive material on the
internet  that  claimed  to  represent  some  sort  of
community was no evidence in itself. In fact many people
ended up putting such materials on the internet precisely
because these had been dismissed by all other media and
no one took them seriously. A place on the internet could
be evidence for how insignificant something was rather
than  the  reverse.  Others  such  as  John  Postill  provide
many good reasons for being careful with regard to any
glib use of the term community in this regard and Steve
Woolgar devoted a whole research project to a sceptical
perspective on these early claims (Postill 2008, Woolgar
2001).
However in 2009-10 I carried out research in Trinidad
which revealed a very different situation. This is the first
work to document what happens when social networking
matures  into  a  facility  increasingly  popular  with  older
people  and in  countries other  than the US.  The initial
literature  on  social  networking  sites  (from  Boyd  and
Ellison 2007 through to Kirkpatrick 2010) was based on a
period when these seemed to be the plaything of college
students (especially in the US), for whom Facebook was
invented.
My Trinidad research represents a more mature phase
in the development of Facebook. It is based on more than
a year participating with many Trinidadians on Facebook
itself,  supplemented  by  two  months  there  discussing
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Facebook  face-to-face  with  those  same  participants,
including over fifty more formal interviews, most of them
carried out with Mirca Madianou, since they overlapped
with another research project we are conducting jointly
on  the  impact  of  new  media  on  transnational
communication,  with  case  studies  of  Filipino  domestic
workers as well as Trinidadians.
The  research  in  Trinidad  demonstrates  that  there
really is a case for saying that SNS reverse certain key
trends  presumed  by  most  of  social  science.  What  had
become regarded as the natural attrition of relationships
is  reversed.  Previously  we  tended  to  lose  touch  with
groups we once knew well who become replaced by new
sets of friends. But almost inevitably the first action in
using Facebook seems to be the resurrection of all lost
relationships,  for  example,  with  ex-school  friends  or
relatives who have migrated. Many of the participants in
our study used these networks for several hours a day in
order  to  resurrect  what  might  be  seen  as  a  more
traditional devotion to close social relationships that do
come close to classical ideas of community.
Once  this  issue  arose  from the  fieldwork,  I  decided
deliberately to target research on people who still live in
small villages and hamlets and who are well aware of the
nature  and  character  of  such  communities.  It  seemed
right to let such people comment on the degree to which
Facebook  was  or  was  not  analogous  to  their  own
experience of living in a community and in other social
networks such as kinship ties.
So  let  me  summarise  a  portrait  of  someone  who
exemplifies this aspect of the research in the book:
Alana  is  a  college  student  who  lives  in  a  kind  of
settlement that has become quite rare in contemporary
Trinidad. Modern Trinidad is a pretty mobile place and
one  meets  relatively  few  people  of  any  age  who  live
where they were born. Her hamlet, Santa Ana, is quite
small. There are around twenty-five houses straddling a
ridge in the foothills of the mountains that form a spine
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pointing north. These houses, with only two exceptions,
represent the descendants of the same three or four core
families. So by now pretty much everyone in the village is
related to everyone else. When it comes to any kind of
significant  event,  such  as  a  wedding  or  a  wake,  any
remaining lack of relationship is ignored. For all intents
and purposes this village is a family writ large. It also has
those other hallmarks of community, for example Alana’s
family have a running feud with their neighbour that has
gone on for years. Every time a pause arises that might
lead to a  rapprochement,  it  gets  extended by disputes
about where children shouldn’t be playing or when dogs
shouldn’t be barking.
Alana  has  two  main  times  when  she  is  involved  in
Facebook.  She  was  originally  persuaded  to  go  on
Facebook by a score of younger cousins who like to play
the game FarmVille. She admits that this can add up to
something like two hours a day of online labour. But the
consequence  is  a  thriving  online  cousinhood  that  is
effective in developing her extended family relations. In
order to detach from the family she goes to sleep around
8 pm. She then gets up at midnight and from then to 3
am she is on Facebook with most of her college class.
Almost  all  of  them  have  adopted  the  same  diurnal
rhythm.  Alana  reckons  that  only  about  20%  of  the
subsequent  conversation  is  purely  discussion  of
homework and joint projects.
Amongst  my  various  conversations  with  Alana,  one
centres on this question of an analogy with community.
What was it like growing up in and continuing to live in
Santa  Ana?  As  a  student  at  university  she  is  used  to
thinking  abstractly  about  such  comparisons  and
concepts.  Nor  does  she  have  the  slightest  difficulty
appreciating  the  meaning  of  community.  In  her  mind
there is a clear analogy but in various respects Facebook
is  not  a  patch  on  the  real  thing.  However  much  one
blames  Facebook  for  malicious  or  ill-informed  gossip,
Alana  feels  it  doesn’t  even  begin  to  approach  what
happens routinely in a small place like Santa Ana. She
tells of how, in a community like this, people would look
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at  or  the  youths  in  the  village,  at  how  their  friend’s
children are growing up,. They wouldn’t take time to get
to know them, they would just sit and talk about whether
a child is neglected or a youth is into drugs. She says
`Yeh,  it’s  much  much  worse.  I  think  people  still  have
some  level  of  respect  on  Facebook,  well  at  least  the
people that I socialize with. They wouldn’t blatantly put
something  very  offensive.  We  recently  had  a  stranger
that came in. I think he dating a girl out the road and she
girl, she pretty young. And she and a guy in the village
always had an exchange of words. Like throw talk for one
another  and  stuff  like  that.  So  he  was  passing  and
something  she  said  and  her  boyfriend  get  up  and  try
swing a blade at him. And he hold it and pull it away from
his hand. All his ligaments and everything gone. He came
out of the hospital about three days ago. His right hand,
he can’t do anything right now. He have strings and stuff
on his hand trying to get it back... yeah terrible’.
The point can also work in the other direction. People
congregate online and help each other with homework.
But  that  doesn’t  represent  the  kind  of  commitment
people make to each other in the village. Santa Ana is a
place  where  you  can  spend  the  whole  day  cooking
something  up  for  a  neighbour  who  is  hosting  some
communal occasion. There had just recently been a wake
that  is  celebrated  on  the  first  year’s  anniversary  of  a
death,  with  food  cooked  by  many  neighbours  and  the
community playing cards into the night. In a village such
as this, whatever the internal quarrels, there is still the
foundation for deep and sustained solidarity in relation to
an external threat. When someone is ill or in crisis, you
know instinctively what being in a community means, the
responsibilities it gives you and the hold it has on you.
When judging the nature of Facebook as a community
Alana  is  clear  that  it  can  only  be  assessed  relative  to
offline  community.  She  regards  her  situation,  living  in
Santa  Ana,  as  exceptional  in  contemporary  Trinidad.
When you are living in a place like that, the community is
incredibly  intense  and  her  use  of  Facebook,  however
sociable, is a means to give herself some sort of break
325
DANIEL MILLER
from  that  intensity.  If  people  in  Santa  Ana  turn  to
Facebook as a kind of milder version of community, it is
to achieve some sort of distance, because the reality of
living within such a close-knit community is simply too
intense and invasive.
She contrasts her experience with that of a friend who
lives in a much more typical settlement within Trinidad,
near Tunapuna: ‘it’s more of a small town and you don’t
really see people going by each other. But she will keep
in contact via Facebook’. For her friend there simply isn’t
enough actual community. She is frustrated at how little
she knows or interacts with the people who live close to
her. So her experience of Facebook does the opposite. It
helps  create  a  bit  more  social  intensity  in  a  situation
where  people  have  an  insufficiency  of  direct
communication  and  contact  with  each  other.  So  Alana
concludes  that  Facebook  is  used  to  balance  out  the
degree of offline community.
Facebook  has  all  the  contradictions  found  in  a
community.  You  simply  can’t  have  both  closeness  and
privacy. You can’t have support without claustrophobia.
You can’t have such a degree of friendship without the
risk of explosive quarrelling.  Either everything is more
socially intense or none of it is. This is one of the ironies
of the huge emphasis on the loss of privacy that we find
in journalist’s  accounts.  It’s  the same public  discourse
that  goes  on  and  on  about  how  we  have  lost
neighbourhood  and  community  and  everyone  is  so
individualistic  and lonely.  Well  if  you really do want to
have  more  community  and  less  isolated  individualism
then that means trading privacy. But popular discourse
wants it both ways, they want a community that is totally
private and anthropologists should be pointing out this
kind of contradiction.
So the most  important  thing Facebook provides  is  a
means to complement the offline version of community
and to live with those same contradictions.
I found Alana’s account the most plausible I have come
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across and the one that accords best with the findings of
my research. I don’t have the space here to examine in as
much detail the relationship of Facebook to other aspects
of  close  social  relations  such  as  kinship,  but  my
conclusions there are similar. What this means is that the
best  way  to  understand  Facebook  is  in  relation  to
anthropological studies of close-knit and intense society,
not as part of sociology’s encounter with contemporary
individualism and the kind of networking envisaged by
Castells  (2000)  Facebook  seems  like  the  end  of  what
previously was the natural attrition of social networks. It
brings all those who were once disregarded back into the
frame  of  current  regard,  such  as  lost  kin  and  school
friends.  Equally important is the ability of Facebook to
bring  back  Diaspora  populations  and  ameliorate  the
effect of their residence in different countries.
Facebook  is  six  years  old,  but  if  it  continues  on  its
currently trajectory and a billion people use it for several
hours a day mainly for actual social networking, with the
resultant intensification of those social networks, then we
will  see a kind of  shift  from sociology to anthropology
that  we never  dared expect.  This  is  perhaps  the most
profound challenge to the basic presuppositions of social
science for a century.
Proposition 2: Facebook is a medium for developing
a relationship to god.
I  have  always  been  fascinated  by  the  Akheda,  the
section in the bible where Abraham offers to sacrifice his
son Isaac to god. This is when a covenant is established
and we see thereby the effective  institutionalisation  of
that monotheism that develops unto Judaism, Christianity
and  Islam.  For  theologians  such  as  Levinas,  the  key
moment  within  the  Akheda  is  when Abraham says  the
word ‘Here I Am’. By standing before god, he establishes
humanity in the moral gaze of the divine. From a secular
perspective one could turn this around and argue that
this is equally the moment which establishes the divine
as the projected vantage from which humanity sees itself
as being  seen.  It  is  culmination  of  a  journey  a  `going
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forth’  (lek  lek’ha)  that  Abraham  makes  from  the  first
mythic portion of the bible which has much in common
with Sumerian myths such as Noah and the Flood to the
main  `historical’  narrative  which  leads  to  this
monotheistic trajectory.
If this is viewed, however, only as a movement from
myth  to  history  it  raises  the  question  of  whether
Abraham should be regarded as some kind of freakish or
unique episode based on the specific latent propensity of
this individual patriarch to search out such a relationship
to the divine as witness and thus moral encompassment
of  humanity,  which  leads  in  turn  to  the  religious
conceptualisations of these three monotheistic religions
and eventually to further ethical and political orders of a
secular kind. Or should the story of Abraham be seen as
neither myth nor history, but rather as a pointed to some
broader  latent  propensity  towards  a  vision  of  moral
humanity with analogies that make it a characteristic of
being human? In which case this same `going forth’ or
journey  towards  the  conditions  of  the  Akheda  is
something we might expect of people generally, including
those who may be polytheistic of atheist in their beleifs,
in which case it could be equally prevalent in the secular
conditions of the contemporary world?
When investigating Facebook, the first step is to take it
at  `face-value’  simply  an  effective  means  of
communication to multiple audiences, that helps people
keep  in  touch,  post  photos  and  everything  else  that
makes up a simple description of what Facebook appears
to  be  and  do.  But  after  a  while  it  becomes  clear  that
there  is  a  sort  of  surplus  communicative  economy  to
Facebook, in that people seem to do all sorts of things
with it, and think of it in various ways that are hard to
reduce  either  to  some  kind  of  communicative
instrumentalism  or  indeed  to  any  other  kind  of
instrumentalism.
When I first started to try and understand this surplus
communicative economy, I came up with the question of
whether  Facebook  should  be  considered  some  kind  of
328
AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
meta-friend.  What  if,  instead  of  seeing  Facebook  as  a
means to facilitate friendships between people, many of
us use friendships between people in order to facilitate a
relationship  to  Facebook  itself?  I  had this  fantasy that
what most people should really be typing under the title
of  relationship  status  was:  Married to  Facebook lol?  A
common trope in modern discourse is that we feel we live
in an era of materialism or fetishism, such that proper
relationships  between  people  are  being  replaced  by
relationships to things instead. This is a rather simplistic
rendition of our world. As I have argued many times with
regard  to  Mauss’s  The  Gift  (1990),  an  anthropological
sensibility is surely very different from a colloquial one.
We  have  never  regarded  culture  as  a  medium
constructed to facilitate friendships between persons. On
the  contrary,  relationships  and  exchange  between
persons, for example kin relations, are usually seen as a
means to grow culture, for example through exchange.
So for anthropologists,  a relationship to Facebook as a
thing  is  not  axiomatically  morally  inferior  to  a
relationship  with  a  person.  We  do  not  resort  to  such
simple  judgments;  we try  to  understand these cultural
processes.
Given that Facebook is a social network, perhaps the
simplest  idiom  for  conceiving  of  this  relationship  to
Facebook itself  is  to think of it  as a sort of meta-best-
friend. In the popular culture of TV, on programmes such
as  Sex and the City, a best friend is the person we can
turn to when we are feeling lonely, depressed or bored,
when life  seems to  have  less  purpose  than usual.  Our
best friend is the one who is least likely to mind being
disturbed when having a meal, or wanting to go to sleep,
because  they  sense  our  deep  need  to  engage  in  long
gossipy  discussions  about  ourselves  or  others,  just  to
make us feel better. One advantage of Facebook is that it
is a totally reliable best friend. Even at 3 a.m., when not
even our best best-friend wants to be disturbed, we can
turn to Facebook and feel connected with all those other
lives, and come out of it less lonely and bored. Though, of
course,  we may also  end up being more  depressed  or
jealous because of  the revelations about all  those very
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active other people who don’t seem lonely and bored. But
this can happen after face-to-face chats with actual best
friends  also.  There  are  people  who  see  themselves  as
irredeemably unattractive and shunned by those who, in
public, don’t want to be associated with them. Fieldwork
suggested to me that this was not uncommon, especially
for school-age children. Such people often find Facebook
a lot more forgiving and benign. You can’t say that the
photos  on  someone  else’s  Facebook  site  were  posted
specifically for  you to see,  but also you can’t  say they
weren’t. Once there, they are part of your social life.
Journalism  is  already  full  of  extreme  stories  about
Facebook’s  negative impacts.  It  is  held  responsible  for
people becoming jealous and murdering their lover, or for
paedophilic grooming. To a lesser extent there are also
positive  stories  about  how Facebook  stopped  someone
from  committing  suicide  and  helps  those  who  are
depressed. With 500 million users, we can be pretty sure
that  most  stories  and  anecdotes  about  what  Facebook
might  be capable  of  doing are true,  however  extreme.
But  that  is  a  good  reason  to  replace  journalism  and
anecdote  with  more  systematic  research,  which  can
demonstrate that such instances may be so exceptional
as to be largely inconsequential,  except  for  the people
directly  involved in  those  cases.  It  is  not  necessary to
suggest that Facebook as a meta-best-friend necessarily
cures  depression  or  prevents  suicide.  We  can  still
recognise that it is plausible, for a number of people, that
it  does  act  to  complement  offline  friendships  and  to
become significant as a friend in its own right.
Facebook is  somewhere we can talk as much as we
like, with or without responses from others. It is a site
that  genuinely  addresses  the  perennial  problem  of
boredom,  especially  teenage  boredom,  without
necessarily  imposing  on  the  time  of  others.  It  has  its
limits; it doesn’t get drunk when we do. It doesn’t always
comment back when we want it to. You can only ‘sort of’
have  sex  with  it.  But  at  a  meta-level  it  may  serve  a
purpose. Some of the most poignant examples we found
were of a person who posted constantly about a baby that
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was born prematurely and another who posted about a
parent afflicted with a terminal illness. We observed that
these individuals seemed not too concerned whether or
not the responses they received were from people they
knew  well.  Facebook  allowed  the  public  sharing  of
suffering.  It  was a ‘witness’  to suffering that  might be
cathartic in its own right. The fact that Facebook is made
up of actual people may give it unprecedented power and
plausibility  to  act  like  a  meta-person  in  this  way.  The
downside  to this  relationship  would  be its  potential  to
become so extreme that it  does become appropriate to
talk of fetishism or indeed pathology. One of the stories in
Tales  from  Facebook is  about  a  man  who  feels  his
partner’s addiction to Facebook has become pretty much
on a par with heroin addiction; at least it became fatal to
their relationship. There was no evidence that this sort of
thing was common, but I believe that some sort of best-
friend like relationship with Facebook is.
This is a work of anthropology rather than psychology,
but it is worth at least speculating about Facebook’s role
in facilitating the fantasy worlds of individuals. Imagine a
novel  in  which  two  work  colleagues  have  barely
exchanged  more  than  a  few  sentences,  an  occasional
comment on what the other is wearing, but little more.
Yet one of them dissects each word actually spoken, each
glance,  in  copious  detail.  The  man  thereby  convinces
himself that he is now completely in love and in thrall to
this work colleague and would surely leave his wife for
her  if  only  he  didn’t  have  children.  He  knows  exactly
which Greek island will  be the site  of  their  passionate
tryst.  A  little  molehill  of  conversation  becomes  the
mountain that moves Tristan and Isolde. My evidence for
the impact of Facebook in this regard is very limited. But
it seems likely that people’s increased ability to observe
and  follow  another  person  passively  gives  even  more
licence to their internal fantasy world,  where they can
imagine whatever they might choose to happen between
them.  It  is  therefore  possible  that  one  of  the  most
significant impacts of Facebook will be on internal worlds
of  fantasy  and  imagination,  where  many people  spend
much of their time.
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One of  the first  discussions  of  the  internet’s  impact
that looked more deeply into its possible consequences
was The Second Self by Sherry Turkle (1984). But much
of  her  discussion  concerned  the  implications  of  being
anonymous and how people could appear to be someone
quite  different  from  their  offline  selves  when  online.
Although she doesn’t make explicit use of his work, her
discussion leads back to Erving Goffman, the author of
the most rewarding of all social science writings about
the  self  (1956,  1974).  Yet  Facebook  points  us  in  the
opposite  direction  to  this  concern  with  anonymity,
indicating rather an end to anonymity. This alone should
give pause for thought to anyone who thinks such digital
technologies  lay  down  a  consistent  path  in  any  given
direction.  In either case, such debates release us from
any  simple  or  colloquial  assumption  that  there  is
evidently  a  more  true  or  less  true  self,  or  that  these
correspond to the distinction between online and offline
selves.  What  Goffman  and  Turkle  reveal  is  that  all
versions of the self are to some degree performative and
based on frames of expectation. We play a variety of roles
in life with degrees of attachment and distance.
To  determine  whether  or  how  far  Facebook  itself
makes  a  difference  to  the  nature  of  the  self  or  self-
consciousness  is  extremely  difficult.  For  example,  one
could  argue  that  the  sheer  number  of  photographs  a
person posts online must create a new self-consciousness
about their appearance. As someone commented, ‘I think
for  teenagers  Facebook  is  just  dangerous,  and  seeing
everybody’s  photos  makes  you  so  superficial.  It’s  like
constantly  looking  in  a  mirror  and  seeing  yourself
reflected. But through other people’s eyes. So you have
everybody’s  opinions  coming  down  on  you,  because
everyone will comment on your photos. “And, oh I love
your top” or this and that and you never know, it’s just
constant. So I don’t think it’s healthy for teenagers at all
or  anybody  who  has  insecurities’.  There  were  many
versions  of  this  idea  that  Facebook  makes  us  more
concerned with appearances and thus more superficial.
But  often  such  arguments  work  by  contrasting  the
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concrete present with a mythical, more authentic past. I
was  conducting  fieldwork  in  Trinidad  long  before  the
invention  of  the  internet,  and  at  times  I  would  spend
hours with young women who were getting changed to
go out for an evening. They would try on seven different
outfits to get the right image. It’s hard to imagine they
could  be  any  more  self-conscious  about  their  public
appearance  now  than  they  were  then.  At  that  time  I
argued that, in an egalitarian society such as Trinidad,
the concept of the self  depended less on some interior
being or institutionalized position or role. The self  is a
more  transient  creation,  largely  formed  from  other
people’s responses to your appearance, which alone tells
you who you are. So if the truth of who you are exists
largely in other peoples responses to how you look, it is
not that unreasonable to be obsessed about your public
appearance.
Lets move this from an issue of psychology to one of
anthropology. The idea that making visible relationships
is  far  more  than  just  a  representation  of  those
relationships  has  become  widely  accepted  in
anthropology  largely  through  the  writings  of  Marilyn
Strathern.  In  her  work  a  person  is  constituted  by  a
network  of  relationships  which  are  not  just  made
manifest, but come to exist through becoming apparent.
So in  The Gender of  The Gift the birth of  a  child was
significant  in  particular  because  it  objectified  the
relationships  that  are  made  evident  through  the
existence of that child (1986). Obviously having a child is
what makes people related as parents.
Scroll on a few years and it looks as though Strathern
was not merely a theorist but a rather prescient prophet.
Since  today,  when  so  many  of  us  regularly  use  social
networking sites, it seems almost common sense to see
an individual on our computer screen as constituted by
their  network  of  relationships  and  to  regard  social
networks as a medium of objectification that makes these
not  only  visible,  but  also  constitutive.  A  student
increasingly discovers who they are by going online and
checking to  see  in  what  regard they  are  held  by  how
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many people and how they have engaged with them and
each other. Social networks also seem to generate their
own compulsion to visibility. Just as people don’t feel they
were  not  actually  on  holiday  unless  they  can  see
photographs of themselves enjoying that holiday, so today
some people don’t feel they have experienced an event
unless  they  have  broadcast  it  through  Facebook  or
Twitter. It is as though we have all read Strathern and
want  to  transform our  lives  to  accord  better  with  her
understanding of the nature of social networks.
This  idea  that  making  a  relationship  visible  also
creates that relationship can extend to the self. Facebook
is a place where you discover who you are by seeing a
visible objectification of yourself. Central to Trinidadian
cosmology, as found in Carnival, is the belief that a mask
or outward appearance is not a disguise. As something
you have crafted or  chosen and not merely  been born
with, the mask is a better indication of the actual person
than  your  unmasked  face.  This  is  why  one  of  my
informants  states  that  the  true  person  is  the  one  you
meet on Facebook, not the person you meet face-to-face.
It follows that the truth about yourself is revealed to you
by what you post on Facebook. On Facebook you find out
who you are.
I  believe,  however,  that  there  is  a  final  stage  in
accounting  for  this  surplus  economy of  communication
that  is  Facebook.  What  becomes  clear  from  studying
Facebook after a while is that, whatever the reason why
we first friended them, most people are well aware that
there are two main layers to their network. There is the
active layer they respond to and who respond to them
and the inactive layer of  hundreds of  others who have
come  to  represent  a  generic  other  consisting  of  the
anyone or  everyone.  We may not  actively  engage with
them, but we are well aware that they are there and the
question  remains  what  their  role  is  in  relation  to  our
personal postings.
The idea of  witnessing comes in  dozens of  different
philosophical and theological guises. In the next section I
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turn to Nancy Munn on Kula; she makes considerable use
of just such a concept of witnessing which she derives
from  Jean-Paul  Sartre.  There  are  powerful  religious
undercurrents to the idea that everything we do is seen,
or should be seen,  by another,  perhaps divine force. A
common trope in the various forms of Christianity found
in  Trinidad  is  the  idea  of  an  all-witnessing  God  from
whom  nothing  is  or  should  be  hidden.  An  increasing
proportion  of  Trinidadians  follow  various  kinds  of
Pentecostal  and  Apostolic  churches  where  concepts  of
witnessing  are  central.  But  even without  any  religious
beliefs, there are plenty of secular equivalents. Consider,
for  example,  Freud’s  concept  of  the  superego,  the
introjected  image  of  one’s  own  parents,  who  see
everything  and  again  become  the  foundation  for  our
moral evaluations.
This is what leads me back to my starting point when
considering the Akheda and to Levinas’ proposition that
we are constituted as moral agents only in relation to this
third observing  other,  which corresponds to the divine
before whom Abraham can proclaim `Here I am’ (Levinas
1985).  It  is  manifested  as  the  belief  that  there  is  a
witness out there that is often the driving force behind
moral action.
In  Trinidad  it  is  clear  that  people  are  increasingly
aware that Facebook postings are also a form by which
one  sets  oneself  up  for  moral  adjudication.  It  may  be
intentional  presentations  of  ones  best  face  or  the  fact
that one inevitably ends up being posted while drunk and
disorderly and often with the wrong partner, all of which
shows  why  Facebook  corresponds  readily  with  a
Trinidadian concept of truth. So here perhaps we reach
the logical end of the search for an explanation of the
surplus economy of Facebook.
These reflections imply a sort of necessity that people
may feel with regard to ensuring there is a higher and
wider  scrutiny  of  their  personal  exchanges  and  self-
presentations.  That  is,  people  may  want  an  assurance
that there is some higher moral evaluation and they use
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Facebook to ensure that it  exists.  In which case,  what
Facebook  provides  is  not  only  some  particular  friends
who may  comment  on  you  nor  even  just  a  meta-best-
friend. We have reached the point where Facebook may
be regarded as providing a crucial medium of visibility
and  public  witnessing.  It  gives  us  a  moral
encompassment within which we have a sense not only of
who  we  are  but  of  who  we  ought  to  be.  Facebook  is
normative  not  just  in  the  sense  of  a  consensual
netiquette, but also as a force for witnessing the moral
order of the self. Not for all people and not necessarily.
But without some kind of explanation of this ilk, it is hard
to  account  for  what  often  appears  as  a  compulsion  to
place things under a generic public gaze rather than to
post  them to any particular person.  Such an argument
would render Facebook anything but superficial. It may
be,  for  some,  their  equivalent  to  the  presence  of  the
divine as witness in their lives. In which case perhaps the
Akheda really is  a story about the latent propensity  of
humanity with regard to something we have in the past
generally regarded as divine.
Proposition  3:  Facebook,  like  Kula  is  an  ideal
foundation for a theory of culture, mainly because
Facebook and Kula are practically the same thing.
As I have made clear in several previous publications,
my all-time favourite ethnography is  The Fame of Gawa
by Nancy Munn, a book that seems to me the culmination
of Malinowski’s project (Munn 1986, Malinowski 1922).
Social scientists are not natural scientists, but I want to
suggest  that,  if  we  imagine  The  Fame  of  Gawa as  a
theorem,  than  Facebook  would  be  its  proof.  Kula  has
become the ur-example of culture for anthropology.  We
might  spend  the  day  like  animals  obtaining  and
consuming food, mate, protect our young till they are old
enough  to  survive  for  themselves  and  then  die.  By
contrast,  human societies  such as  the  people  of  Gawa
create  vast  arrays  of  custom  and  expectation,  rituals
based  on  spirits  of  good  and  evil,  arts  and  artefacts,
etiquettes  of  behaviour,  all  of  which make for  a vastly
more  elaborate  world.  This  wealth  of  culture  rests  on
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fundamental values by which people are expected to live
and are judged. In turn these values create goals in life
that make it rich and complex. Not only that, thanks to
the Kula ring, the cultural universe of Gawa in turn gives
rise  to  the  excitement  and  challenge  of  Malinowski’s
Argonauts within a still more expansive universe, where
those who negotiate transactions with other islands make
even wider possibilities and accomplishments beyond the
shores  of  Gawa itself.  The  Fame of  Gawa is  so  called
because it rests on a series of sanctions and exhortations
designed to create, maintain and increase these values. If
there were not a great world out there in which we can
do deeds and become known for them, there would be no
possibility  of  fame and much less  to  live  our lives  for.
Culture provides the platform that allows every person to
become  a  player.  Kula  activity  finally  comes  back  as
Fame;  and  the  people  who  exchange  the  valuables
become the ‘celebrities’ of the Kula ring. To use modern
parlance, culture is what ensures that the people of Gawa
‘get a life’.
Munn  reasons  that  this  activity  represents  an
expansion of  what  she calls  inter-subjective spacetime:
the scale of the world within which people can live and
gain  Fame.  Positive  transformations  expand  this
spacetime  and  negative  transformations  shrink  it.  The
first chapters of The Fame of Gawa are mainly concerned
with the establishment  of  positive  transformations,  the
complex  systems  of  exchanges  based  on  principles  of
reciprocity  and mutual  obligation  and  expectation  that
grow spacetime: first  exchanges within Gawa and then
through Kula with other islands. The final chapters are
more concerned with witchcraft, an aspect of these same
activities  that  can  destroy  and  shrink  our  social
relationships  and  the  field  within  which  we  can  gain
Fame. So culture itself can grow or shrink.
If Facebook may be regarded as a kind of social ‘big
bang’ leading to an expanding social universe, then an
analogy seems warranted with Munn’s argument about
culture. For this analogy to be useful, we would have to
see  in  Facebook  something  equivalent  to  both  the
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positive expansion and negative shrinking of spacetime.
To  start  with  expansion,  in  Gawa  a  contrast  is  drawn
between  just  eating  the  food  you  grow  yourself  and
sending it out into ever expanding networks of exchange.
Similarly,  in  Trinidad,  a  person  might  use  some
experience  or  reflection  in  dyadic  exchanges  with
someone  close  to  them,  reporting  it  in  a  personal
conversation  with  another  person.  I  tell  you  about
something that happened to me and that’s as far as it
goes. But, with Facebook, they can harvest those same
observations  from the garden of  their  experiences and
post them onto a site, where not just one other person
will be able to consume them, but hundreds. Even if no
direct messages are sent to and from individuals,  they
are made aware of aspects of others lives through textual
and visual posts. As spacetime, it allows this information
to carry across continents and diasporas, allowing news
and  information  to  travel  vast  distances  with
extraordinary  effect.  There  is  an  unprecedented
simultaneity,  but also a digital inscription that lasts. As
such,  Facebook  is  a  positive  transformation  and
expansion of spacetime through social media.
Trinis are,  in general,  just  as keen as the people of
Gawa  that  their  individual  reputations  should  lead  to
enhanced respect for the island of Trinidad itself. Thanks
to Facebook,  the achievements  of  Trinidadians abroad,
the degrees  they pass,  the children they have,  are re-
internalised within the local networks of Trinidad, ready
for  discussion  and  assessment.  By  the  same  token,
Facebook internationalises events in Trinidad, initially to
the Diaspora and then, if they are of sufficient interest, to
others. Similarly, there is a consensual desire to export
interest in particular aspects of Trinidadian culture, such
as Steelband or Carnival. In the book, I also show how
Facebook  rests  on  reciprocal  exchanges  analogous  to
Munn’s  reliance  on  Mauss  and  indeed  Mauss’s  on
Malinowski.  Munn,  as  noted  above,  also  uses  Sartre’s
concept  of  wider  witnessing ‘In  Gawan images of  kula
fame,  the  virtual  third  party  is  the  distant  other  who
hears  about,  rather  than  directly  observes  the
transaction……As iconic and reflexive code, fame is the
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virtual form of influence. Without fame a man’s influence
would, as it were, go nowhere: successful acts would in
effect  remain  locked  within  themselves  in  given  times
and places of their occurrence or be limited to immediate
transactors’ (1986: 116-117). My last proposition rests on
the idea that Facebook represents  a realisation of  this
ideal as a virtual component in the construction of Fame.
Again  in  my  book  I  demonstrate  the  application  of
Munn’s  theory  of  the  ‘qualisign’  to  the  analysis  of
Facebook.
The last chapters of The Fame of Gawa are devoted to
negative transformations of spacetime. This implies that
any  cultural  form  that  creates  expansion  has  to  have
within itself the opposite quality which would destroy and
shrink spacetime. I argue that the Trinidadian concept of
Bacchanal  corresponds  to  the  Gawan  concept  of
witchcraft  because  it  derives  from  gossip  and  the
exchange  of  news,  which  is  part  and  parcel  of  what
makes Facebook work. But it is equally the aspect that
destroys  its  ability  to  expand spacetime positively.  The
very first portrait I introduce is one where viewing turns
into stalking, stalking into jealousy and jealousy destroys
a marriage.
There were many other stories circulating in Trinidad
about  inadvertent  or sometimes deliberate exposure  of
sexual  material,  ranging  from  school  girls  to  people’s
own  relatives.  Such  as  when  a  photographer  has
recorded something and tagged the photograph or, as is
common with teenagers, the mere hint that one person’s
boyfriend  was  observed  with  another  girl.  These  can
cause an explosion of  recrimination publically aired on
Facebook itself. When such bacchanal occurs it often has
the effect of either demolishing specific relationships or
of  making  people  in  general  frightened  of  the
consequences of beinf exposed through participation in
their  online  community.  Bacchanal  thereby  directly
contributes to the negative transformations of spacetime
made possible by Facebook as. It shrinks social worlds.
The other significant impact of bacchanal is that, like
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witchcraft in  The Fame of Gawa, it also operates as an
important sanction which secures normative and moral
use of Facebook. In Gawa, witchcraft provides a sanction
against those who would rather not bother to take part in
these complex exchanges. We could call them the ‘couch
yams’ of Gawa who just can’t be bothered to help build a
canoe  or  participate  in  a  ritual,  but  come  to  fear
witchcraft.  In  Trinidad,  defining  culture  itself  as
bacchanal  creates  a  fierce  and continual  debate  about
netiquette:  how  to  determine  what  is  proper  and
improper  behaviour  in  the  use  of  Facebook.
Conversations about the immaturity of teenagers who fail
to see the consequences of their desire to look more sexy
than  the  girl  next  door  or  about  how  much  they  will
regret losing their temper when they vent their spleen
against a parent or best friend on Facebook are typical.
Equally,  many negative comments appear about people
who photograph private quarrels or tag too many photos
or  otherwise  behave  inappropriately.  This  negative
potential, the bacchanal inherent in Facebook that could
destroy community, is one of the main factors that help
people  build  consensus  as  to  how they  should  behave
there. At least if they want to stave off destructive acts of
witchcraft.
The extended analogy can be found in the book, where
it is used to demonstrate my claim that, if Munn’s book
were a theorem about culture, then Facebook would be
its  proof.  The  true  significance  of  her  arguments  only
really becomes evident when they are applied, not only to
Gawa, but to an entirely different context. Her theory can
work not just for a few hundred people on an island in
Melanesia but helps us to comprehend the vast network
that  is  Facebook.  By  the  same  token,  this  act  of
theorisation makes another point  that  is  central  to  my
decision  to  study  Facebook  from  an  anthropological
perspective.  It  follows  from  this  essay  that,  if  Kula
exemplifies  what  anthropologists  mean  by  the  word
culture, then so does Facebook.
I would prefer to offer the evidence of the book rather
than  these  short  examples,  in  order  to  make  such
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extreme  points  more  plausible;  but  the  world  of
publishers seems inexorably slow and the book will not
be  out  until  April.  Meanwhile,  I  hope  there  is  enough
here at least to show why I think anthropology has the
potential  to  appreciate aspects of  Facebook that might
not emerge from discussion by other disciplines. That we
have have a responsibility  to  at  least  push things  well
beyond  the  incredibly  superficial  idea  promulgated  by
films such as  The Social Network that Facebook is best
understood by an investigation of its invention by Mark
Zukerberg.  I  confess  that  I  have  pushed  things  to
extremes, partly because I get intellectual pleasure from
doing so. I am sure that some of you out there will see
this self-indulgence as detrimental to the larger goals of
our discipline, so by all means attack.
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Chapter 13
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
Liria de la Cruz and Paloma Gay y Blasco
The reflexive turn that made anthropologists protagonists
of their texts did not alter the role of informants: they
remain  objects  rather  than  creators  of  anthropological
knowledge.  Through  their  concepts,  analytical
frameworks,  and  debates,  ethnographers  talk  to  each
other,  not  to  their  informants.  As  interlocutors,
informants belong firmly in the field, not in the academy.
It  is  as  if  informants  were  what  happened  to
ethnographers  before  they  started  writing.  And  so,
although ethnographies deal with the lives of informants,
informants  are  kept  out  of  the  conversation  of
ethnography.
Here we collaborate, acknowledging that ethnographic
knowledge  is  made  by  ethnographers  and  informants,
and  should  be  owned  by  both.  We  write  together,  an
informant  and  an  anthropologist,  a  Gitana  (Spanish
Gypsy)  and a Paya (non-Gypsy),  a  street  seller  and an
academic, two women born in the same city, in the same
year,  two  mothers,  two  friends.  We  write  about  our
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worlds  and  about  us:  this  text  is  ethnographic  and
biographical.  We  talk  about  being  women,  mothers,
wives,  lovers,  and  workers  in  a  world  shaped  by
inequalities  to  do  with  gender,  class,  ethnicity  and
wealth.  And  we  talk  about  anthropology:  not  just  as
writing, although that too, but as a powerful presence in
our lives.
By reflecting together on our lives and on how we have
influenced  each  other  through  the  years,  we  try  to
challenge  divisions  that  have  been  fundamental  to
anthropology  since  its  beginnings.  These  are  the
divisions between field and academia, between the ones
who write and the ones who are written about, those who
do  the  knowing  and  those  who  are  known.  We  also
consider  other  divisions:  between  men  and  women,
Gitanos and Payos, people for whom everyday survival in
twenty-first century Spain is easier and people for whom
it is harder. These are the divisions that have moulded
our lives and that underlie our friendship.
We  first  met  in  1992,  when  Paloma  was  doing  her
fieldwork  in  a  government-built  Gitano  ghetto  in  the
south of  Madrid where Liria  had some close relatives.
The two of us were twenty-three at the time, since we
were born in Madrid towards the end of the Francoist
dictatorship. Our lives,  however,  had developed in very
different directions. Liria, a Gitana, had grown up in the
expanding suburbs where the cheapest council housing
mixed with shanty-towns. Until leaving to start university
in  Britain  aged  eighteen,  Paloma,  a  middle-class  Paya,
had lived in a large apartment in an affluent district of
the city. When we met, Liria was a young mother of two
sharing a council flat with her husband and children near
the ghetto, in an inner-city estate where Gitano families
mixed with low-income working-class Payos. Paloma was
working  towards  her  anthropology  PhD for  Cambridge
University in the UK, and was looking for a Gitano family
with  whom  to  stay.  Liria  and  her  husband,  Ramón,
offered their home. Quickly, we two became close friends.
Nineteen years later, Liria no longer lives with Ramón
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and their children. In 2008, she met a young Moroccan
immigrant, Younes, fell in love, and had to lose her whole
family  in  order  to  start  a  new  life  with  him.  She  is
shunned  by  other  Gitanos  and  lives  instead  amongst
North African and Latin American immigrants. Paloma is
now an academic, a wife, and a mother of two working in
Scotland. On the cusp of middle-age, we are still  close
friends.  Until  recently,  we  have  remained  fixed  in  our
roles  as  informant  and  anthropologist.  Now  we  have
decided to challenge these roles: we have things to say,
and we believe we can say them best together.  In this
project,  Liria  is  not  the  provider  of  raw  material,  of
‘ethnographic  data’  for  Paloma  to  analyse  and  argue
about.  We  each  talk,  about  ourselves  and  about  each
other,  from  our  own  particular  standpoints,  with  our
histories,  our  own  interests,  fears  and  desires  as  a
foundationincluding  a  deep  involvement  with
anthropology. In these pages both of us speak, sometimes
apart,  sometimes  together,  sometimes  with each other.
The strength of what follows lies not only in the story we
tell  but  also in  the way we tell  it.  We mix voices and
styles because we want to foreground our complicity and
also  the  tensions,  negotiations,  agreements  and
disagreements  involved  in  doing  and  writing
anthropology.
How we work together
In order to write this article, we started by discussing
what we wanted to write, and how we would do it. Since
we  were  apart  for  the  majority  of  the  time,  Liria  in
Madrid  and  Paloma  in  St  Andrews,  we  talked  on  the
phone and emailed each other with the kind assistance of
Younes Bziz,  Liria’s partner.  Liria wrote in Spanish,  by
hand, the sections where she speaks in the first person,
and  Paloma  typed  them,  added  punctuation  and
translated them into English. On her laptop Paloma wrote
in  English  the  sections  where  she  speaks  in  the  first
person and translated them into Spanish for Liria to read
and suggest changes. Paloma also wrote in English first
drafts of the sections were we speak together, using the
plural ‘we’. She translated these drafts into Spanish, and
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Liria  made  changes  and  additions,  sometimes  very
substantial,  which  were  then  incorporated  into  the
English text. We had Paloma’s fieldnotes, and her letters
from  the  field  to  her  PhD  supervisor  in  Cambridge,
Stephen Hugh-Jones,  but  only  Liria’s  letters  to  Paloma
since  Liria  had  left  Paloma’s  letters  behind  when  she
eloped. We also had many hours of taped conversations
in which we talked about our lives, past and present, and
our  friendship.  Because  Liria  is  unfamiliar  with
anthropological  literature,  we  have  not  quoted  other
authors. We have only made a short explicit reference to
anthropological debates in the introduction, and Paloma
is  responsible  for  this  interpretation.  We  hope  that
readers will be able to make their own connections with
other anthropological texts.
In order to make our joint and separate voices clear to
readers, we use three different fonts. We use Garamond
when we speak together, Cambria for Liria’s sections, and
Calibri for Paloma’s.
Beginnings
I would like it if, with what I am going to write, people
could understand how wonderful and important it was to
meet my friend Paloma. No matter how much I write, it
will  never  be  enough  to  express  so much  gratitude
towards just one friend. Because everything started with
just a fieldtrip. We never thought this would reach so far
into both our lives. We had barely started to live, we were
both twenty, she was single and I was married with two
children,  Nena  and  Angel.  We  have  had  so  much  in
common although we grew up in very different settings
because  I  was  Gitana  and  she  Paya,  and  because  we
belonged  to  different  ethnicities  (etnias).  That  never
pulled us apart, the very opposite. I even believe this was
the interesting thing about our friendship, the desire to
get to know new worlds and different people from what
we were used to living with.
For  this  reason  I  remember  very  well  the  day  I  met
Paloma. My elder sister Carmen had already talked to me
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about her. She had told me that she had met a Paya girl
who came to the Villaverde church and who was doing a
study  about  the  Evengelical  Gitanos  and  about  all  our
surroundings and anything related to the Gitanos of the
neighbourhood.  Back  then  Paloma  lived  in  Tío  Basilio’s
house, the most respected Gitano in the area of Madrid
and  some  provinces.  He  was  also  my  father’s  uncle,
although we have been brought up very differently in our
two families, in particular we in my father’s house. And so
when my sister told me that a young Paya girl was staying
at Tío Basilio’s, I was surprised, not because they are bad
people but because, as Gitanos, they still lived by rather
old  customs.  When  my  sister  introduced  her  to  me,  I
thought she appeared ignorant and shy, but I recognise
now that we were the ignorant ones, and she was also
very brave to be in a neighbourhood full of Gitanos, most
of them poor and with little schooling. For this reason I
recognise that she was doing a very difficult job because
she had started with the hardest part, and she still had a
long way to go.
My first impression was that she was intelligent and a
little serious. After introducing us my sister had told me
that  Paloma  needed  to  live  with  a  family  in  the
neighbourhood but nobody was offering their house and
all her studies hung on her living with a family. I hardly
knew Paloma, only from seeing her in church, I had never
talked to her,  but  my sister  had said  very good things
about her and she told me that they couldn’t have her in
their  house  because  her  husband  was  an  Evangelical
pastor. They could be given a church to lead at any time,
and  they  would  have  to  go  outside  Madrid,  so  they
wouldn’t be able to pay the necessary attention to Paloma
to  help  her  do  her  work.  But  I  also  know  they  were
influenced by gossip because they were a young couple,
and people’s tongues and their enviousness are very bad.
I too was advised not to take a Paya girl into my house
because she would bring problems to my marriage. But
my marriage could not go to waste more than it already
had, even though back then he was not so bad with me.
So I felt very sorry for this girl who had so much interest
in our lives and our way of life, that we would not give her
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the chance to realise her project and her future. It  was
then  that  my  parents  supported  my  decision  to  have
Paloma in my house. They have always been very liberal,
in particular my mother, who had friends of all ethnicities
(etnias),  not  minding  about  race,  or  colour,  or
circumstance. She put that in our hearts, and without a
doubt this helped me a lot  in  my decision to open my
house to Paloma and to show myself the way I was. And
also I acknowledge that I too was interested in knowing
more about her world, because the first friends I had as a
girl were Payas who went to school with me and I liked
very much their way of being, so simple. For Payos live
more independently in their lives, without thinking about
others’ opinions or gossip. And it has always bothered me,
having to do things so that people will let you be and not
be criticised for no matter what. For this reason I wanted
to  have  a  Payo  friendship  in  my  life,  because  since  I
married all my friends were Gitanas. I had a good group of
friends, and got along with everybody, but I also wanted
to make new friends, different from what I was used to.
And so,  listening to my heart  and my instinct,  I  said
yes, she could come to my house to live with us and finish
her  research.  Although in some ways  I  also  researched
her, because I was fascinated by her world and her way of
life,  even  though  I  did  not  know what  Paloma’s  family
thought about us, the Gitanos. I admit that I have never
been  bothered  by  what  her  family  or  my  family  think,
although I have to say that my parents behaved rather
well with Paloma, and they were never negative about her
work and our friendship. The truth is that Paloma earned
their trust through her behaviour. She adapted very well
to the Gitano world, and she knew how to get in, through
the elders and then through the church, and coming to
live with me was the icing on the cake.
It was an experience for both of us. In our free time we
used  to  go  to  the  university  behind  Ramón’s  back,
because Gitanos, and in particular the men think that a
woman goes  to  places  like  that  because  she  wants  to
meet boys and do bad things. They do not think that two
people can just be friends, without going any further. And
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in that they were wrong, because I met friends of Paloma,
and nothing bad ever happened.
Paloma’s fieldnotes, March 1993
Liria and I talked today about what it has meant for her
to have me in her house, and about what other people
have been asking and telling her. She told me that people
have  been  amazed  that  she  has  a  young  Paya  in  her
house, in particular because her husband is very young.
Young men are  easily  tempted,  she  said,  and  any tiny
event  would  make  people  gossip:  ‘you  know  what
people’s tongues are like…’ For example, she said that if it
was hot and Ramón took his shirt off, and I happened to
be in the same room then, people would say ‘Ramón is
having it off with the Paya’, and specially ‘how stupid Liria
is, they are doing it in her own house’. Even people who
have known me well  for  a  full  year  were,  according  to
Liria, shocked to learn that I was living in her house. The
two pastor’s wives, Carmen and Emilia,  who are always
friendly and open with me, refused to take me in on the
grounds  that  ‘people  would  talk,  and  it  would  damage
very much out testimony, our standing’. Today I began to
understand the implications that having me in her house
has for Liria,  since even those who seem to accept me
best  and  talk  freely  with  me  would  not  have  me.
According to Liria, even these people ask her if I pay her
money, and if I help her in the house, and she said she
feels compelled to say that I do, because it is a kind of
justification. I said to Liria that, in my opinion, for them it
is  a  question of  finding out who is  fooling who,  who is
being tricked, and who is doing the tricking, a very Gitano
thing:  Gitanos  won’t  accept  that  ours  could  be  a
relationship  on  equal  terms.  So  when her  grandmother
‘innocently’ asked me where I was staying (she already
knew) Liria told her, ‘poor wee Palomi, she is very good,
poor thing, she helps me a lot in the house and with the
children.’ Although I see that Liria could have done little
else, I was rather offended at this, being made to look like
a dimwit. But I didn’t say anything.
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Informant and anthropologist
Our friendship started with her kindness, taking me into
her house although she barely knew me and even though
I  was bad news.  I  was a Paya,  young,  unattached,  not
really  managing  to  gain  acceptance  in  a  strongly
marginalised community where the dominant Payos were
distrusted  and  despised,  and  where  Payas  were
considered uniformly immoral and sexually promiscuous.
It was only because Liria looked beyond the stereotypes
and the conventions that dominated interactions between
Payos  and Gitanos,  because  she questioned what  most
around her took for granted, that we became friends. Her
generosity,  her  compassion,  and her  curiosity  were  the
foundation of our friendship. From the first time we met
and throughout twenty years, she has loved, helped and
supported me.
We were fascinated by each other, perhaps because we
were  both  dissatisfied  with  our  lives  and  because  we
embodied  for  the  other  the  deep  unfulfilled  desire  to
belong somewhere else. I had had an average childhood
in an upper-middle class, conservative family. I had learnt
languages and travelled abroad relatively often, but had
also  been  immersed  in  a  world  of  rigid  conventions
regarding  such  things  as  class,  upbringing,  occupation,
dress and accent. I looked to anthropology as an escape
into  imagined,  alternative  worlds,  but  all  I  did  was
exchange the inward-looking, suffocating atmosphere of
the  Madrid  middle-class  for  the  inward-looking,
suffocating atmosphere of a Cambridge college, and I felt
at ease in neither. Among the Gitanos of Villaverde I was
even more out of place: by the time I met Liria I had been
doing  fieldwork  for  nine  months  and  was  increasingly
frustrated and convinced that I would never ‘get in’.
To start with, Liria seemed to me certain of her place
and of her path in life. She was a well-respected young
matron, a good street seller and money-maker, strict in
her  adherence  to  the  highly  elaborated  Gitano code  of
conduct  for  women,  always  dressing  modestly  in  long
skirts, not smoking, drinking, or interacting with unrelated
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men. Her parents were well off by comparison with other
Gitano families nearby, and they were very well liked, her
father’s  patrilineage  was  large  and  powerful  and
controlled much of Gitano life in the ghetto. At fifteen, her
mother had arranged her betrothal  to an older relative,
Ramón, and she had married well, at a wedding ceremony
where her virginity was tested and displayed, rather than
much less  prestigiously  by  elopement  like  some of  her
cousins and friends. She fitted in, and yet I  soon learnt
that she was discontented, with her marriage to a man
she did  not  love and who could not  love her,  with the
routine of wifely everyday life,  and with the restrictions
that being a ‘decent Gitana’ imposed on her. Above all,
she was desperately curious to know what  things were
like among the Payos, the Others who surrounded her but
were  beyond  her  reach.  She  had  a  deep  intuitive
understanding  of  what  anthropology  was  about  and
embraced the informant role with enthusiasm.
Liria wanted to learn, about the Payos and so about me
and what she called ‘your world’. Together we took what
seemed  like  huge  risks,  lying  to  Ramón  and  going  for
secret outings into Madrid so that she could see what my
life was like. We dressed Payo-style, discarding our long
skirts  and putting on trousers,  which the Gitanas never
wore,  and  we  visited  museums,  parks,  middle-class
restaurants, and the home where I grew up. Since she had
opened up her house and her life to me, and she was so
curious about mine, I  felt  I  had to reciprocate and took
Liria  to  my  mother’s  flat,  where  she  met  not  only  my
family but the housekeepers who worked for us, and to
the  university  where  we  had  lunch  with  my  childhood
friends, well-off boys and girls who studied business, law
or economics. Just like fieldwork amongst the Gitanos for
me,  these  trips  into  middle-class  Madrid  were  a  great
adventure  for  Liria.  Having  spent  all  her  life  on  the
periphery  of  the  city,  she  literally  discovered  a  new
Madrid.  And,  at  the  university,  she  talked  freely  with
unrelated men of her own age for the first time in her life.
Our  outings  were  interludesfrom  the  strain  of
fieldwork for me, from the monotony of everyday life for
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herand they made us accomplices.  Aged 22,  we were
excited,  by  life  itself  and  by  our  friendship.  We  talked
endlessly, while selling in the streets, cooking, taking care
of the children, and at night while Ramón watched TV. We
talked  about  men and about  sex,  about  our  pasts  and
futures,  about  being  Gitana  and  Paya,  and  about
anthropology.  We  argued  about  whether,  as  a  Paya,  I
really had more freedom than her, and of what kinds. I
read  to  Liria  from  San  Román’s  classic  Gitano
ethnography,  and we discussed together the rights and
wrongs  of  the  anthropologist’s  account  of  Gitano
patrilineages. I also read to her from my fieldnotes, and
we laughed about things we had said only days or weeks
before. Liria’s friendship was a wonderful gift.
Looking back, I see that we were not preoccupied by
the material inequalities between us, which now seem so
blatantly important and which worry me so much. I was
very aware of the large-scale hierarchies and inequalities
that  framed  Gitano  marginality,  and  of  our  relative
positions  within  these,  but  in  our  everyday  life  in  the
ghetto I was out, wanting in. Yes, my parents were better
off and I had reaped the benefits, having a comfortable
life  and  going  to  study  abroad.  But  Liria  came from a
Gitano  family  which  was  highly  respected  in  Villaverde
and  she  was  secure  in  her  role  within  the  Gitano
community,  where  the  hierarchies  and inequalities  that
mattered  were  among  Gitanos,  and  where  Payos  were
despised outsiders. In Villaverde Liria belonged and had
status where I had none. Similarly, it did not occur to me
that opening my life to Liria might be unethical. Later on,
talking about our friendship to anthropological audiences
in the UK, I have been criticised for not considering the
impact that allowing Liria to meet my family might have
on  her,  for  not  envisaging  that  it  might  make  her
dissatisfied with her lot  as  a poor Gitano woman. Back
then, both of us knew that that I could not ask to be let
into Liria’s life whilst keeping mine out of her reach.
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Friends
Paloma  and  I,  after  spending  so  many  moments
together  from  when  she  came  to  my  house  to  do
fieldwork until now, we have lived so many experiences
together that I would not have notebooks enough to tell
all the good things and the bad ones. Today I can say with
all my heart that between myself and Paloma there is a
relationship as if we were sisters, because friends are not
just for when things go well, but for when things go badly.
And throughout many years I think that both of us have
realised that our relationship as friends has been very firm
and sincere.  Even when we were separated  by a large
distance  because  she  had  to  work  in  England,  nothing
prevented  us  from staying  in  contact,  by  letters  or  by
phone, and whenever she came to see her mother in the
holidays she kept some days exclusively to share with me.
Nothing  has  stopped  our  union  as  great  friends.  Even
though  one  was  Gitana  and  the  other  Paya,  and  even
though we had such different customs, we knew very well
how to share our ideas and our tastes. My whole world
revolved around the Gitano environment (entorno),  and
when Paloma was living with me just seeing her was an
eye-opener.  I  saw  that  a  woman  is  not  just  good  for
marrying and having children and cleaning, even though
within the Gitano world I used to go out with my sisters, to
the beach in the summer, and in winter to the malls and
shopping. But with Paloma I did other things, like visiting
museums,  or  going  to  the  university,  and  many  more
things that I loved. And above all she made me see my
qualities as a woman. She always used to tell me that I
was intelligent and a very good person, but in my family I
was always treated as a something of a moron, and I used
to be taken for a ride. One of the people who helped me
see  my  good  qualities  and  my  worth  was  Paloma.  In
particular with Ramón, he knew how to have me all mixed
up, psychologically, with the idea that I wasn’t sufficiently
clever, or pretty, and he told me so often that I came to
believe it. Until one day a great friend turned up to tell me
that this was not true, and through the years I have had
other  Paya  friends,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  working  with
them when I was president of the parents’ association in
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my daughter’s school and they also encouraged me.
From the first time I met Paloma I opened my heart to
her, as sincerely as possible, because as time went by I
realised that I could tell her any secret since I knew she
would  keep  it,  and  she  knew  she  could  also  tell  me
anything, because with me it would be safe. The truth is
that in this life you never know when you are going to
need your friends. I think that in life, if you do good, the
future  can  return  it  to  you,  although  I  never  helped
Paloma  out  of  any  kind  of  interest,  and  she  knew  it.
Because when I helped Paloma I never thought that later
on she would return the help to me with increase. When I
decided to leave my Gitano environment (entorno) to find
my  happiness  in  a  completely  different  world  with  a
Moroccan partner (he was prepared to fight for our love
against the Gitano people, Younes Bziz is his name), that
is when I received all the support and the unconditional
love, something never seen before, from my great friend
Paloma. This is why we decided to write together. We both
know  we  have  many  experiences  to  tell,  together  and
apart,  but our lives are  always intertwined,  the lives of
two people, a Paya anthropologist with a great heart, and
a sincere Gitana.
The middle years
Between 1993 and 2008 we wrote to each other, back
and forth. We also talked on the telephone often and met
whenever Paloma was in Madrid, at least once a year. As
time went by, we continued to share our preoccupations –
with pregnancies, children, schools, husbands, work, and
our  families.  Liria  and  Ramón continued  to  earn  their
living by selling textiles at open air markets. They were
resettled by the local government to a different flat, even
closer to the ghetto where Paloma had carried out her
fieldwork.  Earning  a  livelihood  became  increasingly
difficult as they became indebted and lost first one and
then another permit to sell at weekly markets. Villaverde
changed around them as  immigration  into  Spain  grew
and more and more North Africans and Latin Americans
came to the southern periphery of the city. Meanwhile,
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Paloma  and  her  husband  obtained  tenured  academic
positions, moved to Scotland and bought a house. They
settled into a typically British middle-class life.
All along Paloma wrote about Liria and her relatives
and neighbours, a book and articles: we were friends, but
we were also anthropologist and informant. Liria helped
Paloma with her anthropology because she was a friend.
She  had  a  sense  of  what  Paloma’s  anthropological
interests were but did not fully know what Paloma did
with  what  she  learnt,  how  she  communicated  her
knowledge  and  to  whom,  and  who  benefitted  or  how.
Paloma felt that she could only explain to Liria in very
basic terms what her work was about, or how academic
anthropology  is  produced.  The  jargon  and  theories
through  which  Liria’s  life  could  be  made
anthropologically  meaningful  seemed to  Paloma almost
impossible to convey to her. The fact that Paloma wrote
in  English  meant  that  Liria  could  not  even  read  what
Paloma produced.
Throughout  these  years  our  friendship  continued
whilst  our  personal  lives  changed.  Liria’s  marriage
deteriorated and she left Ramón several times. She took
her  children  to  her  father’s  house,  but  was  always
persuaded by her family to return. But as her difficulties
inside the home increased, Liria found satisfying rewards
outside it. In 2008 she became president of the parents’
association at her daughter’s school. She found herself at
the  helm  at  a  time  of  serious  crisis,  when  the  local
government  decided  to  transfer  the  children  (mostly
Gitano) to a smaller building of poorer quality, to make
way for  the  children  of  a  neighbouring  school  (mostly
Payo). Liria became a key player in the campaign against
the plans, making several appearances on national radio
and  television.  Although  the  fight  was  lost,  Liria
discovered  in  herself  new  capacities  and  needs,  the
desire to become something else than a Gitana wife and
mother.  In  the  meantime  Paloma  too  found  herself
moving in new directions. She become a mother by birth
and  adoption  in  her  thirties,  engaged  in  political
activism,  and let  her career take second or even third
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place in her life. For both of us our horizons opened up
throughout the 2000s:  for  Paloma to the world beyond
anthropology and academia, for Liria beyond her family
and the Gitano Evangelical Church. And then Liria met
Younes,  by  chance,  and  our  lives  were  brought  closer
than ever before.
Lives transformed
One morning like so many the unexpected happened.
There  was  a  young  man  working  with  some friends  of
mine at a stall nearby, we were separated only by some
fruit sellers. I don’t know how one morning I came to the
stall  of  my friends to say hello,  and to see the clothes
they  were  selling,  because  often  they  had  very  pretty
things and I liked to buy from them. The truth is that I had
already seen that boy before, but shame and fear to fall in
love, especially because he was younger than me, those
things  did  not  allow  me to  pay  attention  to  him or  to
anybody else. But I don’t know how something made me
look at him that morning, and his eyes were fixed deep
into mine. I felt that he talked with me through his eyes. I
had never felt like that before.
One morning like so many the unexpected happened.
Liria’s  sisters  phoned  me  from  Madrid.  She  had
disappeared  the  day  before,  and  they  were  desperate.
They had found a small piece of paper with a man’s name
and a telephone number in one of Liria’s handbags, and
they suspected that  she had eloped with him. I  was to
ring them immediately if she got in touch. I tried and tried
Liria’s phone, and texted her, ‘Where are you? Everybody
is worried. Is everything ok? Please get in touch, I’m dying
of anguish here.’ That evening she rang. She had left with
Younes, her sisters had realised she was having an affair
and she felt she had no option but to elope, straight away.
She  had tried living with  Ramón  for  twenty  years,  and
Younes loved her. She hadn’t been able to take her young
daughter along: according to Gitano customary law, which
is often violently enforced, in cases of adultery children
must remain with the blameless spouse. And so her family
were  looking  for  her,  to  bring  her  back  and  perhaps
356
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
punish Liria, and Younes too. She was terrified. I was to
pretend she had not been in touch, keep her secret, help
her be safe.
I had no alternative but to return, because my sisters
and their husbands found me, and my family threatened
to kill Younes, and so I had no other option. Today I realise
I allowed myself to be intimidated, and that my fear did
not let me think straight. Now I see they could easily have
harmed him before coming up to fetch me from the flat
where  I  was  hiding,  because  they  were  with  him
downstairs quite a while, but they did not.  The thing is
they convinced me, with threats and with kindness, they
did all  they could because they were desperate at that
time. For me it was very painful, in two ways. First there
was Younes, and being forced to leave him. I didn’t know
how to explain to him that my family feared that he had
tricked me,  or  pressured  me somehow to  be with  him,
because I had never done anything like this before. And
then  there  were  my children,  and  when  I  returned my
heart broke to see how much they had missed me. ‘How
am I going to recover my family, and my children?’, that is
what I was thinking back then. But it was too late, nobody
trusted me, they kept me under watch all the time. They
tried to make me see I  was deluded, that it was all  an
illusion because I had never had happiness with Ramón.
And so they thought I was very confused, and a little bit
mad.
She had no alternative but to return and, when three
weeks  later  I  went  to  Madrid,  all  her  family  wanted  to
make sure I understood why she had done wrong. ‘This is
how we Gitanos do things, you know us, you understand
us, you know how terrible this is for us, we are not like
you Payos, this is beyond the pale, there is nothing worse
than this.’ I had to talk to her, they said, convince her not
to elope again, help to keep her in the house, under their
control.  Ramón,  Carmen  and  Liria’s  other  sisters,  her
children,  her  daughter-in-law…  they  were  the  voice  of
Gitano reason. They knew how close Liria and I were, and
were  desperate  for  me  to  take  sides.  These  were  ‘the
Gitanos’ of whom I had written for so many years, and
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what they said fitted all I had learnt about them: women’s
virtue and subservience to men were central to how they
saw their place in the world. And yet she asked for my
help, and she was Liria, my friend, a woman whose fears
and desires I knew, who had shared with me her wishes
and disappointments, who loved me and whom I loved. So
I  did  not  say  ‘leave’  or  ‘stay’,  but  I  helped  her  meet
Younes clandestinely, taking our young children along as
cover,  knowing  that  the  family  would  never  think  we
would  try  something  like  that.  When  she  decided  she
would leave for good, I helped again, sorting out plans,
listening to Liria’s fears, anxieties, and hopes, and gving
some of  the money they needed to  try  to  start  again.
After she and Younes went into hiding, I became the point
of  contact  between  Liria  and  her  family,  relaying  her
children’s  heart-wrenching  pleas,  receiving  and
forwarding Ramón’s desperate letters.
My heart is broken in two. Every day that passes I feel
worse, for my daughter. Whenever I see girls of her age in
the street I die inside, it is true. Something is killing me
inside. I try not to tell Younes and I go into the bathroom
to  cry.  I  tell  myself,  ‘Be  happy’.  How  can  I  be  happy
knowing that my daughter needs me? Then I say, ‘What if
I return, and I die of longing for Younes?’I can’t think of
anything else, I only think about her.
Her heart  is broken in two. Liria spent six months of
living with Younes, in flats shared with African and Latin
American immigrants, working as a domestic, hiding her
Gitano identity from her middle-class employers, people
very similar  to  my own family.  We talked almost  every
day, and I visited her in Madrid every few weeks. I could
see  how  much  she  and  Younes  loved  each  other,  how
much fun and freedom she had in her new life, but also
how deeply cutting her pain was. I saw her cry with my
daughter in her arms. I raged at Ramón and her sisters,
who were unwavering: so long as she stayed away, she
would not see her child. And if  she took the child, they
told me, they would kill both her and Younes. I understood
well  the  cultural  logic  that  underlay  their  actions,  and
knew I  could  not  expect  them to behave in a different
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way, yet I did. I began to ask myself about the force of
compassion and of hatred too:  could Ramón and Liria’s
sisters  not  take  pity  on  her,  just  because  they  were
Gitanos? Were they so firm because they were Gitanos, or
because  they  hurt?  Liria  asked  for  my  help  and  from
Scotland  I  rang  women’s  NGOs  in  Madrid,  government
agencies, social workers, solicitors, but nobody seemed to
be able or willing to give any help. They were all puzzled
by  the  complexities  of  the  Gitano  world,  unable  to
understand why Liria would not simply apply for a divorce,
request access to her child through the usual legal routes,
why she was frightened, why there were threats. We could
not see a way forward and so she went back once again.
When for the second time I had to return it was much
worse. I thought that after so many conversations with my
sisters and my children’s father, the situation was going
to  be  better.  But  it  was  much  worse.  I  could  feel  a
tremendous hatred from Ramón. Earlier on, even when I
was an honest and stupid woman our marriage did not go
well, so imagine the situation after living six months away
from home, with another man, and Ramón swallowing his
pride of Gitano man, fooled by a woman who was inferior
to him. So the last night I spent with my daughter I made
her a promise, and I told her, ‘Darling, whatever happens I
want you to know I love you very much’, and told her that
if  one  day  we  had  to  be  apart  from  each  other  for
whatever reason, I would fight for her, until we could be
together again. She looked into my eyes and said, ‘Mama,
you are going to leave again’. And with pain in my soul,
and so  as  not  to  worry  her,  I  said  no,  but  that  if  that
happened I would go back to get her. And I looked at her
straight and said, ‘You believe me, don’t you?’ So the first
thing I did when I returned with Younes was find a solicitor
to get custody of my child, and my divorce from Ramón. I
got on with it, ready to face the world for the sake of my
daughter.
When for  the  second  time she  had  to  return  it  was
much worse. Ramón knew I had helped Liria with money
and emotional support during her time away: although he
allowed us to talk on his mobile phone, he was always
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nearby, listening closely to our conversations. Younes was
heartbroken, thinking that she had left him for good, and
would not sleep or eat.  We talked often, but there was
little  I  could  do  for  him.  Liria  had  managed  to  hide  a
mobile  phone,  and  she would go into  the bathroom at
three of four in the morning, to ring Younes and me. In
whispers, she told me about her life: she had no freedom,
Ramón was in touch with a solicitor to get sole custody of
her  child,  he  wanted  to  have  sex  in  spite  of  her
reluctance, and she missed Younes desperately. When her
sisters brought a Gitano Pentecostal priest to exorcise her,
she thought it was the last straw, and decided to leave
knowing that this time there would be no turning back.
Sharing our lives
When Liria left her home for the very first time, but
also later,  she and Younes were in dire need of money.
Since they had to hide from Liria’s family, they also lost
their livelihoods. Liria could no longer sell with Ramón
and  Younes  could  no  longer  work  for  Gitano  street-
market  sellers  loading  and  unloading  stock.  As  the
economic  crisis  deepened  and  Spain’s  unemployment
reached  20%,  finding  work  became almost  impossible.
Without  papers  the  only  jobs  Younes  could  find  were
sporadic and very badly paid. They could not afford to
lose  Liria’s  small  disability  pension,  so  she  worked
without  contracts  for  two  or  three  euros  per  hour,
cooking in  bars,  as an office cleaner or as a domestic
servant.
Knowing  it  would  be  difficult  to  provide  substantial
economic help on a long-term basis, Paloma applied first
to her Department and then for a small grant to pay Liria
for writing down her life. What began as a way to find
money became a project that came to fascinate us both.
We  started  to  tape  long  conversations,  about  Liria’s
elopement,  our  earlier  lives,  and  our  families  and
friendship. Liria wrote, and Paloma wrote too. Liria went
to Scotland, visiting Paloma abroad for the first time ever.
She talked to Paloma’s colleagues and students, and we
gave a talk about our relationship. As Liria’s and Younes’
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life  unfolded,  and  as  Paloma  shared  in  it,  we  thought
together about what it meant. Since Paloma was not just
an observer,  but a player in the story,  it  became clear
that what we wrote had to include her too.
In March 2011, two years after she first eloped, Liria
went to court to claim visiting rights to her child. She
was the first Gitano woman to turn to the Payo courts to
challenge  Gitano  traditional  law  and  custom.  Paloma
went  with  her,  and  we  came face  to  face  with  Liria’s
sisters, their husbands, and Ramón. In spite of repeated
requests,  we  had  not  managed  to  be  allocated  police
protection, and we were frightened that Ramón or Liria’s
brothers-in-law would manage to hurt one or both of us.
All  in Liria’s family thought Paloma had betrayed them
and had shown her true nature as a Paya, helping Liria in
her  transgression.  They  were  wrong  in  thinking  that
Paloma  had  encouraged  Liria  to  leave,  but  right  in
identifying the strength of our bond.
Paloma’s Spanish family too have seen our friendship,
and  are  disturbed  by  it.  One  of  Paloma’s  sisters
suggested a solicitor and a social worker who might help.
Another opened her home to Liria and Younes when they
needed a place to stay for a couple of nights. But their
middle  class,  comfortable  lives  have  very  little  in
common with Liria’s and Younes’s, and they are keen to
keep their distance. They have a highly developed sense
of class and ethnic distinctiveness, like many other well-
off,  culturally  conservative  Madrileños.  They  believe
firmly in their economic and moral superiority. Paloma’s
family see Gitanos like Liria and immigrants like Younes
as unfortunate parts of Spanish society, to be blamed for
their  ‘situation’,  victims  of  their  inability  to  join  in  or
‘integrate’.  They  perceive  Younes,  like other  Moroccan
immigrants, as one of the lowest of the low, a member of
an abject tide that threatens to engulf Spain. They call
him, pejoratively, ‘el moro’ (‘the Moor’), and have been
adamant that he must under no circumstance visit their
homes, where Paloma stays during her visitsto Madrid.
The majority of Paloma’s Spanish relatives are not unlike
Liria’s  Gitano  family  in  the  effort  they  make  to  keep
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themselves distinct, and in their conviction that they, and
only  they,  live  righteous  and beautiful  lives.  But  while
Liria’s family were the amongst the first Gitanos to open
their lives and their homes to Paloma, most of Paloma’s
family want to have as little as possible to do with Liria
or Younes. For them, Paloma’s friendship with Liria is a
sign of her unfortunate eccentricity. The fact that Paloma
spends more time with Liria than with her own sisters or
her mother, demonstrates that Paloma has failed in her
responsibilities to her family.
Writing together
I learnt what anthropology was when Paloma came to
live in my house. I had a vague idea of what anthropology
was,  but  it  was  living  together  day  by  day,  seeing
Paloma’s fieldwork, that I learnt its meaning. I think it is a
very beautiful work that opens frontiers onto new worlds.
Because  it  is  not  just  writing  about  other  people,  but
getting to know their lives, their customs, religions, and
their ways of being. I find it fascinating, writing not only
about  my life,  but  about  Paloma’s  life.  Because  I  have
always been the informant, but now we are breaking the
mould.  We  know  that  telling  our  lives,  together  and
united, is going to be something never done before. Two
women, a Paya and a Gitana, but very close from youth,
breaking  the  barriers  between  two  different  levels  and
ways of life, although that distance never pulled us apart.
Since I started writing about anthropology I have found it
wonderful to have the opportunity to express my feelings
towards other people, and to understand them. As I write
about Paloma, I also learn to see things in a different way,
especially  because  we  two  have  been  brought  up  so
differently, in our customs. I know for sure that what I am
doing right now is that I would like to do for the rest of my
life, because getting to know people, their customs, their
experiences,
their  sadness  and  their  joys,  and  especially  having
another person opening their heart to you, is wonderful.
I  want people to know what the world of a Gitana is
like, told by herself, and also how my life has changed so
362
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
that  through  circumstances  I  find  myself  in  the  Payo
world. I want to tell how I see everything, and also how
my life changed, and also how things changed for Paloma
and  those  who  surround  us,  like  Younes,  and  Paloma’s
husband and her  children… All  of  us  have  come much
closer together.  Being able to become united while you
work,  that  is  the  beauty  of  anthropology.  For  me
anthropology is about complicity and union, so that we all
of us can build a better world, a world with more love.
I have learnt what anthropology is alongside Liria, and
my understanding has changed as we have become older
and  our  lives  have  been  transformed.  For  many  years
after I first did fieldwork among the Gitanos I thought that
my  task  was  to  extract  information,  make  knowledge,
weave  patterns  with  words.  I  wrote  and I  looked away
from those parts of experience I could not make sense of
easily, from what did not fit into the moulds I had built.
And so much of Liria’s life, and of the lives of her relatives
and neighbours,  was invisible to me. Over  the last  few
years I have been drawn into Liria’s life much deeper than
ever  before,  and she into  mine.  Sharing our  happiness
and our difficulties, I have had to confront the nitty-gritty
of experience, as a person and as an anthropologist.
The  bedrock  of  anthropology  is  fieldwork,  because
fieldwork is what brings us into deep contact with people,
with  their  daily  miseries  and joys,  their  fears  and their
hopes. And it is during fieldwork that we anthropologists
open ourselves up to others. But then those others, our
informants,  are  left  behind,  they  do  not  continue  the
journey  with  us.  Imagine  the  possibilities  if  the  deep
mutual commitment that is so often seeded in fieldwork
were allowed to grow, to spread into other areas of life. I
do not know how successful our experiment has been. But
I know that, if I want to learn and write about Liria, I have
to let her learn and write about me. We share our lives,
this is why we write together.
We  meet  in  the  spaces  between  worlds:  between
Gitanos and Payos, between immigrants and middle-class
Spaniards,  between  informants  and  anthropologists.
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These worlds touch and interpenetrate, but they are also
sealed away from each other, in many senses far apart.
Anthropology is what has enabled us to come together,
yet anthropology also erects barriers between us: until
now  Paloma  has  watched,  investigated,  looked  for,
written; Liria has been in a way in the dark. Our relation
has  been  unequal,  not  because  of  Paloma’s  greater
wealth, but because Liria was a friend above all  while
Paloma was always a friend and an anthropologist.  For
anthropology to reach its potential to change the world,
barriers like these need to be not just acknowledged, but
undermined.  By  writing  together,  about  our  lives,  our
friendship, and our worlds, we hope to have contributed,
in a small way, towards this project.
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